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VOL. V. 





I. The Kingdoms of the North 7 

II. The Policy and Intellectual Life of Athens up to the 

Beginning of the Public Career of Demosthenes . 85 

III. Athens and King Philip to the Peace of Philocratbs . 225 

IV. The Last Struggles for the Independence of Greece . 341 

Index to Vol. V. 


General Index ........... 505 


From Ol. civ. 3 (b. c. 362) to Ol. ex. 4 (b. c. 337)1 




In a higher degree than the other nations The countrieg 
of ancient and of modern times, the Hellenes jj Qreece° rth 
possess an independent history. Their civili- 
zation is based on their connexion with the East; but 
that which thence accrued to them they independently 
developed, and thoroughly converted into property of 
their own. Foreign nations at various times interfered in 
the relations between the Hellenic states ; but these inter- 
ventions actually brought about the reverse of that which 
they had been intended to accomplish. The Persian 
Wars only served to raise the Hellenes to a full conscious- 
ness of their national resources ; and so far from the later 
proceedings on the part of Persia which affected Greece 
having had their origin in Persia itself, it was rather the 
Hellenic states which transferred to the Great King an 
influence such as he would never have been capable of 
acquiring by himself, and such as he was also unable to 
turn to account. For, notwithstanding the disruption of 
the Hellenic nation, it was beyond his power to recover 
the dominion over the sea, upon which the relations 
between Persia and Greece entirely hinged. Thus the 
development of the Hellenic states had hitherto been of a 
thoroughly independent character. Good and evil for- 


8 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

tune had been the results of internal causes, and the 
history of Greece had never been controlled by foreign 

An entirely different phase necessarily began, when in 
the North of the Greek mainland forces of population 
came into motion, which had hitherto slumbered ; when 
from the same mountains, whence a great part of the 
Hellenic nation had formerly issued, tribes came forth 
anew, to form states and to assert an influence upon their 
Southern neighbors. They were by birth infinitely better 
entitled to rank as the equals of the Hellenes, than were 
the Persians and Medes ; and it was far easier for them to 
establish their claims as valid, inasmuch as no seas sepa- 
rated them from the Greek states. By sea, it was only a 
state already developed, and in command of a coast-line 
and of pecuniary resources, which could enter the lists 
with the Hellenes. By land, the greatest successes might 
be achieved even by ruder forces of population. 

The first attempts to make the history of the Southern 
states dependent upon the North originated in Thessaly. 
No country indeed was by nature better adapted for the 
purpose. For Thessaly was the nearest in situation, and 
the wealthiest in resources ; it formed the natural comple- 
ment to the peninsular countries in the South. In Thes- 
saly there dwelt the largest body of Hellenic population 
settled outside Hellas (in the more limited sense of the 
term) ; and according to ancient tradition Mount Olym- 
pus was the true boundary of a system of Hellenic states. 
The condition of political affairs was however too un- 
favorable for success to have attended the attempt to 
transfer the centre of gravity of Hellenic history to Thes- 
saly. The endeavors in this direction proceeded from 
families, whose power was one founded by force, and was 
therefore insecure in its bases ; these endeavors were iden- 
tified with individual men, and w T ere wrecked by the 
death of Iason (vol. iv. p. 472) and by the resistance of 

chap. I.] T/ ie Kingdoms of the North. Q 

Thebes, which frustrated for ever the schemes of a Thes- 
salian hegemony, without being able to carry out its own 

It was now the turn of the countries beyond Mount 
Olympus, which connect the southern peninsulas with the 
broad masses of territory forming the mainland of Eastern 
Europe, — of the alpine countries of Northern Greece, 
with their lofty ranges and large river-valleys, viz., Mace- 
donia and Thrace. These regions had, with the excep- 
tion of the tracts along the coasts, remained strange and 
unknown to the Hellenes ; for centuries they had been 
regarded as a land of barbarians, destined only to be 
made use of by the Hellenes through the agency of the 
colonies settled on the coasts, and to be turned to account 
by them for the purposes of their trade. And indeed 
Mount Olympus, together with the Cambunian range, 
marks a very definite division. On the further side a new 
world commences ; and this not only in the external for- 
mation of the land, but also in climate and in the whole 
life of nature. Thessaly itself already shows the transi- 
tion towards the Northern regions, which in this part of 
Europe begins much sooner than in France or in Italy. 
On the further side of Mount Olympus the olive-tree and 
the flora of the South prosper only in specially favored 
localities, notably in the sunny plains by the sea-shore, 
stretching like a narrow rim round Macedonia and 
Thrace. In the interior a climate like that of Central 
Europe prevails, which was unfamiliar and full of mys- 
terious discomfort to a Greek, and which with regard to 
dress and food, modes of dwelling and social intercourse, 
likewise prescribed to human life conditions quite differ- 
ent from those to which the Greeks were accustomed. 

But though such differences beyond a doubt deeply 
affect national civilization, yet they are unable perma- 
nently to determine the progress of political relations. 
The very charms which a Southerner misses in a foreign 


10 History of Greece. [Bookvu 

clime, tempt the Northerner to advance southwards, so 
soon as the weakness of the neighboring tribes opens to 
him a prospect of success ; nor was Mount Olympus in 
any respect such a boundary as could have prevented the 
countries and populations beyond from claiming their 
share in Greek history. The peninsular countries of 
Greece are after all nothing but the offshoots of the 
Northern mountain-system; and the inhabitants of the 
countries on the hither and on the further side of Mount 
Olympus were, not less than those countries themselves, 
naturally connected together. An entirely new epoch 
therefore necessarily commenced, so soon as this connex- 
ion was asserted, so soon as the Hellenes ceased to lead 
in their states a life untouched from the direction of the 
North, and left entirely to itself. Accordingly, already 
those men who narrated the history of the Hellenes in the 
times of their absolute independence, Herodotus and 
Thucydides alike, directed glances of special attention to 
the North, and carefully watched the earliest beginnings 
of the formation of states observable there. 

Their natural -k e * us now more closely survey the coun- 
configuration. tries of the North, starting from the same 
point, which we previously designated as the starting- 
point of the formation of the Southern land (vol. i. 
p. 10). 

The fortieth degree of latitude is the boundary-line of 
Hellas proper. Here the mountains are, out of the 
ramification dividing off the southern countries, drawn 
together in a firm knot, viz. Mount Lacmon. From this 
point the chain of mountains which severs Thessaly from 
Epirus continues in the same direction through two de- 
grees of latitude. This is Mount Pindus, the lofty ridge 
of the regions between Macedonia and Illyria, extending 
from south to north as far as the point where it inserts 
itself in the Northern mountain-systems leading horizon- 
tally across from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. But 

chap, i.j Tj ie Kingdoms of the North. 11 

here, instead of any immediate junction taking place, a 
broad gap remains between the Dalmatian chain of Alps, 
running parallel to the Adriatic Gulf, and the Balkan. 
Into this gap the northern end of the extremity of the 
Pindus-chain, called at the present day the Tschardagh, 
inserts itself like a mighty promontory: it forms the final 
point of the mountains of the Greek peninsulas, the 
Scardus of the ancients. 

After the Tschardagh there begin, in the forty-second 
degree of latitude, the heights stretching to the east, and 
separating the waters of the Danube from the rivers of 
the Archipelago. These form the rear-wall of the Thra- 
cian mainland, which are designated by the collective 
name of the Balkan or Hsemus. They are, however, no 
unbroken chain, but a series of knots of mountains (Rilos- 
tock and Perin), from which two main ranges issue sepa- 
rately, — a northern range, the Haemus proper, and 
another, which runs down in a south-easterly direction, 
and gives to the coast-land of Thrace the character of a 
highland district, viz. Rhodope. 

The two series of mountains which meet in a right 
angle at the Tschardagh, viz. Pindus and Hsemus, form 
the framework of the great river-territories which are 
distinctive of the North of the Greek world : two in the 
west, the valleys of the Haliacmon and the Axius, and 
two in the east, those of the Nestus and the Hebrus, with 
the valley of the Strymon in the centre. 

These river-districts possess this feature in common: 
that they are by the lofty mountain-ranges cut off from 
the regions along the Adriatic, as well as from the low- 
lying districts of the Danube; while on the other hand 
the course of their rivers causes one and all of these 
countries to depend exclusively upon the ^Egean, and 
summons them to participation in its affairs. At the same 
time, however, the surrounding mountain-ranges are 
broken through at certain points; whereby it becomes to 

12 History of Greece. [Book vil 

such a degree easier to pass to the districts beyond, (so 
especially from the sources of the Axius to the valley of 
the Morava, and again from the Hebrus to the Iscer or 
Oscius,) that it naturally suggested itself to the peoples 
dwelling in the valleys of those rivers also to advance 
further to the north. In other words, upon their states 
was imposed the mission of establishing a connexion 
between the lands of the Danube and the regions on the 
coasts of the Archipelago. 

As to the internal configuration of the countries which 
we call Macedonia and Thrace, the two are by no means 
separated in any such way as that of a territory, coherent 
in itself and confined within natural boundaries, being 
formed in common by the basins of the two western, and 
another such by those of the two or three eastern, rivers. 
The valley of the Strymon in particular may be equally 
well reckoned as belonging to the eastern and as belonging 
to the western half. For this reason, too, no fixed frontier 
between the states ever existed here ; but every imperial 
dominion developed in these regions endeavored to spread 
to the east or to the west, from the territory of one river to 
that of the next. 

The most important part of the eastern country is the 
basin of the river Maritza, the ancient Hebrus. Its 
sources are at Mount Rilostock, called Scombrus by 
Aristotle ; whence it flows first in a line parallel to that of 
the Balkan, and then after a sharp turn (at Adrianople) 
along the base of Rhodope, in a southerly direction, and 
into the sea. 

The Thra- When King Darius on his Scythian expedi- 
cian empire, tion passed through Thrace, he found settled 
in the valley of the Hebrus the Odrysse, who at that time 
constituted only one of the many tribes dwelling as 
neighbors in the land. After the Persian Wars the 
chieftain of the Odrysse, Teres, succeeded in increasing 
their power, and in placing his tribe at the head of the 

chap, i.] T] ie Kingdoms of the North. 13 

whole population. He left to his son Sitalces a realm of 
considerable extent, which had its centre in the fertile 
lowland district of Adrianople, while in the north it 
reached as far as the Danube, and in the east as the Black 
Sea, and subjected to itself the populations of the 
mountain-ranges around. He passed, to the west, beyond 
the Strymon, and first opened paths through the jungle of 
the Cercine-chain, in order to incorporate in his kingdom 
the PaBonians in the valley of the Axius. 

This was the first national kingdom in the North of the 
Archipelago, — a kingdom which comprehended an abun- 
dance of vigorous population. For the Thracian people 
was accounted the most numerous and the most powerful 
of all the nations in the regions of the Mediterranean ; and 
its obstinate valor was most severely felt by the Athenians 
in the course of their settlements. 

If the kiugdom was to have a future, it was necessary 
for it to acquire influence on the shores of the ^Egean. 
The first step towards this end was taken by the formation 
of family-connexions with the nearest Greek city of some 
importance, viz. Abdera (vol. ii. p. 147), whereby the in- 
troduction of the foreign princely dynasty into the system 
of relations subsisting between the Greek states was pre- 
pared. The brother-in-law of Sitalces, Nym- Thrace and 
phodorus (vol. iii. p. 64), acted as mediator Athens - 
with Athens, where it was early recognized what import- 
ance a Thracian empire possessed for the Attic maritime 
state, and what dangers, as well as what advantages, might 
arise from such an empire for the Athenians in the war 
then breaking out with Sparta. Nothing was therefore 
left undone, by way of honoring the royal house in the 
North; advantage was taken of the ancient popular 
legends about Tereus and Procne, in order to represent the 
family of Teres as of kin with the Athenians ; the alliance 
with Sitalces was regarded as the most valuable of all the 
foreign connexions of Athens ; and in his Acharnians 

14 History of Greece. [BookVU 

Aristophanes makes the envoys report, how Sitalces adored 
the city of the Athenians like a tender lover, and wrote 
her name upon every wall, while his son Sadocus, the 
honorary burgess of Athens, longed for naught else more 
deeply than to take part in the festive banquets of his new 

But the alliance concluded in the year 431 was also to 
acquire a political significance. A great military expedi- 
tion was jointly devised. From the north the Odrysse, from 
the south the Athenians, — thus they intended in common 
to overthrow the guileful hostility of Perdiccas, who had 
injured both the one and the other, as well as the defiant 
obstinacy of the Potidaeans and of the Chalcidians, which 
gave so much trouble to the Athenians ; and who could 
have withstood such a power as this ? 

At the head of 150,000 men Sitalces advanced out of 
the valley of the Hebrus. It was a host of nations, such 
as had not been seen since the days of Xerxes. With fear 
and trembling the power of the North was for the first 
time recognized ; all the neighboring peoples, all Thessaly, 
were full of apprehensions for their liberty ; and the states 
which had taken the side against Athens already saw 
themselves crushed by a double overwhelming force (vol. 
iii. p. 103). 

But grandly as the undertaking had begun, it ended as 
a failure after a campaign of thirty days. The Athenians 
never made their appearance, either from negligence, or 
because they were themselves visited by a fear of the 
superior strength of their ally and of the consequences of 
his intervention in Greek affairs. In Thrace a change 
likewise ensued. Sadocus must have died young. For 
when Sitalces fell in 424, fighting against the Triballi, his 
successor was his nephew Seuthes, who had already for- 
merly played a part hostile to Athens. Seuthes allowed 
himself to be gained over by Perdiccas, who doubtless 
contrived to convince the young king, how the princes of 

chap, i.j y/ie Kingdoms of the North. 15 

the North could not pursue a more absurd policy than 
that of supporting, from motives of a foolish Philhellenism, 
Athens, the most dangerous opponent of the extension of 
their own power. 

Under Seuthes Thrace stood at the height d ™ e f king " 
of its prosperity. It formed a connected em- seuthes. 
pire from Abdera to the Danube, from Byzantium to the 
Strymon. It was an inland country, strong in its natural 
seclusion, and yet with a coast-line skirting three seas ; 
destined by its situation to control the passages leading 
across into Asia, as well as the communications between 
St. Pontus and the Archipelago. The central body of the 
forces of the empire was composed of the Thracians from 
the Hebrus, between Hsemus and Rhodope. To these 
were joined the Getse, who dwelt beyond the Hsemus as 
far as the Danube, mounted archers like their neighbors 
the Scythians ; and also the Thracians of Rhodope and of 
the mountains in the vicinity, armed with sabres. Finally, 
the fourth division of the army was formed by the Pseonians. 
The land abounded in resources, in corn and flocks and 
herds, in gold and silver. A yearly tribute of 400 talents of 
silver flowed into the treasury, besides an equal sum in 
the shape of gifts, consisting of stuffs for clothing, domestic 
implements, &c. Gifts of homage of this description were 
proffered not to the king alone, but also to his governors 
in the several provinces, and to the great officers of state. 

No such state had as yet existed in the whole circuit of 
the ^Egean. A commanding importance therefore seemed 
to be awaiting Thrace. Already even Greek towns were 
reckoned among her tributary subjects. Their numbers 
could not but increase ; and to internal prosperity and 
flourishing manufactures would inevitably be added mari- 
time trade and naval dominion. How would it, under 
such circumstances, be possible for the Athenians to main- 
tain their hold over their colonies, already so vacillating ? 
Accordingly the Spartans already in the days of Sitalces 

16 History of Greece. |BookVii. 

attempted to provoke a hostile feeling on the part of the 
Thracian power against Athens (vol. iii. p. 75). The time 
seemed to have arrived, when the settlement of the Greek 
conflicts lay in the hands of the Thracian kings. 

But their kingdom failed to endure. After Seuthes it 
broke up into several principalities ; and this averted from 
Athens the danger menacing her. The land of the 
Thracians was not naturally adapted for a settled unity. 
The mountain-ranges traversing it acted as inducements to 
the tribes which had been united by so great exertions, to 
pursue once more their own separate courses ; and indeed 
the cohesion between them had never been of any but a 
loose kind.* 

The moun- Different, and more favorable, conditions 
the rivers of existed in Macedonia. Here too, indeed, the 

Macedonia. . . . ,-, « .. « , ■> •> 

variety in the configuration ot the ground was 
so great, as in a high degree to impede the union of the 
whole. For on the eastern side of the Pindus is to be 
found neither an extensive formation of table-land nor a 
simple incline ; but from the central chain stretches forth 
a variety of branches, which subdivide the country by 
forming a series of basins of valleys. These valleys, sur- 
rounded in a circular form by heights, lie above and 
beside one another, and possess a great significance for the 
history of the country. 

First comes the upper valley of the Vistritza (valley of 
the Haliacmon), between Pindus and a parallel line of 
mountains, running so near to the Cambrunian range, that 
it is only through a narrow gorge that the Haliacmon 
winds out of the circular valley. This valley was the 
ancient district of Elimea ; and further up, into the corner 
of the mountain-range, where out of a lake rises the rocky 
peninsula of Castorea, stretches the ancient Orestis. But, 

* The people of the Thracians: Herod, vii. 110; their empire : Thuc. ii. 
29 and 95, seq. (against the connexion, which in his day there was a 
fondness for asserting at Athens, between the Parnassian and the Odrysian 
Thracians, between Teres and Tereus). 

chap. L] 2^ e kingdoms of the North. 17 

secluded and remote as the valley of the Haliacmon seems, 
it is yet possessed of very important communications. For 
to the north-west of Castorea Mount Pindus is broken 
through by a deep rift in a horizontal direction ; and 
through this a river (Devol), of which the sources lie on 
the eastern side of the range, flows out to empty itself into 
the Adriatic. Here, then, is a natural mountain gate, 
opening a way to Albania, the solitary gap in the other- 
wise uninterrupted course of the central chain ; while on 
the other side an easy transit offers itself by means of the 
Cambunian hills from the Haliacmon to the Thessalian 
valley of the Peneus. 

Towards the east, another long valley lies between 
that of the Haliacmon and Mount Bermius, which 
forms the border-line towards the plain of the coast. 
This is the basin of Ostrovo, the district of the Eor- 
dsei, where from lakes and rivulets are gathered the 
waters which empty into the sea under the name of the 
river Lydias. 

To the north of Eordsea and Orestis lies a third hollow 
valley, that of the sources of the river Erigon, which is 
traversed by the forty-first degree of latitude. This valley, 
the modern basin of Bitolia, leans upon the principal line 
of the northern Pindus-chain, across which an easy inter- 
course takes place with the Albanian districts. Here were 
in antiquity the seats of the Lyncestse and, further to the 
north, those of the Pelagones. Finally, there is the Var- 
dar- valley, the deep valley watered by the Axius (Paraxia), 
the northernmost of the entire system of mountains, bounded 
by lofty alpine chains, and fed by numerous streams having 
their sources here, of which the most distant lie near to 
the Morava, which empties itself into the Danube below 

All these are basins of a circular shape, the rocky belts 
around which are broken only at a single point, — originally 
valleys of the sea, as is indicated by the still existing in* 

18 History of Greece. lBookVil 

land lakes ; in other words, generally mere repetitions of 
the Thessalian plain, with which, for the traveller coming 
from the south, commences the series of the hollow valleys 
on the east side of the Pindus. But while Thessaly is by 
the river common to the whole country connected so as to 
form a natural unity, and opens at two places towards the 
sea, in Macedonia we have a highland region, remote from 
the sea, and only with difficulty accessible. And this 
highland region is again variously subdivided in itself; 
and the divisions between the several hollow valleys are in 
part more considerable than the external frontier-line of 
the entire land ; for the parallel chains of the Pindus in 
part overtop the height of the principal chain, and it is 
easier to proceed from Macedonia to Thessaly, to Illyria, 
and to the Danube, than from one Macedonian valley into 
the other. Under these circumstances very serious obsta- 
cles lay in the path of a political union of the country ; 
and the danger was greater in Macedonia than in Thrace, 
that the permanent consolidation of a single kingdom 
would never be effected. 

Nature, however, provided in a very remarkable way 
for indicating most plainly to the inhabitants of the nume- 
rous divisions of the highland country the advantages of 
union amongst themselves and with the coast-land. This 
she effected by means of the course of the rivers. For out 
of the mountainous recesses of Orestis winds forth the 
Haliacmon, and out of Eordsea the Lydias; the Erigon 
forces his way into the valley of the Axius ; and all these 
rivers, whatever the respective remoteness of their sources, 
after they have escaped from their mountain hollow, take 
their course towards the same sea-coast, where in one and 
the same bay they have what is equivalent to a common 
mouth. While, therefore, the Thracian rivers flow in a 
number of distant parallel valleys, the Macedonian become 
a single river, and serve to connect highlands and coast- 
plain, and at the same time to point out to the highland 

chaf. I.] 2^ Kingdoms of the North, 19 

tribes the direction, to which it behooves them to apply 
their attention and resources. 

No greater natural difference can be ima- 
gined between two halves of a land, than that donian coast- 
between the open plain along the coast and 
the highlands, shut off like a citadel. Accordingly, the 
coast-land possessed a history of its own. The highlanders 
only were called Macedonians ; while very different tribes 
dwelt below, on the shores of the beautiful bay, stretching 
between the wooded base of Mount Olympus and the op- 
posite crags of the Chalcidian promontories deep into the 
land as far as the corner, where are the sources of the hot 
springs which gave its name to the town of Therma (after- 
wards Thessalonica). Therma was the ancient capital of 
Emathia, where the Bottiaeans were settled in the delta 
formed by the Macedonian rivers. The Bottiseans were 
not aboriginal inhabitants. They derived their origiu 
from Crete, whence they had brought their worship of 
Apollo ; and they were conscious of ancient relations of 
kinship with remote coast-districts, in particular with 
Attica. Further to the south dwelt the Pierians, the ser- 
vants of the Muses and of Dionysus, a tribe which by 
means of its early civilization exercised a very important 
influence in art and religious worship upon the whole 
nation of the Hellenes. 

Among these coast-tribes, which had settled in pre- 
historic times on the Macedonian Gulf, afterwards came 
to dwell the colonist-citizens of Greek mercantile towns, 
notably the merchants from Euboea (vol. i. p. 455, seq.). 
They attached themselves in a peaceable way to the earlier 
population ; between the Pierians and the Bottiseans arose 
Methone, the colony of Eretria ; and the entire coast was 
drawn into the commercial traffic opened by the Euboeans 
on the northern coast of the Archipelago (01. xii., b. c 
730, tire.) 

While Emathia, naturally belonging to Hellas by the 

20 History of Greece. l BoOK VI * 

proximity of tlie sea as well as by climate 

The people r J . . . . J 

of the and vegetation, was also thoroughly pervaded 

by Hellenic culture, Upper Macedonia lay com- 
pletely in the obscurity of autochthonous conditions of life; 
indeed, it became more and more estranged from the Hel- 
lenic nation. For originally it was not a foreign country. 
Distant reminiscences in the Hellenic nation mounted back 
to an age, when a close connexion had existed between it 
and the Macedonians. Of the Dorians Herodotus attests 
that they had once themselves been Macedonians, — and, 
indeed, it occasionally happens that individual tribes, be- 
longing to a larger popular whole, issue forth from it and 
for a time again fall back among it. For this reason too 
the ancestor of the Macedonian people was reckoned 
among the sons of Pelasgus; he was called a son of 
Lycaon, the forefather of the Pelasgian Arcadians ; and 
if the language of the Macedonians was unintelligible to 
the Greeks, the same was likewise the case with regard to 
the populations on the Achelous, which assuredly no one 
will desire to exclude from the stock of the Greek nation 
(vol. iii. p. 146). The Hellenes of the classical period 
were extremely sensitive against anything strange in lan- 
guage or manners, and loved to draw a narrow circle 
marking themselves off from all outside it, so that they 
regarded even populations akin to themselves in race as 
foreigners and barbarians, if their feeling towards them 
was one of unfamiliarity. But inasmuch as this unfami- 
liarity is based on differences of culture, the consciousness 
of it cannot be considered decisive as to the original rela- 
tionship of the peoples in question. 

With reference to the meagre remnants of the Mace- 
donian tongue, it is to be remarked that they reveal Greek 
roots, and that in them are found forms of the iEolic 
dialect, and also such words as belong to the ancient com- 
mon property of Greeks and Italicans. In the manners 
of the Macedonians there are likewise several points cor- 

chap, i.j tj w Kingdoms of the North. 21 

responding to the most ancient usages of the Greeks ; so 
e.g. the custom of sitting at table. Finally, in their public 
life also much of an ancient Greek type was preserved, 
above all the kingship, which in the civic life of the 
Greeks had generally been extinguished at so early a date 
(vol. i. p. 264). As in the Heroic age, so with the Mace- 
donians, the king was supreme judge, military commander- 
in-chief, and high-priest ; but he was no master over the 
people according to the Oriental fashion, no despot, before 
whom all other rights vanish. Rather, even as towards 
the king the people is conscious of its liberty and of its 
just claims ; the royal authority is limited by legal usage ; 
and among the Macedonians, as among the Greeks, a 
decided aversion prevails from unmeasured and absolute 
power placed in the hands of a single individual. By the 
side of the king stand noble families, the members of which 
form an association on terms of more intimate daily inter- 
course with him, accustomed to accompany him on expe- 
ditions of war, and to share with him the dangers of the 
conflict and the honors of the victory. Such a war- 
nobility, corresponding to that which the Homeric poems 
bring before our eyes in the kings' comitatus, maintained 
itself in the highlands of Macedonia, because here there 
existed no life in towns, which levels class-distinctions and 
creates a new class in the burghers. The nationality of 
the Macedonians, akin by descent as it was to the Greek 
race, yet remained not free from admixtures, which dis- 
turbed the original agreement between the two, and 
changed the character of the Macedonian people. This 
foreign element was above all formed by the 

& ^ Macedo- 

Illvrians, the body of whose population niansand 

, t» Illynans. 

branched out from the north-west far into 
the interior, and extended through the above-mentioned 
passes of Mount Pindus to the eastern slope, — a savage 
people, prone to a life of brigandage, who offered up 
children as sacrifices before battle, and among whom the 

22 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

custom of tattooing the body obtained. In proportion as 
the nobler and more gifted branches of the nation, such as 
the Dorians, had separated themselves from the Mace- 
donians, it became difficult for those who had remained 
behind in the mountains to withstand the inroads of the 
Western barbarians. Macedonian and Illyrian became at 
many points confounded ; the fashion of dress and the way 
of clipping the hair, language and manners, were assimi- 
lated ; so that gradually the population came in a certain 
sense to be of the same kind throughout the whole of the 
broad mainland from the Sound of Corcyra to Thrace, the 
original points of contrast between Macedonians and 
Illyrians losing themselves. In this way Macedonians 
and Greeks became estranged from one another ; and the 
more fully that Greek civilization developed itself in the 
South, the more its inhabitants became accustomed to re- 
gard those who were originally members of the same race 
as themselves in the light of a fundamentally different race 
of men, and to despise them as such. They were looked 
upon as beings incapable of leading a political life, and as 
therefore destined by nature, like the other barbarians, to 
furnish slaves to the Hellenes. Nay, not even good slaves, 
so the Athenians thought, were obtainable from Mace- 

Thus highlands and coast-districts, Macedonia and 
Emathia, lay beside one another like two utterly different 
countries. From the narrow rim of land along the coast 

* The system of the Macedonian hollow valleys is fully explained by 
Grisebach, Eeise in Rumelien. Maxera, highlands ; MaKeoore?, highlanders (or 
men of high growth? cf. G. Curtius, Griech. Etymol. i. 148).— Bomaroi, 
connected with Crete according to Aristotle, Plutarch. Thes. 15, and Strabo. 
Ancient worship of Apollo in 'I\vai, &c. : Rhein. Mus. xvii. 742. The religious 
worships of Pieria: Hes. Theogon. 53; Muller, Orch. 381.— To 'EAAtjvucov -ye'i/os 
. . . oi«e ev Hlv8(* M.aice8i>bv Ka\e6fxevov, Herod, i. 56. Atapucov re ical Ma«ce£- 
vhv e6vos, viii. 43.— Macedonian kingly government, ov /3ia dAAa v6>w, 
Callisth. ap. Arrian. iv. 11. 'Eralpot: JEUslu, Ver. Hist. xiii. 4; Theopomp. ap. 
Athen. 167. — 'IAAvpioi /caTaom/cToi, Strabo, 315; xaKojSiot, Theopomp. ap. 
Athen. 443. First in Herod, v. 61; ix. 43.— 'OAeflpo? Mcuceowv, bOev ovo" ovfipd- 
■noSov airovSalov ovSiv fjv irportpov 7rpi'ao*dat, Dem. ix. 31. 

chap, i.] j^he Kingdoms of the North. 23 

it was impossible that a conquest and Hellenization of the 
highlands should proceed ; a history common to the 
whole land was therefore not to be realized, unless among 
the Macedonian tribes were called forth a higher life, 
which should make the development of a a state-growth 
possible. But this could not take place from within ; 
there were needed external influences, through which the 
elements in the population akin to the Greeks could once 
more assert themselves. It was necessary that Hellenes 
should come to the North, in order there to give the 
impulse to political developments, 

Such influences may have been exerted from ~ . . 

J Greek lm- 

various sides, although no information has migration. 
been preserved on the subject. The earliest tradition 
points in the direction of the Western Sea. 

The coasts of Illyria were already in the most ancient 
times visited by foreign mariners. Ulyrius was the name 
given to a son of Cadmus ; and just as the sea washing the 
shores of Illyria and Epirus from the earliest ages bore 
the name of the Ionian, so Old-Ionian settlements were 
also known to have existed on the coasts.* Next, the 
Corinthians took in hand the colonization of these regions 
(vol. i. p. 460 ; vol. iii. p. 5), and with unwearying in- 
dustry also extended their mercantile connexions into the 
interior. This explains the circumstance, that we meet 
with the same Corinthian noble house, which represented 
Hellenic culture in the widest variety of Greek and Italian 
regions, also in the Macedono-Illyrian highlands (vol. i. p. 
293). The Bacchiadse had established the most intimate 
connexions with the Macedonian chieftains; and in par- 
ticular the chieftains belonging to the tribe of the Lyn- 
cestse gloried in their relationship to the Corinthian Hera- 
clidse. The Lyncestse were settled on the banks of the 
Erigon, far away in the interior, at an equal distance from 

* 'Idvios ttoitos, Pind. Nem. iv. 54. 

24 History of Greece. t Bo °* vu 

either sea ; but it is precisely in this locality that the 
mountain-portal spoken of above is open to the west (p. 17) ; 
and the valley of the Apsus, which flows into the sea be- 
tween the two Corinthian colonies of Epidamnus and 
Apollonia, here leads up into the country containing the 
sources of the Erigon and the habitations of the Lyncestae.* 
Th It would seem as if the same paths, which 

Temenidce. were opened by the Corinthians, had been 
likewise followed by the Heraclidse of Argos ; for Hero- 
dotus had heard that the ancestors of the Macedonian 
kings had been first settled in Illyria, whence they had 
crossed over into Macedonia, f The arrival of this family 
first gave to the country an impulse towards political union, 
which native elements would never have sufficed to accom- 
plish. Macedonia is, therefore, essentially a dynastic state, 
and the history of the Macedonian kingdom is the history 
of its royal race. 

The members of this royal house called themselves 
Temenidse ; i. e. they venerated as their original ancestor 
the same Temenus, who was accounted the founder of the 
Heraclide dynasty in Peloponnesian Argos (vol. i. p. 177). 
Now, we remember the disturbances at Argos during the 
regal period, the quarrel between the Heraclidse and the 
Dorian soldiery, and the flight of a King Phidon to Tegea 
(vol. i. p. 272). It is therefore highly credible, that during 
these troubles individual members of the royal house emi- 
grated, in order to seek a more favorable theatre for their 
activity, than was offered by the cribbed and confused 
affairs of their home; and tradition points precisely to the 
brother of this Phidon as the man who came to Mace- 
donia from the shores of Peloponnesus. The name of 
Cararms, given to the immigrant, indicates the royal posi- 
tion which the Temenidse contrived to obtain in their new 
home. Here the events of the Heroic age repeated them- 

* Lyncestae under Bacchiadse : Strabo, 326. 
f Temenidae in Illyria: Herod, viii. 137. 

chap. L] The Kingdoms of the North. 25 

selves. For as of old the city-founding families had come 
to Boeotia and Argos, so it was now Argive princes who 
came into the North, and whose intellectual superiority of 
mind enabled them to constitute themselves the centre of 
the highland populations. 

That the Peloponnesians took the paths opened by 
Corinth, the chief commercial city of the peninsula, is in 
itself very probable, and is further confirmed by the cir- 
cumstance, that the first Macedonian settlement of Temen- 
idse was Orestis, the district, already mentioned, situate 
around the sources of the Haliacmon, in the neighborhood 
of Illyria, and immediately to the south of the district of 
Lyncestse. The chief place of Orestis was Argos, from 
which the Macedonian Temenidse were named the Argeadse. 

Wherever Hellenes prevail, their tendency 
is to push on towards the sea. The Argeadse, of the 

ArfTCti (Ire. 

too, were unable long to remain content with 
the mountainous recess of Orestis ; no sooner had they ac- 
quired power among the chieftains of the surrounding dis- 
tricts, than they advanced in the direction of the coast; 
and by these movements the two previously separated 
halves of the country were brought into connexion. The 
rivers Lydias and Haliacmon, the natural connecting 
veins, became the guides of the Temenidse ; and the first 
momentous act of their policy was the choice of a capital, 
belonging equally to the interior and the sea-coast. This 
was Edessa or iEgse, a place of primitive an- 

t tv! i ii Founda- 

tiquity, according to a Phrygian legend the tion of 
site of the gardens of Midas, at the northern 
extremity of Mount Bermius, where the Lydias comes 
forth from the mountains. 

In all Macedonia there is no more excellent situation. 
As the traveller coming from Salonika ascends the gra- 
dually narrowing plain, his attention is already from afar 
enchained by the glittering silver streak, which reaches 
vertically down into the valley from the rim of the 

26 History of Greece. [Book vil 

mountain-side nearest to the front. It announces the 
waterfalls of Vodena, which lies on the site of ancient 
iEgse, on a well-wooded declivity turned straight to the 
east, while in the background rises in solemn grandeur 
the lofty mountain range. The waterfalls, which at this 
day mark out the place and give to it a striking resem- 
blance to Tibur, were not in existence in ancient times. 
Only gradually, by means of a progressive formation of 
tofa, the waters have contrived to stop up the passages in 
the rocks, through which they formerly found a subter- 
raneous outlet. But at all times -ZEgse must have been a 
spot of exceeding beauty and salubrity, the portal of the 
highlands and the dominant castle of the plain in the rear 
of which it lies, like My cense or Ilium. The view from the 
castle extends over the gulf to the hills of the Chalcidice, 
and at its feet unite all the main rivers of the country. 

TFlgflfi was the natural capital of the land. With its 
foundation the history of Macedonia had its beginning ; 
jEgae is the germ out of which the Macedonian empire 
grew ; and for this reason mythology already ascribed its 
foundation to the Caranus, and spoke of him as having 
been conducted to the spot by a divine sign, as Cadmus 
was to Thebes.* 

We have here a remarkable recurrence of processes be- 
longing to the earliest history of Greece. Once more we 
see mountainous tribes of the North under the command 

* Two forms of the regal myth, viz. the Caranus-myth in Theopompus, 
the Perdiccas-myth in Herodotus: Weissenborn, Hellen. lii. 4; Gutschmid, 
Maced. Anagraphe in Symb. Philol. (Bonn), 118. The ancestor of this royal 
house is a brother of Phidon, the seventh Temenide (quaere, the one who 
fled to Argos ? vol. i. p. 254). An attempt is made to establish a connexion 
between the Argeadae and the history of Argos by C. F. Hermann in the 
Verhandl. d. Altenburg. Phihlogenversamml. p. 43. The existence of a connexion 
between the 'ApyeaSou (Strabo, 329; Steph. Byz. 'Apyiov) is denied by O. M til- 
ler and O. Abel, Gesch. Makedon. vor Philipp, 99, with whom also agree von 
Gutschmid and Born, Zur Makedon. Gesch. p. 8. Instead of Peloponnesian 
Argos, the Argos in Orestis is by them said to be the original home of the 
Macedonian dynasty, — a view, of the justice of which I have never been 
able to convince myself. 

chap, i.j The Kingdoms of the North. 27 

of Heraclidse advancing towards the sea, in this instance 
moving in an eastward, as of old they moved in a south- 
ward, direction : once more they invade countries possess- 
ing a civilization of superior antiquity, like the Pelopon- 
nesian Hcraclidse occupy more ancient cities, and, starting 
from well-situated points, conquer the surrounding lands. 
Henceforth Emathia became Macedonia proper, the land 
of the three rivers, the most productive of territories, pos- 
sessing a fertile soil, lakes and grassy lowlands, with a 
shore well adapted for maritime traffic. The Temenida) 
were now changed from chieftains into kings, into princes 
engaged upon the formation of a state, who contrived 
gradually by conquest and treaty, to call into life a kingdom 
out of a number of mountain-cantons and city-territories. 

The first of these kings was Perdiccas, who 
about the beginning of the seventh century 
B. c, starting from iEgse, conquered the low- 7 ^ r c. c ' 
lying country between the Lydias and the 
Haliacmon. The Macedonians advanced with irresistible 
force, a hardened people of herdsmen and hunters, superior 
in vigor to the peaceful inhabitants of the plain, under 
the leadership of scions of noble families, who never laid 
aside their arms. 

And yet the progress of the development of the Macedo- 
nian power was very slow and frequently interrupted. 
After Perdiccas a whole century passed, before the 
Temenidse succeeded in giving a firm permanency to their 
kingdom, and in executing their seaward plans. For they 
had to meet a constant succession of attacks from the up- 
lands, which prevented them from devoting themselves 
with full energy to their favorite task. Four kings, who 
ruled after Perdiccas, were incessantly occupied with their 
hereditary enemies, the Illyrians, whose pre- A myntas. 
datory incursions endangered the realm. The B c 540 _4 99 
fifth, Amyntas (vol. ii. p. 188), was the first 
who again found leisure to direct his attention to the 

28 History of Greece. [Book vil 

coast. Pieria and Bottissa were completely subjugated ; part 
of their inhabitants were driven out into the Chalcidice, 
while in their place foreign settlers, from whom profit 
was expected, were brought into the land. Moreover, the 
sagacious prince sought to take advantage of the Greek 
party-feuds, and in particular offered Anthemus on the 
Thermsean Gulf as a habitation to the fugitive Pisistra- 
tidse. But this desire to establish a connexion with Greece 
displays itself far more clearly in the case of Amyntas' 
son Alexander, as is attested by the cognomen of the 
latter, Philhellen. 

Alexander Alexander viewed the conflict, commenced 
Philhellen. by ^ e Achaemenidse with the design of sub- 
jecting Europe, from the standpoint of Greek 
love of freedom ; and in his reign proof was first given 
of the aversion from the empires of the East, which was 
one of the popular tendencies wherein Macedonians and 
Greeks agreed. He caused the Persians to be massacred, 
who demanded submission from his father (vol. ii. p. 139) ; 
and when homage had after all to be done, he was even as 
a Persian vassal incessantly active in promoting the cause 
of the Hellenes. In him the ancient family character of 
the Temenidse thoroughly revived; it was his highest 
ambition to be acknowledged as an equal in birth by the 
Greek nation, and he never rested, till he was allowed as 
a member of that nation to take part in the Olympian 
games. He perceived how in the Attic state Greek life 
found a full realization, and regarded it as the greatest 
distinction, when a relation of neutral hospitality was 
acknowledged by the Athenians between him and them- 

At the same time, however, he was also used by the 
Persians as an instrument of their policy (vol. ii. p. 304). 
For king Xerxes conceived of Macedonia as the nucleus 

* Legitimization of Alexander at Olympia : Herod, v. 22. At this time the 
pedigree was definitely settled : Gutsehmid. u. s. 

chap, i.j The Kingdoms of the North. 29 

of a vassal empire, which it was his design to found in 
Europe ; and for this reason he extended the boundaries 
of the country from Mount Olympus as far as the Haemus 
range. Alexander availed himself of the advantages of the 
situation, without on that account undertaking the part 
which the Persians intended him and his dynasty to play ; 
he allowed Persia to make his kingdom great, in order 
thereafter to maintain it in this greatness by his own 
strength ; and the increase of the power of his house ena- 
bled him to assume a doubly decisive and firm attitude as 
supreme lord towards the chieftains of the land. He sub- 
jected the Thracian tribes inhabiting the metalliferous 
mountains to the west of the Strymon, and adapted his 
royal coinage to the Asiatic standard of silver, which had 
been introduced from Abdera into the mining district in 
question, impressing upon the coins the armorial bearings 
of the Bisaltae, who dwelt on the Strymonic Gulf. The 
mines produced him a talent of silver daily. Within his 
kingdom he advanced civilization, by introducing Hel- 
lenic settlers ; thus he gave a welcome to the Mycenaean 
fugitives from Argos, the ancient home of the Temenidae 
(vol. ii. p. 420). He attached great weight to his name 
being mentioned with honor among the Hellenes ; for this 
purpose he availed himself of the victories at the national 
festivals, and of his connexion with eminent men in the 
nation, who celebrated his achievements, as was above all 
done by Pindar. 

But although he so eagerly wooed the favor of the 
Hellenes, he could not resist the force of the actual state 
of affairs, which necessarily brought him into a different 
kind of contact with the same people. For it was indis- 
pensable to round off the territory of the Macedonian 
state; and this rounding-off could not be accomplished 
without conflicts with the Hellenes. Alexander had 
already removed his capital to Pydna, situate south of the 
Haliacmon, in the domain of Pieria. Between Pydna and 

30 History of Greece. t BooK VIL 

the mouth of the Lydias lay Methone, an independent 
Greek city. Such a territorial relation was not perma- 
nently tenable ; and the same was the ease with regard to 
the Thracian coast. Between the Thernuean Gulf and the 
Strymon lay a dense group of Hellenic towns, all of which 
after the Persian Wars attached themselves to Athens, and 
thus formed on the borders of the Macedonian country a 
coherent power, which, being directed from a single centre, 
controlled both sea and coast. So long as Athens main- 
tained her position on these shores, the sovereign of the 
land was, so to speak, a prisoner on his own coasts. Re- 
gions closely connected with one another by nature were 
severed into two totally distinct territories serving two dif- 
ferent masters ; — as is very perceptible from the coinage 
of the land ; for the royal coins follow the Thracian money, 
while the coast-towns in the immediate vicinity in their 
coinage adopt the Eubceo-Attic standard.* 

Alexander had introduced Macedonia into the group 
of the Mediterranean states, and had thus prescribed to 
his successors their task. It was of a twofold kind : 
first, to give unity, system, and stability to the state 
at home, and by the introduction of higher culture to en- 
able it to claim a natural equality with the Greek states ; 
secondly, to enlarge its power abroad against its inconve- 
nient neighbors. In either direction the successors of 
Alexander had to contend against the greatest difficulties ; 
and it was extremely natural, that, in their foreign policy 
above all, they, instead of pursuing their ends by straight 
paths, sought to wind cautiously through the difficulties 
besetting them, and hoped to reach the goal rather by 
craftily taking advantage of the situation abroad, than by 

* The most ancient silver coinage of Mgse, with the he-goat as armorial 
bearing, follows the JEginetic standard ; the first coins impressed with the 
royal name are (from 480) according to the Bisaltic standard. The Chalci- 
dian towns used the Euboeo-Attic standard. Brandis, Munzwesen von V. Asien, 
207, 209, 211. 

chap, i.] rpj^ Kingdoms of the North. 31 

using their own strength and engaging in open warfare. 
This system of policy, which was characteristic of the 
TemenidaB, shows itself at a stage of full development in 
the successor of Alexander, Perdiccas. In the „ J . 

7 Perdiccas II. 

course of his long reign Athens and Mace- 
donia came to know one another as irrecon- 
cilable adversaries ; both parties learnt clearly to under- 
stand the points at issue, the methods of attack, the dan- 
gers and the prizes of the struggle ; and it was in this 
period that were laid the foundations of all subsequent 
complications and crises. 

Perdiccas was not the legitimate successor. He had 
first to oust the heir to the throne, Alcetas ; hereupon, he 
divided the dominion with his second brother Philip, who 
held the land to the east of the Axius ; nor was it till after 
contests lasting many years that he became sole sove- 

In the settlement of these matters the 
Athenians bore a part. We remember, how em policy 
since the victories of Cimon (vol. ii. p. 384) 
they incessantly kept in view the coasts of the Thracian 
sea, and how Pericles was most especially active in firmly 
establishing the Attic power in these regions. After the 
Thracian peninsula had been made secure (452 b. a), the 
city of Brea had been founded to the north of the Chalci- 
dice, and after it Amphipolis, the lordly city at the mouth 
of the Strymon, the foundation of which was a genuine 
triumph of the maritime policy of Athens. Amphipolis 
was to be the centre of the Northern colonial domain, the 
advance post against the peoples of the North, a bul- 
wark against both Thrace and Macedonia. Pericles 
divined what daDgers must arise for Athens, were a spirit 
of consolidation into states to arise in those peoples. It 
was therefore necessary to maintain a strict watch over all 
their movements, and to intervene in their internal quar- 
rels in such a fashion, that the barbarian princes should 

32 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

feel themselves dependent npon Athens, as upon the city 
controlling the entire region of the iEgean. 

About the time of the foundation of Amphipolis Perdic- 
cas was still struggling with Philip ; and as the territory 
of the latter lay next to the districts on the Strymon, the 
interests of the Athenians and those of Perdiccas at that 
time went hand in hand. It is therefore very probable, 
that the Athenians helped him to gain his victories, and 
that his assistance was only given on conditions, which made 
the king to a certain degree dependent upon Athens. For 
the first piece of absolutely certain information which reaches 
us out of the reign of Perdiccas states him to have belonged 
to the Attic confederacy ; indeed, Macedonia is repeatedly 
stated to have been at that time a tributary state.* 

These relations changed as soon as Perdiccas had 
reached the immediate goal of his ambition. He now at 
once lay in wait for a favorable opportunity to free him- 
self from all burdensome obligations. The ways and 
means he easily found ; for nowhere were the weak and 
assailable points of the Attic coast-empire more palpable, 
than in the vicinity of his kingdom ; and doubtless no 
foreign prince arrived earlier than he at the conviction, 
that Athens would find it impossible long to bear such 
enormous exertions of strength, and to sustain the artificial 
edifice of her maritime dominion. The Thraeian coast 
was the earliest field of contest between Attic and Pclo- 
ponnesian policy ; and in no colonial district were there 
so much ill-will against Athens, so much popular vigor 
and spirit of independence, as in the Chalcidian towns. 

These facts prescribed to the king his next course of 
action. He established secret relations with the discon- 
tented cities ; and, without openly quarrelling with the 
Athenians, he contrived to be the cause of the greatest 
perils for them, by animating the spirit of resistance 

* Macedonia tributary : Arr. vii. 9, 1 ; Demosth. vii 12. 

chap, i.] ^he Kingdoms of the North. 33 

among the Confederates, encouraging them by promises 
and giving them good advice, how by holding together 
they ought to raise their capabilities of withstanding 
Athens. Perdiccas would gladly have himself continued 
to remain in the background ; but he was forced to come 
forth from his hiding-place. The Athenians found out 
their enemy ; and the secret feud became an open war. 
The Potidseans, the Bottiseans and the Chalcidians re- 
nounced their relations with Athens ; Perdiccas admitted 
part of the population into his territory ; the rest he in- 
stigated to make Olynthus their capital and the centre of 
their resistance. He openly espoused the T} ,. 
cause of the communities in revolt, and was of Perdiccas' 

7 reign. 

together with them made war upon by Athens. 01. lxxxvi. 4 
The Athenians now supported those who op- 
posed the king in his own country. Attacked at home 
and from the coast, and menaced in the east by the Thra- 
cian empire, the power of which was continuously on the 
increase, Perdiccas found himself in a situation of the ut- 
most difficulty. Therma was captured, and Pydna be- 
sieged. Perdiccas saw himself incapable of meeting these 
dangers by force of arms. 

But, never at a loss for a course to pursue, he applied 
to his neighbor Sitalces ; by means of high promises he 
obtained the mediation of the influential prince ; and, to 
outward appearance entirely changing his policy, and un- 
hesitatingly abandoning the Chalcidians, he together with 
Sitacles entered the Athenian Confederation, and received 
back his port of Therma. The Athenians were hereupon 
able to restore their shaken power; they overcame the 
recalcitrant city of Potidsea, and sought by a sagacious 
system of policy to secure the fidelity of the towns on the 
Macedonian coast which had remained true to them. 
Thus, e. g., the Methonasans were granted quite extraordi- 
nary privileges (01. lxxxvii. 4; b. c. 429). They were 
freed from all payment of tribute, with the exception of 


34 History of Greece. [BookVii. 

the temple-tithes, and accorded a distinctly privileged 
position among the Confederates.* 

In this combination of severity and generosity we are 
doubtless justified in recognizing the sagacious spirit of the 
Periclean policy. Soon a change ensued. Perdiccas, who 
liked nothing better than carrying on war while seeming 
to keep peace, supported the Corinthians in Acarnania (vol. 
iii. p. 103), and at the same time freed himself from the 
obligations which he had undertaken towards Sitalces. 
Hereby he embittered his two most powerful neighbors ; 
and they agreed to inflict upon the faithless king a joint 
chastisement, a judgment which should once for all put 
an end to his intolerable intrigues. The non-appearance 
of the Athenians (vol. iii. p. 104) was the first momentous 
error of negligence in their Northern policy. By it they 
estranged from themselves the mightiest of their allies, 
and preserved the most dangerous of their foes from inevi- 
table extinction. Indeed, he came forth incomparably 
stronger from this crisis. For it ridded him of Amyntas, 
the son of Philip, whom it had been intended to put in 
his place as king ; and he now entered into the kindliest 
relations with the Odrysse as their very good friend and 

With Athens he for the time kept peace ; but the fire 
which he had kindled in the Chalcidice, continued to 
burn without interruption ; he understood how once more 
to gain the confidence of the cities, at the same time estab- 
lished relations in Thessaly securing him an influence in 
this country, so important because of its intermediate posi- 
tion between Macedonia and Hellas; and unceasingly lay 
in wait for opportunities of damaging Athens. The war, 
as it was conducted in Hellas, by no means corresponded 

* Kirchhoff, Chron. des Volksbeschl. fur Methone, in Abhandl. d. Berlin. Akad. d. 
Wissensch., 1801, p. 555. In general, cf. W. Vischer, Perdikkas II. Kanig v. Maked. 
in the Schweizer Mm. far histor. Wissensch. ; and, with regard to the forty-ona 
years of the king's reign, von Gutschmid, p. 106, seq. 

chap l.j tj w Kingdoms of the North. 35 

to his hopes. The Spartans were unskilful and unfortu- 
nate ; if matters continued thus, it was to be foreseen that 
Athens would soon have her hands free from asserting her 
power most decisively on the Thraco-Macedonian coast. 
This it was necessary to prevent. Perdiccas therefore in 
conjunction with the Chalcidians sent the secret embassy 
to Sparta ; occasioned the mission of Brasidas ; opened the 
way through Thrace for him ; and thus for the second 
time kindled a Thracian war, the most dangerous of all 
the contests which the Athenians had to wage during the 
Peloponnesian war, and of which they never after- 
wards completely recovered the consequences. At the 
same time, however, he wished to make use of the Spartan 
general as of a hired condottiere for the purposes of his dy- 
nastic policy, in order to break the obstinate resistance of 
the chieftains of Upper Macedonia, in particular of the 
Lyncestse. Although these intentions were frustrated by 
the proud spirit of Brasidas ; although bitter feelings of 
hostility between himself and the king were the result, 
such as they could hardly fail to be in consequence of the 
straight-forward character of the one, and the selfish 
faithlessness of the other ; although this hostility against 
Brasidas even drove the king once more to an alliance 
with the Athenians ; — yet Brasidas was of material ser- 
vice to Perdiccas, by destroying the Attic power in 
Thrace ; and the king took good care even as their ally to 
do nothing for the Athenians, which might have served 
once more to transform the affairs of the North in their 
favor. The utter incompleteness of the results attending 
upon the peace of 421, and its failure to restore the power 
of Athens on the Thracian coasts, were in complete accord- 
ance with his interests. He diligently observed the sub- 
sequent developments of Greek affairs ; together with the 
Chalcidians in 418 joined the Argivo-Laconic alliance, 
again without openly renouncing that with the Athenians 
(vol. iii. p. 316) ; and was therefore by them punished by 

36 History of Greece. [BookVU 

a blockade of the harbors and landing-places. These under- 
takings, however, led to no further consequences ; and Per- 
diccas, who had entered into an alliance with every power 
of political importance, with Sparta, Corinth and Athens, 
with the Odrysse and the Chalcidians, and who had suc- 
cessively deceived them one and all, in the end alone de- 
rived a lasting advantage from all the struggles, although 
to him alone they had virtually cost no sacrifices. He 
secured all the gains of a thoroughly unscrupulous system 
of policy ; he knew of no distinction between friend and foe, 
between war and peace ; he was victorious by means of 
the conflicts excited by him between his neighbors ; and 
even though at the close of his reign he had not made any 
considerable acquisition of territory, yet to have crippled 
the Attic power on his shores amounted to a more import- 
ant success than a series of conquests. In spite of 
all its home troubles Macedonia had proved itself to be a 
power difficult to attack and independent, and at the same 
time exercising a deeply-felt influence upon the affairs of 
the Greek states ; and this power and influence of Mace- 
donia could not but grow in the same measure as that in 
which the Greek states mutually consumed their strength. 
No state, therefore, was more benefited by the Sicilian 
war than Macedonia, which was thereby freed from all 
anxiety on account of Athens ; nor is the mistaken course 
of Attic policy more manifest in any one point than in 
this : that, while the Athenians still had unlimited re- 
sources at their disposal, they failed to use every possible 
exertion in order to restore their dominion on the Thra- 
cian coasts. This omission they were never afterwards able 
to make good. 

In the interior of his kingdom Perdiccas was likewise a 
sagacious and active prince. He favored all combinations 
which brought his land into closer contact with the Greeks ; 
established relations of mutual hospitality with the noble 
families of Thessaly ; received into Macedonia the His- 

chap, i.j TAe Kingdoms of the North. 37 

tiseans who had been expelled from Euboea, as well ag 
some of the Chalcidian Greeks ; and attached great value 
to having at his court famous Greeks, such as the dithy- 
rambic poet Melanippides, and the great Hippocrates 
(vol. ii. p. 560). 

In these peaceful endeavors he was far sur- 

A roll plfum 

passed by his successor Archelaus, who was 

B. c. 415-399. 

able all the more fully to devote himself to 
this task of Macedonian policy, inasmuch as he had no 
attacks to ward off from abroad, while for conquests no 
opportunity as yet offered itself. He made himself a path 
to the throne by criminal bloodshed ; for as the son of a 
slave who had borne him to Perdiccas, he had to remove 
his legitimate kinsmen ; but after this he showed himself 
a born ruler, who, with determined calm, pursued great 
aims. For he perceived how all external successes must 
remain useless to his kingdom, if it lacked a real coherence, 
and security and order, at home. It was still open to 
hostile incursions from the mountains as well as from the 
sea ; and any resolute enemy might imperil not only the 
prosperity of the inhabitants, but the very existence of the 
state. It was therefore indispensable to build cities, the 
walls of which should offer a protection to the inhabitants. 
The cities were connected by roads, along which a regular 
traffic could unfold itself; standing forces guarded these 
roads, and put a check upon brigandage. The inhabitants 
became acquainted with the blessings of a generally ob- 
served peace ; all property rose in value ; and the higher 
civilization, which had hitherto only found a home at in- 
dividual points, began to penetrate into the interior of the 
land, the several parts of which gradually blended into a 
single whole. As a founder of cities, constructor of roads, 
and organizer of the military system, Archelaus, according 
to the judgment of Thucydides, accomplished more than 
all the eight kings before him. His reign constituted a 
new era for the kingdom ; and in order to establish this 

38 History of Greece. [BookVU 

by outward evidence also, he founded, below 

Founda- JL . . . ' 

tion of -^^36, in the low-lying district of Emathia, the 


new capital of Pella. Surrounded by the 
natural defences of lake and morasses, and connected with 
the sea by the river Lydias, Pella was better situated for a 
centre of the kingdom, and for the preservation of the 
royal treasures, than Pydna in Pieria, the city of Alex- 
ander. But Pieria was not, on this account, neglected by 
Archelaus. On the contrary, this district was pre- 
eminently used for the purpose of connecting with one 
another Hellas and Macedonia. At the northern base of 
Mount Olympus Dium was built, in the centre of the 
plain ; for it was to be no fortified town, but, like Olympia 
in Elis, an openly and rurally situated place for festivals. 
It was dedicated to Zeus, the most ancient deity of the 
Hellenic race, and to the Muses, the first celebrations in 
whose honor had taken place on this spot. And this wor- 
„. . , ship of the Muses was further attested by 
home of Archelaus, in that he regarded it as a prin- 

cipal task of his government to make his court 
the meeting-place of the most eminent among his contem- 
poraries. Invitations were therefore issued by him to the 
foremost men of Greece. Not all of these was he able to 
secure ; neither Sophocles, who, as a genuine Hellene, held 
aloof from a royal court, nor Socrates, to whom every posi- 
tion in life was painful, where he could not give an equiv- 
alent for that which he received. But, with these excep- 
tions, those who had been invited gladly responded to the 
summons, and gathered round the king, at whose hospitable 
court they enjoyed high appreciation and serene leisure, 
while their native cities were consuming their strength in 
sanguinary wars and party-struggles. Zeuxis of Heraclea 
adorned the royal palace with his pictures ; Timotheus made 
its festivals glorious with the sounds of his art. Chcerilus 
and Agathon lived and composed poetry here ; and, above 
all, Euripides, who in his Archelaus celebrated the glories of 

chap, i.] Tf ie Kingdoms of the North. 39 

the king, bow like unto the ancient Heroes he redeemed 
the land from its savage condition, and who in his Bacchft 
sang Pieria, the seat of the Muses, where fair festive joy- 
freely unfolded itself, and lauded the fertile fields of the 
Lydias, the giver of blessings. But the death of Euripides 
also shows how a hostile party was opposed to the foreign 
guests; and we recognize in this event, as in so many 
other traits, the strange mixture of unfettered brutality 
and of ideal efforts, which met at the court of Pella. All 
the more are the actual achievements of Archelaus deserv- 
ing of recognition. For it was no whim of taste or princely 
vanity which made him a munificent patron of arts and 
sciences ; he clearly perceived, that he could in no way 
more effectively promote the most important objects of his 
state, than by constituting his capital a centre of Hellenic 
civilization. The state, which desired to rule on the shores 
of the Greek seas, was above all bound to acquire Greek 

Archelaus had conducted the policy of Macedonia into 
the right course ; and the young seed grew up hopefully 
under a royal dynasty, which so brilliantly proved its mis- 
sion to rule, and which led the kingdom in the direction 
of a clearly-recognized goal. But immediately T 
after the death of Archelaus a counter-current of confusion. 
set in, a revolt on the part of the native nobi- B ' c * 399 " 389, 
lity against the royal Philhellenism, a period of wild dis- 
order, which, at the very time when the state was regularly 
organizing itself, cast it back into the vortex of internal 
party-struggles, and again absolutely called into question 
the rule of the Temenidse. 

Among their adversaries the Lyncestse arose, an ambi- 
tious and unruly family, who had zealously encouraged 

* Dium, so called from the temple of Zeus Olympius: Dkd. xvii. VS-. 
Steph. Byz. Concerning the court of Archelaus as a home of the Muses; 
Abel, «. 8. p. 193. Euripides derided by Decamnichus : Ar. Polit. 220, 6. Hid 
death : Diogenian, vii. 52; Suidas. 

40 History of Greece. [Book vn 

the agitation in the people, and, although themselves 
of Greek descent, yet took advantage of every movement 
on the part of the faction of the autochthones, to escape 
from the enforced supremacy of the Temenidse. They con- 
nected themselves with the other malcontent families of 
the country, in particular with the Elimiotse ; conciliated 
the support of the rural nobility, who were adverse to 
Hellenic culture; and brought the Hlyrians into the 
country, in order to defy the royal army. 

For ten years the throne was cast to and fro between 
the two parties. Neither was able to overthrow the other ; 
they therefore sought to effect a compromise, by endeavor- 
ing to put an end to the prevalence of mutual hostility by 
means of a family alliance, — after the fashion in which in 
Attica, in the times of Pisistratus, the parties were tempo- 
Am as rarily re-united through marriage. Amyntas, 
a great-grandson of King Alexander, married 
a wife out of the family of the Lyncestse, who 
was at the same time the daughter of an Elimiote, by 
name Eurydice. Amyntas proved his capacity for govern- 
ment, by remaining true to the policy of his house ; among 
the Greeks of distinction who lived near him, we find, 
with others, the physician Nicomachus, the father of Aris- 
totle. But Amyntas also had close to him insidious ene- 
mies ; for which reason he sought to fortify himself against 
fresh dangers by establishing a connexion with the Chalci- 
dian towns. The feelings of mutual opposition became 
again intensified ; and in the seventh year the Lyncestse 
set up a new counter-king ; the Hlyrians were again power- 
ful in the land, and even the Thessalians, who possibly 
considered themselves as deceived with regard to the claims 
which they thought to possess, sided against Amyntas.* 

* Into these ten years fall the following reigns: Orestes, 399-6 b. c, son of 
Archelaus ; removed by his guardian, the Lynceste ^ropus ( = Archelaus 
II.), 396-2 ; Amyntas II., 392-90, according to von Gutschmid, p. 105, an ille- 
gitimate son of Archelaus; Pausanias, 390-89, son of iEropus. Next 
follows Amyntas III.; cf. von Gutschmid, p. 107. Nieomachus: Suidas, «. « 

Chap. I.J The KuKJiloMS of the North. 41 

He now more and more threw himself into the arms of 
the Greeks ; the coast-towns were his last anchor of hope. 
In his distress he promised them all possible commercial 
advantages, and gave up to them nearly the whole of 
Lower Macedonia, while the upper part of the country 
was in the hands of the Illyrian party. For two years he 
was a lackland king, till at last he after all succeeded, 
with the help of the Greeks, in recovering his throne (b. c. 

Hereupon fortune once more smiled upon and 381 _ 
the sorely- tried prince. He not only con- 369 - 
trived to maintain himself against the parties in the 
country itself, but he also beheld the superior power of 
those Greek states which were dangerous to him collapsing 
without any effort on his part. Against the Olynthians 
who even had possession of Pella (vol. iv. p. 326), the 
Lacedsemonians intervened, rendering to the king the in- 
estimable service of humbling the arrogant neighbor-city. 
But Sparta herself was unable to reap the advantages of 
her successes ; inasmuch as, having been vanquished by 
Thebes, she was forced to renounce all territories under 
her dominion abroad. Hereupon a totally new power 
formed itself to the south of the Macedonian kingdom, viz. 
the Thessalian ; and the Macedonians now inclined 
towards the Athenians, because they were always friends 
with that state, whose centre was furthest distant from 
their own domain. But in Thessaly, too, affairs took an 
unexpectedly favorable turn. For the danger which was 
undoubtedly imminent from that quarter, collapsed with 
the death of Iason (vol. iv. p. 472) ; and the troubles im- 
mediately ensuing upon this decisive event now even in- 
duced the Macedonians, whose policy had hitherto merely 
consisted in cunningly taking advantage of the condition 
of affairs presenting itself from abroad, to interfere 
for their part in the history of the neighboring countries. 
Alexander, the successor of Amyntas, crossed the moun- 

42 History of Greece. [BookVil 

Alexander tains > and occupied Larisa and Crannon. 
IL This was the first independent deed of Macedo- 

B. c. 369— 368. • i • - „ 

man policy, the first step towards a hegemony 
over the North ; — but the proceeding was too strongly 
characterized by violence; garrisons were kept in the 
cities against rules of right and express promises ; and the 
AleuadaB were suppressed, in whose aid the expedition had 
been undertaken. And thus the consequence was, that the 
Thebans made their appearance in Thessaly, and obliged 
the Macedonians to evacuate it. Indeed, instead of 
having reduced a country on their borders to dependence 
upon themselves, as had been their intention, they, by 
reason of their unsuccessful intervention, now themselves 
became dependent upon a foreign state, which was with 
mighty energy extending its influence to the north as well 
as to the south. Theban troops entered Macedonia, where 
new quarrels had broken out, and the Theban general be- 
came umpire between king and anti-king (vol. iv. p. 475). 
The anti-king's name was Ptolemseus. His 

Ptolemseu9. ° 

wire was a daughter of Amvntas ; but at the 

B. c. 368-365 

same time he lived in amorous intercourse with 
Eurydice, the widow of Amyntas, who favored him as 
against her own sons. Pelopidas thought best to serve the 
Theban interest, by endeavoring to satisfy both candidates 
for the throne. Alexander remained king, after having 
promised his alliance to the Thebans and given hostages ; 
while his adversary received a principality in Bottisea. But 
this compensatory arrangement only served to irritate the 
ambition of the pretender. Soon Alexander was made away 
with ; and Ptolemseus, united to Eurydice, now reigned 
professedly in the name of the younger brothers, over all 

His rule was, however, regarded in the land as a crimi- 
nal usurpation, and provoked vehement resistance. The 
friends of the murdered king repaired to Thessaly, where 
Pelopidas was still present at the head of an army of mer- 

Chap. L] ^he Kingdoms of the North. 43 

cenaries; and at the same time Pausanias, a banished 
adherent and relative of the royal house, invaded Mace- 
donia, took a number of towns, and became the head of a 
large party. The haughty Eurydice and her paramour 
were placed in a most critical position. Without any 
secure support in her own realm, she turned her eyes to 
the Attic vessels, which were at that time, under the com- 
mand of Iphicrates, cruising in the waters of Amphipolis, 
in order to observe the progress of affairs. In the charac- 
ter of representative of the legitimate order of succession, 
and mother of the rightful heir to the throne, this woman, 
whose recent course had been one of arbitrary violence, 
addressed herself to the Athenian general, and humbly 
craved his succor against Pausanias. Attic and Theban 
influence now met face to face in Macedonia. Iphicrates 
stayed the progress of Pausanias, but was without the 
necessary resources for thoroughly effective measures. The 
influence of Thebes was the stronger of the two. On the 
other hand, however, Pelopidas was prevented by the un- 
trust worthiness of his troops from asserting himself with 
decisive results. He was unable to settle the T „ 


quarrel in the sense of those at whose sum- settlement 

by Pelopidas. 

mons he had come ; he had to content himself 
with forcing the Macedonians once more to acknowledge 
the influence of Thebes as paramount, and to put an end to 
that of Athens. With the aid of Thebes Ptolemseus again 
firmly established his rule, but on condition that he should 
only reign as the guardian of the children of Amyntas ; 
while he was forced, by way of security, to give hostages, 
who were taken to Thebes. Among these was his son 
Philoxenus, and probably also the younger son of Amyn- 
tas, Philip. If this was the occasion on which the latter 
came to Thebes, the object was to withdraw one of the 
legitimate heirs to the throne from the dangers threatening 
them in Macedonia itself, and thereby at the same time to 
have at command a source of authority as against the regent 

44 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

But this settlement, the result of a weak compromise 
sincere on neither side, likewise failed to endure. Per- 
diccas, the elder of the two surviving sons of Amyntas, 
was only awaiting the hour of vengeance. No sooner had 

Perdiccas ^ ie » on reacnm g maturity, become conscious of 
IIL his powers and duties, than, careless of the 

arrangement made by Thebes, he came for- 
ward as the avenger of his brother against Ptolemseus, 
overthrew him, who had for three years occupied the 
throne gained by murder and adultery, and contrived 
rapidly to acquire authority as an independent sovereign. 
This he effected by energetically confronting all his ene- 
mies, making victorious war upon the Illyrians, and then 
establishing the independence of the kingdom against 
Thebes as well as against the Chalcidians. Fortune 
favored him ; for very soon after the death of Pelopidas 
Thebes ceased to be a source of danger. Against the 
Chalcidians he availed himself of the Athenians, and sup- 
ported the undertakings of Timotheus. This commander 
achieved precisely as much success, as corresponded to the 
intentions of Perdiccas. The power of Olynthus was 
broken, but the purposes of the Athenians were not ac- 
complished ; in particular they were unable to master 
Amphipolis, whose great importance the king fully appre- 
ciated. In order to strengthen his dynasty, he recalled 
his brother Philip, and gave to him a separate princi- 
pality. Everything was proceeding according to the 
wishes of Perdiccas, when in the sixth year of his reign 
a fresh revolt broke out against the dynasty of the Temen- 
idse ; Illyrians once more swarmed into the land ; the 
young king fell in a bloody battle, together with a large 
number of loyal Macedonians; and once more the 
realm was in a condition of terrible and hopeless confu- 

• Perdiccas and Timotheus : Dem. ii. 14 ; Philol. xix. 248, 578. 

chap, i.] fj^ Kingdoms of the North. 45 

The heir to the throne was a child. Pre- Competi . 
tenders, old and young, made their appear- ^neV^ 6 
ance on all sides, and hoped now to be able pJJ^**^ ° f 
successfully to assert their claims. First, a 
step-brother of Perdiccas, Archelaus by name ; then, Pau- 
sanias, the leader of the Lynccstse, accompanied by Thra- 
cian auxiliaries placed at his disposal by Cotys ; again, 
Argajus, the former anti-king, supported by the Athenians, 
who desired to see on the throne of Macedonia a king 
owing his elevation to them. Finally, the Pseonians too 
rose, in order to turn to account for their own interests 
the difficulties of the house of the Temenidse, and to shake 
off the yoke of strangers. Pseonian chieftains designed to 
take the place of the Temenida3. 

The most insignificant of all those who sought 

.,,,., , . Philip II. 

the Macedonian throne, the one competitor 

B c 351-336 

who had no foreign forces at his command 
was yet the best prepared. This was the third son of 
Amyntas, Philip, whose time had now arrived. He was 
animated by the same princely spirit and courage which 
had possessed his brothers, Alexander and Perdiccas ; nor 
was he by their misfortunes frightened off from resolutely 
pursuing the same end. He had, quite unobserved, been 
admirably preparing himself for the events which had now 
actually taken place. Three years of adolescence spent at 
Thebes (b. c. 368-365) constituted a schooling, such as no 
prince of the North had before him undergone. Thebes 
was at that time a centre of contemporaneous history, a 
seat of all the arts of war and of peace, a city filled with 
generous self-consciousness, whose deeds had been great, 
though her resources had been small. In Thebes Philip 
had become a Greek. In accordance with his inborn 
sagacity he had abstained from all exclusiveness, such as 
might have been natural to one of his rank, in order that 
he might master whatever was to be learnt from the 
Greeks. He had been an inmate of the house of Pam- 

46 History of Greece. [BookVU 

menes, one of the foremost of the soldiers of Thebes (vol. 
iv. p. 442) ; and his intimate intercourse with his host had 
at the same time made him an admirer of Epaminondas, 
and initiated him into all the secrets of that great man's 
system as a general and a statesman. Nor had he remained 
a stranger to the higher intellectual culture which had 
found admission at Thebes ; he is even, according to a 
statement which is, however, doubtful, said to have been 
acquainted with Plato, and by Plato's pupil, Euphraeus, 
to have been recommended to Perdiccas. On the other 
hand, it was of great advantage to the future ruler, that 
he first learnt in a smaller dominion to govern inde- 
pendently, and to recover his familiarity with Macedonian 
ways. Here he turned to account the lessons he had 
learnt at Thebes : how great things were to be achieved in 
a small sphere of action, and how quite unobservedly might 
be trained the nucleus of an excellent army, capable of 
deciding the course of events when the right moment 
should have arrived. At the head of a well-disciplined 
and devoted military force he suddenly came forth from 
his obscurity. The multitude of his enemies was rather 
an advantage to him than the reverse ; for it caused the 
resistance to him to be split up. In proportion as the 
confusion increased, and as foreign influences asserted 
themselves from a greater number of quarters, the patriots 
hastened to gather round the one surviving son of Amyn- 
tas. Macedonia was in the camp of Philip.* 
nis acces- Hereupon he displayed endowments, such as 
no man had expected in the youth. He was 
at this time twenty-three years of age, of a 
noble figure and princely bearing, master of all that skil- 
fulness of conduct, versatility, and knowledge of the world, 

* Philip's triennium at Thebes : Justin, vii. 5 ; Diod. xvi. 2. Through 
Pammenes he became a ^tjAwtjjs 'Enafiei-ixtivSov, Plutarch, Pelop. 26; Carystius 
Pergamenus from a letter of Speusippus, ap. Athen. 500; Fr. Hist. Gr. iv. 357, 
where Philip, as owing his sovereignty to Plato, is accused of ingratitude 
As to Euphraeus of Oreus, cf. Bernays, Dial, des Aristot. 21, 143. 

B. c. 359 

chap. I.] TIw Kingdoms of the North. 47 

which were only to be acquired in Greek cities ; he spoke 
and wrote Greek fluently and with taste. But he took 
care not to give offence by his foreign culture, for he 
wished not to appear a stranger among the Macedonians. 
He hunted and feasted with them like a true child of the 
land ; he was the best swimmer and horseman, the most 
excellent of comrades in all national exercises and social 
pleasures to the young nobility, whom he contrived to 
sway, without allowing them to become aware of the real 
cause of his superiority. He assembled around him the 
chiefs of the several districts of the kingdom, knowing how 
to take hold of every one of them in his own way, and to 
turn to account his strength and his weakness alike ; while 
in the people he managed to arouse confidence in his 
person by skilfully making known the sayings of oracles. 
The citizens of the royal town of JEg&s, whom Argsens 
sought to attract to his side, decisively declared for Philip ; 
and soon it was no longer by uncertain expectations or by 
favorable divine signs, but by the most brilliant successes, 
that he was before all eyes proved to be the one man des- 
tined by fate to re-establish the kingdom out of its collapse. 

He had in him many of the ways of a barbaric prince, 
in consonance with the usage of the Northern peoples ; 
he could be savage and intemperate, and give himself up 
to sensual pleasures even to the extent of bestial indul- 
gence. But he never lost sight of his higher aims. He 
was wrathful and merciful, valorous and cunning, obstinate 
and ready with concessions, just as circumstances de- 
manded ; there was in him a combination of royal dignity, 
natural vigor and Hellenic culture, such as was necessary, 
if Macedonia was at last to be made strong at home and 
powerful abroad. 

With unfaltering sagacity he ridded himself of his ad- 
versaries. Archelaus had to pay for his claims to the 
throne with his life ; Argseus was surprised during his 
retreat from iEgse and destroyed, while the Athenians in 

48 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

his army were allowed to go free without a ransom. The 
Pseonians were induced by gifts to retire ; and the Thracian 
king was likewise by means of a peaceable settlement 
brought to abandon the cause of Pausanias. 

Thus Philip became king of the land ; and nowhere was 
thought taken in these times, when a thorough man was 
needed on the throne, of asserting the claims of his nephew, 
who was under age ; especially inasmuch as there was any- 
thing but a definitely fixed order of succession in Mace- 

His first What was first required to be done, was 
mentJ e * *° es ^ aDnsn the kingdom in a position of se- 
01. cv. 2 (b. c. cur ity an d freedom as against the neighbors of 
358 >- the realm. This was a twofold task, accord- 

ing as the coast or the neighbors towards the interior 
had to be dealt with. The latter had been the chief 
impediments to a continuous prosperity on the part of 
the Macedonian kingdom ; for three generations the in- 
fluences opposed to one another had alternated like ebb 
and tide. At one time the Illyrians had flooded the land, 
at another the Temenidse had again made their appear- 
ance ; Macedonia incessantly oscillated between Hellen- 
ism and barbarism, till in truth it was unknown who was 
really master in the land. If, therefore, there was to be 
any question of an assured progress, this conflict must be 
definitively suppressed, Macedonia must be emancipated 
from the barbarous countries around it, and secured 
against the intervention of foreign force ; it must at last 
belong to its own people, and become free, and sure of it- 
self and of its royal house. 

Philip was at an early age master of the art of isolating 
his enemies, and of overcoming the dangers, to which he 
must have succumbed, had they all come upon him at one 
time, by the process of meeting them one after the other 
at the season suitable to himself. Thus after acquiring 
freedom of action in the interior, he first marched against 

Chap i.] pfe Kingdoms of the North. 49 

the Pseonians, with whom he had arrived at a temporary 
settlement. They were now once for all to acknowledge 
the superior strength of Macedonia, and to renounce all 
influence upon the affairs of the kingdom. He availed 
himself of the moment, when confusion had been created 
among the people by the death of the warlike king Agis, 
and when no preparations existed for a lasting resistance. 
After completely humbling the Pseonians, he attacked the 
Iilyrians, who constituted a mighty military force under 
Bardylis, a man who had risen from the occupation of a 
charcoal-burner to the throne. They held a number of 
Macedonian towns, and were by no means minded to re- 
linquish the authority acquired by them in the Macedoni- 
an kingdom in consequence of the endless disputes about 
the succession and party-conflicts there. A bloody, but 
decisive battle was fought, which forced the Iilyrians to 
withdraw all their garrisons, and acknowledge the moun- 
tain ridges, which form the natural boundary between the 
eastern and western inclines, to be henceforth the frontier 
of their territory. 

These successes Philip owed to the art of „. 

r His re- 

War, which he had learnt in Greece, where (°. rm s in the 

7 kingdom and 

he had had opportunities of convincing him- in tno mili - 

. . . tary system. 

self of the political importance of useful re- 
forms in military organization. He developed fully what 
his predecessors, Archelaus in particular, had commenced. 
The right of every free man to bear arms became the duty 
of bearing arms, the regular obligation to military service, 
for which the king furnished the arms and pay. The 
equipment of his soldiers was upon the whole that of the 
Greek hoplites, but it included certain details derived 
from ancient Macedonian usage. Among these were the 
large round shield studded with bronze, and above all the 
sarissa, a spear, the length of which is stated to have ex- 
ceeded twenty feet. Shield joining shield, the men of 
Macedonia formed the closely-united phalanx, the firm 

50 History of Greece. [Book vn. 

central body of the national forces, which stood like an 
unassailable solid mass, with its motionless front and pro- 
jecting forests of spears. Besides the phalanx, there ex- 
isted as a separate division of the infantry the species of 
troops called Hypaspistce, who were probably more lightly 
armed and more loosely organized. They were in a 
special sense a roy*.\l corps, of which part was always un- 
der arms and at the disposal of the king for every sudden 
emergency. The mountaineers were after their fashion 
employed to strengthen the military force, serving as 
light-armed troops and bowmen, as e. g. the Agrianes from 
the upper Strymon. Foreigners were used by Philip, 
where they seemed to promise to be of advantage, in par- 
ticular Greeks of the widest variety of origin ; he had 
captains from Tarcntum, archers from Crete, while skilled 
workmen from Thessaly built engines of war for him. 
Special attention was devoted by him to the cavalry. At 
its head was the proper place of the king, whose person 
was surrounded by a picked body of horsemen. These 
formed the royal guard of honor, to which the sons of the 
nobility belonged, who entered the king's service as pages, 
were subject to his immediate training, and afterwards, 
if they had proved their efficiency, rose to the highest 
posts in the army. A corresponding band of companions 
or iralpot of the king, who formed the solid nucleus of the 
army, was likewise to be found in the infantry. In these 
guards, horse and foot, the comitatns, which in the most 
ancient times had surrounded the chieftains on their expe- 
ditions for the conquest of territory, continued to exist in 
a form adapted to the requirements of the times. While, 
therefore, the townsmen, peasants and herdsmen of the 
land were in the army blended into a Macedonian 
nation, felt their coherence as members of one great whole, 
and learnt to obey a single will, and in this union to re- 
cognize the guarantee of peace at home and of victory 
against foreign foes, — the grandees of the land were per- 

Chap, i.] TJ ie Kingdoms of the North. 51 

sonally associated with the interests of the throne ; an in- 
dependent, or indeed recalcitrant, nobility of landed pro- 
prietors was changed into a nobility of courtiers and sol- 
diers ; the acquisition of authority and wealth depended 
upon the favor of the king ; ambition attracted the young 
nobles near his person, and rendered them props of the 
monarchical power. This committee, always under arms, 
of the army of the realm, with the members of which the 
king lived on terms of a certain comradeship — this so- 
called agema was at the same time regarded as bearing in 
some respects a character resembling that of a popular 
representative body as towards the king. Thus Philip 
knew how to combine old things and new, foreign ele- 
ments and native, Macedonian usages and Greek inven- 
tions, and by means of the organization of the army to 
give firmness and solidity to the whole country. And 
this was of all the more importance, inasmuch as hitherto 
Macedonia had been a loose group of mountain-cantons, 
devoid of any town-centre. 

But the main point was this : that Philip not only gave 
laws and established institutions, but was himself the soul 
of all, controlling all relations by the superiority of his 
intellectual power, making high and low dependent upon 
himself, steeling and developing his soldiers, and thus 
creating an empire which possessed a living unity in the 
person of him, its sovereign military chief. 

In this way Philip had raised his paternal His f ore j gn 
kingdom from its low estate, and thus he had P° llc y- 
succeeded in drawing firm frontiers round the land 
wrested from his adversaries, and in so to speak damming 
it up against the inundations of the savage neighboring 
peoples. Now, and not before, thought could be taken of 
a Macedonian system of policy, and attention given to 
the world outside Macedonia. Here it was a directly 
opposite task which awaited him. Here the inland state 
stood opposed to the maritime powers, the barbarian to 

52 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

the Hellenes. Towards the interior, it behooved him to 
shut off the kingdom ; but towards the sea, to open it ; 
here the resources of the neighbors of Macedonia had, 
not to be warded off, but to be secured for the state 

From this point of view there were three powers, upon 
the relations of whom to Macedonia all ulterior successes 
depended. These were Athens at the head of her Mari- 
time League, commanding the coast of the Thermasan 
Gulf; Amphipolis on theStrymon; and Olynthus on the 
Thracian peninsula, the mighty city enjoying the primacy 
among the Greek towns of the surrounding district. If 
these three acted in unison, nothing was to be accom- 
plished ; for then Macedonia must remain an inland and 
a petty state, in an oppressive condition of dependence 
upon foreign powers. The one thing absolutely indispen- 
sable, therefore, was that the Greeks should not penetrate 
the designs of Philip ; they must be kept deceived and 
divided as long as possible ; and by their mutual distrust 
one Greek city must be made to promote Philip's schemes 
against the other. 

Amphipolis The first which was in question was Amphi- 
and Athens. p ^ Sj t h e f a tal city, the source of so much 
grief to its parent, the maritime policy of Athens. How 
many brave bands of Attic youth had perished on these 
shores in conflict with the Thracians, before a lasting 
settlement had been brought to pass ! At last success had 
crowned these endeavors, and in all the pride of hopeful- 
ness the city at the mouth of the Strymon had been built 
(vol. ii. p. 537). For twelve years the Athenians had 
rejoiced in the possession of the rapidly-progressing city ; 
then it had fallen away from them ; since which time the 
faithless daughter-city had been an incessant subject of 
vexation and most painful annoyance to the Athenians. 
All their labors, contests, and sacrifices were lost to them ; 
and the costliest of constructions by land and by water 

chap, i.j fj Le Kingdoms of the North. 53 

had been made for others, and those others the foes of 
Athens ; for this very city, designed to become the coping- 
stone of Attic maritime supremacy and the dominant 
fortress of the Thracian sea, now became the most danger- 
ous point of attack upon Athens, a basis of operations for 
the Lacedaemonian power, and in spite of the provisions 
of the Peace of Nicias had not been restored into the pos 
session of the Athenians (vol. iii. p. 291). The citizens 
themselves would have nothing to say to the mother-city ; 
Amphipolis was never an Attic town, as is attested by the 
dialect of its inscriptions ; the non- Attic population, from 
the first far more numerous than the Attic, brought about 
a close connexion with the towns in the vicinity. In 
them and in the Thracian tribes Amphipolis, after having 
remained loyal to Sparta longer than any of the other 
coast-towns, found a security against Athens, while at the 
same time it contrived to maintain itself independent in 
all directions. Magnificent silver coins give evidence of 
the splendid prosperity of the city. Hereupon ensued the 
revival of the Attic naval power; and simultaneously 
there commenced the fresh attempts of the Athenians 
upon Amphipolis, by means of negotiations with the 
neighboring powers, as well as of campaigns by land and 
by sea. But nothing was done with the necessary energy ; 
and when a success was obtained, it ended by changing 
into a failure. In b. c. 371 Amyntas solemnly acknow- 
ledged the claims of Athens ; and Iphicrates, probably 
with the aid of a party among the Amphipolitans favora- 
ble to Athens, succeeded in bringing into his power a 
number of hostages from their city. Its capitulation 
seemed at hand, when of a sudden the general was re- 
called, and the hostages were returned to the citizens 
through the treachery of Charidemus. Hereupon com- 
menced the efforts of Timotheus ; but however greatly he 
prospered in other respects (b. c. 365), before Amphipolis 
he too was deserted by fortune ; and his futile attack was 

54 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

reckoned as the ninth in the series of the expeditions 
undertaken against Amphipolis. It was also the last of 
them. For now Philip intervened, to whom the city on 
account of its commanding situation on the main roads 
along the coast, on account of its harbor, and of its wealth 
of timber and metals, was the nearest and most important 
of all positions outside of Macedonia proper, and an indis- 
pensable basis for operations in the direction of Thrace. 
But Philip was far from interfering by open force. He 
seemingly resumed the policy of his father, by recognizing 
afresh the claims of the Athenians upon their colony, and, 
in order at a time inopportune to himself to avoid all pos- 
sibility of conflict, withdrawing the garrison from Amphi- 
polis, which had already on several occasions been in the 
hands of Macedonian troops. Amphipolis honored the 
generous prince as its liberator; while the Athenians 
rejoiced in the good-will displayed by him towards them- 
selves, and entered into negotiations with him, in order 
even at the price of abandoning Pydna, which was still in 
their possession, to secure Amphipolis through the media- 
tion of Macedonia.* 

N .. Meanwhile, Philip had secured freedom of 

tions concern- action bv his victories over the Illvrians and 

ing Amphipo- J > t J 

lis. the Poeonians ; and his designs upon the Thra- 

cian coast now became palpable. Amphipolis saw the 
troops approach, and rapidly took the resolution which 
was alone capable of saving it. Two Amphipolitans of 
consideration, Hierax and Stratocles, repaired to Athens ; 
and the proud civic community now voluntarily did hom- 
age, opened its gates and harbors, its city and territory, 
and besought the protection of Athens against Philip. 

* Amphipolis and Athens: Weissenborn, Hellen. 13(> ff. Treason of 
Charidemus: Dem. xxiii. 149. Fresh defeats: Sehol. iEschin. p. 754, ed. 
Reiske ; p. 29, edd. Baiter et Sauppe. J. de Witte, Medai'lles d' Amphipolis (in 
Revue Numism. 1864).— Macedonian troops in Amphipolis, at the request 
of Perdiccas, according to the probable conjecture of Grote, vol. x. p. 510, and 
yol. xi. p. 300. 

Chap, i.] T ne Kingdoms of the North. 55 

But contemporaneously envoys from Philip himself made 
their appearance. They renewed the alliance which had 
been concluded already after the victory over Argseus, 
and at the same time made a confidential communication 
concerning Amphipolis, designed to remove all fears and 
misconceptions. The Athenians were reminded how they 
had already acknowledged the king to be their friend ; 
how he had condoned their support of his adversary, and 
had sent their soldiers home with donations (p. 47). As 
to Amphipolis, that arrogant city was as much an enemy 
to him as to the Athenians. He would humble it; where- 
upon they should receive the city out of his hands as a 
pledge of his friendship. 

Thus the city, for the possession of which the Athenians 
had carried on so many futile contests, was of a sudden 
voluntarily offered to them from two sides ; and it seemed 
as if they had simply to choose, out of whose hands they 
would accept it. On calm reflection the citizens ought 
not to have remained in doubt as to choice. With regard 
to the Amphipolitans there was no reason for mistrust. 
They were in trouble, and since no alternative was left 
them, preferred losing their independence to Athens to 
losing it to Philip. But as to Philip on the other hand, 
what could induce him, whose comprehensive spirit of en- 
terprise must have already been so secret, first to take the 
trouble of conquering the most important city in his im- 
mediate vicinity, and then to surrender it again, and sur- 
render it to a state, which was more than any other 
capable of hindering the extension of his empire? In 
any case, it must assuredly have suggested itself to the 
Athenians, that the motive of this surrender would not be 
pure kindness of heart, but that it would be accompanied 
by conditions fully counterbalancing such a sacrifice. 

The Athenians had quite recently accomplished a suc- 
cessful expedition to Euboea ; their navy was in full 
activity ; — how then could the Amphipolitans anticipate, 

56 History of Greece. [Book vil 

that their offer would be refused ? And yet this was the 
case. Instead of gladly seizing the opportunity, the 
Athenians were deluded enough to abandon themselves to 
the influence of a petty sensitiveness. They took pleasure 
in letting the obstinate city undergo a well-deserved 
chastisement, and thought themselves secure of obtaining 
possession of it without exertions, without sacrifices, and 
without giving offence to the magnanimous and benevo- 
lent king. They were vain enough to deem the friendship 
of Athens so great a blessing, that they thought it quite 
natural for even a powerful king to incur some expense in 
order to secure it.* 

This mistake on the part of the Athenians 

Conquest of r 

Amphipoiis. was worth more to Philip than a victory in 
(i$. c. 357). battle, and was at the same time the most fa- 
vorable of signs for all ulterior enterprises. Amphipolis 
was rapidly attacked and taken (b. c. 357) ; and hereup- 
on there remained nothing for the king to fear but a com- 
bination between Olynthus and Athens. Olynthus which 
had calmly looked on at the fall of Amphipolis, could no 
longer remain neutral. Immediately after that event the 
Olynthians had accordingly represented to the Athenians 
the situation of affairs on the Thracian coast, and pro- 
posed to them an alliance against Philip. But at Athens 
belief was still rife in the magnanimous king ; and the 
more that his good-will was now of importance, the less 
were they inclined to undertake anything against him. 
For although they had no longer any very sanguine ex- 
pectation of an unconditional transfer of Amphipolis into 
their hands, yet they hoped to be able to recover the longed- 
for possession on the Strymon by means of an exchange of 
it for Pydna; and this project was treated with much self- 
importance as a secret of state by the Attic politicians. 

* Hierax and Stratocles: Theopomp. ap. Harpocr. s. v. 'Iepaf. Decree 
of banishment against Philo and Stratocles after the capture of the city: 
Corp. Inter. Gr. No. 2008 ; Sauppe, Inscr. Haced. 20 ; Philistor, ii. 492. 

chap, l] ^he Kingdoms of the North. 57 

But Philip needed no exchanges or volun- A n iance b e . 
tary offers ; he took what he required. He {^01 *£ ilip 
unhesitatingly advanced into the territory of thus - 
the Attic Confederacy ; seized Pydna ; and no 
sooner had he by this step openly brought about a rupture 
with Athens, than he concluded an alliance with the Olyn- 
thians, whom Athens had rejected : an alliance, which was 
of so much immediate importance to him, that he even 
consented to considerable concessions in order to bring it 
to pass. Since, then, a dispute had long prevailed between 
Macedonia and Olynthus as to Anthemus, the port-town 
on the Thermaean Gulf (p. 28),. he now abandoned it to 
the Olynthians ; indeed, he also promised them Potidsea ? 
which closed against them the access to the island of Pal- 
lene, and which was at the present time the most im- 
portant support of the Attic power in Thrace. Potidsea 
fell, before the Attic ships arrived ; and the Athenians, 
taken by surprise, suddenly found themselves, without a 
war or a declaration of war, driven out of their most im- 
portant positions, deprived of all their allies, and complete- 
ly beaten out of the field. They hurled wrathful manifes- 
toes against the faithless king, but were unable to change 
anything of what had been done ; for they were shackled 
by the defection of their confederates, and amidst the con- 
fusion created by the events of the war were utterly in- 
capable of accomplishing anything of consequence on be- 
half of their possessions in the North. 

Philip had now full freedom of action, and The mineg 
contrived to take advantage of his gains for of Thrace - 
further acquisitions. For to him the city on the Strymon 
was only the key to that district beyond the river, which 
projects like a peninsula into the sea and forms on the one 
side the Strymonian Gulf, on the other the deep bay, 
separated by the island of Thasos from the open sea. In 
the centre of this projecting coast there rises at a height 
of 6,000 feet Mount Pilaf-Tepe, the ancient Pangseum, a 


58 History of Greece. [BooeVIL 

lofty range abounding in snow and difficult to cross, but 
on account of its subterranean treasures the most valuable 
piece of territory in the entire coast-region of the Archi- 
pelago. For although the Hebrus washed precious 
metals down from the HaBmus, although the Paeonians 
turned up gold with their ploughshares from their fields, 
and Thasos possessed mines of its own, yet Pangaeum was 
by far the most productive source of gold and silver. 
Ever, therefore, since the Phoenicians had first brought 
these treasures to light, they became again and again the 
subject of bloody conflicts. For here the most warlike 
Thracian tribes dwelt in close proximity, in particular the 
Satrae and the Bessi, who adored on the summit of the 
mountains their national god, called Dionysus by the 
Greeks ; next to them the Pierians, who had been pushed 
from the south to the base of Pangaeum, the Edoncs and 
others. Certain of the tribes settled here, e. g. the Edoncs, 
the Letaeans, the Orrhescians, as early as the sixth century 
b. c. coined their native silver; and, although they 
frequently quarrelled among themselves, yet they were 
united in defiantly defending the treasures of their land 
against any stranger. This was experienced by all who 
stretched forth their hands for the possession of these dis- 
tricts, among them by Aristagoras, who perished with his 
whole army, when endeavoring firmly to establish the 
dominion, which Histiaeus had founded in the land of the 
Strymon (vol. ii. p. 189). The Thasians contrived to 
maintain themselves longest on the gold-coast ; they 
founded settlements on the shore, whence although only to 
a limited extent, they explored the mines ; and their 
colony of Datum became proverbial for a locality over- 
richly endowed with all the good things of the earth. But 
even to them the gold brought no lasting good fortune. 
First they were humbled by the Persians, who themselves 
made the attempt of controlling the iEgean from Abdera 
(vol. ii. p. 226); and afterwards they had to contend 

Chap, i.j Tfa Kingdoms of the North. 59 

against Athens. Hereupon the Thracian gold acquired 
its significance in the history of the Greek states. It 
stimulated Sparta to ally herself with the Thasians; it 
tempted the Athenians to these shores ; and one of the 
most terrible routs ever suffered by them made the names 
of Datum and Drabescus words of terror to every Attic 
ear (vol. ii. p. 403). But they refused to be awed away. 
They founded, opposite to Thasos, the town of Neapolis in 
the bay of Antisara, the ancient port belonging to Datum ; 
and the new city became a flourishing colony. And yet 
they never thoroughly succeeded in securely possessing 
themselves of the district and turning to account its trea- 
sures. The Thracian tribes remained independent ; nor 
was it until a very late date, in the year before the acces- 
sion of Philip, that an attempt was made to penetrate 
from Thasos further into the interior. This took place at 
the instigation of Callistratus (vol. iv. p. 403), who even 
as an exile continued to pursue schemes of statesmanship. 
A body of settlers went up into the valley of the Angitcs, 
which flows into the Strymon to the north of Pangseum. 
There, in a well-watered region, was founded Crenides, a 
place most favorably situated for gold- washings. This 
was the first mining colony proper, which was called into 
life under Attic influence (b. c. 360). But this settle- 
ment only served the purposes of the enemy of Athens. 
For the little colony was so hard-pressed by the Thra- 
cians, that in its distress it applied for succor to Philip. 

Nothing could have better suited the wishes of the king. 
He had long kept in view the gold-mines ; they were in- 
dispensable to him for the execution of his schemes. Now, 
he could accomplish his purpose, not by forcing an en- 
trance as a conqueror, but by appearing as the friend and 
ally of Hellenes in their struggle against barbarous 
tribes. Three or four years after the foundation of the 
above-mentioned colony he advanced across the Strymon ; 
easily drove back the Thracians ; annexed to Macedonia 

60 History of Greece. [Book vn. 

all the land as far as the river Nestus ; hereupon, in the 
place of Crenides in the fair valley of the Angites, which 
has a convenient outlet towards the gulf, built a fastness, 
which became the centre of the entire district of the 
mines. He succeeded in accomplishing by a single blow 
that in which the troops landing here after voyages from 
remote cities had invariably failed, since he entered from 
the land-side with a regularly organized army of horse 
and foot, and had all his resources close at hand. The 
ancient curse which lay upon the gold country, seemed 
expiated ; land and people lost their savage nature ; roads 
were levelled ; marshes were dried up ; the very climate 
Foundation was thereby altered ; and at Philippi there 
of Philippi. began to nourish the first of those city-founda- 
'«!!I ' tions, in which Greek citizens served the pur- 

(B. C. 396). ' # r 

poses of the Macedonian kingdom. Now at 
last the working of the mines prospered, so as to produce 
an annual revenue of one thousand talents in cash 
(£244,000 tire). 

The produce of the mines, as in Thasos and at Athens, 
constituted the fundamental capital of a naval power, 
which was needed in order to ward off every attack by 
sea, to extend the dominion along the coasts, and to pro- 
tect Macedonian commerce. And for the foundation of 
a navy, as already Histiaeus had perceived, there existed 
no more favorable region. For in addition to the fine 
bays and passages through the sea, and to the inexhausti- 
ble wealth of timber, this coast possessed this great advan- 
tage over all others ; that, by taking advantage of the 
north-wind prevalent throughout the summer, any point 
situate to the south could be rapidly and easily reached, 
while approach from that quarter was rendered correspond- 
ingly difficult. And the favorable opportunity for sudden 
and unexpected landing was of additional importance, be- 
cause the Macedonians, before they possessed a real naval 
power, were forced to content themselves with such sudden 

chap, i.j The Kingdoms of the North. 61 

surprises and with freebooting, as Alexander of Phers9 
had done before them. Hereby sensible damage might be 
inflicted even upon naval states of far superior power.* 

The most important institutions in the newly-acquired 
territory were called into life, while Philip himself was 
occupied with fresh feuds with Thracians, Paeonians, and 
Illyrians, in the years 355 and 354. On his return to the 
coast, he attacked Methone, which hitherto, in order to 
calm the fears of the Athenians, he had allowed to con- 
tinue as a free city and as a member of the Attic Naval 
Confederation. The Athenians attached a high value to 
this city (p. 34) ; notwithstanding which, at the critical 
moment they came too late. Methone fell, and was de- 
stroyed. Thus, with the exception of the Chalcidian 
towns, the whole coast-line from the Thessalian Olympus to 
the river Nestus was now subject to a single prince. The 
barbarian state of a remote inland country, which a few 
years ago had not felt well assured of its own existence, 
had become a power in the Archipelago, a state which 
was even by the Persians recognized as a Great Power, 
which had no need to fear any of its neighbors, but was a 
cause of fear to all. 

With the acquisition of the mines and the 
successful rounding-off of the territory of the tem of coin- 
kingdom is connected the reform of the sys- 
tem of coinage, to which Philip attached great impor- 
tance. Hitherto it was precisely in the countries now 
united that a difference of standards had prevailed, which 
exercised a very disturbing influence upon traffic. There 
was an entire absence of any centre, from which the insti- 
tution of a regular system might have proceeded. Accor- 

* Concerning Panggeum, Philippi, Neapolis : Heuzey, Miss. Arch, de 
Macedoine; cf. Gottingen Gel. Anzeigeri, 1864, p. 1228.— Coins (but remarkably- 
few gold) of the Letaeans, &c, Brandis, 208.— A<£to? (Airov) ayaOCtv, Zenob. iv. 
34. Kpijeifie? : Diod. xvi. 3. *i'Ai7nro, ib. 8. Harpocr. and Steph. s. v. Datos. 
Cf. Boeckh, P. Ec. of Ath., vol. i. p. 15 [E. Tr.] ; Schafer, Demosthenes, i. 120 ; ii. 
25.— Improvement in the climate : Theophr. de caus. plant, v. 14. 

G2 History of Greece. [BookVU 

dingly, the Macedonian coinage had sought to attach 
itself to others in various directions. In the first instance, 
to the very ancient system of coinage in the Thracian 
towns and tribes (p. 58). Then, when in Thrace the Per- 
sian standard, as fixed by Darius, was adopted, — the stan- 
dard which, at the very time when the political power of 
the Persians was in a condition of utter decadence, had 
widely spread even on the European side of the seas, — 
king Archelaus likewise accepted it. In the times of 
Philip's reign, on the other hand, the money of Asia 
Minor, as regulated by the Rhodians, had spread through 
the whole of the Archipelago. According to this stan- 
dard, therefore, Philip, like Euagoras (vol. iv. p. 293), 
coined his royal silver. His coins show the growth of 
the prosperity of the kingdom, and the anxious care 
bestowed upon the interests of trade ; for their workman- 
ship is more careful than that of the coins of his predeces- 
sors. He treated the coinage of money as a royalty ; and 
caused all coins belonging to separate cities in his domin- 
ions to be suppressed, with the exception of those belong- 
ing to his colony of Philippi, which he thereby wished to 
distinguish, as it were, as a free imperial city. At the 
same time he introduced a regular gold coinage, which had 
hitherto, even in the parts of his territory most abound- 
ing in gold, been singularly inconsiderable. His gold 
piece, the Philippic stater, was in value nothing else than 
the Persian darieus, which was current throughout all 
Greece, and which was likewise the prototype of the Attic 
gold. Hereby he established his position as a prince of 
equal rank as towards the Great King, and by the well- 
regulated double standard of the public coinage of his 
kingdom introduced Macedonia into the general traffic of 
the world.* 

After Philip had firmly established his rule, and had 

* As to Philip's system of coinage, see J. Brandis, p. 250. 

chap, i.] y/te Kingdoms of the North. 63 

hereupon given to his kingdom such a terri- 

, . , , , . to „ . Philip and 

tory, that it could by virtue 01 its own re- Arybbas the 

, n . , , ~ Molossian. 

sources assert ltselr as an independent Great 
Power, the third chapter of his activity commenced, which 
was concerned with the relation of Macedonia to the sur- 
rounding states of the mainland. 

Towards the West he had already at an early period 
directed his attention, having entered into a combination 
with the most vigorous tribe of the Epirotes, the Molossi ; 
as had been done before him, and with the same inten- 
tions, by Iason of Pherse (vol. iv. p. 468). The Molos- 
sian princes had always undergone manifold pressure at 
the hands of the Illyrians ; after, therefore, the latter had 
been with so much vigor overthrown by Philip, it very 
naturally suggested itself to seek in him a support against 
the common enemy. For this reason Arybbas, the succes- 
sor of Alcetas, gladly consented to bestow the hand of his 
daughter Olympias upon Philip (before 357 b. a), in 
whom he already recognized an ally mightier than him- 
self; and by means of this connexion Philip found him- 
self able to exercise upon the land of his western neigh- 
bors an influence, and reserved it to himself for an oppor- 
tune moment, to turn this influence fully to account. 
For he was at present occupied with the incomparably 
more important and difficult task of bringing his relations 
with the states on his southern border into the condition 
necessary for the execution of his plans. 

The relations of Philip towards the Greek Philip and 
states resembled those which had of old ex- the Greeks ' 
isted between Croesus and the cities of Ionia. Neither of 
these princes was an enemy of Hellenism, or by any 
means desired its humiliation ; on the contrary, it was the 
fullest recognition of Greek culture and of the power con- 
tained in it, which induced them to make every effort to 
render these forces serviceable to their empires, which in 
no other way could attain to their full development. But 

64 History of Greece. [Book vil 

Philip approached incomparably nearer to Greek culture 
than the Lydian king ; and it was therefore much easier 
for Philip to attach himself to the traditions of Greek 
political life. While, therefore, the Asiatic prince saw no 
other way before him for the accomplishment of his ob- 
jects, than that of conquest, Philip designed to have him 
self acknowledged by the Greek states as the leader and 
director of their common efforts. Already his ancestors 
had been recognized as Hellenes ; he was himself a pupil 
of Greek training ; he had also as victor at Olympia (01. 
cvi. i. ; b. c. 356) in his own person acquired the Hellenic 
citizenship ; now, his state, which had become strong 
through Greek culture, was to be introduced into the 
Greek system of states, and as the most powerful in this 
group of states to assume the leadership over them. 

The position of affairs could not have been more pro- 
mising. Thebes had sunk back into her former impo- 
tence ; and after the death of Epaminondas Athens was 
the solitary state in which the idea of a national policy 
survived ; but it was merely a dreamy reminiscence of the 
past, which her citizens would not bear to renounce, while 
at the same time they felt themselves possessed of no vital 
powers for making the idea a reality. During the bloody 
feuds, which led to no decisive result, a weariness of the 
present condition of things, and a desire for peace and 
union, had come to be more and more widely felt ; and 
how were those ends to be reached otherwise than under 
the leadership of a state, which stood outside of the 
exhausted group of states, without being a stranger to 
them ? When Philip took into consideration this condi- 
tion of things ; when with his keen glance he perceived, 
how the petty states had degenerated, how the still exist- 
ing forces of population were uselessly consuming them- 
selves in party discord, in war and in a lawless life of 
mercenary service, how among the best citizens many 
were longing for a vigorous leadership, without finding 

chap. L] The Kingdoms of the North. Go 

the right men for the purpose in their own people ; when 
Philip could convince himself, how in the same measure 
in which the faith in the vitality of the small republics 
had sunk, the reputation of regal power had risen in the 
eyes of many of the most intelligent Hellenes : — he natu- 
rally and necessarily arrived at the conviction, that the 
objects of his personal ambition were also that which was 
historically necessary and alone rational, and must thus in 
the end be also acknowledged by the Greeks, in spite of 
their obstinate local patriotism and of their contempt for 
the Macedonian people. The national history of the 
Greeks had lived its life to an end in the orbit of their 
native country, in a more limited sense of the term, and 
under the form of republican constitutions ; if it was to 
have a future, the fresh vigor of the cognate peoples of 
the North must be added, and the direction of the 
national policy must pass into the hands of a prince, pos- 
sessing a dynastic power which was independent, and 
superior to all the petty states together. 

Philip, therefore, trod exactly in the steps 

/» t n ™ 1 i . -if Phili P the 

oi lason oi Pherse, but stood in a signally successor of 

more advantageous position, than that of 
lason had been. For while lason was confronted by the 
Thebans, who disputed the hegemony with him, there ex- 
isted at the present moment no Greek state capable of 
directing the affairs of Greece. Athens issued forth in 
pitiable and mortal exhaustion from the Social War ; of 
Sparta nothing was left but her ancient obstinacy ; Thebes 
was after the day of Mantinea incapable of holding her 
position, and of sustaining the system of policy which she 
had begun in Thessaly and in Peloponnesus. With the 
death of Epaminondas all the elements which that great 
statesman had united fell asunder again ; and there re- 
mained nothing but an unhappy and pernicious excite- 
ment. The history of the Greek people demanded the 
leadership of a state holding the primacy ; but the pri- 

66 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

niary position stood empty ; nor could it be presumed, 
that among the Greek states another would come forward, 
and display such a pre-eminence in power and moral 
force, as to be able to assert a claim to the hegemony. 

Philip's Moreover, Iason was a prince who had 

Greek policy. f 0linc [ e< i n i s dominion by arbitrary force ; he 

had no nation to fall back upon, and was not secure in his 
own house. Philip was a legitimate king, and master of 
incomparably greater resources ; he was in league with 
Greek states, an ally of the Great King, and in possession 
of the most important coast-territory; he therefore en- 
joyed an authority in the eyes of the Greeks quite differ- 
ent from that of Iason, who compared with Philip was an 
audacious adventurer. Finally, Philip was in a quite 
different degree equipped with the intellectual powers, 
indispensable to a prince desirous of transferring the 
motive power of the Greek world to the North ; he had 
gone through quite another schooling both abroad and at 
home. He was acquainted with all the resources of 
Greek statecraft, and knew how to employ them for his 
purposes. Like Themistocles, he contrived to apply the 
annual payments from the mines to the rapid construction 
of a navy ; from Brasidas he had learnt to know the 
weakest point of the Attic power; with Lysander he 
shared an utter unscrupulousness in the choice of means, 
and the art of crippling the power of resistance in the 
several cities by taking advantage of the internal party- 
divisions existing in them ; he was the scholar of Epa- 
minondas in the science of war, in the policy of interven- 
tion, in the settlement of cities as bases of influence 
abroad ; while lastly he was the successor of Iason in the 
method of bringing into his hands the hegemony over 
Hellas. That which had made the Athenians irresistible 
in the days of Cimon and Pericles, viz. rapidity and 
energy of action, was now the victorious force possessed 
by Philip ; he now stood in the same relation towards the 

Ehap.L] The Kingdoms of the North. 67 

Greeks, in which Athens had once stood towards the 
slowly-moving and irresolute Peloponnesians ; for he was, 
as the Athenians had been, at all times ready to strike ; 
he always advanced with rapidity upon his object, every- 
where drove his adversaries into a position of mere de- 
fence, and confounded them by the unexpectedness of his 
attack. Free from nervous impatience, he knew how to 
wait for the right moment, calmly to pause when at the 
very height of success, and to localize war within definite 
limits. He therefore from the first took care not to wear 
the aspect of a conqueror after the fashion of the Persian 
kings, lest perchance he might stimulate the Greek states 
to unite for common resistance and for a struggle of de- 
spair against him; he rather sought to espy suitable 
opportunities for interference in the affairs of Greece ; nor 
was he ever better satisfied, than when he found single 
parties or entire communities applying to him as the 
mighty neighboring prince, to undertake the office of a 
protector of those in trouble and of an umpire, so that he 
was thus able gradually to accustom the Greeks to recog- 
nize a supreme authority resting in his hands. But in 
order to give to such a position a semblance of justifica- 
tion, he, like Iason, could value nothing more highly, 
than admission into the Greek Amphictyony. The occa- 
sions needed for the purpose very soon presented them- 

Thessaly was the country, through which 

J * ' ° Interven- 

lay the road to Hellas. In Thessalv it be- ti( ? n in Th es- 

«/ saly. 

hooved Philip in the first instance to establish 
a footing, so that he might become the next-door neighbor 
of Interior Greece. With the state of affairs in Thessaly 
he had become sufficiently acquainted at Thebes. The 
Thebans had waged war against the Tyrannical dynasty 
of Pherse, and had prevented the union by force of the 
country. It was Philip's task to take up the policy of 
Thebes, and for his part to accomplish the tasks which 

68 History of Greece. lbookvil 

she had left unfulfilled. Alexander of Pherse (vol. iv. p. 
472) had been assassinated in the year 359, at the instiga- 
tion of his wife, by her brothers Tisiphonus, Lycophron, 
and Pitholaus. The last two resumed the struggle 
against the Thessalian nobility, who were at that time 
serving under the Thebans in the war against Phocis. 
The Aleuadse, abandoned by Thebes, applied for aid to 
Philip. He arrived at the head of an armed force, and 
was thereby simultaneously involved in the Sacred War, 
w r hich had at that time broken out. He thus took up 
the policy of the Thebans, not only as an adversary 
of the Thessalian tyrants, but also as an adversary of 

Phocis -^ or a gitation had l° n g prevailed in the 

highlands of Parnassus. This country, which 
had been only slightly affected by the earlier wars, was 
densely peopled ; it possessed a large class of peasants and 
herdsmen, whose natural strength was still unused, and 
whose manners were of great simplicity. The free inhabi- 
tants themselves attended to their rural business ; an an- 
cient law in Phocis even prohibited, or narrowly re- 
stricted, the possession of slaves. This state of things 
changed in the fourth century. In the towns individual 
families arose, which acquired a large amount of landed 
property and abandoned the ancient usages of the coun- 
try ; the house of Mnaseas owned one thousand slaves. 
Henceforth, one family sought to outstrip the other ; jea- 
lousy and hostility grew apace, e. g. between the houses of 
Mnaseas and Theotimus ; and these relations of mutual 
ill-will led to important consequences, when the Phocians 
were drawn forth out of their former retirement, and in- 
troduced into the complications of the Greek world. 
They had little concern with the general national inter- 
ests. The spirit animating them was one of defiant inde- 
pendence and hatred of their neighbors, of the Thessalians 
in particular, which already in the Wars of Liberation 

chap, i.j Th e Kingdoms of the North. 63 

had decided their political attitude (vol. ii. p. 274). In 
recent years they had against their will submitted to the 
Theban hegemony, and had, even while Epaminondas was 
still alive, refused to furnish a contingent for service be- 
yond their own boundaries against their friends the Spar- 
tans (vol. iv. p. 503). For this conduct they were now, 
after the battle of Mantinea, to be punished. For, in 
spite of the warning uttered by their great general, the 
Thebans were by no means minded immediately to re- 
nounce their position as a Great Power, and even at- 
tempted to draw the reins of their hegemony over Central 
Greece tighter than before. This stimulated the Phocians 
to venture upon the most resolute resistance ; their spirit 
of freedom, once aroused, grew after the first successes, 
and encouraged them to direct their efforts to ends 
yet greater than mere independence as towards Thebes. 
It was the exhaustion of the great states, which, as the ex- 
ample of Arcadia shows, at this time encouraged even the 
lesser popular communities to come forth from their obscuri- 
ty, and to pursue a policy of their own. Thus in Phocis 
also there was awakened a new spirit of state-autonomy 
and of a high-flown craving for glory. 

The Boeotians were not sufficiently superior Amphic . 
in strength to their neighbors, to be able alone aga?nst d pho- e 
to subdue them. They therefore sought to cis - 
take advantage of the ancient enmity of the 2^356) 
Thessalians against Phocis, and again of the 
authority of Delphi. Here they found no difficulty 
in drawing the officers of the temple into their interest, 
and causing the Pythian god to intervene, in order 
through his support to secure their object, the chas- 
tisement of their rebellious vassals. A suitable oc- 
casion soon presented itself in the complicated fron- 
tier-relations of the sacred district. Phocian landed 
proprietors were accused of having encroached upon 
the domain of the temple. For this the Council of the 

70 History of Greece. ibookVH 

Amphictyons now inflicted a heavy pecuniary penalty; 
while in the event of this remaining unpaid, Phocis was 
placed under the ban, and declared to be land escheating 
to the god. 

There existed from the first in Phocis a party, which 
recommended a compromise, when this storm gathered 
over the country. But vehement demagogues succeeded 
in making every voice of moderation die away. The mu- 
tual jealousy prevailing among the families contributed its 
effects. For at the head of the movement stood the 
houses of Theotimus and of Euthycrates, — the latter the 
same man, between whom and Mnaseas a violent quarrel 
concerning an heiress had broken out. The family-feud 
became a political struggle. Moreover, priestly guile 
had doubtless been concerned in the arrangement, accord- 
ing to which the house of Euthycrates, which was disliked 
at Delphi, had been hit especially bird in the sentence of 
the Amphictyons. Indignation at this sentence caused 
the son of Euthycrates, Onomarchus, to place himself at 
the head of the war-party, where a prospect opened to him 
of simultaneously satisfying his ambition and his family- 
hatred. Onomarchus was reputed the real author of the 
decisive decree. At his side stood Philomelus, the son of 
Theotimus. These were bold and highly-gifted men, po- 
tent in word and deed. Led by them, the popular assem- 
bly resolved upon energetic resistance against the demands 
of the Amphictyons. But this was not deemed enough. 
The entire political relations of the country were to be 
transformed ; for every element of vexation and hatred, 
which had gathered from of old among the Phocians 
against Delphi, against Boeotia, or against Thessaly, now 
came to light ; bitterest of all was the rage against Delphi, 
which was once more allowing itself to be used as the tool 
of the enemies of Phocis. This temple-state, it was declared, 
could no longer be tolerated ; the natural guardian of the 
sanctuary was the Phocian state, which ought not to permit 

chap, i.j ^ Xingdoms of the North. 71 

such a focus of hostile intrigue to continue to exist in the 
heart of its own district.* 

The Phocian people summoned up its energies for a 
new political career, and deemed itself called to great 
deeds. A general armament was decreed, and Philomelus 
was chosen commander, with Onomarchus as his colleague. 
Environed by bitter foes, the Phocians looked around for 
allies abroad, and placed their hopes above all in Sparta. 
For the Spartans, it was remembered, were lying under 
the same kind of sentence as the Phocians ; they had been 
for the second time condemned by the Delphic authorities 
on account of their criminal seizure of the citadel of Cad- 
mus, and like the Phocians had raised a protest against 
the sentence (vol. iv. p. 427). From Athens, too, support 
was hoped for. Both these states, it was thought, could 
not possibly remain tranquil supporters of the annihila- 
tion of an independent Phocis, and of the unconditional 
victory of the Thebano-Thessalian policy. Philomelus 
himself repaired to Sparta, where his plans met with ap- 
proval, and where he received promises and pecuniary 
support, but no real aid from any quarter. 

The Phocians were left to rely upon them- outbreak 
selves ; and from without they derived no ad- ^J** 16 Sacreci 
vantasre except through the tardiness of their nm 

& m r to # 01. cvi. 1 (B. C. 

adversaries, who shrank from decisive steps. 365 -) 
Philomelus accordingly perceived, that everything de- 

* Our knowledge of the (ten years' : Duris, ap. Athen. 560) Phocian war is 
entirely based upon Diodorus, whose sources were Theopompus, Demo- 
philus (the son and continuer of Ephorus), and Diyllus (the continuer of 
Callisthenes). Besides him we have Pausanias and Justin ; and in 
occasional points Demosthenes and iEschines. Cf. Flathe, der phokische Krieg, 
1854. — No slaves in Phocis : Athen, 264 c. — Quarrel about the heiress : 
Aristot. Polit. 200, 28. (Aristotle had an immediate acquaintance with the 
mother as the friend of Mnason, the son of Mnaseas, according to Timseus 
ap. Athen. u. a.) The rape of Theano the occasion of the war : Duris ap. 
Athen. 560 b. Sentence of the Amphictyons in August, 356 b. c. — Onomarchus 
7roAAats »eai fxeyaAai? Slko.k; vnb twv ' A/j.<t>LKTv6i><i)v ty KaraSeSiMurfAevos 6/aomoc 
toi? aAAot? (read oi>x opioi'ws), Diod. xvi. 32. Diod., c. 56 and 61, makea 
Onomarchus and Philomelus brothers. 

72 History of Greece. [BoorVH. 

pended upon rapid action ; by means of a bold advance 
he hoped to have the best chance of inducing his allies 
likewise to take part in the struggle. Nor indeed was it 
admissible for him to wait, until the members of the 
League were in arms, established themselves in the heart 
of the country under the pretext of protecting the temple, 
and controlled the connecting routes ; for the Phocian 
communities encircled Mount Parnassus, and could from 
Delphi be very easily hindered in their common action. 
He therefore urged on the armament, adding to it from 
his own resources, and, while outwardly peace still 
reigned, anticipated his adversaries by a bold sudden 
stroke. He occupied Delphi, where he de- 
at Delphi. meaned himself with the utmost rigor as the 
<d\. cvi. 1 (b. c. guardian of the sanctuary. Bloody ven- 
^Spring. geance was wreaked upon the families at Del- 
phi, which were particularly hostile in their 
sentiments and offered resistance ; their lands were confis- 
cated ; the Locrians who were coming up were driven 
back ; the memorials of the recent decrees were destroyed ; 
and the Pythia herself was forced to espouse the side of 
the Phocians. 

After this decisive advance, the necessity of a single 
leadership was felt even more keenly than before ; and on 
the part of the popular community all the powers of an 
absolute dictatorship were conferred upon Philomelus, who 
established his residence at Delphi, constructed a fort com- 
manding the ways of access to it, and issued a manifesto 
to the Greek nation, wherein he justified his apparent 
breach of the peace, and solemnly declared his intention to 
maintain intact the common sanctuary of Hellas, and to 
render an account of the treasures of Delphi.* 

The Thebans were manifestly extremely surprised by 
the resolute bearing and energetic action of the Phocian 
people. They had intended to use Delphi as the base of 

* Fort erected by Philomelus : Ulrichs, Reisen, i. 117. 

chap, i,] The Kingdoms of the North. 73 

their further operations for the humiliation of the despised 
Highlanders ; instead of which it had become a citadel of 
the foe, which they did not venture to approach. Philo- 
melus, who was forced to undertake expeditions of pillage 
in order to support his mercenaries, even threatened the 
Boeotian frontiers ; and the Thebans began to fear for 
their country-towns, whose loyalty was never to be de- 
pended upon. 

They accordingly summoned an Amphictyonic assem- 
bly to Thermopylae, where the adversaries of the Phocians, 
the Thessalians in particular, were represented. This was 
a diet in every respect illegal ; it however, de- 
clared itself to be the representative body of £ ic T JeJ ree 
the Hellenic nation, and claimed the rights of mo P.v 1;0 
such an assembly. Philomelus was placed un- lnelus > 
der the ban; and all the men capable of 01. cvi. 2(b. c. 
bearing arms were in the name of the Delphic Autumn, 
god summoned to take part in a Sacred War. All the 
tribes armed, which stood towards Thebes in the relation 
of communities bound to furnish military contingents ; 
once more Thebes found herself at the head of the popu- 
lations from Mount Olympus to the Corinthian Gulf, of 
the Locrians, Dorians, Thessalians, of the tribes of 
Mount (Eta and of the Pindus-range. They came in with 
great ardor for war, not in order to succor the Delphic 
god and his Pythia, but in order at last thoroughly to 
gratify their hatred against the Phocians (autumn of 
355). Greece was divided into two camps, according as 
it adhered to the one or the other side. For Phocis there 
was much sympathy, but little aid ; the two Great Powers 
were crippled, and auxiliaries came only from Achaia. 
Philomelus therefore had the greatest difficul- Conduct of 
ties to contend against ; and, although he was *!l e -, war t* 
originally a party-politician, swayed by ambi- 
tious designs and dynastic schemes, he yet showed him- 
self a born prince, and a man of mighty intellectual force. 

74 History of Greece. C BoOK vu 

In his eyes everything depended upon awakening confi- 
dence in his cause, and upon proving that the Phociaos 
were not a savage horde, but ripe for, and capable of, 
independence as a state, and worthy of taking their place 
among the other states. He maintained discipline and 
order, and by means of energetic counter-measures forced 
the enemy, who regarded his soldiers as sacrilegious de- 
spoilers of the temple, and was about to treat as such 
those who had fallen into his hands, to concede to his 
army equality of treatment according to the laws of war. 
But the worst evils he was unable to remove. They arose 
from the fact, that his power was based on mercenaries, 
whom he had rapidly collected by meaDs of excessive 
payments of money. His whole power was therefore in 
reality a money power. Under these circumstances it 
would have been miraculous, had Philomelus succeeded 
in throughout observing the moderation which he had made 
his law, and which he had openly recognized as an obliga- 
tion incumbent upon him. The temptation was too great. 
He and his friends were absolute masters of the best-filled 
treasury in Greece, — and were they from want of money 
to abandon the country to its most furious foes ? In point 
of fact, no choice remained for the Phocians, after they 
had once gone so far. Accordingly, a treasury-office was 
instituted ; and under its responsibility resort was had to 
the temple-treasure, in the first instance probably only in 
the form of a loan taken from the temple, afterwards, 
however, with increasing boldness and recklessness. The 
treasures, which had for centuries lain in a sacred place 
under the threshold of the temple, now found their way 
abroad ; and the more gold was found, the more was 
sought. The long-restrained ill-will against the priestly, 
city gratified itself by taking full advantage of its trea- 
sures ; not only was the gold cast into the mint, but the 
sacred relics too were laid hands upon, and precious orna- 
ments dating from the Heroic age were seen glittering 

Chap, i.j Tfo Kingdoms of the North. 75 

upon the necks of the wives of the captains of the mer- 
cenaries. 10,000 talents (nearly £2,500,000) are said at 
that time to have come into circulation ; nor were they 
merely expended as pay to the soldiery, but also applied 
abroad, in order to gain over influential personages, such 
as Dinicha, the consort of king Archidamus at Sparta, or 
on the other hand to excite favorable sentiments in the 
camp of the enemy.* And yet the Phocians could not 
secure a control over the fortune of war. 

After a series of successful contests, Philo- D f 
melus was attacked in the valley of Cephisus death of 
by a superior force, and involved in a battle, _ 

... Ol. evil. 1 

which ended in a defeat. He only escaped (b. c. 354). 
personal captivity by throwing himself, bleeding from 
many wounds, into the abyss from the rocky crags near 

Apparently, the Thebans regarded the cause victories 
of the Phocians as lost, inasmuch as about the °. f 0n °mar- 
same time they dispatched their best general, oicvi. 4(B. 
Pammenes, at the head of 5,000 men through °- ar)3) - 
Macedonia to Asia, where he was to support the satrap 
Artabazus against the Great King. But they were 
greatly mistaken, if they conceived the defiant spirit of 
the Phocians to have been broken. Even now the mod- 
erate party in the country was unable to prevail. Ono- 
marchus, who had probably long borne with difficulty his 
subordination to Philomelus, now assumed the first place, 
and his brother Phayllus the second ; the dynastic char- 
acter of the movement becoming more and more palpable. 
The house of Euthyceates stood like a royal family at the 
head of the people ; and, in order to gratify the ambition 
of that house, the bloody war was continued with fresh 
ardor. There were still more and more Delphic trea- 
sures to be turned into money ; fresh bands of soldiery 

* Dinicha and Archidamus are accused of corruption by Theopompus, op. 
Pausan. iii. 10, 3. 

76 History of Greece. [BookVH 

flowed in to serve the free-handed prince; under him 
Phocis was the first financial and military power in 
Hellas. Fortune likewise favored him. At Pherse new 
tyrants arose. He connected himself with them, sup- 
ported them with money, and thereby secured freedom 
from molestation in his rear. The Thebans had allowed 
their ardor to grow slack, while in a foolish dream of 
playing the part of a Great Power they had weakened 
their strength by undertakings at a distance. Of a 
sudden they found themselves no longer sure of their own 
land. For Onomarchus made himself master of all the 
advantages belonging to an energetically conducted war, 
occupied Thermopylae, and devastated the territories of 
the confederates of Thebes, in order to render the tribes 
of Mount CEta, the Dorians and Locrians, heartily sick of 
their obligation of furnishing military contingents to 
Thebes. Hereupon a revolt was provoked in Boeotia 
itself; while simultaneously an expedition was under- 
taken into Thessaly, in order there to secure the victory 
to the anti-Theban party. 

It was in Thessaly, then, that the complications ensued, 
which caused the Macedonian king to intervene directly 
in the quarrels of the Greeks, precisely at the time when, 
after accomplishing his more immediate tasks, he was 
seeking for an opportunity to extend his influence upon 
the countries of Greece. No opportunity could have been 
more favorable than that which now offered itself to him. 
He had on his side not only the ancient dynastic families 
of the land, which claimed his aid against Lycophron and 
Pitholaus (p. 67) but also the Thessalian people. For 
the Tyrants of Pherse were hated throughout the country 
on account of the arbitrary policy which they had at all 
times pursued ; and this aversion had naturally in a high 
degree increased, since they had allied themselves with 
the hereditary enemies of Thessaly, the Phocians. Philip 
could therefore reckon upon vigorous support in Thessaly 

chap, i.j T he Xingdoms of the North. 77 

itself; he appeared in the character of a protector against 
the savage mercenary bands which fed upon the spoils 
of the temple, and which had more and more become a 
plague to all Greece. And yet he found his next mea- 
sures far from easy of execution. At first, indeed, he 
without much difficulty drove back Phayllus, who had 
been dispatched against him in support of the Tyrants. 
But hereupon Onomarchus perceived, that Thessalian 
affairs would not admit of being treated as matters of 
secondary importance. He advanced at the head of all 
his forces from Boeotia, and threw himself with wrathful 
energy upon the new foe, who was minded to ruin his 
schemes. In two great battles he defeated the Macedo- 
nian king, so that the latter only escaped pursuit with the 
broken remnants of his army. The power of the Aleua- 
dae had thus been broken ; and inasmuch as simultane- 
ously Boeotia, whose union had been an effort of so much 
difficulty, was likewise iu a state of utter dissolution, 
Coronea, the ancient confederate city, falling into the 
hands of the Phocians, and Orchomenus again rising in 
opposition to Thebes, while the Tyrants of Pherse were 
eagerly endeavoring to obtain for their energetic protector 
the supremacy over all Thessaly, — it was indeed possible 
for Onomarchus, who nowhere saw an enemy worthy of 
consideration confronting him in the field, to indulge in 
the hope, that he would succeed in founding a dominion 
for himself and his house, which should unite a great part 
of the Greek mainland as a single empire. 

But king Philip had only inarched home Hig defeat 
in order to return better armed to the scene and death - 
of the conflict. After the lapse of a few c ^vi. 4 < B - 
months he was again in Thessaly, at the head 
of 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse. Here he contrived to 
turn to excellent account the hatred of Phocis, which had 
been provoked afresh by the late war ; he fired the troops 
with the thought, that they were fighting for a sacred 

78 History of Greece. t Bo0K VIL 

cause, and gained a bloody, but complete, victory. More 
than 6,000 of the enemy fell in the field, while 3,000 
prisoners were cast into the sea as sacrilegious violators of 
the temple. Onomarchus himself fell, and his dead body 
was nailed to the cross (spring of 352 B. c.).* 

The king pacified Thessaly, and, after expelling the 
Tyrants, immediately occupied the positions of the greatest 
moment to himself, which he had long resolved never to 
relinquish again ; viz. Pagasse, the most important 
harbor of all Thessaly, and the peninsula of Magnesia, 
which controlled the port, and the possession of which was 
of decisive significance for the mastery over all Thessaly. 
In order at the same time to be credited with some popu- 
lar measure, he declared Pherse, the city of the Tyrants., 
to be a free city, and was hereupon loudly celebrated as 
the saviour of Thessaly, as the benefactor of the Hellenes, 
and as the avenger of Apollo. 

Meanwhile, the party opposed to him was anything but 
annihilated. Phayllus became leader of the 
Phocians ; and it redounded to his advantage, 
that the victory of Philip had excited terror among the 
other Hellenes, and had roused them from their inaction. 
They beheld the Macedonian king — of whom they had 
been accustomed to think only as of a potentate on the 
distant frontiers of the Greek world, and who was known 
to them as a dangerous neighbor in the region of the colo- 
nies alone, — suddenly powerful in Thessaly, and standing 
with a victorious army on the boundary of Interior 
Greece. The Athenians without delay manned a fleet, 
and occupied Thermopylae. Had Philip continued his 
advance, in order to fight out the Sacred War, he would 
have united Phocis, Athens, and Sparta, in an armed alli- 
ance, and have driven them to pursue an energetic 
national policy. Such was not his intention. There still 

* Death of Onomarchus : Diod. xvi. 61. 

chap, x.j rpitc Kingdoms of the North. 79 

remained more dedicatory gifts and temple-vessels to melt 
into money ; succor arrived from Sparta and Achaia, and 
the Tyrants of Pherae as fugitive partisans supported the 
war of pillage in the territory of Locris. andPhal83 _ 
Phayllus died with his spirit unbroken, after JSId of h af- 
he had appointed his nephew Phalsecus, the fairs in Pho- 
son of Onomarchus, his successor; the cap- 
tainship in war had become a hereditary princely power.* 

But gradually the pecuniary resources failed. The 
war slackened ; it degenerated into a border-feud, which 
dragged on year after year without arriving at any deci- 
sion, and which, like an open sore, exhausted all the 
healthy forces of the population. More and more fields 
were left untilled ; more and more homesteads were burnt 
down, and fruit trees felled ; while the inhabitants were 
barbarized by the sufferings resulting from the war, which 
was carried on from year to year, without its being very 
clear with what object. Boeotia and Locris exhausted 
their strength, while the state of mercenaries was inevi- 
tably doomed to a thorough collapse. Neither side could 
obtain a result worthy of such enormous sacrifices. 
Everything remained undecided except that which king 
Philip had intended. He alone had secured any ad- 

His dominion now extended from the gold- Pnilip mas _ 
mines of Thrace to Thermopylae. Thessaly, g a 1 | ofThes " 
the land so indispensable to him with its c ^5 2 C ) Vi " 4(B; 
abundant resources, which had never before 
been united under the control of a single ruler, and had 
therefore never before been fairly turned to account, was 
at his feet, and the strongest natural boundary, Mount 
Olympus with its passes, no longer existed for him ; the 
military contingents of the Thessalians, above all their 
cavalry, were at his disposal ; in the Pagassean Gulf he 

* Phalsecus, nephew {qusere and adopted son ? Wesseling ad Diod. xvi. 38) 
of Phayllus : Diod. Schol. iEsehin. ii. 130 ; Pausan. x. 2, 6. 

80 History of Greece. [BookVU 

possessed a new naval station on the shores of the Greek 
sea, and in the port-dues levied there a new and rich 
source of income.* And all this he had achieved, not as 
a conqueror taking by force, but as a friend and bene- 
factor of the country, fighting for a just and national 
cause, on behalf of order and sacred usage against 
Tyranny and military despotism, and had achieved it after 
such a fashion, that those whom he had aided would be 
also unable to spare him in the future. He retained the 
threads in his hands ; he had thrown the bridge across 
into Interior Hellas, and calmly waited, till the hour 
should arrive for crossing it. In the meantime the Hel- 
lenes, in particular the immediate neighbors of Southern 
Thessaly, themselves did more than any foreign foe could 
have done thoroughly to consume the power of resistance 
remaining in Hellas ; and, after securing Thessaly, Philip 
was all the more able calmly to turn his attention to the 
tasks demanding it in the North. An empire such as his 
claimed the presence of the king at the greatest variety 
of points ; nowhere existed a fixed usage, everything was 
in a state of generation, and he was the soul of the whole. 
Accordingly, the rapidity of his marches, which excited 
the astonishment of all the world, was one of the most 
effectual means, whereby he made his empire firm and 

„,... . In the autumn of 352 he stood in Thrace: 

Philip in 9 

Thrace. forced the chiefs there to acknowledge his 
oi. cvii. i supremacy : advanced as far as the w r aters of 

(B. C. 352). r J ' 

the Pontus ; and concluded treaties of amity 
with Cardia on the Hellespont, with Byzantium and Pe- 
rinthus.f About the same time he extended his power in 
the direction of the Adriatic, erected forts in the Illyrian 
country, and accustomed the princes of Epirus to submit 

* Port- and marketrdues as a royalty of Philip : Dem. i. 22: tovs Ai/ne'vay 

Kai Td? ayopa? KapnovaQai. 

t Philip in Thrace : Diod. xvi. 34, et seq. 

chap. L] The Kingdoms of the North. 81 

to his ordinances. Finally lie had also from Thessaly 
already opened communications with Euboea, in order to 
secure friends in this important island, and was inces- 
santly engaged in extending his combinations in all direc- 
tions, and in acquiring influence on every coast. 

These were introductory measures, which gently pre- 
pared future steps, while in localities nearer to his domin- 
ions he set about executing his previously prepared plans 
with full vigor. One of the principal among these was 
the complete subjection of the Chalcidian peninsulas. 

It is true that since the fall of Amphipolis p . ... 
affairs nowhere wore a more peaceful aspect, 01 y nth us. 
than in the regions in question. While in Central 
Greece the war raged and everything was unhinged, pros- 
perity and wealth prevailed among the Olynthians and 
the cities confederated with them. For they had nothing 
to fear either from Athens or from Sparta ; and was not 
the single neighbor, who would have inflicted damage 
upon them, their best friend (p. 56) ? He had proved 
himself such by his acts ; to him they owed the extension 
and rounding-off of their territory, for he had abandoned 
to them Potidsea and Anthemus ; he bestowed gifts upon 
their citizens ; favored their city by manifold concessions ; 
permitted their capitalists to take a lucrative share in the 
working of the mines, now flourishing with unprecedented 
vigor ; extended their rights of pasture ; and seemed to 
take pleasure in their prosperity. In this attitude of 
Philip the Olynthians recognized the old Macedonian 
policy, such as already king Perdiccas had pursued to- 
wards them ; and they thought to have all the less reason 
for mistrust, inasmuch as they might consider that even 
the present monarchy, engaged as it was in efforts for a 
further advance, must necessarily attach some value to 
their friendship. But since the Macedonian kingdom 
soread with so bold a self-assurance in every direction, 

and developed a systematic policy of asserting itself as a 


82 History of Greece. [Book vn. 

Great Power, the Olynthians after all began to be dis- 
quieted by their position next to a neighbor so vastly 
superior in strength, whose conquests surrounded their 
territory like an island. They felt as if they were sitting 
before the lair of a beast of prey, on whose humor alone it 
depended, when it would stretch forth its claws upon a victim 
which could not escape it. They lived in a constant condi- 
tion of terror, which increased or diminished according as 
Philip and his army were more or less remote from them. 
This disquietude was further heightened by the fact, that 
the Olynthians were not a single city community, but a 
group of from twenty to thirty towns, each of which con- 
tained parties in mutual hostility against one another. 
For Philip had taken care to have in the communities of 
all the towns adherents, who advocated an unconditional 
alliance with Macedonia as the one true policy of the 
Chalcidians, and who kept him informed of every sign of 
movements in a contrary direction. And yet the feeling 
in favor of independence, which was so deeply rooted in 
all Greek communities, and the love of liberty once more 
gained the upper hand ; the national parties in the con- 
federate towns combined, and it was resolved to see, how 
far it was still permitted to them to pursue a policy of 
their own. For, although apparently enjoying equal 
rights of independence, they yet already stood in a rela- 
tion of vassalage to Macedonia, since in the treaty of alli- 
ance they had undertaken to carry on war conjointly with 
her against Athens, or conjointly with her to conclude 
peace. This was the price exacted for Potidsea and 
Anthemus ; for how could the king have given up such 
cities as these to a neighboring state, without having 
assured himself of its alliance ? It was therefore from the 
Olynthians that the first offence against the treaties pro- 
ceeded, when, without asking Philip, they entered into 
peace-negotiations with Athens, which was already in 
arms against the king, so as at least to claim for them- 

chap, i.] The Kingdoms of the North. 83 

selves the right of neutrality. The earliest of these trans* 
actions are probably contemporaneous with the Macedo- 
nian campaigns in Thessaly.* 

Since this proceeding the relations between 
Philip and the confederation of cities had an d Athens. 
been the reverse of easy ; but neither side was 
inclined to bring about an open rupture. The king came 
into contact with the territory of the cities on his expedi- 
tions to Thrace; he let them perceive his power, he 
warned and threatened, but did nothing on his side to 
break the peace. The Olynthians, on the other hand, 
under the guidance of the national party, went a step fur- 
ther, by requesting military aid from the Athenians for 
the protection of their frontiers. This already amounted 
to a decided demonstration against Philip, who could not 
possibly be expected to tolerate the appearance of hostile 
troops in the territory of his allies. There was now 
nothing needed but chance occasions, in order to bring 
the war to an outbreak. Such an occasion presented 
itself, when the king demanded that one of his 
step-brothers, who had taken refuge at Olyn- the oiyn- y ° f 
thus, should be given up. Hereupon the city Athens. 01. 
took the decisive step, by sending envoys to £SJ 4 " ^ B ' c * 
Athens, with instructions to conclude an 
offensive and defensive alliance against Macedonia. 

Everything now depended upon the result of this 
embassy. Olynthus and Athens were the two states alone 
remaining in possession of resources for resistance. A 
combination between them was therefore also what Philip 
had from the first endeavored to prevent. If Olynthus 

* Conclusion of peace between Olynthus and Athens : summer of 352 b. c. 
according to Schafer, Demosth., ii. 114. The negotiations with Athena 
amounted to an " offence against the treaties," in so far as according to the 
sense of those treaties Olynthus had evidently renounced an independent 
foreign policy. This is quite reconcileable with the statement in Chap, iii 
infra, that a real breach of the treaties could not be proved against 
the Olynthians. 

84 History of Greece. [Bookvii 

was lost like Amphipolis, Pydna, and Methone, then 
Athens alone was left. What then was the condition of 
things at Athens? What had been her course of conduct 
during the period of the growth of the Macedonian 
power ? Was she able and resolved, to enter upon a deci- 
sive struggle on her own behalf and on that of the Hel- 
lenes against Philip of Macedonia, whose intentions with 
regard to Greece could no longer be matter of doubt since 
his proceedings in the vicinity of Thermopylae ? 





Since Athens had freed herself from the 
Thirty Tyrants, she involuntarily again and Atticpo5cy° 
again returned to the courses of her ancient 
policy, endeavoring to extend her dominion, and to 
acquire influence over the general affairs of Greece. She 
was unable to forget her past, while at the same time the 
interests of her trade demanded that she should recover 
maritime power and confederates. But the great differ- 
ence between the new and the old Athens lay in this : that 
it was now no longer the entire civic community, which of 
one accord desired progress, and that its efforts had no 
endurance. Athens betrayed her exhaustion ; and when 
she had made a vigorous advance, she soon sank back 
into an attitude of fatigue, and craved for nothing but a 
tranquil enjoyment of life, and undisturbed comfort 
within the limited sphere of her civic life. The other 
difference lies in the circumstance, that the policy of old 
Athens had always developed itself out of itself by virtue 
of a certain necessity, while now impulses to a more 
vigorous course of action invariably came from without, 
so that the policy of the Athenians was determined by 
special opportunities, and depended upon outward acci- 

It was thus that Athens, her action being impelled by 
foreign states, had become involved in the Corinthian 
War ; and after she had, exhausted and discouraged by 


86 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

heavy losses, concluded peace, it was again the events in 
Bo3otia which had determined the Athenian policy. In- 
deed, even the parties at home, to whose influence the 
resolutions of the citizens were subject, were distinguished 
from one another according to their relations towards the 
foreign states. 

Now, the formation of these parties was not based upon 
any new principles of policy ; but in them there merely 
reappeared in an altered shape the old tendencies. For 
while the one party disapproved of a one-sidedly demo- 
cratic policy, and in spite of all the warnings of experi- 
ence still continued to seek to bring about a good under- 
standing with Sparta, the other clung to the principle, 
that the strength of the state lay in the sovereignty of the 
people, and that the state ought to be fortified against 
Sparta by means of an alliance with other states of the 
same kind of constitution. This could not at the present 
time be any longer effected by force, in the way in which 
Alcibiades had desired to bring it about, when he made 
Athens the centre of all the democratic parties in Greece ; 
but it was necessary by means of the peaceable establish- 
ment of a connexion with states of cognate tendencies to 
support the city, and to endeavor to relieve it from the 
dangerous isolation in which it stood. And thus it wore 
the aspect of a piece of providential good fortune, when 
immediately after the deepest humiliation of Athens a 
mighty change took place in Boeotia, which burst asunder 
its ancient alliance with Sparta, and by virtue of an 
inner necessity placed the country on the side of the 

This turn in affairs was immediately recognized as a 

great advantage at Athens ; and upon it was based the 

formation of the party, which during the 

tiaa h pa?tyr ensuing decades united in its ranks the best 

elements of the community, and gave the 

most vigorous impulses to the life of the state. Thig 

CiIAR n -J The Policy of Athens. 87 

party established as its principle the closest alliance with 
Thebes. This combination, which it had been in vain 
sought to bring about at the sword's point, was now by 
peaceable means to be made a reality redounding to the 
welfare of either state. Boeotia and Attica were natu- 
rally called upon to join hands as a land and a sea- 
power ; neither state had cause to fear the other, or could 
derive aught but benefit from its neighbor. The friend- 
ship of Thebes made Attica secure as to her passes in the 
north, and equally so as to the Euboean sea. United, 
they formed a power, which no other in Greece could 

Such was the programme of the Boeotian party, — a sim- 
ple and clear plan of action, the healthy and fertile germ 
of a new- Attic policy, and the revival of the old popular 
party upon a basis in accordance with the demands of the 
times. This policy rested not merely on general princi- 
ples and views, but also on personal relations of the most 
intimate character, on mutual services performed in days 
of great danger for the attainment of the highest pur- 
poses of state. These rapidly led to a warm feeling of 
elective affinity, to a political sympathy, which had a 
clear title to the removal of all earlier sentiments of ill- 
will. The " men of Phyle," as the heroes were called, 
who had from the first taken part in the work of the 
Liberation, were also the leading statesmen of the Res- 
toration (vol. iv. p. 68). Thrasybulus and Cephalus con- 
cluded the first offensive and defensive alliance with 
Thebes ; the same tendency was shared by the eminent 
orator Leodamas of Acharnae, by Aristophon the Hazeni- 
ean (vol. iv. p. 71), and by Thrasybulus of Collytus.* 

Although this party was so rich in efficient 
members, although its tendency was so genu- n ^nts! S ° pp(> 
inely patriotic, so thoroughly justified by the 

* Oi err! ♦uArJ, Lys. xii. 52; oi <rvyico.Te\86vTes ano *vA»js, xiiL 71. 

88 History of Greece. [Boo*vil 

existing state of things, and indeed so truly based upon 
historical necessity, yet it met with manifold contraven* 
tion. It was the party of movement and of opposition to 
Sparta. Thrasybulus was the companion-in-arms of Alci- 
biades (vol. iii- p. 472) ; and Aristophon was the son of 
Demostratus, who had been the most zealous supporter of 
the Sicilian expedition (vol. iii. p. 346). For this reason 
all who were afraid of a new quarrel with Sparta and of 
new dangerous undertakings, all the enemies of demo- 
cracy and of democratic agitation, were among the oppo- 
nents of the Boeotian party. But at the same time it was 
opposed by the demagogues proper, such as Agyrrhius 
(vol. iv. p. 296), because they would not hear of any dis- 
turbance of a comfortable prosperity, and of the imposi- 
tion of sacrifices upon the citizens. Hereupon, the influ- 
ence of Thrasybulus and his associates was driven into the 
background by the appearance on the stage of Conon, 
who had been out of connexion with the period in which 
the new relations towards Thebes had formed themselves. 
Nor did the men, who attached themselves most closely to 
Conon, viz., Iphicrates and Timotheus, ever thoroughly 
enter into the points of view adopted by the Theban 
party ; they were probably hampered in their judgment 
of the political situation by Attic pride. But the most 
decided adversary of the party was Callistratus of Aphid- 
na, the foremost orator of his day at Athens. Although 
a nephew of Agyrrhius, he was on friendly terms with 
the Theban oligarchs; and, although as a good patriot he 
withstood every act of force on the part of Sparta, he was 
yet far more decisively prejudiced against Thebes. He 
was opposed to the establishment of a third capital in 
Greece, and of a Boeotia, united under the supremacy of 
Thebes, in the rear of Athens. In other words, he re- 
curred to the principles of the policy of Cimon, in desiring 
to see the direction of national affairs retained by the two 
ancient primary states ; and he thought he might hope to 

ca * p - "0 The Policy of Athens. . 89 

find the right form in which to bring about this result, if 
the encroachments of Sparta were prevented by a firm 
course of action and a resolute bearing. But if Thebes 
put herself unduly forward, he held that the confusion 
which had existed of old would simply be increased. In 
no case was he willing to see Athens bound down to sup- 
port Thebes ; she was to reserve to herself the power of 
acting at any and every time according to circumstances, 
The policy which he advocated with great talent and in 
all sincerity, was therefore that of reserving perfect free- 
dom of action. But this policy was in its whole tendency 
a faint-hearted one, which never glanced beyond the tasks 
of the hour, which lacked all great aims, and was there- 
fore incapable of inspiring enthusiasm in the citizens and 
deciding them to vigorous resolves. This, however, was 
precisely the cause why it found a ready response ; for it 
seemed to be the most cautious and prudent of policies.* 

The Boeotian party was accordingly, in spite of all the 
sympathy which Thebes excited by her struggle for libera- 
tion, unable to carry its views, until again an outside 
event occurred, which put an end to this hesitation. The 
lawless attempt of Sphodrias (vol. iv. p. 379) made it 
clear even to the dullest eye, that Sparta desired to have 
no allies, but only subjects, in Greece ; to wage war 
against her was therefore ordained by the necessity of self- 
preservation. Hereupon, Cephalus carried the conclusion 
of the offensive and defensive alliance with Thebes ; the 
civic community braced itself to fresh exertions, and all 
the parties in the state now co-operated with the Bceo- 

There was no lack of the elements requisite for pur- 
suing the new aims now adopted. The Athenians pos- 

* Demagogic connexions of Callistratus : Boeckh, Publ. Ee. of Ath. vol. i. 
p. 306 \Eng. 2V.J ; Schafer, Demosth. i. 12. As to his grandfather, cf. vol. 
ii. p. 500. 

t Popular decree ol Cephalus : Dinarch. i. 39 ; Xen. Bellen. v. 4, 34 : oi 
/3ot<i>Tia^OfTC( £6i&anKov top oq/xov, &C. 

90 History of Greece. t BooK VI1 

sessed generals of proved merit, who hailed with joy the 
opportunity for new deeds; they possessed experienced 
statesmen, who were able to provide that the agitation of 
the moment should result in a permanent strengthening 
of the state. Callistratus by no means evaded this task ; 
for although he differed from the now dominant party 
with regard to the ultimate objects in view, he yet ap- 
proved of whatever redounded to the advantage of the 
power of Athens, in particular by sea, where she could 
most independently assert herself as towards Sparta and 
as towards Thebes alike ; and he was glad to be able to 
show, that his standpoint too was far from excluding a 
vigorous onward movement on the part of his native city. 
With him worked Aristoteles of Marathon and other 
men, who offered a splendid testimony to the fact, that 
the higher kind of statesmanship had not yet died out at 
Athens, and that there was no lack of organizing talent 
Financial in- *^ ne thorough and methodical character of 
novations, their proceedings is proved by the institutions 
dating from the year of Nausinicus (vol. iv. p. 385). The 
classes and the principle of the financial census, as estab- 
lished by Solon, were retained, in order that on the basis of 
this principle the actual property of the citizens as well as 
of the resident aliens might be officially ascertained ; but 
the earlier usage was changed in important points, espe- 
cially in this : that in all the classes there was entered as 
the capital subject to taxation not the entire property, but 
only part of it. This part in the lowest class corres- 
ponded roughly to the yearly income from its property ; 
in the case of the wealthier classes, on the other hand, the 
amount of property liable to taxation proportionately in- 
creased ; while, however, at the same time the citizens 
were reassured by the fact, that in none of the property- 
classes were the claims of the state allowed to extend to 
their capital itself, the interest of it being always alone in 

chap, il] The Policy of Athens. 91 

question, of which eventually a certain percentage was to 
be contributed. The measure therefore amounted to 
nothing more than an income-tax graduated on a fair 
scale of proportion. 

A second innovation consisted in the establishment of 
associations, in which the contributions for the require- 
ments of the state were to be collected without the imme- 
diate participation of the government. The 1,200 richest 
citizens, elected out of the ten tribes, formed twenty 
unions or Symmories ; and again the richest out of every 
symmory, fifteen from each, formed together a smaller 
college, that of the Three Hundred, whose duty it was to 
assess the payment of the war-tax imposed upon the com- 
munity, and, if necessary, to cover deficiencies by 

A beginning was made with a not incon- The new 
siderable levy of taxation, which produced federation of 
300 talents (£73,000 cire.) With this sum a „, en *'_ „ 

v ' ' Ol. c. 3 (B. C. 

new armament was commenced; 100 ships of 378 -) 
war were built, and 10,000 men placed under arms ; 
the maritime supremacy of Athens being restored on 
essentially new principles (vol. iv. p. 387). For the first 
time a league of states was called into life, which was 
based on the foundation of impartial justice, an associa- 
tion which could not be taken advantage of for the 
purposes of any one state, but which served the well- 
understood interests of all those concerned in it. Athens 
was to possess no rights, except such as were necessary in 
order to give unity and strength to the League. No state 
could dispute with her the position of a directing pri- 
macy, or deny to her generals the conduct of the common 
undertakings. Athens necessarily became the seat of the 
permanent Federal Council, at which all the states were 
represented with equal rights of voting. Any possibility 
of encroachment was prevented by the prohibition of 
interference in the internal affairs of the states, of the de- 

92 History of Greece. £ BoOK V1 * 

spatch of troops to garrison confederate towns, and of the 
arbitrary advance of any demand or arbitrary levy of 
any contribution. Nor was any Federal treasure formed, 
which again might have been transferred into the prop- 
erty of the Attic state ; but the larger states furnished 
their own vessels, while the smaller paid their contribu- 
tions according to the resolutions arrived at in common. 

The ideas which lay at the basis of the new Federal 
policy had their origin at Athens. But before they were 
definitely fixed, an understanding was brought about with 
those states whose support it was pre-eminently necessary 
to secure, unless operations were to be commenced with 
nothing beyond an empty programme. Among those 
states were Chios, which had adhered to Athens even 
after the Peace of Antalcidas, as well as Mitylene and 
Byzantium ; also Tenedos and Rhodes, where, after pro- 
tracted party-feuds, the citizens had again deprived the 
families, partisans of Sparta, of the government ; the 
Mitylenseans had drawn after them the Methymnseans, 
and the Byzantians Perinthus. An agreement had been 
secretly arrived at with these states, and afterwards with 
Thebes, where it was soon perceived what advantage 
could be drawn from the new Confederation. And, 
although Thebes itself was without immediate value for 
the power of the Naval Confederation, yet its accession 
was of importance, because it gave to the League the 
character of a wider, a Hellenic combination, and helped 
to remove the fears of a one-sided Attic policy. 

. y After the execution of the proposed course 
before the f ac tion had been thus assured, the instru- 

battle of ^ i ' 

Leuctra. ment of the Confederation was, in accordance 
with the popular decree moved by Aristoteles, published, 
and after the names of the participating states had been 
added, erected as a lapidary inscription in the market- 
place; while at the same time a public summons was 
issued to all the maritime cities, to join this association, in 

chap, ii.] fj^ p^ j Athens. 93 

which they would find protection for their independence 
against the lawless encroachments of the superior strength 
of Sparta. But this summons could only exercise an 
effect, if, instead of being sent to its various addresses as a 
mere lifeless piece of writing, it reached the states through 
the personal mediation of men certain to awaken confi- 
dence. This was the task of the generals chosen in the 
first year of the new confederation, viz. Chabrias, Callis- 
tratus and Timotheus, — a combination of men, each of 
whom was after his fashion specially qualified for this 
difficult mission. 

Callistratus enjoyed a widely-spread au- c ... 
thority as a statesman; and the moderate 
policy, as the representative of which he was known, his 
comprehensive insight into affairs, his large experience 
and his diplomatic skill, were even more effective than 
his brilliant gifts as an orator. Chabrias was _. , . 

° Chabrias. 

a commander of great fame both by land and 
by sea (vol. iv. p. 383), of inventive genius both in the 
improvement in the ships-of-war, and in the disposition 
and employment of his troops, and daring and prudent in 
all his undertakings. His good-fortune inspired confi- 
dence, and to be under his protection gave a sense of se- 
curity. Thus he succeeded in bringing about the adhe- 
rence of the Thracian island and coast-towns ; while the 
important accession of Euboea was due to Ti- Timotheug 
motheus. The last-named, a man still in the 
vigor of youth, could not have been better recommended 
to his fellow-citizens or to the allies than by the fact of 
his being the son of Con on ; and doubtless this recom- 
mendation was not left out of sight by the Athenians, 
when they set about resuming the work of his father, 
which the unfavorable aspect of the times had interrupted. 
But Timotheus was also personally eminently well 
adapted to represent the city abroad ; for in him all the 
good elements which Athens contained were, so to speak. 

94 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

incarnate. Accustomed from early youth to move in 
choice society, he possessed a refinement of manners, and 
a maturity and many-sidedness of culture, such as could 
be acquired nowhere else but at Athens. He was the son 
of a wealthy house, morally over-indulged and irritable, 
an aristocratic nature which, conscious of its own purity 
of intentions, was not devoid of acerbity against all efforts 
tinged with corruption, in particular against the doings of 
the popular orators, who sowed discord among the people ; 
while at the same time he was always ready to acknow- 
ledge the deserts of others, perfectly free from arrogance 
and harsh party-feeling, courteous, open-handed and amia- 
ble. He belonged already to the younger Athens, whose 
best sons rose above mere party-distinctions, and were 
possessed of a culture free from all one-sidedness, and 
broadly Hellenic. Hereby he was singularly well quali- 
fied for intercourse with the cultivated men of all locali- 
ties, and for acquiring everywhere friends for his native 
city. He viewed foreign policy from its ethical side ; and 
the conquests which he made, whithersoever he came, were 
moral conquests, — in direct contrast to the clumsy method 
of the earlier democratic party, which asserted its influ- 
ence by means of banishments, confiscations of property, 
and the overthrow of constitutions. 

isocrates ^ n n * s no ^ e course of action Timotheus was 

assisted by the efforts of a chosen circle of 
friends, in particular by Isocrates, with whom he had 
entered into a close intimacy of habits of life since about 
the year 384. The writings of Isocrates were at this 
period extraordinarily popular in the whole of Greece, be- 
cause they were the finished expression of an Attic culture, 
which with all its patriotism rested on the basis of the 
general national consciousness, and could be thoroughly 
appreciated and comprehended outside Athens. On this 
account his orations not only had an effect upon the 
taste of his contemporaries as models of style, but they 

chap, ii.j 'fh e Policy f Athens. 95 

at the same time as political pamphlets exercised a mo- 
mentous influence upon public opinion. For he contrived 
in so calm, impartial and winning a fashion to unfold 
the deserts of Athens, and her claims to the direction of 
national affairs, that he thereby advanced the interests of 
his native city. His writings were the open declaration 
of the new- Attic policy ; he acted as pioneer to his 
youthful friend ; and during his campaigns accompanied 
him and advised him, drew up his despatches, and be- 
came the eloquent herald of his deeds.* 

A policy so well adapted to the times, and Transitory 
directed and supported by men of such ca- ^^{f £an 
pacity, could not remain without results. P art y- 
The ancient fears had vanished, and Athens was met with 
affectionate confidence. The cities, freed from the terror 
inspired by Sparta, paid the homage of wreaths of honor 
and monuments to their 'preserver and liberator, the 
people of Athens, ' and united in an offensive and defen- 
sive alliance under its leadership. The Federal Council 
was established, and the regular levy of a Federal force of 
200 vessels and 20,000 heavy-armed troops decreed. As of 
old, the citizens themselves mounted their triremes and, once 
more made the Archipelago an Attic sea (vol. iv. p. 390). 

These brilliant successes lacked an enduring foundation. 
The Athenians were still capable of rising to an enthusiastic 
effort ; but there existed no lasting readiness to come forward 
with personal sacrifices, and the successes themselves re- 
mained extremely incomplete. For while from the most dis- 
tant seas tidings of victories arrived, the Athenians were un- 
able to secure their own trading-vessels against the priva- 

* As to the documents of the new Confederation, see note to vol. iv. p. 389. 
Aristoteles of Marathon (6 noki.Tevcrdnei'Os 'Afljjvpa-iv, ou #tol 8i.icavt.Kai fyipovrai. 
Aoyoi xapcevTe?, Diog, Laert. v. 35). Instrument of the Confederation, i. 7; 
76. To this law reference is probably made by Isocr. iv. 114; where he 
touches upon the removal of the former abuses in the treatment of the 
Confederates. — Invention of Chabrias : Poly<en. iv. 11, 13: cf. Boeckh, 
Seewesen, 161.— Timotheus and Isocrates: Rehdantz, 180. — Dem. xxii. 72: 
Ei'/Soei? i\ev6ep(o9ivrei icrrccpavuMTav rbv br)fj.ov. 

96 History of Greece. [BookVii 

teering operations of the iEginetans. This was a most un- 
pleasant contrast, which could not but greatly mar the joy- 
ous interest in the glory of the naval heroes. The announce- 
ments of their triumphs were invariably accompanied by 
fresh demands for money ; for in order to keep the newly- 
gained friends in uninterrupted good-humor, all harsh mea- 
sures were carefully avoided, as well as any more rigorous 
application of the rights of the primary state for procuring 
the requisite moneys. This appeared, and not without rea- 
son, to the economical citizens at home to wear the aspect 
of an idealistic policy, in the pursuit of which nothing was 
to be gained but uncertain honor paid for at an excessive 
price. After all, it seemed as if the efforts of Athens only 
profited the Thebans, who took advantage of the naval war, 
in order undisturbed to complete the subjection of Bceotia. 
And in point of fact the heroes of the new Naval Con- 
federation had, without belonging to the Theban party, 
rendered the greatest services to it. The others were less 
sensitive to this fact, because they had altogether less 
distinctly adopted any particular standpoint, and were 
rather generals than statesmen ; but Callistratus, the de- 
cided adversary of Thebes, who disapproved of any aimless 
war-policy, and who was moreover hurt in his self-conceit 
by the glory of the general, encouraged the pacific ten- 
dencies of the civic body. By means of the armaments of 
Athens and the new Naval Confederation he had obtained 
what he desired, viz. a more advantageous position as 
towards Sparta ; and this position he now wished to use 
as a basis of peace, so as thereby to bring back into his 
hands the direction of affairs. 

Fail of Ti- In order that this end should be reached, it 
motheus. . t ^ e £ rst ms t ance necessary to remove 4 i i i j 

(B. c. 373). that one among the generals who had most 
boldly passed beyond the measure of the intentions of 
Callistratus, and who had most decidedly cast him into 
the shade. In the case of Timotheus the disproportion 

chap, il] The Policy of Athens. 97 

between outward brilliancy and actual results stood forth 
in the most glaring light ; his enemies accordingly found 
no difficulty in depicting him to the citizens in the light 
of an arrogant and self-willed man, who in order to 
gratify his own vanity cruised about in the iEgean, and 
caused princes and cities to glorify him, while he was neg- 
lecting the tasks set him by the state, — an accusation all 
the more invidious, inasmuch as at the same time every- 
thing was done to deny the heroic patriot the means 
which he needed in order to achieve actual successes. 
Charges were twice preferred against Timotheus (vol. iv. 
p. 401). On the second occasion Callistratus combined 
with Iphicrates, who had quite recently returned in fresh 
vigor, and who was ambitious to have his share in the 
glory of the new great era of Athens. Amidst immense 
excitement the case was opened towards the close of the 
year 373. It was an indictment for high treason against 
the man who had achieved more than any of his contem- 
poraries for the glory of his native city. His adherents 
exerted themselves to the utmost of their power. The 
Tyrant of Pherse and the king of Epirus appeared in 
person, to offer testimony on behalf of their friend. 
Timotheus was able to prove, that he had staked his own 
property and pledged his lands, in order to prevent a 
dissolution of the naval force. And, indeed, he was 
himself acquitted by the jury, but his treasurer Antima- 
chus, whose name was put forward by the adverse party, 
lest the guilt should rest upon the civic community and 
its advisers, was sentenced to death ; nor was the dismissal 
of Timotheus himself from his office of general, which had 
been decreed before the trial, reversed. He retired from 
public life, utterly ruined as to property, and took service 
with the Persians.* 

* Trial of Timotheus: Hellen. vi. 2, 13; Dem. xlix. 9; Sch&fer, Demottk. 
iii.s 138. 

98 History of Greece. [BookVU 

m , .. Callistratus alone had a definite aim in 

The policy 

of caiiistra- view : and therefore the victories of Iphicrates 
tus. ' m r 

(vol. iv. p. 402) were again simply subser- 
vient to the advancement of his policy. Callistratus per- 
ceived, that the Spartans had lost all heart for disputing 
the sea with the Athenians ; while on the other hand he 
saw with very considerable satisfaction, that among the 
Athenians ill-will against Thebes was on the increase, be- 
cause they could not renounce their ancient sympathies 
with Thespise and Platsese, and had taken deep offence at 
the destruction of these cities. In spite of all the counter- 
representations of the Boeotian party, the citizens grew 
disgusted with the Theban alliance ; and thus Callistratus 
found a most favorable basis for his policy. He was now 
able to put an end to the connexion which was so odious 
to him, and to bring about an alliance with Sparta, in 
which full consideration was allowed to the present power 
of his native city, and effective barriers were opposed to 
the ancient arrogance of Sparta as well as to the recent 
arrogance of Thebes. The peace of 371 wore the aspect 
of brilliant success on the part of the policy of Callistra- 
tus ; Athens and Sparta had once more each assumed its 
proper position ; the latter was by land, and the former 
by sea, the primary power of the Hellenes ; and Thebes, 
which had endeavored to intrude itself as a third power, 
was utterly isolated (vol. iv. p. 403 seq.). 

And yet this policy proved to be thoroughly short- 
sighted ; and its calculations to be erroneous with regard 
to Thebes as well as Sparta. Thebes was not hindered in 
her progress by the alliance between the two states ; while 
Sparta, because she had ceased to be a great power, lost 
Attic poii- ner importance for Athens. The day of 
Leuctra Leuctra overthrew the political system of 
Callistratus. That day found the Athenians 
wholly unprepared ; and made their vacillation most 
clearly manifest. They oscillated between a petty annoy- 

chap, ii.] <rfo, p ^ j Athens. 99 

ance at the good fortune of Thebes, and the sympathetic 
feeling, still not extinct, towards the heroic victors. The 
Thebans too, it must be remembered, showed so warm a 
feeling for their former confederates, that before the battle 
they brought their wives and children to Athens, and 
sent thither the first messengers bringing the tidings of 
the victoiy. The leaders of the Boeotian party also now 
came forward once more, and demanded the immediate 
abandonment of the alliance with Sparta, which had be- 
come meaningless, now that there could no longer be any 
question as to dividing the hegemony with her. Now or 
never, they declared, was the time to join Thebes in ren- 
dering Sparta harmless for ever. 

But there was yet a third way open to the Athenians, 
viz. that of siding neither for nor against Sparta, but 
taking advantage of her weakness for their own purposes, 
and going forward on their own account. There was 
some sense in this policy, if the Athenians were resolved 
to take the affairs of the nation into their own hands, if 
they were resolved to establish by the side of their naval 
force a land-army, which should render them able to 
assume the direction of the lesser states in the place of 
Sparta. The deputies of these states were summoned to 
Athens (vol. iv. p. 435) ; but the matter was not pursued 
with any real energy : it was thought preferable to rest 
contented with a lukewarm neutrality. Thus the Arca- 
dians were forced to take the side of the Thebans (vol. iv. 
p. 446) ; and the Athenians had against their expecta- 
tions and wishes to see a complete change take place in 
the entire situation of affairs. Instead of decisively inter- 
vening in its development, they stood before it as sur- 
prised spectators, and their tardy policy ever limped in 
the rear of events. 

Hereupon the question confronted them, whether they 
would calmly look on at the annihilation of Sparta. This 
question they were called upon to answer at once, when in 

100 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

the year 369 the Spartans entered into negotiations with 
Athens. Their envoys had on no previous occasion stood 
in so humble an attitude as this before the Attic civic 
assembly. They prayed the Athenians to save them ; 
showing in a skilful argument how all the great military 
exploits of the Hellenes had owed their success to the 
combination of the two powers ; asserting their belief, that 
what had been left undone after the battle of Platsese, viz. 
the destruction of Thebes, it was not now too late for them 
to accomplish with united strength ; and thus contriving 
very successfully to intensify the existing feeling of ill-will 
against Thebes. Peloponnesian envoys likewise worked 
in favor of Sparta ; and Cliteles of Corinth called for 
protection on behalf of his native city, which he declared 
to be innocently exposed to all the evils of the war ; and 
when finally Procles of Phlius in an admirably calculated 
address reminded the Athenians, how well it would cor- 
respond with their ancient glory, now, when Sparta's 
destiny lay in their hands, magnanimously to forget the 
injuries formerly inflicted upon them, and how their own 
interest likewise demanded that they should not abandon 
Sparta, because otherwise Thebes would advance unre- 
strained and become the most dangerous of neighbors for 
an isolated Athens, — the success of the embassy was 
decided. The spokesmen of the Boeotian party found no 
listeners ; and the policy professing to include in its aims 
the interests of the whole of Greece at once (grossgriechische 
Politik) was completely in the ascendant. The old phrase 
was revived as to the two eyes of Hellas, neither of which 
ought to be suffered to be put out, and so forth. Callis- 
tratus had therefore merely, in accordance with the pre- 
vailing state of feeling, to make his motion for the imme- 
diate despatch of succor ; and 12,000 Athenians marched 
out, in order to hem in Epaminondas in the penin- 
sula. Great events were expected. But both as a 
general and as a statesman, Iphicrates had good reasons 

ClIAP - "0 The Policy of Athens. 101 

for avoiding to bring about a decisive battle (vol. iv. 
p. 456). 

Although hereupon the Lacedaemonians were suffi- 
ciently irritated to find, that the Thebans had been 
allowed to escape unhurt through the passes of the 
Isthmus, yet they, without betraying their indignation, 
immediately entered into fresh negotiations, in order to 
bring about a closer alliance with Athens. They dropped 
all claims to precedence, and found the Council of Athens 
likewise ready to conclude a new treaty of alliance on the 
simple basis of a division of the supreme command. 
Hereupon a very lively discussion arose among the citi- 
zens as to this point, Cephisodotus coming forward against 
the proposition of the Council. It was not, he said, any 
real equality for Athens to have the command over Pelo- 
ponnesian sailors, while the citizens of Athens stood under 
Spartan leaders. The supreme command ought therefore 
to alternate both by land and by sea ; and he accordingly 
moved that it should so change every five days. 

This strange proposal was solely designed to take the 
fullest possible advantage of the troublous situation of 
Sparta ; her kings were thereby to be placed on a leve] 
with the citizens of Athens. Cephisodotus was one of 
those who, like Autocles (vol. iv. p. 405) and others, were 
vehement adversaries of Sparta, without on that account 
belonging to the Boeotian party. But of course that party 
voted with him ; his motion was carried ; and Sparta, 
who in her terror clung to Athens, actually submitted to 
this humiliation. The inevitable consequence was, that 
the kings withdrew from the command of the troops, and 
that the whole military action was crippled. Now, this 
precisely agreed with the wishes of the Athenians, who 
regarded the continuance of enmity between Sparta and 
Thebes as the source of their own strength, and were 
unwilling to change this state of things. They desired 
not to be involved in war with the Thebans ; and the 

102 History of Greece. [BookVii. 

latter were sagacious enough, in no way to force theii 
neighbors to take up a more decisive attitude towards 
either side. On the part therefore both of Athens and of 
Thebes, direct hostilities were, in accordance with a tacit 
understanding, avoided.* 

So feeble and false a policy as this, which was not 
courageous enough to own real friends and real foes, 
which was merely intent upon taking advantage of the 
troubles of other states, without having any ends or 
daring any deeds on its own account, specially delighted 
to indulge in combinations abroad, which inspired the 
pleasant sensation of Athens being a Great Power, whose 
friendship was sought. Thus a connexion was brought 
about through Sparta and Corinth with the Tyrant 
Dionysius, whose vauity stimulated him to desire to play 
a part in Greece, and again with Iason of Pherse, — con- 
nexions not very honorable to the Athenians, and not 
productive of any lasting advantages.! But the most am- 
biguous relation of all was that with the Persian court. 

In order here to counteract the superior influence of 
Thebes (vol. iv. p. 484), it was endeavored to intimidate 
the Great King by entering into combinations with re- 
bellious satraps. Timotheus, on his return from Persia 
received orders to support Ariobarzanes (vol. iv. p. 480), 
who showed himself very ready to render services to the 
Athenians on the coasts of Thrace. After the fall of 
Ariobarzanes, Timotheus succeeded in occupying Sestus 
and Crithote on the Chersonnesus (01. ciii. 3 ; b. c. 365).J 
The endless confusion prevailing in the East offered a very 
favorable arena to the policy at this time pursued by 
Athens ; in many places it was unknown who was really 

* Spartan embassy : Hellen. vi. 5, 33 ; Isocr. vii. 69. Leptioes (ovk e&v 
irepuSeiv ttjv 'EAAaSa eTep6<£0aA/ut.ov yevonevyv), Aristot. Bhet. 127, 25. — Cephiso 
dotus . Hellen. vii. 1, 12. 

f Athens and Dionysius (two embassies to Sicily in 369 and 368 b. c): 
Philol. xii. 575. 

X Concerning Sestus, see Schifer in Bhein. Mus. xix. 610. 

chap, il] The Policy of Athens. 103 

master in the land ; the Athenians therefore were friends 
with both parties, and, without declaring war against the 
Great King, fought against the royal troops. 

The most reckless proceedings of all were Seizureof 
those taken at Samos, where lay a Persian garri- Samos. 
son. Timotheus, who was supremely anxious to {?««?" 3 (B * 
perform some fresh brilliant exploit after his 
return, attacked the island. For ten months he besieged 
the city, and contrived so well to obtain supplies for his 
3,000 light-armed soldiers in the island, that he needed 
no supplementary payments from home. In the end the 
Persians were forced to give way (01. ciii. 3 ; B c. 365) ; 
and hereupon there was a great temptation to turn this 
success to the best possible account. Samos had not yet 
been a member of the new Naval Confederation ; and it 
seemed all the more admissible to proceed here according 
to martial law, inasmuch as the island had been taken 
by force of arms from the Persians. The entire Naval 
Confederation had lost much of its cohesion after the 
battle of Leuctra ; and Timotheus himself was not firm 
enough to remain true to the original Federal policy. In 
contravention of the solemn promise of the Athenians, to 
conduct themselves everywhere as liberators only, and in 
spite of the warnings of prudent statesmen, such as Cydias, 
the expulsion of the Persians was accompanied by that of 
many natives ; Attic citizens were taken across in several 
divisions, and settled in the island as landed proprietors. 
Thus Samos was placed in the same position as Imbros 
and Lemnos, which formed a separate group by the side 
of the members of the Confederation, and, so to speak, 
constituted the domestic power of Athens.* 

* Conquest of Samos, which had through the oligarchical party been 
subjected to Persian control: Dem. xv. 9; Isocr. xv. Ill; Nepos, Timoth. 1. 
Cydias wepi -n}? 2aju.ou /cAr/pouxt'a?, Ar. Rhet. 70, 16. Expulsion of the hostile 
party, followed by the expulsion of all the Samians, owing to the repeated 
introduction of Attic citizens ('Attiko? 7rapoi»co?, Zenob. ii. 28). The inscrip- 
tion in Ehein. Mus. xxii. 313, edited by W. Vischer, refers to their return 
(after an exile of forty-three years). 

104 History of Greece. [Book vil 

Herewith Timotheus once more became the popular 
favorite : he gained victories, without demanding sacri- 
fices ; he achieved the most important conquests, without 
carrying on war. He contrived to re-establish a firm 
footing in the Chersonnesus, and in common with Iphi- 
crates in the following year once more subjected Methone, 
Pydna, Potidrca, to the control of Athens. 

Loss of Or- ^ n * s g° 0( l fortune w r as not, however, to 
opus. endure. The first heavy blow was the loss of 

^•cjii. 3 Oropus (vol. iv. p. 490). This event put an 
end to the neutrality of the Bceoto- Attic fron- 
tier, which had been so anxiously guarded. A war 
seemed inevitable ; but no aid came from the allies, and 
the Athenians lacked courage to go forward alone. 

Instead of the war against an outside enemy, which was 
in a craven spirit avoided, a passionate party-feud burst 
forth at home concerning Oropus. Those who sympa- 
thized with Boeotia seized, the opportunity, to attack the 
party in power, in order to show that it was not they who 
sacrificed the interests of Athens to the Thebans. The 
leader was Lcodamas of Acharnse, and his charges were 
principally directed against Chabrias and Callistratus. 
He accused them of having caused the disaster by the 
insufficiency of their armaments and by their incapacity 
as commanders ; and they were indicted before the people 
for neglect of duty, and even for treason. It seems 
that the accusers allowed their party-zeal to carry 
them too far, and thereby facilitated the defence of the 
accused. Certain it is, that Callistratus was splendidly 
successful, not only in rebutting the charges against him, 
but also in justifying his entire public administration so 
fully as to gain a thorough triumph over his oppo- 

callistratus ^ n ^ * n * s ^ a ^ ec ^ t° ma <ke the policy of Athens, 
and Epami- w hich now remained in his hands, in any de- 

nondas. ' J 

gree more successful or profitable. There was 

Chap - ft ] The Policy of Athens. 105 

no end to a feeble tacking from one side to the other. The 
alliance with Sparta and Corinth had fallen into utter dis- 
credit, since the Athenians had been left wholly in the 
lurch in the matter of Oropus ; and when hereupon the 
Arcadians took advantage of this state of public feeling 
among the Athenians, and sent to them Lycomedes, a man 
of no ordinary intellectual power, to solicit help for effect- 
ing the liberation of Arcadia from Thebes, the Athenians 
very readily entered into the proposal. For in this way 
they thought they would in the first instance be able to 
revenge themselves upon Thebes ; and, moreover, they se- 
cretly entertained secondary designs upon Corinth, which, 
it was thought, might in its isolated and dangerous posi- 
tion be forced to join Athens. In accordance with the 
system of policy now in vogue, it was believed that the 
alliance with Sparta might at the same time be preserved 
intact, since for Sparta too the withdrawal of Arcadia 
from the Theban connexion could be nothing else than a 
gain. The alliance was concluded ; but it led to no re- 
sults. For in the first place Lycomedes, who was the soul 
of the new combination, was assassinated on his way home 
from Athens ; and, again, the Corinthians perceived what 
was in progress, and speedily came to terms with Thebes 
(vol. iv. p. 491). Athens, on the other hand, was heavily 
punished for her unworthy policy of merely looking out 
for opportunities. For, instead of acquiring fresh influ- 
ence, she forfeited all that which she possessed in the pe- 
ninsula ; while at the same time new dangers of the most 
momentous character arose for her out of the naval arma- 
ment of the Thebans. For Epaminondas very skilfully 
contrived to take advantage of the mistakes of the Athe- 
nians, and to discover their weak points. In a short time 
matters had come to such a pass, that Thebes was the rival 
of Athens in the Hellespont, the aid of Timotheus and 
that of Epaminondas being successively invoked by the 
council of the city of Heraclea in the Pontus, and Byzan- 


106 History of Greece. [Book vn. 

tium engaging in negotiations with Thebes behind the 
backs of the Athenians.* 

The Attic statesmen were now solely occupied with 
watching every movement on the part of Epaminondas, 
and counteracting every design of his for the extension of 
the power of Thebes. Thus above all Callistratus. He 
was incessantly countermining the great Theban ; he set 
all his eloquence to work, in order to arouse distrust 
against him, to force the Corinthians out of their neutrali- 
ty, to secure the co-operation of the Arcadians and the 
Messenians, and to bar the peninsula against the Thebans. 
He brought to pass a new league against Thebes ; and 
the battle of Mantinea was, notwithstanding the defeat of 
the allies, to be regarded as an event most fortunate for 
Athens. For the mightiest of her rivals had been re- 
moved, and there was no longer any foe whom she needed 
to fear, neither Thebes nor Sparta. 

And yet no fortunate turn ensued in the situation of 
affairs. On the contrary, the cessation of arms, which 
now ensued in consequence of the universal exhaustion, 
was more pernicious than the period of war. The atti- 
tude of opposition against Thebes had at all events pro- 
duced a beneficial tension, and had directed the public 
mind to definite objects. This tension was now at an end; 
and the Athenians, who had long been accustomed to re- 
ceive all powerful impulses from abroad, became all the 
more enervated, and allowed the evils of the times to 
overwhelm them, without offering any vigorous resistance. 
And those influences which had during the lifetime of 
Epaminondas been set in motion against Athens, exer- 
cised very perceptible after-effects even now, in particular 
the enmity of Alexander of Pherse, who had been forced 
to join the Boeotian confederacy, and who now proved an 
intolerable burden to his former friends. He was an 

* Heraclea and Bysantium : Justin, xvi. 4 ; Isocr. t. 5S. 

0hap.IL] The p n C y f Athens. 107 

adept in petty naval warfare. With his pirate-fleet he 
levied forced requisitions upon the Cyclades, besieged 
Peparethus, surprised the squadron stationed there under 
Leosthenes by a sudden attack, and then, hastening in 
advance of the tidings of this defeat, sailed with such ra- 
pidity to the Pirseeus, that he was able thoroughly to 
pillage the warehouses of the port there, and to effect his 
departure with a rich cargo of booty, before the Athe- 
nians were ready for warding him off. Simultaneously, 
very bad news arrived from the coast of Thrace : Cotys 
was controlling the Chersonnesus ; the prospects of recov- 
ering Amphipolis were worse than ever before ; and thus 
everything combined most deeply to humiliate and to 
damage the Athenians, at the very time when they 
imagined that the death of Epaminondas had freed them 
from the most imminent danger.* 

These humiliations as usual led to a reac- _, „ 

Fall of Cal- 

tion upon affairs at home. The leaders of the listratus. 
communitv were made responsible for the dis- 01. civ. 3 (b. c. 

. . 361). 

asters, and the whole feeling of vexation at 
the unprofitable policy of recent years, at the useless war 
expenditure upon the Peloponnesian expedition, at the 
losses in Thrace, and at the disgrace suffered by sea, 
turned against Callistratus. The Boeotian party, which 
had for years contended against him, now found a better 
handle for attack than ever before. In the eyes of the 
Athenians, Callistratus was the born adversary of Epami- 
nondas. So long as the latter existed to keep their fears 
alive, they thought it also impossible for them to be with- 
out the former ; he was personally a pledge to them, that 
nothing was neglected which was demanded by their jea- 
lousy of Thebes. Now, he seemed no longer indispensa- 
ble ; now, all the weak points of his system of government 
were ruthlessly laid bare, and the hatred of his opponents, 

* Piratical expeditions of Alexander: 4, 35; Dem. xxiii. 12U 
Peparethus : ib, li. 8 ; cf. Kirehhoff, Rede vom trier. Kr. 

108 History of Greece. 

riaOOK \~IL 

which had long been gathering, succeeded in making him 
to such a degree responsible for the most recent occur- 
rences, that this time his eloquence failed of its effect, and 
that he as well as Leosthenes could only escape death by 
voluntarily going into banishment (361 b. a). 

Such a sentence had not been deserved by Callistratus. 
For there is no evidence to show that his counsels were 
given to the community from other than the most con- 
scientious motives. He was an honest patriot, and highly 
gifted for the business of administration ; but as a states- 
man he was devoid of creative ideas, narrow-minded and 
dependent upon prejudices. He followed the ancient tra- 
ditions of conservative policy, and desired to revive dual- 
ism in Greece after a fashion in accordance with the 
times. But how could it be to the advantage of the 
Athenians, in times such as these, to tie the destiny of 
their city to Sparta, who only waived some of her ancient 
claims because she was conscious of her utter decline ! It 
was for this reason that hi^ whole system of policy was so 
sterile ; and the apparent freedom of his activity as a 
statesman was at bottom nothing but weakness, inasmuch 
as he in a spirit of jealous irritation refused to recognize 
the most important development which had taken place 
in his times, viz. the power of Thebes. In his conduct 
towards Timotheus he likewise betrayed pettiness of mind. 
Notwithstanding the brilliant talents which he possessed, 
he lacked greatness of character : and, for the same rea- 
son, he disliked those men who had in them elements of a 
heroic nature, and who passed the ordinary measure of 

Victor of ^ e Boeotian party had during recent years 

the Boeotian never been wholly powerless. It had ever and 

again repeated its demand that, inasmuch as 

Athens was by herself incapable of leading Hellas, she 

should combine, not with weak states which had lost their 

* Fall of Callistratus: Lycurg. in Leocr. 93; [Dem.] 1. 48. 

' ;, »^ "0 ZVte Po% 0/ Athens. 109 

vitality, but with the one state possessed of vigor and en- 
ergetic life, which was ready to conclude a sincere alli- 
ance, and alone adapted for such a purpose by virtue of 
the agreement between the principles of its constitution 
and those of the Athenian. But in proportion as the cor- 
rectness of this policy was confirmed by the continuous 
progress of Thebes, the vexation of the Athenians in- 
creased ; and in vain they were urged not to consume 
their strength in petty jealousy, and not to ruin their state 
by again and again concluding unfortunate alliances. At 
last the men belonging to this party came to the helm of 
affairs, but it was now too late. During the long and 
fruitless period of opposition their forces had been broken 
up and worn away, and their programme now no longer 
admitted of execution ; for it was based on the hypothesis 
of a powerful Thebes. But at the present time Thebes 
was herself without a firm system of action, and incapable 
of being a vigorous ally ; the day had therefore gone by 
for the existence of a real Boeotian party ; and the conse- 
quence was, that even after the fall of Callistratus no on- 
ward movement ensued in Athenian affairs. In truth, 
what occurred was simply a change of persons in the 
leaders of the community ; while in the main everything 
continued in the same track. The members of the party 
assumed the direction of affairs ; but the party as such had 
outlived itself. 

The most remarkable man among them was Arist0 hon 
Aristophon (p. 87), the most active member 
of his party, and an orator of high talent. During more 
than forty years he had contended on behalf of his 
views ; he had always been found at his post, when it was 
requisite to fan into flames the popular passion against 
Sparta, and to promote the cause of the Theban alliance. 
Vehement as he was in temperament, he had become in- 
volved in numerous quarrels, and had more frequently 
than any other citizen been called to account for illegal 

110 History of Greece. [Book vu 

proposals. For this reason he had drawn upon himself 
the enmity of many men, with whom an amicable under- 
standing w T ould have been both possible and in the inter- 
ests of the city extremely desirable, — of such men as Cha- 
brias, Timotheus, and Iphicrates. He lacked moral earn- 
estness and sobriety ; and the fact of his having long re- 
mained in opposition, as well as his numerous lawsuits, 
had probably contributed to intensify his natural vehe- 
mence. True dignity and self-control were therefore 
found to be wanting in him, when by the overthrow of 
Callistratus he became the foremost man in Athens. For 
in proportion to its own want of energy, the civic com- 
munity gave itself up to the control of individuals, and 
conceded to them such a degree of influence, that they 
were able to exercise an arbitrary sway, and to fill the 
most important offices with persons of their own color.* 

But the worst evil lay in the circumstance, 
dirctof a?-" that * ne ^ est meu °^ tne Boeotian party were 
361b' c fl ° m no l° n g er preyent in the city, and that Aristo- 
phon found himself unable to attract new per- 
sonages of eminence into the public service. The most 
highly-considered among his friends was Chares, of the 
deme of JExone, a born soldier, nurtured in the life of a 
mercenary, full of courage and spirit of enterprise, daring 
and versatile, but devoid of character, untrustworthy, 
and without political training or natural tact. Of the 
generals of proved merit several were still in full vigor, 
but they w 7 ere not to be reckoned upon ; for their relations 
to their native city defied calculation. While Athens 
was being pillaged by pirates in her own harbor, and en- 
dangered in her most important possessions, Chabrias was 
serving in Egypt, and Iphicrates was helping his father- 
in-law Cotys finally to establish his dominion against 
Athens no less than against other adversaries. It was 
under such circumstances as these that the public admin- 

• Aristophon: Sch&fer, u.s. i. 122 Beq. 

Chap. II.] The Policy of Athens. Ill 

istration of Aristophon commenced. It would therefore 
be unjust, if he, who entered upon the inheritance of a 
long period of misgovernment, were to be made responsi- 
ble for all the disasters of the next-ensuing years. In his 
toilsome life he proved himself a man of uncommon intel- 
lectual force ; but he came to the supreme conduct of 
affairs, when his day had really passed by ; and he was in- 
capable of sustaining the city against the heavy disadvan- 
tages of the situation. 

One calamity followed upon the heels of the other. In 
the first place, Chares repaired to Corcyra, in order to set- 
tle disputes which had arisen there. But with great want 
of wisdom he intervened in favor of an oligarchical fac- 
tion ; and the consequence was, that Corcyra was lost to 
the Attic Naval Confederation.* The disastrous events in 
Thrace, which had occasioned the fall of Callistratus, were 
to be made good by vigorous armaments ; but Autocles 
(p. 101), the first general who obtained the command 
through the influence of Aristophon, was unable to accom- 
plish anything effectual against Cotys. In vain the gene- 
rals were changed, without any consideration being paid 
to party-color. Things continued to become worse and 
worse. Amphipolis remained lost, although Timotheus 
too attempted a new attack upon it; Timomachus, the 
brother-in-law of Callistratus, had to abandon the whole 
of Chersonnesus, and finally (360 b. c.) Sestus, the chief 
station of the Attic fleet in the Hellespont, likewise fell 
into the power of Cotys. 

Under these circumstances it could not but Events in 
be regarded as a piece of great good fortune, Thrace - 
when the tidings unexpectedly arrived, that 3 6 ose'Y B ' c " 
the despot in Thrace had been assassinated 
(359 b. a). The assassins were extolled as heroes of lib- 
erty and as benefactors of the state ; but before advantage 
could be taken of this favorable turn, the son of Cotys, 

* Chares in Corcyra : Diod. xr. 95. 

112 History of Greece. [Book vn. 

Cersobleptes, contrived to reunite in his hands the dominion 
of his father. And in this he succeeded through the aid of 
a man who had served with distinction under Iphicrates 
and Timotheus, and who had in consequence acquired the 
Attic citizenship ; but who after the manner of these con- 
dottieri was of far too roving a disposition to devote his 
services permanently to any one state. This was Charide- 
mus of Oreus, one of the boldest captains of mercenaries 
of his age. He enabled the son of Cotys to secure his do- 
minion, just as Iphicrates had helped the father, and like 
Iphicrates married into the Thracian royal house. Cephi- 
sodotus, the Attic admiral, was defeated by Charidemus, 
and forced to acknowledge Cersobleptes as ruler over his 
dominions ; and although fresh disputes as to the tenure 
of the throne involved the Thracian prince in difficulties, 
and made him incline to a variety of concessions, yet 
there was no fleet at hand to enforce their being carried 
out, and the situation was immediately reversed again. 
The Athenians for their part could do nothing but call to 
account their unfortunate commanders, one after the 
other, and declare the treaties which had been concluded 

Successes While Athens was so impotent with regard 

Thmce 6 ^ 114 ^° Thracian affairs, a danger nearer home 

01 cv 3 (b a ft er a l° D g interval once again aroused her 

357 > to superior energy. For this time the most 

important of all the districts outside Attica was in ques- 
tion, viz. Eubcea. Here sanguinary disturbances had 
broken out ; and Eretria, allied with Chalcis and Carys- 
tus, was attacked by hostile neighbors, who had estab- 
lished a connexion with Bceotia. Manifestly the intention 
was nothing short of resuming the policy which had be- 

* Death of Cotys, 01. cv. 1 ; beginning of 359 b. c. ; cf. F. Schultz, Schol. den 
Aisch. in Neue Jahrb. ftir Phihl, 1865, p. 399. Charidemus : Dem. xxiii. 162. 
Harpocr. s. v. Kepo-o/JAeVnjs. Cephisodotus fined five talents : Dem. xxiii. 
163 seq. He was sent out before the death of Cotys; his recall took place 
01. cv. 2 ; cf. Schultz, tt. $. 

Chap. II.] The Policy of Athens. 113 

gun with the occupation of Oropus (vol. iv. p. 490), and of 
extending the power of Thebes to the land, as well as the 
waters, of Eubcea. The present case admited of no hesita- 
tion ; and the men of the Boeotian party, unless they were 
to offer a most excellent opportunity of attack to their op- 
ponents, who were still not wholly without power, were 
bound least of all to neglect a danger coming from the 
side of Thebes ; it behooved them on this occasion to 
prove themselves more energetic than their predecessors 
had been in the affair of Oropus. In this matter the dif- 
ferent parties went hand in hand. Timotheus above the 
rest urged the furnishing of vigorous aid. Voluntary 
trierarchs were summoned ; in a few days the armament 
was complete ; and a campaign of thirty days sufficed to 
force the Thebans to take their departure from the 
island. Eubcea had been recovered to the Naval Confed- 
eration (357 b. c.).* 

But this was not deemed enough : it was thought well 
to take advantage of the favorable moment of patriotic 
enthusiasm. Aristophon once more entertained the high- 
est hopes of Chares ; and persuaded the citizens to send 
him into the Northern seas with extensive powers. Success 
was thought to be all the more ensured to the expedition, 
inasmuch as it was confined to the execution of a single 
task ; when therefore the troops of king Philip about the 
same time advanced upon the coasts, and when in conse- 
quence Amphipolis applied to Athens (p. 54), it was held 
to be a very prudent proceeding, to trust to Philip's friend- 
ly assurances and to reject the application for aid, in order 
that the whole power of the state might be directed upon 
the Chersonnesus, the possession of which was the condi- 
tion, not only of the maritime dominion, but also of the 
civil prosperity, of Athens. 

This policy seemed in truth to prove itself right. The 

* Euboea: Diod. xvi. 7; ^Eschin. iii. 85; Dem. viii. 74; xviii. 99, and 
in frequent other passages. 

114 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

victory over Thebes was followed by the restoration of the 
Athenian power on the shores of the Hellespont. Cerso- 
bleptes was compelled to conclude a treaty, in which he 
ceded the Thracian peninsula with the exception of Cardia, 
and recognized the protegees of Athens, Amadocus and 
Berisades, as independent princes. Philip might be re- 
garded as a new ally against Cersobleptes ; and it was 
firmly reckoned upon, that Amphipolis would likewise 
soon be bestow T ed upon the Athenians by his hands.* 

But how soon the whole aspect of affairs changed ! 
How rapidly a bitter disappointment followed upon this 
hopeful phase of public feeling ! It was perceived how 
nothing certain had been gained in Peloponnesus, while 
with regard to Amphipolis the most favorable opportunity 
had been sacrificed. The seeming friend revealed himself 
as a fresh foe ; and the task of Athens in the North con- 
tinued to increase in difficulty. But the Athenians did not 
give way to despair. They were resolved to exert them- 
selves to the utmost, in order to punish the perfidious 
king ; and Chares received orders to attack Amphipolis. 
But for achieving this he needed greater resources than 
Athens was able alone to collect. Chares turned to Chios. 
But at the very moment, when the confederates were 
needed more urgently than ever, they not only refused to 
furnish any aid, but, in accordance with an agreement 
arrived at in common, rose against Athens, so that the un- 
happy city was suddenly surrounded by a multitude of new 

.. , f This rising had both nearer and more re- 
the social mote causes. The first blow experienced by 

01. cv. 4 the newly-established Naval Confederation 

was the secession of Thebes ; for upon this 

there immediately ensued a prevalence of ill-will, and the 

establishment of secret connexions between Epaminondas 

* Treaty with Cersobleptes : Dem. xxiii. 173 (dated four year9 too late in 
Diod. xvi. 34). 

Chap. II.] yAe Policy of Athens, 115 

and the more powerful maritime cities. He labored with 
excellent success to dissolve the Confederation ; for he was 
strong enough to afford protection, while at the same time 
more confidence was placed in him than in Athens with 
regard to the freedom of the islands. It was, therefore, 
only by his death that the fear of a transfer of their alli- 
ance on the part of the confederates from Athens to 
Thebes came to an end. But the agitation which had 
once existed remained and increased, and received a con- 
tinuous accession of materials through the constant 
jealousy, which even a more just and less selfish state than 
Athens was would have been unable to allay. For with- 
out unpleasant disagreement of various kinds a league 
composed of members so different, and yet all entitled to 
an equality of rights, who were all to act in common, was 
in the nature of the case not to be maintained. Either it 
must lose all significance, or the influence on the primary 
state must assert itself. Moreover, in consequence of the 
insufficiency of her own resources, Athens was dependent 
upon those of her confederates ; without them, it was im- 
possible for her to sustain her position ; and accordingly 
it was not admissible for her in every individual case to 
rely upon the good-will of the confederates. Thus, there 
occurred transgressions of the confederate code, fresh at- 
tempts to bring about a relation of mistress and subjects, 
forced levies of contributions and measures of violence, 
such as were inevitable in the existing condition of the 
military power of Athens. For it was out of the ques- 
tion, to control the bands of mercenaries from Athens ; 
and the leaders of these bands were by the force of circum- 
stances driven to arbitrary measures, to irritating proceed- 
ings of all kinds, and to requisitions made by violent 
means. But a specially dangerous effect had attached to 
the proceedings in Samos, as Cydias had predicted (p. 103). 
For although no similar allotments of land ensued in the 
territories proper of the confederates, yet it was feared, 

116 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

that the Athenians would recover their taste for sending 
out cleruchies, and would once more establish themselves 
as landed proprietors in the islands. 

The dynasts ^^ these feelings of discontent and anxiety 
of cana. were devoid of danger, so long as there existed 

no centre, where the prevailing dissatisfaction could 
gather, and so long as no foreign state availed itself of it. 
But this now actually took place from a quarter whence 
the Athenians had for a long time not had to experience 
any hostile proceedings, viz. from the Carian coast. In 
this region there had arisen out of the same princely house 
to which Artemisia, of old the most dangerous adversary 
of the Athenians, had belonged (vol. ii. p. 318), a younger 
generation, which about the time of the Peace of Antalci- 
das ruled over the Carian country as a hereditary satrapy. 
Hecatomnus invested this principality with splendor and 
importance ; he already endeavored to connect himself 
most intimately with the traffic of the Greek coasts, as is 
proved by his silver coins, which follow the Attic standard, 
while impressed with the Milesian crest. Maussollus, the 
son of Hecatomnus, carried this system of policy further 
(from the year 377 b. c.) ; he transferred the princely resi- 
dence from Mylasa to Halicarnassus, which by uniting the 
communities of the vicinity he rendered one of the most 
splendid cities of the Greek world ; he firmly established 
his dominion by land and by sea, and took arms against 
the Great King on the outbreak of the rebellion of Aric- 
barzanes (vol. iv. p. 479), as well as on other occasions. 
Subsequently he changed his attitude towards the court, 
and found it more advantageous to pursue the ends of his 
ambition in harmony with the Great King. After, there- 
fore, already several satraps before him had taken advan- 
tage of the weakness of the Greeks, in order once more to 
advance into the Greek Sea, as is shown by the existence 
of Persian garrisons in Sestos and Samos (p. 102), Maussol- 
lus was now intent upon rendering his new capital what 

chap, ii j rpj^ p oli( ^ Q j Athens. 117 

formerly according to the plan of Aristagoras Miletus was 
to have become, viz. the centre of an island-and coast-em- 
pire, which ensured to him an independent and brilliant 
position, although the Persian suzerainty was acknowledged 
by him. Towards this end he chose the right way, when, 
following the precedent of Epaminondas, he instigated the 
confederates of Athens to revolt, excited fears of Attic 
ambition, supported the parties hostile to Athens, and quite 
unobserved brought about an understanding with the most 
considerable island-states, with Cos, Chios, and notably 
with Rhodes. The Rhodians had already long been in a 
disturbed condition. By the foundation of the city of 
Rhodes they had united into one state (408 b. a), and had 
thereby gained very largely in vigor and in self-conscious- 
ness ; they had afterwards concluded treaties of currency 
and commerce with Cnidus, Samos, and Ephesus ; and 
their standard of coinage, introduced in Cyprus as well as 
in Macedonia (p. 61), attests the magnificent growth of 
their traffic. Maussollus promised aid for the war, 
furnished troops and ships, and gained over the cities, by 
designating liberty as the one object of the struggle and as 
the one task of his policy. Byzantium had likewise joined 
this combination. All were prepared for revolt, and 
merely awaited the decisive impulse. This was R 
given at Chios. It is probable that Chares re- Su s, d chios ' 
paired thither, in order to provide himself 01. ev. 4 
with materials of war for his attack upon 
Amphipolis ; and perhaps he on this occasion put forth 
claims which it was possible to regard as encroachments 
upon the compact of the Confederacy. 

Like a festering sore, towards the formation of which 
the noxious humors have long been gathering, the war 
suddenly broke out, without having been preceded by any 
negotiations, without any renunciation of the treaties, 
without any formal secession on the part of the individual 
states. It is clear how unhealthy the relations were, and 

118 History of Greece. [BookVil 

how rudely it was thought possible to tear asunder the 
bonds, which attached the states against their will to 

At Athens the determination was taken, to regard the 
rising of the confederates as a casus belli. It was necessa- 
ry at the same time not to mistake the fact, that, when 
once the war had broken out, a restoration of the previous 
relations was out of the question ; the Athenians there- 
fore felt confident of being strong enough to force rebels 
into a subject position, and once more to make Athens in 
the full sense mistress of the Archipelago. Such was mani- 
festly the view prevailing in the circles which at that 
time led public opinion, the view of Aristophon, Chares, 
and their associates. It was not without justification, in 
so far as the relations hitherto existing in the Confedera- 
tion had become untenable ; so that the only point at issue 
was, whether Athens was willing to renounce her maritime 
dominion, or to restore it by the exertion of any and every 
measure of force. But it seems neither explicable nor ex- 
cusable, that no preparations should have been made, in 
order vigorously to carry out so bold a policy. Nothing 
was in readiness. There was a want of ships, of ships' 
furniture, and of citizens prepared to undertake the trier- 
arch y. Hitherto resort had been had to joint trierarchies, 
so that two persons together bore the burdens of a single 

* Milesian coins with EKA : J. Brandis, 328. The Halicarnassian coinage 
followed the Rhodian standard, ib. 338. The official form of name, MovctwX- 
Ao?, is attested by the coins. Maus. and Rhodes: Dem. xv. 3; Diod. xvi. 7. 
— Synoecism of Rhodes: Strab. 654; Diod. xiii. 75. — Coinage-union between 
Rhodes, Samos, Ephesus, and Cnidus : Waddington, Rev. Num., 1863, p. 223. 
Legend SYN^a^ta, Leake, A t mot. Hell. Inscr. 38 ; Brandis, 202, 375, — as to the 
occasion of the Social War: Oncken, IsoJcrates und Athen. p. 130 seq. ; cf. Kay- 
ser in Neue Jdhrb. fur Philol. 1864, p. 560. — A welcome accession to the 
extremely meagre materials for the history of the war is afforded by the 
Inscription of 01. cvi. 2 (b. c. 355-4), edited by Kumanudes and Sauppe 
(Gottinger Nachr., 1867, p. 151). Philiscus of Sestus is honored on account of 
the service rendered by him during the war to the civic community by 
means of an important piece of news, firivvo-as r[bv tuv Bu£avTiW (tt6K]ov, 
as Sauppe very felicitously supplements the lacuna. 

Chap, ii.] ^6 Policy of Athens. 119 

trierarchy. But even the burdens thus divided proved 
too heavy. It was necessary to establish a further subdi- 
vision, and to impose proportionate exertions even upon 
the less wealthy. Accordingly, on the motion of Peri- 
ander, the principle of association, which had already 
been applied to the property-tax (vol. iv. p. 385), was 
now likewise made use of for the naval armament. The 
1,200 wealthiest members of the civic community were 
divided into twenty companies or symmories, whose duty it 
was, under the direction of a committee of 300, of whom 
fifteen were taken from each symmory, to furnish the 
requisites for the fleet demanded by the state. With the 
upmost rigor everything was called in, which had be- 
longed to the public inventory of the navy and had 
remained in the hands of individuals ; the goods and 
chattels of all public debtors were distrained ; and even 
what had become private property, but might be of 
service for the equipment of the fleet, was forcibly called 
in. Aristophon and his friends took advantage of this 
season of public trouble to raise their power to the highest 
pitch. All views opposed to theirs, all expression of 
pacific sentiments, all attempts to create dissension in the 
enemies' camp by means of negotiation, were repressed 
by them. 

By a spasmodic effort a naval force was Battle in 
brought together ; and the best generals were JJf^ios ° r 
set to work. But they received separate com- „ . . 

J r 01. cv. 4 (b. c. 

mands according to the parties to which they 357 )- 
belonged ; and this could not have a favorable effect upon 
the result. Sixty vessels were commanded by Chares, 
upon whose courage Aristophon pre-eminently counted in 
this desperate course of policy ; a second fleet of equal 
strength was entrusted to Iphicrates, his son Menestheus, 
and Timotheus. Chares advanced at once upon Chios with 
his fleet ; and drove it in wedgewise into the harbor, which 
had been barred by the islanders. Chabrias, who served 

120 History of Greece. [BookVii. 

as a trierarch under Chares, was in the van ; boldly push- 
ing forward before the rest, he had penetrated deep into 
the dense mass of the enemy, and fell, fighting, on the 
deck of his trireme, since lie was too proud to abandon the 
vessel committed to his charge. The whole attack ended 
in failure, and the insurgents were able to assume the of- 
fensive. They devastated the islands in the possession of 
Athens, in particular Lemnos and Imbros, and then ap- 
peared with a hundred vessels off Samos. But this island 
was relieved by the combined squadrons of the Athenians, 
who determined to sail from here to Byzantium, which 
they hoped to find in the most advanced state of prepara- 
tion. But on a stormy day they unexpectedly in the 
channel off Chios came across the enemy's fleet. Chares 
demanded a short attack ; the leaders of the second squa- 
dron unanimously opposed it on account of the weather, 
but Chares refused to give way. He thought by boldly 
advancing to force the others to follow, but he was left 
alone, and was obliged, after suffering losses, to relinquish 
the contest. 

He sent a report of what had occurred to Athens, and 
cast all the blame upon his colleagues. Aristophon sup- 
ported his cause ; his fellow-generals were immediately 
recalled ; and Chares was now at the head of the entire 
... . , He was now above all anxious to perform 

Victory of l 

9 hai h. s n J der some brilliant exploit, wherever the opportuni- 
01 ovi 1 (b ty ^ght offer. And as he was probably also 
c. 356). urged on by want of money, he rapidly re- 

solved to enter with his whole fleet into the pay of Arta- 
bazus, who was engaged in a revolt against the Great 
King and was hard pressed by the royal troops. The 
position of Maussollus might to some extent justify this 
step, since every defeat inflicted upon the King might also 
be regarded as a defeat inflicted upon Maussollus and his 
allies. In any case, Chares completely achieved his iin- 

chap. II.] ^ Ke p /^ f Athens. 121 

mediate object. By a brilliant victory he secured, in ad- 
dition to the high pay for his forces, ample spoils, occupied 
Lampsacus and Sigeum, and caused great rejoicing among 
the citizens. 

But hereupon an embassy from the Great close of the 
King arrived at Athens, which bitterly com- Social War - 
plained of Chares, and gave utterance to the SL * 1, * (B - c * 
most serious menaces. It was already thought 
to be certain that a great Persian fleet had combined with 
the islanders for a joint expedition against Athens ; and 
there ensued a revulsion in public opinion, and a lively move- 
ment arose against Aristophon and his party. Attention 
was directed to the empty treasury, the intolerable burdens 
of the war, and the impossibility of bringing the confed- 
erates to obedience by force. Aristophon had by his sys- 
tem of terrorism estranged from himself even many 
friends ; and it was an adherent of his own party, Eubu- 
lus, who in the civic assembly brought forward this mo- 
tion : that a cessation of arms must immediately be 
effected, unless the city was to be utterly ruined. As 
hastily as the war had been begun the peace was con- 
cluded, in order at any cost to put an end to the hardships 
of the war, without even the attempt being made to save as 
much as could be saved of influence and power. The 
confederates now in revolt were freed from all obligations ; 
and thus, then, after absolutely fruitless efforts of the most 
arduous kind, the Naval Confederation founded twenty 
years before with the happiest prospects by Callistratus 
and Timotheus, had, from fear of Persian menaces, been 
shamefully and disgracefully abandoned. In the place 
of the Attic influence, which kept the island-sea in order 
and cohesion for national purposes, Asiatic influence, 
partly that of the Great King, partly that of the Carian 
Tyrants, now asserted itself. Athens had openly confessed 
her impotence, and had pusillanimously renounced her 
truest and most proper mission. Henceforth all attempts 

122 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

at maintaining in the iEgean a state of things established 
by treaties, were renounced ; and anarchy pure and simple 
was the recognized condition of those waters. As in the 
Corinthian war the land-powers of secondary rank, so 
now in the maritime regions there came forward a group of 
secondary states, which emancipated itself from all control 
No Great Power any longer guaranteed the peace of the sea ; 
the boundaries between the maritime dominions of the bar- 
barians and of the Hellenes had been destroyed ; and Athens 
herself could in future feel sure neither of her own routes 
of trade nor of the smaller islands remaining to her. 

Nor was this all. The struggle between the parties was 
continued in the law-courts, and demanded yet further 
victims. Aristophon exerted all the remnants of his 
influence, in order in conjunction with Chares to ruin the 
other generals, and to deprive Athens, in her deep humil- 
iation, even of those men who were alone capable of 
bringing about a better future. On the occasion of the 
rendering of their account by the generals, Iphicrates, 
Menestheus and Timotheus were accused of having been 
bribed by Chian and Rhodian money to ruin their native 
city. The charge excited great indignation ; and Iphi- 
crates was soon surrounded by a band of companions-in- 
arms, who were resolved to protect and defend him against 
extremities, if necessary by the use of force. The aged 
hero, covered with scars, confronted, in the full pride of 
a warrior, the forensic tricks of Aristophon. He acknow- 
ledged his inability to meet him with the same weapons. 
" This man," he said, " is a better actor ; but mine is the 
better play. " He appealed to his deeds, and inquired 
whether he was thought capable of an act of knavery, of 
which even an Aristophon would be ashamed ? 

The chivalrous pride of Iphicrates did not 

Condemna- r l 

tion of the m j ss its effect. Both he and his son were 


01. evi. i acquitted. Less favorable was the issue in 
the case of Timotheus. He was not indeed 

chap, ii.] The Policy of Athens. 123 

found guilty of the crime imputed to him ; but he dam- 
aged his cause, by irritating the judges through his aris- 
tocratic bearing ; and thus it came to pass, that he was 
sentenced to the enormous fine of one hundred talents 
(£25,000 circ). He took his departure to Chalcis, where 
he died the same year, after having seen the work of his 
life so miserably ruined. Iphicrates remained at Athens, 
in retirement from public life. Chabrias had fallen in 
battle. Thus at the close of this disastrous war Athens 
had not only forfeited her dominion and exhausted her 
resources, but she had also been deprived of her best 

Such were the course of Attic politics up to Social con . 
the close of the Social War, and the series of AtheS^up to 
outward events necessarily resulting from the pearancVof 
relations which we find prevailing in the in. n ( f s n 5^puu ic 
terior of the state. lifo - 

The attempts which had been made in order to cure the 
evils besetting the life of the Attic community had long 
been abandoned again ; the old tracks had once more 
been re-entered, and the traditional forms of life belong- 
ing to the democratic system thoughtlessly resumed. And 
inasmuch as the commonwealth, sick and devoid of vigor 
as it was, could not elevate or ennoble the individual 
citizens, the bonds uniting men among themselves and 
with the state were more and more relaxed, civic duties 
and the demands imposed by them fell into neglect, life 
lost part of its seriousness and significance, and men be- 
came accustomed to a low standard in judging themselves 
and others. 

Outwardly, the difference from earlier times was above 
all perceptible in the circumstance, that, while hitherto 

* Diod. xvi. 22; Dionys. ; Din. p. 608; Nepos, Timolh. 3; Isocr. xv. 129. 
Plutarch, Preec. ger. reip. 801 F: , I<J>iKpdrr]<;, inb twv wept 'Apiorcx^coi/Ta KaxappJ/xo- 
f ev6p.evo%' fiiKriutv juuf 6 rwf avTihlnittv V7TOKpiT)j?, 8pap.a 6e TOVfx.ov ap.etvov. 

124 History of Greece. ibookvil 

more considerable edifices Lad been erected only for the 
purposes of public worship and of the state, the public 
ends were now neglected, while building was carried on in 
the service of the comfort and love of pomp of individual 
citizens. The richer citizens indulged their vanity by the 
display of their wealth ; mansions resembling palaces were 
built in Athens and in its neighborhood. Men delighted 
in exhibiting their establishments of numerous servants, 
splendid equipages, and costly robes and furniture; and 
although this arrogance on the part of the rich was so 
directly opposed to the spirit of the constitution, yet it 
was not punished and condemned by public opinion, but 
imposed upon the multitude, and brought with it influ- 
ence and authority. 

In proportion as the public resources dwindled, the 
difference of property asserted itself among the citizens, 
and the new institutions designed for satisfying the wants 
of the state helped to raise the power of money ; for the 
distribution of the public burdens in the symmories 
(p. 119) was in the hands of the most highly taxed; and 
they employed their influence so as to spare themselves. 
Though on occasion they performed this or that public 
service with pompous munificence, in order to dazzle the 
multitude, yet in general they contrived to arrange matters 
after such a fashion, that disproportionate efforts were 
exacted from the less wealthy, and a disproportionate 
pressure was placed upon them. Thus, in addition to the 
distinction between the classes with and without property, 
an opposition arose between the rich and the middle 
classes ; the committees of the symmories became a privi- 
leged order in the state, and the system of factions became 
less and less endurable. 

In the same degree in which the idea of the state lost 
its power, the virtues rooting in this idea died out, in par- 
ticular the joyous promptitude for personal sacrifices. 
The citizens concealed their property ; and if the richest 

chap, ii.] The Policy of Athens. 125 

among them evaded their duties to such a degree as to 
farm out for execution the trierarchies falling to their lot 
to the lowest bidders, how much less were they willing to 
venture their lives on behalf of the state ! Military service 
was regarded as an intolerable interference with personal 
comfort and with commercial profits. Pretexts of all 
kinds were sought ; and it was necessary to pass severe 
laws of war, in order to secure what formerly had been a 
matter of course. But even these laws proved of no avail. 
The aversion of the citizens from bearing arms spread 
like a contagious disease ; and the trierarchs found it so 
interminable a task to man their vessels, that they pre- 
ferred to offer hand-money, and to entrust the most pre- 
cious possession of the city, her ships, to strangers who 
had no interest in her. 

The desire was to maintain only those elements in the 
democracy which gratified sensual indulgence, and which 
offered a pleasant pastime. Accordingly, the festivals be- 
came the principal object in public life, and were as its 
most important side treated with the utmost seriousness. 
But at the same time the higher considerations lying at 
the basis of Attic festive life, viz. the grateful celebration 
of the gods, the patriotic elevation of men's minds, and the 
emulous cultivation of liberal arts, fell quite into the back- 
ground. In their stead the processions and banquets 
formed the gist of the matter ; and in order not to miss 
any of these, the citizens evaded service abroad, while for 
the same reason the troops were disbanded, so as to be 
able to rush home. To disturb the festive rejoicing was 
accounted the worst of crimes, and an act of treason 
against the city. In all things only the rights of the citi- 
zens, and not their duties, were taken into account, all at- 
tempts to enforce obligations were kept at a distance, and 
there was an absence of salutary discipline in the public 
market-place as well as in the private homes ; for even the 
slaves it was not contrived to keep under. A system of 

126 History of Greece. [Book vil 

mutual concession had been tacitly agreed upon at Athens; 
it would have amounted to an offence against the fashion 
of society for any man publicly to stigmatize the frivolous 
self-indulgence of any of his fellow-citizens ; and iEschines, 
when inveighing against the vices of the trierarchs, ex- 
pressly wishes it to be understood that the object of his 
charge is only the brutal audacity which mocks all public 
decency, and the conversion of immorality into a trade. 

The popular Such was the condition of society ; and thus 
assembly. neither could the civic assemblies maintain 
any dignity in their bearing. A really earnest spirit was 
wanting, even when the most momentous matters were the 
subject of debate; the common interest was no longer 
generally interesting ; and here, too, pastime and diversion 
were sought, and these objects determined the conduct of 
the orators. Outwardly negligent, even with their shoulders 
bare, they appeared before the people, relying upon a sono- 
rous voice and a dazzling flow of words, to which they 
added the attraction of histrionic tricks. Their speeches 
were poor in considerations on the subjects under discus- 
sion, but, on the other hand, abounded in personalities, 
scandal and vulgar jests. Since the multitude was too 
indolent to enter into a consultation and to form an opinion 
for itself, few took part in the debate ; and those speakers 
were the most popular who gave the least trouble to their 
hearers. This demand of course only men devoid of con- 
science were ready to supply, persons of talent and practi- 
cal skill, but without superior culture or a liberal training. 
They struck the note, and had their agents at hand, who 
according to given hints shouted applause to the one, 
drowned the words of the other in clamor, and thus con- 
fused the multitude in order to be able all the more easily 
to direct it. A group of men entertaining the same views 
unites ; they form a close party ; and the multitude so 
thoroughly accustoms itself to be controlled by them, that 
they demean themselves as the lords and masters of the 

chap. II.] The Policy of Athens. 127 

city. Such was notably the case with Aristophon and his 
associates, who established a genuine reign of terror over 
Athens. " They claim," we read in a speech of the day, 
" absolute liberty of speaking to you and of acting ac- 
cording as they choose ; they bring everything into their 
hands, and, as it were like public criers, offer the state to 
the highest bidder. They cause whom they wish to be 
crowned or not crowned, and have secured to themselves 
more authority than belongs to the decrees of the civic as- 
sembly." The orators flatter the people and foster phases 
of agitation, in order to maintain their influence ; they 
take pay both for speaking and for holding their peace ; 
and change from beggars into rich men, while the state is 
becoming more and more impoverished. The citizens curse 
them, when affairs take a bad turn, but relapse again and 
again into their unworthy relation of dependence.* 

In legislation, the principles of ancient Legislation 
times had been recurred to ; but they had not 
been faithfully observed. There prevailed anew an over- 
busy tendency to make new laws, and in consequence an 
incurable state of disquiet. Every month — and frequent- 
ly too in violation of the customary regulations, viz. with- 
out any motion on the part of the Senate, without any 
preliminary examination and public exhibition such as 
prescription demanded, without the fixed terms being 
awaited or the contradictions thence resulting taken into 
account — new laws were passed, which in contravention 
of the principles of the republic were devised to suit 
special cases ; laws of debt, which were to help particular 
persons out of their difficulties, and others to which a re- 
trospective force was given, in order to accomplish certain 
party-objects. Herewith is connected the influence gained 
in Athens by the scribes. These were persons of a low 
class, slaves and freedmen, whose business was the reading, 

* Dominion of faction: irokireveaOai Kara o-u/x/^opia?, Dem. ii. 29. De- 
scription of the terrorism exercised by the party of Aristophon : Dem. Ii. 22. 

128 History of Greece. [Book VU 

composition, and preservation of written documents, and 
who thereby acquired a versatility in business, which 
made them indispensable to every office, great or small. 
They were a venal set, useful for any and every purpose, 
ready for any kind of service, and familiar with all the 
species of tricks. When such men acquired authority, 
there spread together with them through all branches of 
the administration a spirit of impunity and dishonesty, 
above all, of course, where the management of trust- 
moneys was in question. A universal mistrust poisoned 
Lit' ious- P u0 ^ c lif e « The most usual weapon with 
ness. which one party attacked the other, or one 

citizen fought out a personal contest against another, was 
an indictment for peculation ; and the lamentable love of 
litigation, which characterized the Athenians, thereby re- 
ceived superabundant nourishment. Aristophon himself 
was charged with having kept back in his hands moneys 
intended to provide foi the manufacture of golden 
wreaths ; and, in order to avoid a worse alternative, he 
was obliged at once to make good the deficiency. Iudeed, 
it became customary to appoint extraordinary commissions 
to inquire who was illegally in possession of sacred or 
public moneys. During the progress of the suits, oppor- 
tunities were found for tricks of all kinds, in order to de- 
lude the judges, or to prevent the execution of the sen- 
tences actually pronounced. In public and in private mat- 
ters all means seemed allowable ; personal abuse was in- 
dulged in, and there were always at command venal wit- 
nesses and advocates, who were ready to compose a speech 
to be made in court in any cause, either for plaintiff or 
for defendant. No dishonor any longer attached to the 
payment of counsel ; the advocates or writers of speeches 
(Logographi) made their living out of the suits, and did their 
best to goad men into quarreling with one another. They 
had as it were set up their domestic establishments in the law- 
courts, and lay in wait for any dispute among the citizens. 

chap. ii.] The Policy of Athens. 129 

This petty warfare between citizens and civic parties 
claimed attention more than an}'thing else ; upon it time 
and strength were expended, while the commonweal re- 
mained neglected. As the confusion in legislation in- 
creased, indictments for illegal motions became more fre- 
quent, and the popular orators of the genuine stamp 
sought a kind of chivalry in boldly confronting these at- 
tacks. Aristophon boasted of having fought to an issue 
seventy-five such quarrels. 

Those were most of all exposed to suspicion 
and active enmity who were invested with torp an , d th6 

J generals. 

public powers, viz. the envoys and, most nota- 
bly, the generals. If they were successful, they were 
without consideration of persons immoderately honored 
and extolled ; for the observance of a just standard in 
public acknowledgments had long been lost, and, instead 
of the wise economy which had distinguished the Athens 
of earlier days, it had become the practice prodigally to 
squander the highest gifts of honor, and to indulge in a 
senseless extravagance. But far worse was the opposite 
of this : viz. that, whenever a calamity had befallen the 
city, the commanders of the troops were made to suffer for 
the vexation felt by the citizens. Nothing was more 
damaging to the state than the perpetual strife between 
the orators and the generals. Person who sat safely at 
home and understood nothing of the military matters, 
brought charges of life and death against the men return- 
ing from arduous campaigns, when it became their duty to 
give an account of their conduct in office, and made them 
sick of doing their best, though upon their will to do it 
everything depended. After Callistratus had set so bad 
an example by his attack upon Timotheus, this evil sys- 
tem steadily grew worse ; and there was no general who 
was not several times indicted for high treason. 

And what in truth was the position of the generals in 
those days ? They no longer, it should be remembered, 


130 History oj Greece. t BoOK vu 

commanded Attic citizens, held together by a sense of hon* 
or and by a feeling of patriotism. The wealthy Athe- 
nians as a matter of duty served as cavalry, the state fur- 
nishing the customary supplementary payment for the 
purpose ; their handsome squadrons formed the proces- 
sions, which were part of the pomp of the city festivals ; 
but service abroad they evaded. In the place of the 
wealthier, poorer citizens entered as substitutes, in order 
to improve their financial circumstances by pay and pil- 
lage ; in this matter again money became so emphatically 
the main object, that the warriors would not even march 
outside the gates for a review without having received pay. 
From other states, too, enough men came in who were 
ready to sell their persons and their lives ; and these were 
homeless adventurers, folk to whom nothing was sacred, 
who took service to-day with the Persians and the Egyp- 
tians, and to-morrow with the Athenians. Such troops 
were only to be kept together by money. War was there- 
fore diverted into those regions where there was the best 
prospect of gain ; money meant power and victory, and 
in order to obtain money, hands were laid even upon the 
property of the temples. 

The condi- ^ such a system of mercenaries was not to 
tionof the bring about the ruin of the state, there was 
needed a public treasury with well-assured 
sources of income, and a fixed war-budget. But the en- 
tire financial system upon which the greatness of Athens 
rested (vol. ii. p. 523) had long ago fallen to pieces; the 
regular sources of income, in particular the tributes, had 
dried up, with the exception of a small remnant, and there 
was no fund in existence. No sooner, therefore, was an 
army to be assembled, than it became requisite to levy 
property-taxes, and to obtain immediately out of the 
pockets of the citizens the moneys needed for the expenses 
of each particular war. The dislike of giving was intensi- 
fied by the frequent demands, as well as by the absence 

chap, ii.j Tfc p^ty j Athens. 131 

of corresponding success : and this dislike was all the 
greater, inasmuch as the money of the citizens mostly went 
into the hands of strangers. To these causes of unwill- 
ingness were added the distrust of the administrators of 
the sums collected with so much trouble and the informa- 
tions perpetually laid as to unconscientious squandering 
of the moneys. Special officials (Exetastce) were there- 
fore sent out to see whether the professed number of mer- 
cenaries was actually in existence ; but these controlling 
authorities it was likewise possible to bribe, if the general 
thought it worth his while. But even if no part of the 
moneys granted was made away with, yet there was an 
utter disproportion between them and the requirements of 
the war ; as a rule they only sufficed to bring together the 
mercenaries, and the idea became more and more custom- 
ary, that army and fleet ought to maintain themselves 

Timotheus set the first example of wars The position 
which cost nothing. In his patriotic zeal he of the , 

° * generals. 

exerted himself to the utmost to remove every 
obstacle in the way of glorious enterprises, and took plea- 
sure in contrasting the trifling expense of his victories with 
the enormous pecuniary sacrifices exacted by the expedi- 
tions of Pericles. He procured money from friend and from 
foe, and, when a deficency occurred, contrived to pay his 
way by a sham-money of copper, to which he was able to 
give currency by virtue of his personal credit. Timotheus 
seduced the Athenians into the serious error of believing 
it possible to carry on sucessful wars without a fund and 
without a regular system of financial administration. 
This delusion was too agreeable for them to take warning 
from experience, although already in the case of Timo- 
theus himself it might have been perceived, what where the 
real conditions of such a method of conducting war. The 
general never had any control over his own movements ; 
he was incapable of carrying out plans of an extensive 

132 History of Greece. (BookVii 

kind ; he was forced to evade all more important tasks, and 
to dissipate his strength in petty warfare ; from the first 
he was altogether unable to undertake to receive and 
execute definite instructions. The necessary consequence 
was, that the generals became more and more independent, 
self-willed and arbitrary as towards the city. In propor- 
tion as they had to pay more consideration to their troops, 
they took less account of those by whom they were 
commissioned. If they procured pay and soldiers them- 
selves, they desired likewise to reserve for themselves the 
glory of the successes which were achieved. Accord- 
ingly, instead of the victories of Athens, the victories of 
the generals were now alone spoken of; and it was not the 
name of the city, but his own, which the victorious 
commander was wont to inscribe upon the spoils brought 
home by him. 

Furthermore, it lay in the nature of the existing state 
of things, that the generals, while finding less and less sup- 
port and vigorous assistance in their native city, were all 
the more eager to seek for combinations abroad. For this 
Their con- numerous opportunities offered themselves ; 
nexi.on with and thus we find Timotheus in alliance with 


princes. Iason of Pherse, with Alcetas the Molossian, 
with Amyntas of Macedonia, and even with Persian 
satraps. The most important advantages were obtained 
as the gifts of personal friendship. Similar relations are 
met with between Iphicrates and the Thracian princes, 
between Chares and Artabazus. These ties of amity were 
secured by matrimonial alliances with the princely fami- 
lies, which naturally were greatly interested in attaching 
Hellenes to their interests. Thus Seuthes had offered the 
hand of his daughter to Xenophon (vol. iv. p. 196) ; 
Cotys became the brother-in-law of Iphicrates, and Cerso- 
bleptes of Charidemus. Hereby the Attic generals were 
placed in the most ambiguous of positions, and involved 
in inextricable conflicts between opposite obligations (p. 

chap- ILJ The Policy of Athens. 133 

109). They, as it were, included themselves among 
foreign dynasts, and were more at home in foreign lands 
than at Athens. Just as Alcibiades after his banishment 
founded fastnesses for himself in the Chersonnesus, so we 
find in this period generals of the city, while they were 
still its officers, in possession of towns, bestowed upon them 
by foreign princes, or conquered by them on their own ac- 
count. Thus Timotheus is said to have received the towns 
of Sestus and Crithote as a gift at the hands of Ariobar- 
zanes. Iphicrates was allowed to regard the Thracian 
city of Drys as his personal property, and to surround it 
with walls. Chares had his residence at Sigeum ; and 
Chabrias was to all intents and purposes at home in 
Egypt, where he pursued a perfectly independent policy. 
Thus the generals became estranged from Thei . ec 
the city, and obtained a personal power, gla- fjjjjjf*™ "^ 
ringly contravening the spirit of the republic. 
And in proportion as military life grew distinct from 
civil, the commanders, being in constant intercourse with 
the mercenaries, who required a downright kind of disci- 
pline, assumed a rough and imperious bearing ; they felt 
themselves, as towards the citizens, in the character of 
soldiers, and refused to suffer the tongue-valiant gentry, 
who monopolized the attention of the assembly at Athens, 
to interfere in their doings, or to pass judgment upon their 
campaigns. But on the other side there remained to the 
civic community, guided by its orators, the duty of as- 
signing to each general his sphere of military operations, 
and of receiving from each on his return the account of 
his proceedings demanded by the constitution. There ac- 
cordingly arose on this head an unsatisfactory state of re- 
lations, which more than anything else inflicted serious 
damage upon the commonwealth.* 

* Routine by the regular business of scribes (vrroypa^nareta). Vit, X. Orat. 
840. Tlpoo-Kweiv Tt\v 66\ov, Dem. xix. 314. Meier, Comment, de Vita Lycurgi, pag. 
c. Aristophon seventy-five times indicted vapavo/xoiv : iEschia. in Otes. 194 

134 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

Such was the change which had taken place in the re- 
lations of the generals to the state ; and how rapidly 
these relations became yet worse ! How great in these 
times was the difference between the older and the 
younger generation ! Chabrias, Iphicrates, and notably 
Timotheus, still admirably contrived to control the exist- 
ing evils, and to maintain the cohesion between city and 
army. With truly Attic genius they knew how to make 
the new military system as serviceable as possible to the 
state, and to raise its defensive strength by combining the 
service of mercenaries with that of citizens ; they understood 
how to assert the superiority of Attic culture over the savage 
mass of the troops, although already in the case of Iphi- 
crates the defiant ways of the soldier are perceptible, — as 
was shown on the occasion of the indictment of Aristophon, 
when the general drew his sword in the face of the orators. 

At a later date, however, the disastrous evils of these 
relations became far more openly manifest. The generals 
were barbarized simultaneously with the bands com- 
manded by them ; and as they blended with these, they 
separated themselves from the citizens, and lost all habits 
of discipline and legality. They made no distinction be- 
tween friend and foe, squandered the money in Tyrannical 
arrogance, levied forced requisitions upon the confeder- 
ates, and on occasion passed with all their troops into 
foreign service, so that the Athenians were altogether 
ignorant of the whereabouts of the fleet, and had to search 
for it on the wide seas. Indeed, it had become unknown 
who was the master of the fleet. It is in this condition 
that we find affairs under Chares and Charidemus, who 
exhibit the wild ways of a Greek condottiere in their full 
development. Chares was already in his per- 
sonal exterior a complete contrast to the ele- 

— *E£ eTooral tuv f evuv, iEschin. Tim. 113.— Timotheus and Pericles : Isocr. 
xv. 111.— Sham-money: Boeekh, P. Ec. of Ath. vol. i. p. 392 [Eng. Tr.].— Con- 
flicts between civic duty and foreign connexions : Dem. xxiii. 129. 

ClIAP - n -J The Policy of Athens. 135 

gautly-built Timotheus, who, like his father, was of slight 
bodily stature. Chares made a point of letting it be seen 
on every occasion that he was above all a soldier ; and 
sought to impose by means of his martial figure and rodo- 
montading talk. Accordingly, Timotheus reproved his 
countrymen for appointing a man general by reason of his 
broad shoulders. Such a man, he said, might indeed be 
adapted for carrying the general's baggage ; but the office 
of general required a man, who, free from all low desires, 
possessed a clear judgment concerning the mission of the 
city ; so that if Chares boasted of the holes in his shield 
and the wounds on his body, foolhardiness was no praise 
befitting a general. At the same time Chares was a man 
of profligate habits, who took delight in the harsh alter- 
nation of bloody frays with effeminate debauchery, whose 
admiral's vessel was filled with wenches and female flute- 
players, and who shrank from no means of securing the 
favor of the orators and of the civic assembly. As a man of 
the vulgar type, his natural downrightness pleased the peo- 
ple far better than the fine culture of Timotheus. And 
indeed Chares, by virtue of his indefatigable ambition, his 
versatility and his unwearying officiousness, during fifty 
years of active life as a general, obtained many an advan- 
tage in the field for the Athenians ; but he missed more 
opportunities than he took advantage of, and did more 
harm than good ; and, although he is not to be regarded 
as the sole cause of the Social War and of its disastrous 
issue, which the friends of Timotheus laid to his charge, 
yet he, above all others, contributed to bring his native 
city into evil repute, and to destroy the patriotic work of 

The above-mentioned generals were born charide- 
Athenians. But under the then existing cir- mus of 0reus - 
cumstances foreigners too were unhesitatingly taken into 

* Timotheus on Chares: Plut. Apophthegm. 187. Chares and Cleon: 
Polyb. ix. 23. 

136 History of Greece. [BookVU 

the service of the state, provided only that they distin- 
guished themselves in the art, which in those times was 
accounted the highest task of the general, viz. that of col- 
lecting volunteer recruits, and drilling them, and attach- 
ing them to the general's person. In this way Charide- 
mus attained to high honors : a man who was not even in 
his own native place, Oreus in Euboea, reckoned among 
the citizens of the full-blood, who rose from the meanest 
condition by his exertions as a soldier, then at the head of 
a band of his own made himself a name as a freebooter by 
land and by sea, and was on this account, together with 
his men, taken into pay by Iphicrates, when that general 
wished to increase his forces against Amphipolis. Iphi- 
crates displayed a thoughtless confidence in Charidemus ; 
he entrusted to his care the hostages from Amphipolis, 
with instructions to take them to Athens. Instead of this, 
Charidemus took them home to their native city, and 
fought on the side of the Thracians against Athens. But 
in lieu of receiving the just recompense of his treachery, 
the cunning adventurer contrived anew to secure confi- 
dence. Notwithstanding his perfidy, which had inflicted 
irremediable damage upon the Athenians, they regarded 
him as a man whose services ought not to be rejected. 
Timotheus took him into pay again ; and the Athenians 
even conferred their civic franchise upon him, in order to 
attach him permanently to the interest of their city. So 
low had the standard fallen, according to which men were 
judged ; so little was even a general of the city required to 
possess what in truth was the fundamental condition of 
any salutary service to the state, — conscientiousness, fideli- 
ty, and patriotism.* 

Foreign Such was the condition of the military sys- 
reiations. tern of the Athenians in times when the pos- 
session of forces which could be relied upon was more in 
dispensable than ever before; for the number of points 

* Charidemus : Sch'afer, Demotfh. i. 379. 

chap, ii.] The Policy of Athens, 131 

requiring to be defended was continually on the increase. 
The utmost vigilance, sagacity, and energy were therefore 
needed, if Athens desired to maintain her position in the 
iEgean. But since the condition of things at home was 
what it was, the foreign relations could not fail to become 
rapidly worse, the most important places to be lost, and 
the confederates to revolt. The Athenians allowed them- 
selves to be carried on by the course of events, while there 
was no mind gifted with foresight to guide the helm of the 
state and to keep definite aims in view. They took plea- 
sure in the vagueness of existing relations, entertaining no 
really serious intentions either of war or of peace, and con- 
cluding treaties without any fixed resolutions of observing 
them. Thus even their foreign policy shows how tho- 
roughly the love of law and of moral order in public life 
had become dulled. 

Of all the existing foreign relations, those The Cim _ 
with the princes on the Cimmerian Bosporus merian Bos- 

1 r porus. 

Were in truth the most favorable and the best 
warranted. Here since the year 438 the family of the 
Spartocidse had held sway, who displayed a friendship 
towards the Athenians, which had alone survived all the 
changes of fortune and the heaviest blows suffered by 
Athens. Satyrus and his son Leu con (393-353 b. c.) 
were specially zealous in giving proofs of this kindly feel- 
ing. Leucon relieved the Attic vessels of the exit-dues, 
conceded to them important privileges in the purchase of 
corn, so that all vessels had to wait, until the Athenians 
had fully laden their ships ; he even occasionally in 
times of dearth allowed them to buy considerable stores at 
a moderate price. In general he attached the highest 
value to the maintenance of fixed and well-ordered rela- 
tions with the chief market for the corn of the Pontus, 
which were based upon a salutary reciprocity of hospitable 
relations of traffic. 

With Egypt and Cyprus the most advantageous con- 

138 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

nexions had been entered into by Athens; but in 

Egypt and either country she had left her allies in the 

Cyprus. lurch ( yol i v . p> 294). As towards Persia, 

the relations of the Athenians were in the highest de- 
gree uncertain ; they oscillated between a re- 
spectful attitude, conceding to the Great King 
the authority of a suzerain, and a contempt, regarding the 
empire as in a condition of dissolution, and treating it as 
a state in the case of which it was of no moment whatever, 
whether the obligations assumed towards it were observed 
or not. The highest value was attached to the conclusion 
of treaties of peace with the Great King, while on the 
other hand the satraps in revolt against him were support- 
ed, as if no knowledge of what was taking place in the 
Archipelago ever reached the remote court of Susa. The 
entire civic community loudly applauded the defeat of the 
royal army by Chares, as if it had been another victory 
of Marathon ; and when hereupon Artaxerxes III., Ochus, 
complained, this sufficed to scare the Athenians to such a 
degree, that they withdrew their fleet and abandoned all 
the advantages gained, in order at any risk to avoid being 
involved in a serious quarrel with the Great King (p. 121). 

Thrace -^ u * ^ e most important of all foreign rela- 

tions were those with the powers on the Thra- 
cian Sea and on the Hellespont, the high-road of the 
Athenian corn-supplies. Nowhere were their affairs in- 
volved in greater difficulty and exposed to more frequent 
changes ; here was the open wound, which kept the city 
in a perpetual state of feverish excitement, and consumed 
its best vital power. Here everything had entered into 
an unfortunate phase ; and the dominion which had been 
gained at the coast of such infinite sacrifices, it was, since 
the fatal expedition of Brasidas, found impossible in any 
way to restore. Amphipolis, solemnly declared the prop- 
erty of the Athenians by Sparta, Persia and Macedonia^ 
defied all the attacks even of Iphicrates and Timotheus ; 

chap, iij The Policy of Athens. 139 

and though seemingly the Athenians had it once more in 
their hands, it was again further from them than ever 
before. Similarly, Olynthus and the Chalcidian cities 
were able, without receiving chastisement, to refuse to join 
the Attic Naval confederation. The ancient friendship of 
the Odrysse (p. 15) had long since changed into bitter en- 
mity ; and bloody feuds were carried on in order to de- 
cide, whether for a time the influence of Athens, or that 
of a native dynast, was to preponderate. Neither party 
was decidedly the stronger ; for the superiority of the At- 
tic arms was far outweighed by the fact of the extreme 
remoteness of the scene of the struggle, as well as by the 
difficulties caused by wind and weather ; and the Thracian 
princes contrived to overcome the Athenians with their 
own weapons, and to make the talent of Attic generals 
serve the purposes of dynastic policy ; for Cotys, it will be 
remembered, owed his position of power to Iphicrates, and 
Cersobleptes his (since the year 359) to Charidemus. But 
such successes as were actually obtained, the Athenians 
owed solely to the feuds which broke out between the 
Thracian chiefs ; and it was again only in this way that 
in the year 357 the treaty was brought about, by which 
Chares once more recovered the Chersonnesus for Athens. 
Yet even now the tenure of it remained a very insecure 
one ; for Cardia, the most considerable place in the penin- 
sula of which its citadel was the key, situate on the isth- 
mus connecting the peninsula with the mainland, a town 
founded by Greeks and inhabited by a population of At- 
tic descent, remained in the hands of the Thracian prince. 
And concerning all treaties with him this alone was 
known : that he kept them only just so long as he lacked 
the power to free himself from them. There was abso- 
lutely no guarantee for these possessions, which Athens 
was wholly unable to renounce without seeing the bases 
of her prosperity called in question, unless the princes 
there were completely overcome and deprived of the pos- 

140 History of Greece. [Book vil 

sibility of outstepping the limits placed upon them by 
treaty. But for such a method of conducting war the 
Athenians were wholly deficient in both courage and re- 
sources ; the utmost they accomplished were naval arma- 
ments, which temporarily restored the authority of Athens 
and enforced momentary concessions. But if it was im- 
possible to overcome the chieftains of the Thracian coast, 
how was the new enemy to be defied, who was advancing 
from the interior, and who combined the faithless policy 
of the petty barbarian princes with a steadily extending 
imperial power, the nucleus of which was quite beyond 
the reach of attacks on the part of the Athenians ? 

The result ^ ^ rs * * ne y nac ^ m dulged m tne flattering 
°l A th . e P° lic y delusion, that the interests of the Macedonian 

of Aristo- 

phon. king were identical with those of Athens, and 

that he would be of good service against Amphipolis, 
against the Chalcidian cities, and against the Odrysae. 
But by his occupation of Amphipolis (p. 55) Philip had 
thrown off the mask ; and herewith a new foe had been 
added to the list of those who endangered the possession 
of the colonies ; and this new foe, as the Athenians were 
soon obliged to confess to themselves, was the most danger- 
ous of all. 

With regard to the relations with the Greek states, the 
Naval Confederation had notwithstanding its many in- 
firmities yet ensured this advantage : that it maintained a 
connexion between Athens and the Archipelago, and pre- 
vented the downfall of the ancient traditions. Athens 
might, and could not but, conceive herself a Great Power, 
when the deputies came to the city from Rhodes and from 
Cos, from Byzantium and from Chios. After all, there 
was a nossibility of this connexion being firmly established 
by the gradual force of habit, and invested with a new 
importance by the common danger which beset it. But 
now it began to collapse at the very moment when the 
worst danger was imminent, when Philip was revealing 

Chap. II.] The Policy of Athens. 141 

his designs of maritime dominion. Corcyra had already 
been lost at an earlier date (p. Ill) ; Athens therefore 
only retained the least powerful islands ; a shadowy rem- 
nant of the old Federal Council continued to hold its 
meetings in the city, and about forty-five talents (£11,000 
drc.) of federal contributions were paid in. The cowardly 
character of the treaty of peace materially helped thorough- 
ly to undermine the authority Of Athens. For hitherto 
she had always at least remained a power in the JEge&n ; 
and for this reason an Attic party had maintained itself 
in the islands, and had directed their constitutional life in 
harmony with Athens. But now the opposite influences 
came to prevail, and in the most important cities revolu- 
tionary movements broke out, which ended either in the 
government falling into the hands of the oligarchs, or in 
the establishment of Tyrannical rule. The Persians 
encouraged these revolutions ; and Maussollus took advan- 
tage of them, in order to subject to his authority and to 
the suzerainty of the Great King the islands in his more 
immediate vicinity, in particular Cos and Rhodes. In 
Chios the civic community and the oligarchical party con- 
tended with alternating success. In the towns of Lesbos 
oligarchical or Tyrannical governments were likewise 
established. Thus hostile parties and hostile powers 
gained preponderance in the islands, and estranged them 
from the Athenians, so that even the non-political rela- 
tions suffered, while the commercial traffic was disturbed 
and the prosperity of the citizens damaged. 

This was the result brought about for the Athenians by 
the policy of Aristophon ; although the conclusion of 
peace was moved in opposition to him, and carried by a 
party which was adverse to his, and which asserted a novel 
view of public affairs. For up to this time the Attic 
statesmen, although they pursued no independent or con- 
sistent policy, had invariably deemed it their duty to up- 
hold the power of their native city, so far as in them lay. 

142 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

Callistratus had indefatigably struggled agaiust the hege- 
mony of Thebes ; and Aristophon had sought to advance 
Athens at the cost of Sparta, and had shrunk from no con- 
test for the maintenance of the honor of the city. Both 
retained something of the moral elevation which had ac- 
companied the new birth of Athens ; they never left out 
of sight the thought of the Hellenic mission of the city, 
and incited their fellow-citizens to patriotic exertions.* 

The oiic ^ u ^ now men came forward, who acquired 

ofEubuius. influence by providing for nothing but the 

personal comfort of the Athenians, and by setting up as 
the programme of their party the renunciation of all 
aims of a loftier character and such as could be reached 
only by means of sacrifices. All the troubles through 
which the city had passed since the Sicilian expedition 
they averred to be the result of visionary projects surpass- 
ing the strength of the commonwealth, and the fruits of 
the craving of the Athenians to be a great power. It was 
therefore, they said, necessary for the city to confine itself 
to its most immediate tasks, and above all to endeavor, 
while maintaining a well-ordered economy at home and 
peaceable relations towards its neighbors, to foster trade 
and civic prosperity. This public policy resembled the 
views of life taken by a man, who withdraws from exten- 
sive concerns involving heavy risks, in order to enjoy the 
evening of his life in comfortable tranquillity. The great 
majority of the citizens were well satisfied with this sys- 
tem ; they by no means intended on that account to cease 
to be conscious that they were Athenians ; and nothing 
was more welcome to them, than when the orators nar- 
rated to them the deeds of their great ancestors, while 
they were themselves reposing on the laurels of their fore- 
fathers, and not disturbed in their comfortable life by any 
levies of troops or taxes. 

* As to the dominion on the Bosporus : Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. Gr. ii. p. 88.— 
Revenues derived by Athens from the Confederates: Dem. xviii. 234. 

chap. ii.J The Policy of Athens. 143 

The spokesman of this peace-policy was Eubulus, of the 
Attic deme of Anaphlystus, who was born about the time 
when Athens was liberating herself from the Spartan 
yoke. He had introduced himself to the citizens as an 
orator, and they took pleasure in his guileless ways, which 
were of a kind naturally to awaken confidence. He dis- 
played skill in business, and in particular a clearsighted- 
ness in matters of finance, which enabled him to lay bare 
a variety of abuses and trangressions committed under the 
administration of Aristophon and his associates. When 
hereupon the interference of Persia threatened endlessly 
to extend the Social War, — while the resources of Athens 
had already been exhausted at its commencement, while 
the generals were quarrelling with one another, and there 
was an utter absence of belief in a successful issue, — Eubu- 
lus perceived that the moment had arrived for him to 
come forth from his more restricted sphere, which had 
merely been that of exercising a control over the finances, 
and to take into his hands the great question of the day. 
It is true that the career of an Attic statesman could not 
have begun more shamefully, than by his insisting upon 
the conclusion, under existing circumstances, of peace at 
any price, upon the sacrifice of the great efforts which had 
been made, and upon an absolute renunciation of the old 
maritime dominion of Athens. But the unblushing open- 
ness with which he subordinated all considerations of 
honor and power to the longing for peace, gained him the 
hearts of the citizens, who now enjoyed the pleasant sensa- 
tion of hearing their most secret feelings and innermost 
wishes defended by eloquent lips as thoroughly justifiable. 
They therefore gave themselves up with indefinite kindli- 
ness to their Eubulus, who contrived to tranquillize them 
as to the losses of the moment, and to console them with 
the prospect of better times. It was, he declared, the im- 
prudent and irritating policy of Aristophon and Chares 
which had caused the recent disasters : let the Athenians 

144 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

only endeavor to put their own house in good order ; for 
upon a modest domestic life were based the true welfare 
and prosperity of a democratic commonwealth. 

But Eubulus had no intention of biddiDg his fellow- 
citizens remained satisfied with mere phrases. He earn- 
estly set about turning the benefits of the peace to good 
account for his city, so soon as an opportunity presented 
itself for the purpose ; and this opportunity he found, 
when immediately after the retirement of Aristophon he 
was appointed to the office of Treasurer of the state (vol. 
ii. p. 504). His entire system of policy, it should be re- 
membered, had its origin in the management of the 
finances : in this department he was at home ; with refer- 
ence to it he had led the opposition, and was acquainted 
with all the defects of the previous administration ; he 
could therefore energetically address himself to reforming 
it, and achieve rapid results. At the close of the first 
term of his administration he enjoyed tbe triumph of being 
able to show a not inconsiderable augmentation of the 
public revenues. 

The festi- Hereupon it could not fail to become clear, 
vai-money. whether the object of Eubulus really was the 
welfare of the city. In that case, however much he loved 
peace, it behooved him to provide for unseen cases and to 
collect a fund, while without such a fund the city must 
always remain impotent, and incapable even of preserving 
a peace worthy of trust. But to this he gave no thought. 
He desired to maintain himself, to make himself indispen- 
sable, and to attach the people to him. He accordingly 
proposed the distribution of the surplus of the first year of 
peace. The Dionysia (probably in the spring of 353 b. c.) 
were celebrated with a merriment long denied to the peo- 
ple ; even the poorest indulged to his heart's content in 
unlimited festive enjoyment. Henceforth Eubulus was 
omnipotent. He introduced dependants of his own as his 
successors in the supreme financial office, at the same time, 

C flAP - «.] T/io Po% 0/ Athens. 145 

however, diminishing the importance of this post ; for he 
was powerful enough essentially to transform the whole 
system of the Attic financial offices in accordance with 
his principles. 

Formerly it had been the ordinary practice for the sur- 
plus sums of the public revenues to be sunk in the war- 
fund, while in good years part of the surplus was distribu- 
ted, in order to make up to the poorer citizens their en- 
trance-money on the days of theatrical performances. This 
was the Theoricon, or theatre-money, an institution con- 
necting itself with the noblest tendencies of the Periclean 
state (vol. ii. p. 493), but more than any other exposed to 
the danger of degenerating. The theatre-money became 
banqueting-money ; it was doubled, and trebled. The 
Athenians themselves recognized in it a serious evil beset- 
ting the commonweal, and abolished it accordingly ; but 
Agyrrhius (vol. iv. p. 297) re-introduced it as a recognized 
integral element in the democracy, and therefore in the 
system of the Attic state. But it had at least never been 
anything more than a practice occasionally resorted to, 
and the citizens had not been allowed an established 
claim upon it, however disagreeable the non-payment of it 
might affect them. 

Now of a sudden entirely new principles were asserted. 
The festival-moneys, it was now said, are the most impor- 
tant item in the entire budget : the fund devoted to them 
ought to be an entirely independent one, with a well-as- 
sured income. The officers of this fund ought therefore 
not only to have instructions to distribute the moneys 
handed over to them, but, in order that the payments to 
their fund may never fall short of its due, they ought to be 
enabled to control the whole system of public receipts and 
expenditure. For this purpose are needed men enjoying 
public confidence, commissioned by the civic community, 
—if it chooses, year by year. Of course Eubulus now had 
a fixed seat at his board ; the distributions were made 

146 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

more copiously than ever before, and he was regarded as 
the author of this blissful state of things. 

The admin- Herein the standpoint of his system of 
Eubuius ° f administration announces itself ; and there is 
01 cvi 3— ex. e( l ua ^y little obscurity as to its inevitable 
338) B °* 354 ~ C0US8( l ueilce3 ' A. merry life for the people is 
the most important of all considerations ; and 
to procure the means requisite for this is the first and most 
serious task of a conscientious statesman. It is as if in a 
monarchy the principle were asserted, that the income of 
the state is in the first instance designed to defray the 
court-festivals, and court hunting-parties, and other 
amusements of the sovereign, while what is left over must 
suffice for the requirements of the commonwealth. Only, 
of course, a principle so utterly repugnant to the essential 
idea of a state is but rarely put forward and carried out 
with so charmingly simple an openness as it was by Eubuius. 
Granted that the festival moneys, constitute the revenues 
of the civic community, any curtailment of these moneys 
amounts to a crime of Use-majestt, and any motion tending 
in this direction is, so to speak, equivalent to an attempted 
act of violence against the person of the Demos. Now, 
since according to earlier usage the surplus of the year's 
income passed into the war-fund, it became necessary to 
counteract this danger by anticipation ; and a special law 
was therefore passed, attaching the penalty of death to 
any venturesome attempt to propose the employment of 
festival-moneys for purposes of war. Thus the wise appli- 
cation of the public resources was made penal as an abuse 
of popular rights, and prudent economy as an offence 
against them ; while on the other hand luxury was recog- 
nized as the one thing needful. In attempting completely 
to realize the principle of democracy, the Athenians de- 
stroyed its fundamental law, viz. freedom of speech ; for 
the citizens and their spokesmen were now left with their 
hands bound, when the most important affairs of the com* 

c *">- n -3 The Policy of Athens. 147 

raonwealth came under discussion. Every expenditure 
for war-purposes had henceforth to be defrayed by the spe- 
cial imposition of a property-tax ; and hereby the whole 
question, even if it happened to involve the preservation or 
ruin of the state, was from the very outset made unpala- 
table to the citizens. 

Of such institutions it was possible to carry „, . 
the establishment; whereas formerly every °? .Athenian 
orator who made any novel proposal, was 
eagerly watched with a view to the indictment for uncon- 
stitutional motions. But Eubulus knew how to strike 
chords which found a ready response on all sides ; he based 
his policy upon the low and vulgar inclinations of humani- 
ty, and by satisfying these estranged his fellow-citizens 
from all more serious endeavors. The grandeur and 
loftiness of Attic democracy had vanished, while all the 
germs of the pernicious contained in it were fully deve- 
loped. The state cherished and fostered selfishness instead 
of overcoming it. A life of comfDrt and a craving for 
amusement were encouraged in every way, and the inter- 
ests of the citizens were withdrawn from serious affairs. 
Conversation became more and more superficial and frivo- 
lous. Famous hetozroz formed the chief topic of the town- 
talk ; the new inventions of Thearion, the leading pastry- 
cook in Athens, were hailed with loud applause ; and the 
witty sayings which had been uttered at jovial banquets 
were with great ardor repeated about town. The manu- 
facture of jokes became a recognized proficiency, above all 
in the circle of the so-called " Sixty," who held their meet- 
ings in the Heracleum near the Cynosarges. King Philip 
is said to have offered a talent for a report of the meetings 
of this society. 

Thus life went on in the joviality characteristic of a 
petty town, and the people became more and more en- 
feebled. No counter-movement took place. The great 
mass of men without means was satisfied by the festival- 

148 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

moneys, and the well-to-do were contented by a peace- 
policy which kept at a distance the terror of the property- 
tax. The democrats saw in Eubulus one of their own set 
at the head of affairs, while the aristocratic circles were 
likewise in his favor, because they had never given their 
support to the maintenance of a maritime dominion, or to 
the pursuit of the policy of a Great Power, on the part of 
Athens. And thus it came to pass, that such a man as 
this was for sixteen years able to direct the state of 

In the earlier times it was possible to become acquainted 
with all the intellectual tendencies of Athens, by realiz- 
ing to oneself its public life in its various relations. For 
everything was more or less closely connected with the 
state, served its ends, and found its basis and nourishment 
in it. Such was the case with plastic, pictorial, and archi- 
tectural art, with poetry in all its branches, with the 
studies of the philosopher, the historian, the astronomer, 
and with all the departments of science, the manifold 
variety of intellectual life forming a single whole, as we 
endeavored to show it did in the Periclean age. Now 
things had changed ; and it would be in the highest de- 
gree unjust, were a judgment as to the intellectual life of 
Athens to be formed on the basis of her political condi- 
tion in the times of Callistratus, Aristophon and Eubulus ; 
for its best forces had been estranged from the state, and 
the noblest tendencies of the period were unconnected with 
it. It is therefore of all the more importance to devote a 
separate survey to the intellectual life of Athens in Sci- 
ence and Art. 

* Eubulus, Treasurer for the financial term beginning with 01. cvi. 3 
(Aphobetas from 01. cvii. 3); his financial law dating from the time before 
the Olynthian War : Schafer, u. s. i. 177, 185. Eubulus changed the Athenians 
into Tarentines : Theop. ap. Harpocr. s. v. Eu/3ovAos, and Athen. 166. — Among 
the hetserst Nai? was notorious from 403 circ. (Harp.; Athen.). — Thearion : Plat. 
Gorging, 518 b ; Athen. 112. His shop "the habitation of twists," in Aristoph. 
Gerytades (Fr. Com. ii. 1009).— The "Sixty:" Athen. 614; Gottling, Gt$. 
Abhandl. i. 257. 

chap, il] The Policy of Athens. 149 

Philosophy might most readily be expected g cient ifi 
to have acquired a salutary influence upon lif eatAth- 
the whole life of the Athenians. For philos- 
ophy was the youngest and the mightiest movement which 
had seized upon the minds of men. An incli- D . ., , 

* ^ t Philosophy. 

nation to philosophical contemplation had 
been an Attic characteristic ; and the tendency of the 
times made even poets moral philosophers, as is shown in 
the case of Euripides. Moreover, the Socratic philosophy 
designed to be not idle speculation, but practical wisdom 
for the conduct of life ; and Socrates demanded from his 
disciples anything but seclusion from society ; rather, he 
called upon them to take a part in public affairs. Finally, 
we also remember, how the death of Socrates by no means 
put an end to his influence over the Athenians ; on the 
contrary, there ensued a thorough reaction (vol. iv. p. 
161); and when the Sophist Polycrates put forth a 
pamphlet in which he endeavored to vindicate the con- 
demnation of Socrates, the attempt met with general oppo- 
sition among the public, and was refuted by several 

This reaction was a remorseful consciousness of a wrong 
committed, creditable to the kind-heartedness of the 
Athenians; but it amounted to no return on their part 
from the course of conduct which they had hitherto pur- 
sued. They now recognized the noble martyr as one of 
the best of their fellow-citizens, they paid him honors and 
set up his image ; yet this recognition was not deep or se- 
rious enough to impel them to possess themselves of the 
elements of good offered to them by Socrates. Accord- 
ingly, the germs of a higher life, which he with unweary- 
ing zeal fostered among his fellow-citizens, attained to de- 

* Polycrates the Sophist: Diog. Laert. ii. 38. Suidas, Defender of Basiris 
and accuser of Socrates : Isocr. xi. 4. — It was against him that Lysias wrote 
(Holscher, V. Lys. 200), and that Xenophon too composed his Memorabilia 
according to Cobet, Mnem. vii. 752, who appeals to Hermippus op. Diog. Laert, 
This is assented to by Th. Bergk, Gr. Litt. 292. 

150 History of Greece. t BoOK vn. 

velopment only in a more limited association of men ; and 
this community forms within the popular multitude as it 
were a separate race, a new generation of men, owing their 
spiritual existence to Socrates, and finding in him their 
common centre. 

The influ- ^ n ^ Soeratic group was not, however, an 
rates ° f S ° C " excms i ye sect > like that of the Pythagoreans ; 
for Socrates was at no time the head of a 
school pledged to the sayings of its master. His teaching 
was not a seed which, wheresoever it finds a ground upon 
which to fall, produces, though in different degrees of ex- 
cellence, the same kind of plant ; but it was of its nature 
nothing more or less than the impulse to a human life 
having its being within, and independent of external 
influences, to a search after enduring truth, to the devel- 
opment of a free and self-conscious individuality. For 
this reason, too, the influence of Socrates was not restricted 
to his fellow-citizens. In his time the points of contrast 
between the several states and cities had in general lost 
much of their former distinctness ; the Sophists took a 
pride in finding themselves at home everywhere, and the 
culture spread by them effaced the impress of the differ- 
ent characters of the several tribes. This is also manifest 
from the flexible natures of a Theramenes and an Alci- 
biades, who was able, as circumstances demanded, to be an 
Athenian, Spartan, Boeotian, Ionian, Thracian, or Persian. 
But Socrates desired not an effacement of peculiarities due 
to birth, but a purification of them ; he wished that men 
should rise above the usages and views of the narrower 
circles of their homes, to that which was Hellenic and 
universally human. An effort in this direction in these 
times pervaded the entire people ; and in proportion to 
the moral and mental superiority of any individual Greek, 
he felt himself unsatisfied by the life of any particular 
state, and by the social relations in which he was placed ; 
and was vividly conscious of a craving for a higher stand- 

chap, ii.] The Policy of Athens. 151 

point, for absolute and universally valid truth. This 
craving: Socrates met, and his influence therefore extended 
far beyond the walls of Athens. But on the other hand, 
its benefits were pre-eminently reaped by his native city, 
inasmuch as it was through him that Athens first became 
in full measure the seat of Hellenic philosophy, to which 
end it had been consecrated by Pericles, and that it 
attained in the domain of intellectual life to a primacy, 
which far outlasted its political pre-eminence. 

From all sides Hellenes eager for know- Foreign 
ledge arrived, in order to imbibe Socratic g^J^Jj 8 of 
wisdom at its source. From Thebes came 
Simmias and Cebes (vol. iv. p. 355) ; from Megara Eu- 
clid es, round whom the orphaned band gath- Euc i ides 
ered after the death of its master. Having 
already before been occupied with philosophic studies, he 
was able in a very high degree to acknowledge the ser- 
vices which Socrates had rendered to the development of 
a logically consequent method of thought. Keen dia- 
lectics were his element ; and he was indefatigable in his 
endeavors to attack all conceptions, views, and conclusions 
based upon sensual perceptions. Accordingly, the ethical 
side of the Socratic teaching was comparatively disre- 
garded by him, and still more so by his successors, who 
neglected the profounder problems of philosophical con- 
sciousness, and sought to place their whole strength in the 
eristic art, i. e. in that of dialectic contest. The formal 
side preponderated in this school ; and this was why it 
met with all the more ready a response on the part of 
those who had no wish to be philosophers proper, but who 
only desired, with a view to general culture and practical 
purposes, to exercise their thinking powers, and to learn 
the art of convincing argumentation. In this „,.",.. 

& to Eubuhdes. 

direction Eubulides distinguished himself, a 

Milesian by birth, who lived and taught at Athens. His 

was a manly character ; in the philosopher, not less than 

152 History of Greece. [Book vri. 

in other men, he demanded patriotism and a love of liber- 
ty ; and himself adhered to the democratic party at Athens.* 
Phsedo -^ s was tne birthplace of Phsedo, a youth 

of a noble house, who had become a prisoner 
during the war (vol. iv. p. 204). Socrates became ac- 
quainted with him, and brought about his liberation on the 
payment of a ransom. He found in Phsedo a receptive 
mind, which gave itself up to him with absolute devotion. 
To Socrates Phsedo owed his salvation from external and 
internal unfreedom ; and with faithful zeal he cherished in 
his breast the germs of his preserver's teaching. To the 
dialectical side of it he likewise addressed himself with 
predilection ; yet he seems to have more deeply entered 
into its ethical significance than Eubulides. 
Aristi us ^ third was Aristippus, w r hom the fame of 

Socrates had attracted to Athens from remote 
Cyrene. He was vividly moved by the teachings of the 
master, but never fully gave himself up to them. He 
could not emancipate himself from the habits of the 
wealthy commercial city ; he retained a certain want of 
fixity in his conduct and bearing, and had about him 
something of the ways of the Sophists. In his philosophi- 
cal tendency the man of the world likewise displays him- 
self; inasmuch as he was prejudiced against theoretical 
knowledge, had no appreciation for dialectics, and re- 
garded philosophy entirely as the art of the conduct of 
life, as the institution of man in the way of attaining to 
happiness. In reality, he said, w T e know nothing except 
that w T hich has reference to ourselves, that which we per- 
ceive as occurring in ourselves. In this alone we possess a 
fixed standard for the desirable and the good ; for all 
men term that which excites a feeling of enjoyment good, 
and the reverse bad. But certain distinctions ought to be 
drawn : there are perceptions of enjoyment of several 

* Eubulides : Diog. Laert. ii. 108. 

Chap - il J The Policy of Athens. 153 

kinds, sensual and mental, selfish and unselfish, pure un- 
disturbed sensations, and again such as must be paid for 
with a greater degree of discomfort. Intelligence is there- 
fore necessary, and a many-sided mental culture, in order 
to distinguish those enjoyments which are salutary from 
those which are hurtful, in order in the midst of enjoy- 
ment to preserve independence of mind, in order to be- 
come free from perverse excitements, which disquiet the 
soul, from envy and passion, from prejudices and chang- 
ing phases of feeling, in order finally to be able to bear 
even wants and pain with equanimity. Although, there- 
fore, Aristippus still preserved a connexion between his 
views and the teachings of Socrates, inasmuch as he as- 
serted knowledge to be indispensable as means for attain- 
ing to a happy life, yet this connexion was of a very loose 
kind. For with him the domain of knowledge narrowed 
itself into the perception of the individual, and in his eyes 
virtue was essentially nothing more or less than modera- 
tion in enjoyment. It was difficult to sustain a teaching 
of this kind at a moral elevation ; it coquetted with the 
lower impulses of human nature, and thus, after already 
Aristippus had contrived to reconcile his philosophy with 
luxurious worldly enjoyment, his successors in the Cyre- 
naic school went further and further on the dangerous 
path, and more and more completely renounced the So- 
cratic impulse towards inquiry and towards a serious con- 
duct of life. 

A different course was pursued by Antis- Antisthenes# 
thenes, who was a native of Athens, but the 
son of a Thracian mother. In his case it was pre- 
cisely the grandeur of the character of Socrates which 
withdrew him from the Sophistical tendency and from the 
admiration of Gorgias, and which impelled him to consti- 
tute the Socratic idea of virtue the centre of all his efforts. 
He therefore agreed with Aristippus in this, that like him 
he regarded knowledge as nothing more than means to an 


154 History of Greece. [Book vil 

end ; in his view, too, philosophy was essentially the wise 
conduct of life and the systematic teaching of bliss ; but 
on the other hand, he decisively rejected all happiness of 
life rooted in external possessions and in effeminate sensa- 
tions; and, in direct contrast with the refined love of enjoy- 
ment urged by Aristippus, Antisthenes found happiness to 
lie in the absolute freedom of man from all outward posses- 
sions, in virtue, which suffices for itself. Virtue is the sole 
and perfect happiness of man, and there is no unhappiness 
except in evil. Virtue is the fruit of correct intelligence ; 
but, after all, with Antisthenes intelligence is essentially the 
direction of the will ; no sooner has this been gained than 
inquiry loses its significance ; so that for him the idea of vir- 
tue had little definiteness and little meaning. His practical 
maxims, on the other hand, he expressed with extreme deci- 
sion and distinctness ; declaring self-indulgence to be a 
thing, not merely of indifference and without value, but 
pernicious and hateful, so that he could not otherwise con- 
ceive of true virtue, than in the form of voluntary poverty, 
absolute self-denial and resignation. The enjoyment of so- 
cial intercourse and of all the charms with which Attic 
esprit had contrived so abundantly and charmingly to en- 
dow the life of the city, in his eyes resembled idol-worship ; 
and so emphatically was the development of an absolute- 
ly free individuality the object of main importance to 
him, that even the community of state-life seemed to him 
a preventive restriction of it. He stood in no other re- 
lations with the world, except in that of struggling against 
it and endeavoring to save individual men out of it. For 
this purpose he worked with extraordinary zeal, by word 
of mouth and by writings, up to an advanced period of 
age ; and, as Aristippus was surpassed by his pupils in the 
art of enjoyment, so was Antisthenes by his in the art of 
Dio enes res ig na tion. Diogenes, the son of Hicesius, of 
the "dog." Si nope, was the perfected cynic — for such was 
the name given to the followers of Antisthenes, a name 

chap, ii.] The Policy j Athens. 155 

derived from his place of teaching, the gymnasium Cyno- 
sarges, and at the same time intended to point at their 
offensive manner of life, as unworthy of a human being. 
Hitherto the Athenians had been accustomed to see philo- 
sophic culture united to prosperous circumstances and re- 
fined manners ; it was accounted a possession of the higher 
classes, and Socrates himself was, notwithstanding his con- 
tempt for all externals, seen holding intercourse with aris- 
tocratic circles. The philosophy of the cynics declared 
war against all culture of superior refinement ; and Dio- 
genes lay in his earthen tub in front of the Metroum at 
Athens, or in the Croneum, the luxurious suburb of 
Corinth, castigating the perversities of the world after the 
fashion of a dirty mendicant friar, and entertaining the 
jeering crowd by his originality. 

The above named Socratic philosophers were The Athe _ 
foreigners, or, at all events, though born at of^^eT™ 
Athens, like Antisthenes, were in their ten- 
dency strangers to the state ; and all of them have this 
characteristic in common: that it was only particular 
sides in Socrates which were followed by them. The 
schools of Euclides and Phsedo attached themselves above 
all to his method, while the Cyrenaics and Cynics paid no 
attention to the theoretical side in him, broke up the union 
between knowledge and will, the establishment of which 
was one of the main merits of Socrates, and virtually con- 
verted philosophizing into action. Every one of these four 
schools was accordingly based upon a one-sided view of 
the great master ; and it was after all the genuine Athe- 
nians who were best adapted for understanding Socrates in 
his totality. 

The influence of Socrates upon his immediate fellow- 
countrymen operated in various ways. In the case of some 
men it never went beyond impulses which failed to have 
a permanent result, as with Critias and Alcibiades. In 
the case of others there arose an enduring relation of an 

156 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

intimate community of life, which to Socrates was the real 
joy of his existence, and a source of blessings to his friends, 
such as the faithful Crito, and again Apollodorus and 
Chserephon, who were possessed by a deep love of truth. 
Lastly, neither could there be at Athens a lack of men 
of whom Socrates took so complete a hold, that they could 
not remain satisfied with keeping to themselves the bene- 
fits received by them, but were also desirous of placing 
the image of their benefactor before the eyes of those 
further removed from him and of posterity, of spreading 
his teaching in wider circles, and of continuing his work 
after his death. Such attempts were made in various ways. 
Thus the shoemaker Simon, in whose shop the old sage had 
been a frequent visitor, wrote down from remembrance 
the conversations which had specially impressed them- 
selves upon his memory ; while iEschines, the son of Ly- 
sanias, published Socratic dialogues in a more independent 
form and with a deeper sense of their meaning, although 
his conduct of life by no means redounded to the honor of 
his master. These and other writings of the same kind 
are lost ; on the other hand, we can with perfect clear- 
ness realize to ourselves the features of Xenophon, the son 
of Gryllus, as a Socratic writer, — the only genuine follower 
of Socrates who is also closely connected with the great 
public events of the times.* 

v . Honorably trained in a family of considera- 

Xenophon ; J J 

bom tion, distinguished in person and of noble 

(b.'c. X «2) V11 manners, an Attic knight of aristocratic ten- 
dencies, but free from arrogance, simple- 
hearted and pious, and full of a zealous endeavor to attain 

* Simon (SiaAoyoi o-kvtikqi, Diog. Laert. ii. 100), Hermann, Plato, 419 ; 585 — 
JEschines the Sphettian (according to some, next to Plato the most impor- 
tant of the followers of Socrates), Athen. 611 ; cf. Brandis, Gesch. d. att. Philos. 
ii. 70; Zeller, ii. 1, 170. As to the life of Xenophon, Cobet, N. L. 535, has 
demonstrated the impossibility of his having been present at the battle of 
Delium ; and many indications (notably Anab. iii. 1, 25: ov&ev irpo4>a<ri(onat 
Tyv >jAiKtav) justify us in unhesitatingly dating his birth, with Bergk, in 431 
b. c. Cf. Philol xviii. 247. 

Chap - il 1 The Policy of Athens. 157 

to general culture, — it was as such that the young man 
came into contact with Socrates. It was in a deep and 
living spirit that he recognized the value of the man as 
compared with the Sophists to whom he had hitherto 
given ear; and he became his faithful disciple and inde- 
fatigable companion in his walks and conversations. And 
yet Xenophon could not permanently find satisfaction in 
life at Athens ; for with all his craving for instruction he 
was not yet created by nature for finding in scientific 
labors the calling of his life ; and thus it seemed to him a 
hint from Providence, when in the year 401 he received 
from his friend, the Theban Proxenus, a letter from 
Sardis, which depicted the court at that place (vol. iv. p. 
184) in brilliant colors, and promised him an introduc- 
tion to Cyrus. The resolution which he was called upon 
to form was not easy for an Athenian ; for it will be re- 
membered how no man done had more harm to the city 
than Cyrus, to whom a good patriot could wish nothing but 
evil. Instead of this, Xenophon was to devote his ser- 
vices to him ! Socrates made no secret to him of the 
doubtfulness of his scheme, but had no reason for abso- 
lutely dissuading him from it ; he knew Xenophon to be a 
man requiring great tasks, if his talents were to be turned 
to account ; and for such no oppportunity was furnished at 
Athens. He advised him to apply to Delphi, because a 
determination of decisive importance for his whole future 
life was in question, on which it behooved him to take se- 
rious counsel with the deity and with his own conscience. 
But Xenophon anticipated the decision of the deity, by 
merely inquiring to which gods he ought to offer sacrifice 
before departing. His chivalrous spirit had decided for 
itself. He had no heart for the Attic democracy ; his 
patriotism was a Hellenic patriotism ; and as at that time 
the hegemony of his native city seemed to have come to 
an end forever, he thought it admissible for him to give 
himself up all the more trustfully to his predilection for 

153 History of Greece. t BoOK vn - 

Sparta, which, it will be remembered, had now been ac- 
knowledged by Athens itself as the primary state of the 
Hellenes (vol. iv. p. 20), and for the friends of Sparta. 
His ex - Thus Xenophon, when probably not more 
rienees in than thirty years of age, entered the service 
of Cyrus, and was unexpectedly called upon 
to perform duties of high importance (vol. iv. p. 191), in 
which he exhibited so much efficiency, that his fame even 
radiated back upon Athens. And yet by what he did he 
incurred the loss of his native city ; for, probably about 
the time when proceedings against all anti-constitutional 
tendencies were resumed at Athens (vol. iv. p. 153), and 
when Socrates was sentenced, Xenophon was by a popular 
decree deprived of his civic rights as a partisan of Cyrus ; 
possibly a diplomatic consideration for the wishes of the 
Persian King contributed to bring about this decision. 
Hereupon Xenophon lived as a captain of mercenaries 
with Thibron (vol. iv. p. 188), and then with Agesilaus, 
returned with the latter to his native land, and fought at 
Coronea against the Athenians. Sparta felt itself bound 
to offer so faithful an adherent an acknowledgment of 
gratitude, and, in order to provide him with a new home, 
presented him with a landed property at Scillus, a pretty 
spot, hidden between wood-clad heights in the neighbor- 
hood of Olympia, in a side valley of the Asopus, and 
watered by the rivulet, abounding in fish, of the Selinus. 
Here he devoted the proceeds of his campaigns to the 
erection of the sanctuaries vowed by him to Artemis, aod 
divided his life between the chase and science, while his 
sons grew up in Spartan discipline. The war between 
Arcadia and Elis, (vol. iv. p. 492) once more deprived 
him of a home ; he emigrated to Elis, but about the same 
time also again entered into more intimate relations with 
his native city, since the latter had under the guidance of 
Callistratus taken the side of Sparta against Thebes. His 
banishment was revoked on the motion of Eubulus ; his 

Chap - no Z7*e Po% 0/ Athens. 159 

sou Gryllus died the death of a brave cavalier while 
serving in the Attic army at Mantinea ; and Xenophon 
personally in the last year of his life (up to 01. cv. 3 ; B. c. 
357, circ. ) exerted himself on behalf of his native city, 
restored to him after so many experiences, although he 
continued to have his residence at Corinth. 

Xenophon 's life is not like that of a phi- v . 

* r Xenophon 

losopher ; and the unquiet impulse of ambi- a.^a phiioso- 
tion which moved him seems to have little in 
common with the frugal spirit of Socrates. And yet he 
is one of the most faithful followers of the master ; and 
after campaigns full of glory we find him in the period of 
leisure recurring with undiminished veneration to the 
figure of his beloved teacher, in order to note it in his 
Memorabilia, and to purify it from all falsification. It 
was, however, not the inquiring philosopher, whose course? 
of thought he was anxious to unfold and to carry on, but 
the simple man of the people and teacher of the people, 
who was in his eyes a model at the same time of the 
highest honesty, wisdom in the conduct of life, and piety. 
For, notwithstanding all his productivity and versatility, 
there was yet upon the whole a very one-sided tendency 
in Xenophon. Knowledge itself and the methods of 
attaining to it were subjects of indifference to him ; he 
merely sought results useful for the improvement of man. 
The teaching of virtue is in his view the main point ; and 
again, he essentially regards virtue on its practical side, as 
the condition of a happy life, because without it nothing 
of real value is to be found on earth. This doctrine he 
then seeks to apply to all conditions of life. In his 
(Economicus he treats the whole management of a house- 
hold, gives precepts for the state of marriage, demands 
intellectual culture for women, a fair treatment for slaves, 
and the right use of property, which only becomes a 
thing of value when it is turned to a prudent account. 
He discusses husbandry in its connexion with the breed- 

160 History of Greece. C BooK VIL 

ing of cattle and with the chase. Even this last he re- 
quires to be pursued with competent knowledge, in order 
that it may harden the young citizen ; in the same way 
horsemanship is to be regarded as an art ; and for the 
cavalry of the city he requires a commander of pre-emi- 
nent culture, in order that his squadrons may be a credit 
to the commonwealth. Finally, in the life of the state 
the utmost disorder and confusion will according to his 
opinion infallibly prevail, if those occupied with public 
affairs lack intellectual preparation and training in 

In short, all the relations of life, which already the 
Sophists had treated theoretically, are illustrated by Xeno- 
phon according to Socratic principles; his writings pre- 
sent an applied system of ethics devoid of loftier points of 
view, a moral philosophy of a homely sort, which within 
its limit exhibits a sound judgment and delicate observa- 
tion. His mind was always intent upon details. Thus in 
practical life too he showed himself in the presence of the 
most arduous tasks brave, determined, and an excellent 
leader of the helpless multitude ; but in matters of general 
interest he displayed uncertainty and want of independence, 
so that he sought in characters superior to his own the 
anchorage which he was unable to find in himself. At the 
same time, notwithstanding his great receptivity for every- 
thing good, he was so much in want of a fixed standard, 
that, after having been first enchained by the grandeur of 
the character of Socrates, he could afterwards give himself 
up to Cyrus, and in the end attach himself with blind 
veneration to Agesilaus. Xenophon had a soldier's na- 
ture, which demanded discipline and order; but on the 
other hand, itself felt in need of a commanding authority. 
The unstable condition of things at Athens confirmed him 
in his conviction, that there must exist one will, and a per- 
sonage of royal pre-eminence, where a commonwealth is 
to prosper. It was therefore one of the last labors of his 

chap, ii] The Policy of Athens. 161 

life to sketch in his Cyropcedia, in connexion with the 
figure of the Elder Cyrus, the idealizing picture of a genu- 
ine king and founder of an empire. 

Of all the Attic followers of Socrates, Xeno- X eno P hon 
phon and Plato might be supposed to have and plato - 
stood in the nearest connexion with, and dependence 
upon, one another. They were nearly of the same age ; 
their position in sociecy was the same ; they partook of the 
same aversion from the Sophists, as from the men who had 
ruined the Hellenic people ; they were at one in their love 
for their master and in their zeal for laboring at the con- 
tinuation of the work of his life ; they were both for the 
same reasons dissatisfied with the state of things in their 
native city, and in their conception of the tasks of Hellen- 
ic culture had both no hesitation in attaching themselves 
to eminent personages in foreign lands. And yet it is im- 
possible, in the numerous writings which are preserved 
from the hands of precisely these two followers of Socrates, 
to demonstrate the existence of any trace of a more inti- 
mate intercourse between them ; and already in ancient 
times it was sought to account for this by the supposition 
of unfriendly relations between them. There is however no 
reason for assuming any other motive than that of the great 
difference which, notwithstanding all the points of agree- 
ment in them, prevails between the two disciples of Socrates. 

Plato, the son of Ariston, was born at ™ . .. 

' Plato the 

Athens about the time of the death of Peri- ? on of Aris- 

cles ; nor can any man be said to have more rt , , 

J Ol. lxxxvin. 

thoroughly appreciated than he the moral 1 ; oviii. i ( B . 
position given to his native city by that great 
statesman. For Plato possessed in the highest degree the 
Attic spirit of an eagerness for knowledge and a love of 
art; and he grew up in excellent bodily and mental 
training as the son of a noble house, connected by descent 
with Codrus and Solon. But he was in his whole indi- 
viduality of a delicately framed and fragile nature ; and 

162 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

as in Xenophon it was the military sense of order, so in 
Plato it was the idealistic sense of measure and harmony, 
which found itself repelled by the ways of the Attic 
democracy. The bitter calamities suffered by his native 
city confirmed him in his political views, without his being 
able, like his relatives Critias, Charmides aDd others, to 
expect her recovery to result from a complete change of 
the constitution. He therefore all the more completely 
gave himself up to a life of contemplation, to which he 
was attracted by his whole nature, and, after for some 
time hesitating between philosophy and poetry, he formed 
and kept the happy resolution of devoting himself to that 
tendency, which in those days possessed the most vigor 
and had the greatest future before it. This decision he 
His owed to Socrates. Through Socrates, Plato 

training. was emancipated from the narrow-hearted 
party-life which poisoned the existence of the community 
and of its individual members ; through Socrates, he clear- 
ly realized the aim of his endeavors ; for the sake of Socra- 
tes, degenerate and deeply-humbled Athens was yet dear 
to him above all other things ; and he prized as the 
highest blessing of his life the nine years which he was 
allowed to spend in the society of the master. 

Now, though after the death of Socrates Plato quitted 
Athens, this was not the result of indifference or hatred ; 
on the contrary, he loved his fellow-citizens, and enter- 
tained a high opinion of their capability of culture ; for 
let an Athenian, he said, only be an honest man, and he 
will generally be such in an eminent degree. Moreover, 
Plato was far removed from that cosmopolitan spirit 
which shows itself e, g. in Antisthenes and Aristippus ; he 
adhered to the belief in the contrast between Hellenes and 
barbarians. But he was the first Athenian who felt 
himself in full measure animated by the impulse towards 
uniting in his consciousness all human science, and tow- 
ards obtaining, by means of a personal acquaintance with 

chap, ilj The Polioy of Athens. 163 

the most important of his contemporaries and of the 
tendencies of his times, the freest standpoint possible for 
contemplation of the world. He could not, therefore, like 
Socrates, restrict himself to the streets and public places 
of Athens. For this reason he went to Cyrene, in order 
to cultivate his mind by intercourse with the mathemati- 
cian Theodorus; for the same reason he sought th 3 
instruction of the Egyptian priests in astronomical science ; 
addressed himself in Italy to the schools of the Pytha- 
goreans, and entered into an intimacy with Archytas. 
It was at this time that he also acquired a knowledge of 
Sicilian affairs ; and thus, about twelve years after the 
death of Socrates, he returned to his native city, in order 
here in the gardens of the Academy to begin the life of a 
teacher, which he continued during forty years, up to the 
close of his life. 

Plato is the single follower of Socrates who ffia teaeh _. 
remained absolutely true to the master, and in s- 
who at the same time deepened and developed his teach- 
ing in every direction, and broadened it into a collective 
view of the entire moral world. 

But what Plato established was not a scholastic system 
of doctrine ; for philosophy was not to be a special branch 
of knowledge ; — it was rather a matter of universal hu- 
man interest. We all, so he thought, live amidst the 
greatest variety of conceptions ; and the question is whether 
they are just or erroneous, and whether the virtue, which 
we are eager to practise, is merely one taught to us by 
force of habit, or one which is self-conscious, free, and 
based upon intelligence. This is a question of vital im- 
portance, which forces itself with an inner necessity upon 
every consciousness. The human soul finds no repose in 
the contemplation of outward things ; it must therefore 
possess the innate power of divining an invisible world ; 
before its earthly life began, impressions and views must 
have fallen to the lot of the soul, of which the remem- 

164 History of Greece. [Book to 

brance survives in it and impels it to seek after a higher 
life. This endeavor manifests itself in the irresistible at- 
traction exercised upon the soul by the Beautiful, in the 
longing for the Perfect, in the love for the Divine. 
Herein lies the productive germ of a new life. But while 
remaining unregulated and left to itself, this impulse fails 
to reach its goal. It must be subjected to discipline ; and 
this discipline is the art of the just combination of ideas — 
the Dialectic art. Out of its union with the enthusiastic 
impulse of the human soul arises the true philosophy, the 
elevation, progressing step by step, from the sensual to tho 
spiritual, from conception to knowledge, the full posses- 
sion of which is the privilege of the deity. 

Whatsoever is sensual, underlies a continual change ; it 
accordingly has no full reality, it is a combination of 
being and not being, while that which really is, only the 
possible object of knowledge, is something suprasensual. 
The visible is only in so far as it has part in the invisible 
Essences ; these are that which alone endures, the everlast- 
ing first forms and first causes of everything which is, the 
* ideas ' whose life lies in a sphere above the world. There 
are accordingly as many ideas as there are definable 
species ; and the first and prevailing one among them is 
the idea of the Good, the final cause of all knowledge and 
being, the intelligence which forms the world — in a word, 

By the side of God exists the corporeal, without any 
independent being of its own. Through God, as through 
Him who formed the world, it has received measure and 
law, the soul of the world having entered into the bodily 
form. By means of this soul the world has become an 
animated being, as man has become such through the 
human soul, which is likewise implanted in the body, 
without having an essential connexion with it, and which 
only by its return into incorporeal life returns to its natu- 
ral condition. 

Chap - il J The Policy of Athens. 165 

Since the corporeal clings to our soul like a hurt and a 
disfigurement, our moral aim can be no other than aversion 
and purification from the sensual, participation in ideas, 
and realization of them in virtue and perfect knowledge. 
Virtue is that condition of the soul which is in accordance 
with nature ; virtue is freedom and happiness ; it is based 
upon a clear perception of that which is absolutely good, 
and this perception produces the will ; virtue appears, as 
corresponding to the several forces of the soul, as wisdom, 
as valor, as prudence ; but the one and universal virtue 
is justice, the harmonious accord of all the forces of the 
soul. The true training towards such a virtue is only 
possible in the life of a community, i. e. in the state, which 
ought to be an image of a harmoniously ordered indivi- 
dual life ; like the individual life, therefore, the state must 
be trained by philosophy ; and, inasmuch as the great 
mass of the members of a state cannot be philosophical, 
the consciousness of the true state-community of life must 
be upheld by those whose calling philosophy is ; and only 
where they hold sway, can the true state be realized. 

No other of the great men of Greece is It 
brought so near to us as a living man as Plato ; national 

o o ' character. 

and in his mind we at the same time see 
reflected the entire intellectual life of his nation. He 
is the glorified type of a Hellene, the perfect Athenian. 
In his indefatigable impulse towards knowledge he never 
satisfied himself, and up to a late age of life never ceased 
from learning ; for this reason, even as an old man he had 
no hesitation in altering his views, and e. g. in recalling his 
doctrine as to the central position of the world in the sys- 
tem of the universe. Notwithstanding the many-sidedness 
of his knowledge, he remained true to the national con- 
sciousness of the Hellenic people, in asserting man to be 
akin to the gods, in regarding all nature as pervaded by 
divine beings, and in recognising even in the constella- 
tions divine life and divine personages. He venerated the 

166 History of Greece. [BookVil 

popular belief, and loved to take favorite figures of the 
popular mythology as starting-points of his teaching, as 
e. g. when he made use of Glaucus, rendered unsightly by 
shells and sea-weed, to give a clear picture of the condition 
of the human soul disfigured by earthly dross. He was 
zealous on behalf of the traditional forms of divine wor- 
ship, full of veneration for the Delphic god and for the 
mysterious rites of Eleusis. He takes his stand on the 
basis of popular consciousness, when he celebrates the god 
Eros as the author of the higher endeavors of the human 
mind, — when he acknowledges symmetry and beauty, 
together with truth, to be the three sides of the good. 
Nay, however much in his dialectics Plato seeks to soar 
to the pure idea, to the formless and colorless essence of 
the true, he yet remains the genuine child of his nation, 
which is averse from formless abstractions and from pure 
conceptions of thought ; and accordingly he regards the 
supreme truths and forces as ideas — i. e. as forms, as lofty 
models, which human things seek to follow. In conso- 
nance with the popular sentiment Plato judges concerning 
the desirability of attaining to an equal balance between 
physical and mental training, concerning marriage, in 
which he assigns everything of importance to the man, 
and fails to do justice to the family as such in its moral 
significance, and finally also concerning the state. Only 
as a member of the state man becomes fully man. For 
this reason ethics necessarily lose themselves in politics ; 
and again the political maxims of the philosopher are no 
newly-invented maxims, but connect themselves with tra- 
ditions of Old-Hellenic public law, such as had maintained 
themselves in Cretan and Spartan institutions (vol. i. 
p. 196). Among these are the superintendence by the 
state of children from the day of their birth, the leaving 
of agriculture and of trades and handicrafts to subordinate 
classes, the limitation of the number of the citizens, the 
equality of landed property, and the placing of obstacles 

Chap - n -J The Policy of Athens. 167 

in the way of intercourse with other communities. At the 
same time Plato also contrives to turn to account in his 
political writings a variety of Attic and democratic insti- 
tutions. The nation of the Hellenes, by its natural men- 
tal gifts destined above all other peoples of the earth to 
the attainment of wisdom and virtue, is in his eyes a 
great, closely-connected community ; the earlier and the 
later generations of the nation likewise form a single 
whole, to which its knowledge belongs as a common posses- 
sion ; and Plato is the first who united in him- piato and 
self the thinking consciousness of the nation, his prede- 

& 7 cessors. 

which had gradually grown into maturity, 
from the Ionic philosophers with their system of nature 
down to his own Socratic contemporaries. From all of 
these he took into himself the productive germs, supple- 
menting the one by the other. From Heraclitus he took 
the recognition of the eternal change in human things, but 
he saved from the consequences of this view the doctrine 
of true being, according as it was most justly established 
by the Eleatics. This being, however, he could not con- 
sent to regard as solidly fixed and devoid of movement, be- 
cause this would have left inexplicable the element of rea- 
son in the order of the universe. Therefore he had resort 
to the ' Spirit ' of Anaxagoras, to Him who orders the uni- 
verse ; but the mere ordering of it was not sufficient for 
him, and, in looking around for other forms, in which it 
might be possible for the relations between the world of 
being and the world of phenomena to realize themselves, 
he followed the Pythagoreans, by assuming mathematical 
laws, according to which these operations of the one upon 
the other were to be accomplished. From the Pythago- 
reans he likewise borrowed a variety of suggestions for his 
doctrines of immortality and of the state. Everywhere he 
was able to perceive those elements which were pro- 
ductive, to put aside what was imperfect, and to blend 
what was of permanent validity into a general view of the 

168 History of Gh-eece. [Bookvil 

system of the universe, amounting to a perfect expression 
of the matured consciousness of the nation, such as lived 
only in his mind. Finally, the diction of Plato is another 
manifest testimony showing how popular the great think- 
er remained, and how lovingly he cherished and developed 
every possession belonging to his nation. 

Prose-writ- Attic prose had unfolded its growth at a 

piSto ef ° re late date ( vo1 - "• P* 565 )> and it( was for a 
strikingly long time that at Athens rhythmic 

speech was subjected to artistic treatment, while prose was 
only regarded as an instrument for ordinary intercourse 
and for the settlement of business matters. Prose composi- 
tion only began, when the life of the state had fully de- 
veloped itself, so that it was unable to keep pace with the 
rapid unfolding of the popular mind, and quite incapable 
of responding to the abundance of the materials of 
thought. It is quite perceptible in Thucydides, how he is 
wrestling with a still unwieldy language, in order to ob- 
tain from it expressions exactly rendering his meaning. 
We are irresistibly attracted by the unwearying force of 
muscular tension, whence his diction derives the same 
character of manliness and seriousness which is born by 
the whole age of Pericles ; but that diction at the same 
time lacks the just proportion between form and meaning, 
and is therefore frequently awkward, unpleasing, and ob- 

Soon a change took place. About the time when the 
active energy of the Athenians began to grow faint, the 
love of an intellectual exchange of ideas and of communi- 
cation by word of mouth and by writing on all subjects of 
thought became intensified in them ; the influence of the 
Sophists contributed its share, and that which the Athe- 
nians of the old school lamented as a decay, indubitably 
amounted to a progress for general culture. The lan- 
guage became more flexible and facile of movement ; the 
intentional brevity of expression in writing was no longer 

chap, il] ^ Policy of Athens. 169 

adhered to ; and convenient intelligibility was established 
as the primary condition of a pleasing diction. Thus, es- 
pecially in the higher circles of society, where the abuses of 
language common in the market-place and on the orators' 
tribunes were avoided, a refined Atticism developed itself, 
of which the writings of Xenophon bear the clear impress. 
It would not be easy to name two other authors who, 
while belonging to the same city, to the same department 
of literature, and all but to the same age, wrote so differ- 
ently from one another as Xenophon and Thucydides ! 
The latter could never be fully appreciated except by a 
comparatively small number of readers ; Xenophon, on 
the other hand, by the light flow of his diction, and by the 
transparency and perspicuity of his mode of expression, 
attained to the fame of a model writer, and the Athenians 
honored him, although he was an aristocrat and a La- 
conizer, as the genuine representative of their style of 
composition. It was well adapted for general acceptance 
and imitation ; and since Attic as a dialect too occupied a 
kind of mediating position, which made it possible for 
Greeks of the most varying origin easily to accommodate 
themselves to it, there developed itself in Attic prose a 
form of literary diction which attained to universal cur- 

But in addition a peculiar and genuinely The 
Attic form of prose composition developed it- p£f rt -° D *> e 
self in the dialogue. With a people quick of i°gues. 
thought even reflection and the forming of resolutions in the 
mind are prone to assume the form of a conversation con- 
ducted by the soul with itself ; and of this we find many 

* As to the Attic dialect, cf. vol. ii. p. 5C6, Note. It is the least consistent 
of Greek dialects and the most varied in its sounds ; and was therefore pre- 
eminently fitted for harmonizing the dialects on the hither and on the 
farther side of the sea. It presents many analogous elements, particularly 
in its popular form, to the speech of the mainland; e.g. it shares with the 
Doric the long a, with the Doric and the iEolic the t for <r (t^tcv, rrjixcpov), 
with the JDolie the tt. 


170 History of Greece. [BookVii. 

instances in the Greek poets. So immediate with the 
Greeks was the connexion between speech and thought ; 
and it was therefore in perfect accordance with the na- 
tional character, that philosophical inquiry should likewise 
clothe itself in a dialogue form, in which the one interlo- 
cutor aids the other in disentangling the conflicting ideas 
and leading them to definite issues. Socrates regarded this 
office as a duty incumbent upon a citizen ; he was unable 
to remain apathetic and inactive, when he found his Athe- 
nians in an unworthy condition of ignorance and unclear- 
ness with regard to the most important questions of life ; 
he could not but do what in him lay to remedy this con- 
dition. And this he did as a genuine Athenian, not by 
expounding the results of his research in a finished syste- 
matic form, but by constituting all more important pro- 
blems subjects of conversation, and discussing them by 
lively question and answer in the streets and public places. 
Thus he conferred an entirely new significance upon the 
Attic love of talk, and at the same time thereby rendered 
the greatest service to the language and literature of his 
people. For in their writings, which were to carry on the 
personal influence of the master, his pupils could not 
abandon the form which was so peculiarly characteristic 
of his teaching. Accordingly, the Dialogues of Plato are 
actually pictures drawn from nature. Socrates constitutes 
their centre, their moral unity. Every Platonic discus- 
sion is a joint search after truth under the guidance of 
Socrates, who with considerate gentleness enters into every 
opinion, with delicate irony participates in the errors, and 
alone retains in his hand the thread which seems often to 
be lost, and which yet at the end makes its appearance 
again, and leads to the desired goal. The Dialogues of 
Plato are not, however, mere copies. It was by the force 
of his own intellect that he developed the method of teach', 
ing which had grown out of Attic life, and shaped it into 
an artistic form, so intimately intertwined with his philo- 

chap, ii.] The Policy of Athens. 171 

sophy, that it is quite impossible to separate it from the 
latter. By means of his poetic endowment he created 
dramatic works of art, which naturally divide themselves 
into several acts ; a charming introduction, in which the 
scenery of the particular dialogue is sketched, usually 
preceding the successive entrances of the several interlo- 
cutors, a fresh turn in the conversation always beginning 
with the appearance of each of them. The speakers are 
historic personages, well known men of the times, in whom 
the various tendencies of intellectual life are reflected ; 
Athenians of every rank and degree of culture, in the life- 
like depiction of whom Plato rivals the comic poets. 

One is easily inclined to consider this form of philo- 
sophical instruction, this thorough shaking- and breaking- 
up of an exposition into a mere series of questions and 
answers, not only inconvenient and burdensome, but also 
radically unsuited to the end in view. But those who 
enter more deeply into the spirit of these Dialogues will, 
after all, find themselves obliged to allow that in them not 
only was a method handed down by the master retained 
from motives of piety and skilfully developed, but that it 
connects itself most closely with the essential nature of 
the Platonic philosophy, — a philosophy which demands 
not only to be listened to and approved of, but also to be 
participated in as an actual experience of life ; which, in 
short, lays claim to the entire man. It needs a form of 
communication, comprehending in it the enforcement 
of independent reflection, and securing the ultimate result 
by bringing about an express common agreement on all 
the several points in the path leading to that end. It was 
doubly necessary to have this security in the case of in- 
quiries commencing with the Socratic standpoint of not- 
knowing, and in view of the condition of vagueness, which 
beset the consciousness of most of the Athenians, and no- 
tably of those trained by Sophistry. They were every- 
where absolutely without fixed, without acknowledged 

172 History of Greece. [BookVR. 

positions; everywhere, therefore, it was necessary to begin 
at the bottom, in order to gain a secure basis. This ex- 
plains the inexhaustible abundance and variety of Pla- 
tonic questionings, which never for a moment allow the 
hearer to go astray with his thoughts, or to allow his cc 
operating participation in the inquiry to grow slack. 

Hereby, then, a species of literature was founded, which 
more than any other deserves to be called national. For 
inasmuch as the Hellenes were naturally to a certain de- 
gree averse from the use of writing, in which living speech 
seemed to them to grow stiff and cold, it was a genuine 
triumph of the Greek mind, that a successful attempt 
should have been made to overcome this contrast, to cause 
the disturbing means employed to be forgotten, and to 
diffuse over the dead written letter the full charm, fresh- 
ness, and vital warmth of a personal conversation. Every 
inquiry is an ideal dialogue, which repeats itself to every 
attentive reader ; it flexibly accommodates itself with 
perfect directness to all turns of thought and to all phases 
of the mind ; written speech springs forth like the speech 
of the tongue from the inmost recesses of the soul ; and 
the masterly skill with which Plato succeeded in devel- 
oping this species of Attic prose out of the popular man- 
ner in which Socrates carried on his conversations, and in 
elevating it into an artistic form, perfect in itself, attests 
most clearly how firmly he took his stand on the basis of 
popular life, as a genuine Hellene and Athenian. 

Plato's ^ ^ ne same time, the standpoint of Plato 

standpoint was m a u directions a loftier one than that 

above his 

people. f hi s people and of his contemporaries. For 
he not only, like Xenophon, applied the demands of 
Socratic ethics to the various relations of life in which the 
Greeks moved, but he from the first, in his thoughts and 
demands passed beyond the data of existing relations, nay, 
beyond the whole visible world. For by his origin 
and destiny man belongs to an order of things which is 

Chap - nj The Policy of Athens. 173 

above and beyond the earth ; and from this standpoint 
Plato necessarily finds himself in manifold opposition to 
the ordinary views of his people. He is obliged to de- 
mand a renunciation of the sensual, which renunciation 
was utterly repugnant to the conceptions of the Greeks ; 
and in much which to them seemed permitted and natu- 
ral, he cannot but find aberration, and tendencies leading 
away from the Divine. He extols Eros, but it i3 only a 
refined and pure love of which he approves ; he sees in 
beauty an image of the Divine, but he reduces the idea 
of the Beautiful to that of the Good, and attaches to the 
latter in all spheres of life a totally different conception 
and significance. If the Deity is pure goodness, it follows 
that the views as to the envy entertained by the Deity 
must be unconditionally rejected ; and equally unallowa- 
ble is it for man to fancy that he can obtain Its favors 
by sacrifices, dedicatory gifts, and other works. Further- 
more, if man desires to be really good, he must renounce 
all impure inclinations, he must not wish to return evil 
for evil, or to hate his enemy. 

In these points, therefore, Plato passes far beyond that 
which was comprehended in the moral consciousness of 
his nation ; herein he stands like a prophet above his 
times and his people ; and what he demands is not merely 
an amendment of the existing world in this or that direc- 
tion, but an essentially new world. And in proportion as 
Plato in his ideal demands rose above the data of the cir- 
cumstances and principles around him, it became impossi- 
ble to expect that he would exercise a transforming influ- 
ence upon the great body of the people. He The 
was by his whole nature far more aristocratic SJJjJJ 1 ^ 18 of 
than Socrates, the simple man of the people ; 
and his teachings and aims could only become the posses- 
sion of a circle of elect, capable of comprehending in their 
general connexion the doctrines put forth by their master 
in the grove of Academus, and of developing them 

174 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

further. It is true that Plato's personal qualities gave to 
him such a pre-eminence, that he could not fail to make a 
deep impression upon all who possessed receptivity for in- 
tellectual greatness ; and thus we find, even outside the 
philosophers of the Academy, a number of noteworthy men 
of the times, such as Chabrias, Phocion, and Timotheus, 
who were, for a longer period or temporarily, subject to the 
influence of Plato ; though we are unfortunately unable to 
demonstrate more closely the nature and the significance 
of this influence. 

T , The best-known among all the Athenians 

Isocrates. to 

who were personally connected with Plato, and 

ex. 3 (b. c. 436 wno ma y be included among the followers of 
Socrates in the less restricted sense of the term, 
is Isocrates, a man who during the course of nearly an en- 
tire century (436-338 b. c.) was a sympathetic witness of 
the experiences of his native city from the most splendid 
height of its power to the downfall of its independence. 
As a youth of much promise, he was introduced into the 
circle of Socrates, and aroused the attention of the great 
student of men. He was gifted by nature with a tendency 
to the ideal, and with a receptivity for the truly good ; 
for this reason, too, he felt himself attracted by Socrates, 
without, however, any productive relation of personal in- 
tercourse growing up between them. Isocrates was not 
deeply enough seized by the impulse towards truth to be 
inwardly transformed by it ; he remained a child of his 
age, and sought to labor and to shine by his gifts after a 
fashion corresponding to its tastes. His talents lay chiefly 
in the direction of form ; and for this reason not quiet 
inquiry, but the art of oratory, was the domain where he 
could satisfy himself. But since for the profession of a 
popular orator he lacked the necessary confidence, as well 
as sufficient physical strength and presence of mind, he 
found it necessary in his public career to fall back upon 
written speech ; and after having for a time occupied him- 

Chap - OL] The Policy of Athens. 175 

self with forensic orations, he recognized his real calling 
in expounding to the educated public in addresses 
and writings his views concerning the affairs of his na- 
tive city and country. This he did as a warm and honest 
patriot, in whose eyes Athens was the intellectual centre 
of Hellas. But he lamented the existing condition of the 
city ; his thoughts lived in the past ; he was full of enthu- 
siasm for the Athens of the Persian wars and for the con- 
stitution of Clisthenes ; and perceived no other safety for 
Athens except a return to the ancient institutions. His 
patriotism is not, however, confined to his native city ; he 
regards as the greatest of evils the civil wars, by which he 
has seen Athens ruined ; above all, he desires to see th«- 
Hellenes re-united as a people of brothers ; and inasmuch 
as he is aware of no other means towards such an end be^ 
sides a common national war against Persia, which he be- 
lieves now to have a better prospect of brilliant success 
than at any previous time, his political efforts are essen- 
tially directed towards bringing about such a war ; in 
which endeavor his Hellenic patriotism to such a degree 
outweighs that of the mere Athenian, that he welcomes! 
any leadership, under which the wished-for war may be 
realized. He rests his hopes upon Archidamus, the heroic 
son of Agesilaus (vol. iv. p. 481), upon Dionysius, upon 
the Thessalian Tyrants, and finally upon king Philip. 
Isocrates was not the kind of man to subject questions of 
the policy of the day to a keen and effective discussion in 
his political orations ; there was nothing fresh or produc-o 
tive in his ideas, which invariably moved about in the 
same tracks. With weakly sentimentality he longs for the 
return of what has irrecoverably passed away ; with short- 
sighted simplicity he expects outward events to bring 
about a brilliant future, but he never summons his fellow- 
citizens to energetic self-help, or excites their sense of 
honor. He rather desires the renunciation of all efforts 
irreconcilable with his ideal of a universal peace, and 

176 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

with a moderation dominating over all public relations ; 
his views accordingly thoroughly agree with those of Eu- 
bulus ; for which reason in his oration concerning the Peace 
(b. c. 355), he demanded that all confederates who 
objected to continuing in the League should be allowed to 
leave it; in fact, Athens was to exhibit a modest self- 
restraint, and to renounce her cravings after the position 
of a great power. It is true that the same Isocrates was 
also the associate of Timotheus (p. 94), and the panegyrist 
of Conon, and of his victory achieved in conjunction with 
Persia over Hellenes ; but such contradictions are by no 
means astonishing in a policy of mere sentiment, not clear- 
ly understanding its own objects, and lost in the vagueness 
of its own course. 

Nor indeed could it have been possible, except in a 
period of exhaustion and fatigued relaxation of energy in 
Attic public life, that such a man as Isocrates should have 
gained so important an influence upon his contemporaries. 
He owed it in the first instance to his personal character, 
the moral dignity and gentle earnestness of which must 
have exercised a kindly effect upon those around him, 
such as the youthful Timotheus, who, being originally in- 
clined to luxury, is said to have been led by the example 
of Isocrates to a well-ordered and serious course of life. 
Again, he undoubtedly possessed eminent gifts as a 
teacher, which enabled him, first at Chios, and afterwards 
at Athens, to gather around him a brilliant circle of 
young men. He was their fatherly friend and adviser ; 
he impelled them to turn their natural gifts to a useful 
account, partly as statesmen, as in the case of Timotheus, 
Eunomus (vol. iv. p. 298) and others, partly as men of 
learning, and authors. And yet, notwithstanding all his 
merits and his fame, which was spread through the whole 
Hellenic world, he was not a man equal to the highest de- 
mands of his age. He desired to mediate between public 
life and philosophy ; but this mediation was of an unfor- 

Chap, n.] The Policy of Athens. Ill 

tunate kind in either direction. For statesmanship he 
lacked a free eye and a courageous heart, while true sci- 
ence was denied by him when he made it the handmaid 
of practical wants. He had opened his school with a 
programme directed against the Sophists, and yet it was 
to their standpoint he too recurred, when he set up an 
artistically skilful versatility in speech and thought as the 
highest end of instruction. The applause of the multi- 
tude, which liked that species of philosophy best which it 
most readily understood, made him vain and self-con- 
ceited like the Sophists, so that he eagerly denounced all 
inquiry of a more searching sort as unnecessary refining, 
and at the utmost conceded to it the value of serving as a 
preliminary training for the art taught by himself. Thus 
Isocrates, in life as in science, was opposed to the en- 
deavors of the best among his contemporaries ; he 
estranged the young generation from true philosophy, by 
giving currency under its name to a superficial and hollow 
rhetorical training; from being an adherent of Socratic 
science he became an opponent of it, and made it shallow 
in the same degree in which Plato deepened it. 

The real services of Isocrates lie in the domain of the 
art of oratory. This was the art, which more than any 
other was intertwined in its growth with the natural 
genius of the Athenians and with their constitution ; and 
accordingly every progress of Attic culture was at the 
same time a new step in the development of oratory. 

Originally oratory was no artistic acquire- .... 

o j j n Attic ora- 

ment, but a power of natural growth, without tor y- 
which it was impossible to conceive of a man of intellec- 
tual mark in the community. In proportion as the affairs 
of public life became more complicated, the demands 
rose : a special preparation seemed necessary for political 
and forensic speeches, and schools were formed, which 
provided theoretical instruction for the purpose. This 


178 History of Greece. [Book vil 

took place under the influence of Sophistry, whose efforts 
were in no department more in accordance with the times 
and more successful than in that of rhetoric. In this de- 
partment the Sophists labored with more thoroughness 
than elsewhere ; and notably Protagoras entered as a se- 
rious inquirer into the subject of the nature of language, 
in order to establish a correct method for its employment. 
Sicilian oratory, which attained to its highest perfection 
through Gorgias (vol. iii. pp. 264, 265), likewise attached 
itself most closely to Sophistry ; for it too regarded ora- 
tory as essentially nothing else than the mastery over the 
employment of all means which can serve to produce a 
decided conviction in the listener. 

This new art met with the readiest response at Athens, 
where Antiphon (vol. ii. p. 569) had been the founder of 
scientific rhetoric. Thus, e. g. Agathon (vol. iv. p. 92) 
was entirely under the influence of Gorgias; the same 
master was followed by Polus of Agrigentum, Thrasyma- 
chus of Chalcedon, and Alcidamas of Elsea, who sought 
each after his own fashion to develop the art of Gorgias. 
„,. Thrasymachus in particular endeavored to 

Thrasyma- J * 

chus. moderate the poetical bombast in the peculiar 

manner of the Sicilian orator, and to approximate it to 
the language of ordinary conversation. But at the same 
time he attended in his prose diction to the fall of the 
syllables, rounded off each sentence into an artificially- 
constructed period, and went so far in intentional arti- 
ficiality, that certain combinations of feet, especially the 
third Pseon (uv — w), play a great part in his build of sen- 

The art of ^ n * s tendency, then, Isocrates likewise fol- 
isoerates. lowed ; while at the same time there can be 
no doubt but that he aimed at a higher goal than the 

* Thrasymachus the predecessor of Isocrates in the rhythmical construc- 
tion of periods: Aristot. Bhet. 183; Cic. Orator, c. 52; cf. Hermann, d« 
Thrasymacho, 10. 

Chap. II.] fJw Policy of Athens. 179 

rhetors of the Sicilian school. As might be expected from 
an opponent of Sophistry, he desired not to prove the 
power of persuasion by applying it to any and every kind 
of material, but only to concern himself with select sub- 
jects, and only to bring forward such ideas as were worthy 
of being taken to heart ; he refused recognition to any 
art, which was not sustained by moral earnestness and 
productive of noble resolves. These indeed were echoes 
of his Socratic tendency ; but he gradually more and more 
lost the habit of giving a deeper moral significance to his 
labors ; and while Plato was establishing a philosophical 
foundation for the essential nature of true eloquence, and 
deducing it from love, which is unable to retain for itself 
the treasure of knowledge secured by it, and is bound 
to enable others also to enjoy it in the most appropriate 
form, — Isocrates on the other hand fell back more and 
more upon a formal system of technicalities, and devoted 
all his efforts to the perfection of style. And in this di- 
rection, with the support of a quite peculiar natural en- 
dowment, he in truth achieved results of very great impor- 
tance, and novel of their kind ; for although he had been 
preceded by Thrasymachus in the perfection of the con- 
struction of sentences, it was he who first contrived with 
full masterly skill to exhibit the period, which compre- 
hends a thought in all its ramifications with clearness and 
immediate perspicuity in a well-ordered frame. He builds 
up his sentences with the art of an architect, who calcu- 
lates with precision upon pressure and counter-pressure, 
so that no joint is missing, while each is fitted into its 
proper place, and no word can be changed, without the 
effect of the whole being impaired. By means of an 
agreeable distribution of accents, together with a pleasing 
copiousness and rhythmical symmetry, his orations create 
the impression of music, which exercised a great charm 
upon the receptive ear of the Greeks ; whatever disturbed 
the evenness of flow, even the mere occurrence of a col- 

180 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

lision of vowels in two words following upon one another, 
was most carefully avoided in his compositions. They 
afforded an artistic enjoyment, while at the same time 
they exercised an edifying effect by the noble character of 
their contents, and by means of their admirable arrange- 
ment and logical consistency in a high degree satisfied the 
educated listener. In this branch of artistic oratory Iso- 
crates was the acknowledged master ; but at the same 
time his orations betrayed their artificiality : they were 
not works which had freshly sprung from the mind, but 
anxiously elaborated model specimens, which had been 
again and again subjected to the file, and which, in con- 
sequence of the prolix amplitude in the development of 
their ideas, became in the end fatiguing ; the breath of 
the living word was no longer perceptible. It was against 
this point that the rhetor Alcidamas (p. 178; in particu- 
lar directed his attacks, which contrasted as true oratory 
with the literary eloquence of Isocrates the genuinely 
original vigor of a Gorgias, who, as Alcidamas said, could 
almost extemporaneously find the right word. Isocrates 
was in point of fact an artist in diction, a stylist, and only 
in outward form an orator. 

Practical ^ e rea ^ oratory of the Athenians connected 

oratory. itself closely with the tasks of actual life, as 

they offered themselves in the law-courts and in the popu- 
lar assembly. Here it could take for its model neither 
the pomp of the style of Gorgias, nor the artistically-con- 
structed periods of Isocrates ; for the ample and self-satis- 
fied manner of the artistic orators was not in its proper 
place, when the point at issue was to treat a given case 
according to the facts at issue, and in the short time 
allowed concisely to combine that which was adapted for 
determining the decision of the civic assembly or of the 
jury. Such was the oratorical art of Andocides (vol. iv. 
p. 275) ; in the same kind the highly-gifted Critias dis- 
tinguished himself by his abundance of ideas. But this 

Chap - il 1 The Policy of Athens. 181 

Attic oratory reached its fullest development, and the 
most abundant evidence of it remains, in the works of 
Lysias (vol. ii. p. 537 ; vol. iii. p. 152), who is likewise by 
the experiences of his life so intimately associated with the 
internal and external history of Athens. He was the son 
of Cephalus, the friend of Pericles (vol. ii. p. 546), and 
was of the same age as Isocrates. After the death of his 
father he lived at Thurii, where he enjoyed the instruction 
of Tisias (vol. ii. p. 537) ; about the year 411 b. c. he re- 
turned to Athens, where he resided with his brother Pole- 
marchus as a well-to-do alien under the protection of the 
state, and as a loyal adherent of the constitution. On this 
account they were persecuted by the Thirty ; Polemarchus 
was put to death ; Lysias fled to Megara, supported from 
his own resources the liberation of Athens (vol. iv. p. 53), 
and as the avenger of his brother's death publicly indicted 
Eratosthenes (vol. iv. p. 152). At a subsequent period he 
again took part in public affairs (vol. iv. p. 303), and with 
inflexible consistency remained a warm patriot, although, 
for all that he had done and suffered as such, he was not 
even rewarded by the civic franchise. But he now 
applied himself entirely to forensic oratory, which at 
Athens came more and more into the foreground, and 
which was also the principal subject treated in the books 
of instruction. Under the salutary discipline of a practi- 
cal profession Lysias put aside whatever had formerly 
clung to him of artificiality and Sophistic mannerism ; he 
emancipated himself from all useless ornament, and wrote 
his speeches in so straightforward and simple a style, that 
they became perfect models of the natural grace of Attic 
prose. He moreover possessed a peculiar gift, which very 
probably was due to his Sicilian blood (vol. iii. p. 248), 
viz. the power of seizing with admirable force the charac. 
teristic points, according to age and social class, in the 
particular personages whose suits he conducted, and of 
thus making his speeches dramatic sketches of actual life. 

182 History of Greece. L BooK VIL 

The two species of practical oratory separated them- 
selves more and more sharply from one another. As pop- 
ular orators the party-leaders Leodamas and Aristophon 
(p. 88), and above all Callistratus, obtained distinction ; 
in the department of forensic oratory it was achieved by 

isceus Isceus of Chalcis, who was possibly induced to 
emigrate to Athens by the revolt of Euboea 
in the year 411 (vol. iii. p. 483). At Athens he devoted 
his time to philosophical studies, and connected himself 
with Plato ; but, following the same impulse which di- 
verted so many Hellenes of this period from philosophy to 
oratory, he too became a writer of speeches, like Lysias, 
and in the same spirit as he, although failing to compass 
the graceful charm in which Lysias causes us to forget all 
the art underlying it. On the other hand he surpasses Ly- 
sias in vigor of thought and incisiveness of argumenta- 

The history of oratory leads directly into the adjoining 
domain of the sciences. For all the remarkable orators 
were at the same time men of theory, and composed scien- 

The litera- *^ c manua l s f° r the disciples of their art, as 
ture of was d on e by Isocrates, Isseus, Thrasymachus 

pamphlets. J J 

and others. In general this was the great 
service rendered by Sophistry, from which the rhetorical 
art had likewise, as will be remembered, derived its ori- 
gin ; that it gave an impulse to scientific reflection in all 
departments. And in proportion as this tendency averted 

* Plato's doctrine concerning oratory in Part II. of the Phoedrus: von 
Stein, Platonismus, i. 106. Polemical efforts of Alcidamas against written and 
epidaictic speeches and praise of avTo<r\eBi.d^€i.v : Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas, 
1864, p. 21. The genuineness of Ale. jrepl twv tou? yp. A. ypa^ovnav is 
defended by Sprengel and Vahlen. In any case the oration is composed in 
the spirit of Alcidamas. Lysias failed to receive the Athenian citizenship, 
as Thrasybulus had proposed : Archinus Kara ®pa<r. napav6p.u>v, Oral. Att. ed. 
Did. ii. 249 ; cf. Ferd. Schultz, Demosth., 1866, p. 13. — Isseus, 'Aflijveuos to yeVo?, 
was a native of Chalcis; hence according to Schb'mann (and Meier) one of 
the cleruchi in Chalcis. Contra Liebmann de vita Iscei, p. 3. The hypothesis 
of SchBmann seems, however, to be the simplest and the most acceptable. 

chap, il] The p GUcy j Athens. 183 

itself from speculative philosophy it turned its attention to 
political and historical subjects, and in these produced a 
literary activity of a very mobile and varied character. 

Literary intercourse had already during the Peloponne- 
sian War (vol. iv. p. 96) come to flourish very vigorously. 
There existed a distinct class of writers and booksellers, 
who supplied the Attic book-market with cheap wares ; 
the works of Anaxagoras, e. g., were to be bought at 
Athens for a drachm. Moreover, a lively trade in books 
was carried on beyond the seas into the colonies ; and 
Hermodorus, the son of Plato, circulated the Dialogues of 
his master, while the latter was yet living. The rapidity 
and facility in the spread of writings are best seen from 
the fact, that this method was employed for working upon 
the public in the interest of a party. Such party-publica- 
tions appeared already during the great war ; they were 
either outpourings of vehement passion, such as the so- 
called ' Invectives ' of Antiphon, or programmes in brief of 
particular parties, which were published in order to create 
an effect, and to seek sympathizers even in wider and more 
distant circles. A pamphlet of this description was the 
address of Andocides l to his political friends,' which dates 
from the crisis of Attic party-life after 420 b. c. Of a 
cognate kind are the memoranda preserved under the 
name of Xenophon, the essay on the Athenian Polity (vol. 
iv. p. 21) and that on the Revenues. The last-named be- 
longs to the times of Eubulus ; it recommends an adminis- 
tration of the state which carefully turns to account all 
the resources of the country, and under the protection of a 
happy peace fosters commerce, handicrafts, and art. 
These are the same views as those upon which is based the 
oration of Isocrates concerning the Peace. The influence 
exercised by Isocrates himself rests upon the significance 
which the exchange of ideas in writing had gained in his 
age ; his orations and letters were pamphlets on the events 
of the times. In the same way Thrasymachus put forth 

184 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

his oration for the Larisceans, as it would appear, in an 
anti-Macedonian sense. Alcidamas, again, treated politi- 
cal questions of the day, notably in his Messenian Oration, 
in which he supported with his authority the recognition 
of Messenia, the work of Thebes, whose statesmen he was 
able thoroughly to appreciate. In this instance we there- 
fore have a written oration and counter-oration, in other 
words a literary controversy. For at the same time Iso- 
crates published his Archidamus, in which he calls upon 
the Spartans steadfastly to refuse the recognition of Mes- 

To such a degree the literature of the political pamph- 
let at that time flourished. But the writers did not con- 
fine themselves to the events and questions of the day 
which admitted of being treated in flying sheets ; after 
rhetoric had once applied itself to historical subjects, the 
attempt could not but be made, to prove the art of com- 
position also in greater efforts of the same kind. 

Rhetoric ^e combination of rhetoric and history was 
and history. no new id ea . For inasmuch as by the labors 
of the rhetoricians Attic speech had been first prepared 
and trained for all higher demands, how could those who 
set themselves the arduous task of depicting human life in 
the State and in society, remain strangers to this progress 
on the part of the exercise of language and thought ? Thus 
already Thucydides learnt something from Antiphon and 

Xenophon * ne Soph* 8 * 8 . Thus Xenophon again is as a 

historian under the influence of rhetoric ; to 

the greatest extent, it is true, in the work in which he is 

least of a historic writer, viz. in the Cyropcedia. It is the 

* Adyoiori' 'Ep/adSwpos efiiropeverai. Cic. ad Att. xiii. 20. — Antiphon's AoiSopiai : 
Sauppe, ad Fragm. Or. Att. 144. — Androcides, iv tu Trpos tou? ercu'povs : Kirch- 
hoff, Hermes, i. 5. — 'Xenophon,' 7repi npoaobuji', composed after 01. cvi. 2 
(Bergk, Griech. Litt. 383; Oncken, Isocr. und Alcid. 96, where the agreement 
with Isocr. Symm. is demonstrated). Thrasym. vn-ep Aapurauop ('ApxeAa&i 
BovXevao^ev 'EAAijye? Sj/tc? /3ap/3ap&>;) Fragm. Or. ii. 245. Alcid. Adyos MeaoTjvt- 
«cdv, p. 316; cf. Schftfer, i. 100, 4; Vahlen, 5. 

chap, ii.] The Policy of Athens. 185 

most fully elaborated of his writings, but its weakness is 
the inner untruth, that under the image of Cyrus and of 
the Persian monarchy certain ideal conceptions of state- 
government and of phases of national life are put forward. 
Xenophon deserves most respect, where he with simple 
fidelity relates his actual experiences, whether out of his 
own military life or out of the life of Socrates. But in 
undertaking to continue Thucydides, he assumed a task 
far beyond his powers. At the beginning of the work the 
influence of his predecessor is still observable, as sustain- 
ing him ; but this only makes it the more apparent, in the 
course of his Hellenic History, how he lacks independence 
of judgment, freedom of view, and intellectual force. 

Through Isocrates an entirely new combination was es- 
tablished between rhetoric and history. It is true that 
in this department also he had little interest for serious re- 
search ; but he at the same time recognized the necessity 
of not merely fatiguing his pupils with stylistic exercises, 
but also directing their attention to subjects which might 
interest them by their facts. For his art, we remember, 
was to be the centre and flower of all superior culture, and 
it in any cases stood incomparably nearer to the task of the 
historian than did the forensic rhetoric of Antiphon and 
the Sophists. Nor could the frequent recurrence to his- 
tory fail to lead to an endeavor to apply a connected 
treatment to history itself, in particular to that of the stu- 
dent's own city, out of whose past so many edifying exam- 
ples were held up to contemporary eyes ; and it was a 
triumph for the rhetorical art, to succeed in discovering 
a pleasing side even in the least flexible and driest sub- 
jects, and in rendering large masses of materials perspicu- 
ous by means of methodical arrangement. Thus Attic arch- 
there arose out of the history and archseo- «oiogy and 

J ancient his- 

logy of Athens a special department of learned tor y- 
literature, in which a pupil of Isocrates, An- Androtion. 
drotion, distinguished himself. At an advanced age he 

186 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

withdrew from the busy life of an orator and states- 
man, and at Megara wrote his Atthis, in which he 
pursued the history of Athens from its first beginnings 
down to his own times, paying special attention to the 
constitution. Contemporaneously Pharodemus composed 
an Atthis; and even before these two, such a work was 
written by Clidemus, who had lived early enough to be a 
witness of the Sicilian Expedition, and who was accounted 
the founder proper of the literature of Atthides. But the 
historical studies which had their origin in the rhetorical 
school extended far beyond the range of Athens ; and Iso- 
crates as a teacher rendered no service greater than that 
of inciting two of his most gifted pupils, Theopompus and 
Ephorus, to labor in the field of universal history.* 

Theopom- Theopompus of Chios was a man of a fiery 
P us - and ambitious mind. He accordingly devoted 

himself with full ardor to oratory, in which he attained to 
such mastery, that at the celebration of the obsequies of 
Mausollus (01. cvii. 1 ; B. c. 355) he gained the prize in 
panegyrical eloquence. It is consequently all the more 
deserving of acknowledgment, that by the advice of his 
teacher, who probably considered a serious and connected 
system of work specially desirable for the unquiet spirit 
of Theopompus, the latter devoted himself entirely to 
science, and spent his means upon travelling through the 
wildest variety of countries, becoming acquainted with the 
most remarkable persons, and acquiring a clear judgment 
concerning both the past and the present. He wrote 
Greek history down to the battle of Cnidus, at which point 
he broke off and commenced a new and historical work, 
because he had meanwhile reached a new standpoint. 
This new work he called Philippics, because he was arriv- 

* Androtion: Suidas; Zosimus, Life of Isocrates, 257, Westermann; Plut. de 
exilio, 605 ; Schafer, i. 351. KAeifirj/uios, according to Pausanias the earliest 
writer of an Atthis, survived to the times of Demosthenes. Cf. Boeckh, 
Seeweaen, 182. 

chap. II.] The Policy of Athens. 187 

ing at the conviction, that the age of petty states had 
passed away, and that the king of Macedonia would 
henceforth be the centre of Hellenic history itself. After 
the manner of Herodotus, to whom he felt akin as an Io- 
nian and to whom he had dedicated his earliest writings, he 
arranged his work like a great picture of the world, with 
numerous retrospects of earlier affairs and with constant 
attention to political and social institutions. Thus he 
placed side by side the various democracies, compared 
with one another the civic communities of Tarentum and 
of Athens, to the disadvantage of the latter, and in a 
special section gave a review of the Attic popular orators, 
among whom he blamed Callistratus for his luxuriousness, 
but judged Eubulus yet far more severely as leader of the 
state. The wide range of his view, which was that of a 
historian of civilization, further shows itself in the fact, 
that he did not neglect the territorial products and works 
of art of remoter lands, and was the first to direct the at- 
tention of the Hellenes across the seas as far as the Ro- 
man world. Everywhere he displayed a serious love of 
truth, as well as an absolute independence of judgment ; 
and by means of the impartial rigor with which he casti- 
gated the faults of kings and of demagogues alike, and 
judged all the corruptions of the times, gave to his narra- 
tive an ethical character in the spirit of Isocrates. In his 
style too he shared the clearness and dignity of his 
teacher, whom he followed in trivial points, such as the 
avoidance of the Hiatus; but in those parts of his works 
which were fuller of movement he exhibited a superiority 
in vigor and pathos.* 

Ephorus of Cyme was not so brilliantly en- E horug 
dowed by nature; he had a good share of 
iEolic phlegm ; but his power of endurance and his quali- 

* As contributions to a just appreciation of Theopompus, cf. Boeckh, 
Publ. Ec. of Ath., vol. i. p. 390 [E. Tr.J ; Mure, Crit. Hist. y. 520. Erroneoui 
judgment of Polybius, viii. 13. 

188 History of Greece. [BooeVH 

fications for learned research were proportionately greater. 
He diligently followed up the most ancient popular tradi- 
tions and the documents, and with unwearying applica- 
tion completed a work, such as few men before him had 
designed, a universal history of the Greek nation, which 
he continued through a period of more than seven centu- 
ries. He was an adept at methodically commanding his 
materials, contrived, at all events in their main bodies, to 
separate legend and history, and was the first to establish 
as the commencement of the latter the Dorian migration ; 
he knew how to develop with a delicate perception the 
geographical configuration of the different countries, and 
inquired with special zeal into the foundation of cities be- 
yond the seas. At the same time he was elevated above 
the party-divisions which broke up the Greek nation ; he 
was able to do full justice to the greatness of Thebes, and 
his civic patriotism was extremely harmless, inasmuch as 
it only seduced him, when in the course of all too many 
pages there had been no opportunity for speaking of his 
native city, into allowing himself the gratification of at all 
events inserting the words : ' About this time the Cy- 
maaans remained quiet/* 

ctesias While Theopompus and Ephorus were en- 

rPersian l ar £* n S tne knowledge of national history and 
History.) deepening it, Ctesias of Cnidus, who sojourned 
from 415 to 398 b. c. as royal body-physician at the Per- 
sian court and also took part in affairs of state (vol. iv. p. 
220), founded a science of oriental history. He was the 
first Greek to whom the archives of the Persian empire 
were opened ; but the gains derived from them by him 
failed to correspond to the demands of serious science. 
He lacked a sincere love of truth ; his vanity made him 
desire to produce at once a work of grandeur and com- 
pleteness, but in the attempt he permitted himself the 

* Ephorus : Mure, a. ». 539 j Niebuhr, Lectures on Anc, Htit. vol. ii. p. 240 
[E. Tr.J. 

chap, it] The Policy of Athens. 189 

most arbitrary proceedings ; even in the points having ref- 
erence to Perso-Greek history, which there was no reason 
for his not knowing accurately, he proved himself utterly 
untrustworthy; and in those departments of his work, 
where no watch could be kept over him, notably in Assy- 
rian and Indian archaeology, he constructed a thoroughly 
mendacious system of figures and facts, whereby he crimi- 
nally deluded his contemporaries and subsequent genera- 
tions down to the most recent times. This was the wrong 
path, to which the Sophistic culture of the age conducted, 
which had no respect for facts and sought in a frivolous 
fashion to satisfy the craving for knowledge which had 
been excited in every direction.* 

The great desire which in these times pre- Histor 
vailed for an encyclopaedic knowledge is like- ^ d , . 
wise evident from the attempts made to found 
a learned philology. It no longer sufficed to be simply 
acquainted with the classics, and to be able to recite their 
works in the manner of an educated man. The Sophists 
took well-known passages from the poets as the starting- 
points of their conversations, examined them in form and 
meaning, and this moreover frequently only in order to 
assert their own superior standpoint, and to demonstrate a 
false use of words or want of correct judgment in the an- 
cient masters. But more serious studies were also pur- 
sued ; and in particular a special class of scholars arose, 
who made the exegesis of Homer their regular calling. 
Thasos and Lampsacus were the localities where these 
studies flourished. Thasos was the birthplace of Hippias, 
who endeavoured to set forth a thoroughly emendated text 
of the poet, and of Stesimbrotus, who lived chiefly at 
Athens (vol. ii. p. 557), and who, together with the Lamp- 
sacene Metrodorus, was in the times of Plato accounted 
the ablest commentator on the epos. But exegesis already 

* Ctesias makes use of the $i<£0«'pai jSeurtXucai. Diod. ii. 32. 

190 History of Greece. ibookvu. 

at an early date went astray, allegorical interpretations 
being applied and a physical meaning put into the epic 
myths. In this department too Ephorus exhibited greater 
sobriety, who compiled the local traditions concerning 
Homer, and became the real authority for the view, that 
the poet was born at Smyrna of Cymsean parents.* 

Progress of Among the physical sciences, medicine in 
Medicine, particular entered into the most intimate rela- 
tions with general culture. For after medicine had 
formerly been cultivated in the priestly schools of the 
Asclepiadse, and had remained a technical craft based 
upon hereditary experience, a connexion was at a later 
date established between it and the gymnastic art. It 
was sought to fix the rules of a scientific promotion of 
health ; inquiry was made into the influence of the vari- 
ous nutriments and ways of life ; and thus a new art was 
created, which had reference, not to the treatment of par- 
ticular diseases, but rather to the invigoration and pre- 
servation of the human organism as a whole. The real 
founder of the school was Herodicus of Selymbria, whose 
reforms belong to the period before Plato. According to 
his system researches were carried on at Athens by Acu- 
menus and his son Eryximachus, who belonged to the most 
intimate circle of the associates of Socrates, and were very 
well known to the Athenians by their precepts as to 
appropriate exercise in the open air and similar subjects. 
This side of medicine, which had been set in motion by 
Hippo- * ne Sophists, was connected with the earlier 
crates. mode of practice by Hippocrates, the Ascle- 

piade of Cos (vol. iii. p. 69). He was possessed of the 
ancient family tradition, and diligently collected what in- 
formation was to be gained from the inscriptions on the 
votive tablets placed in the sanctuaries of Asclepius by 
those who had recovered from illness concerning the pro- 

* Homeric philology : Sengebusch, Homer. Diss. i. 205. Metrodorus : Plat. 
Ion, 530 c. ; Diog. Laert. ii. 11. 

chap, ii.] ^ 6 p u cy j Athens. 191 

cess of their cures ; but he emancipated the medical art 
from the sphere of the institutions of the temples ; and by- 
means of travels acquired a new and wide range of obser- 
vations and experiences. He became a pupil of Herodi- 
cus, of Gorgias, of Democritus of Abdera ; and it was he 
who hereupon first founded a science of medicine, which 
stood fully on the level of the scientific life of the nation, 
and indeed in some respects passed beyond it. For he 
succeeded, more than any other man, in uniting the 
salutary impulses which proceeded from Sophistry, in 
order to introduce methodical reflection into every depart- 
ment of life, to the most conscientious inquiry into facts 
and to the purest love of truth. In his writings concern- 
ing diseases and remedies, as well as in his researches 
concerning the human organism and the influence of 
climate, atmosphere, winds, &c, he proved himself a true 
philosopher, a predecessor of Aristotle; for instead of ad- 
hering to a dry empiricism, he sought for laws. He 
combined the progress of the new age with the good ele- 
ments of the old, inasmuch as he understood how 
thoroughly to view his calling on its moral side, and 
established the virtues of reverence for the gods, unsel- 
fishness, discretion and love of his neighbor, as the first 
requisites in the Hellenic physician. Finally he also 
knew how to preserve to his calling the character of a 
liberal art ; for while among the Egyptians there existed 
medical systems legally authorized, to which every prac- 
tising physician had unconditionally to submit, the art of 
Hippocrates was one which was independent of the letter, 
and in the practice of which no man was to be responsible 
to any authority but his own conscience. 

Thus many men of real intellectual ability _ . 
among the younger generation of physicians of Cnidiw. 
likewise followed in the footsteps of Hippo- cvl. 2(b.*c.' 
crates, giving diligent attention to philosophy 
and satisfying their desire for knowledge in distant travel. 

192 History of Greece. lbookVIL 

Among these Eudoxus journeyed in the company of the 
Cnidian physician Chrysippus, who was at the same time 
his pupil in philosophy, to Egypt, and in that of the phy- 
sician Theomedon to Athens. Eudoxus himself is among 
all the contemporaries of Plato the personage, in whom 
the many-sidedness of the culture of the age mirrors itself 
most distinctly ; he was a mathematician, an astronomer 
and a physician, a philosopher, a politician and a geogra- 
pher ; in him were combined the sciences of the Ease and 
of the West, and the Hellenic culture, as it had matured 
itself in Asia, at Athens, and in Italy. Born and trained 
at Cnidus, he journeyed in the twenty-fourth year of his age 
to Athens, then among the Egyptians, of whose astronomi- 
cal science he availed himself to give a superior perfection 
to the cctaeteris of Cleostratus (vol. ii. p. 562), and finally 
in Magna Grsecia, where he studied geometry under 
Archytas and medicine under the Locrian Philistion. Af- 
ter these years of travel, in themselves rich in scientific 
results, he founded at Cyzicus a school, which stood at its 
full height about the year 368. Hereupon he came with 
many of his pupils to Athens, and there formed a union 
of friendship with Plato, so that he also followed the latter 
to Syracuse, when he repaired to the court of Dionysius 
the younger, where for a short time the Platonic circle 
was assembled. This was about the time of the battle of 
Mantinea. Two years after this we find Eudoxus in his 
native city of Cnidus, where, as the man in whom his fel- 
low-citizens reposed their confidence, he regulated their 
constitution ; he also visited the court of Maussollus ; and 
finally at the age of fifty-three closed a life full of interest 
and usefulness, leaving traces of his labors behind him in 
the most various fields of science, and notably in geometry 
and astronomy. For whereas his predecessors had only 
directed their observations to the rising and setting of stars 
important for the practical wants of the mariner and the 
husbandman, or had like the Ionic and Pythagorean philo- 

chap, il] tj 16 p n cy f Athens. 193 

sophers set up vague theories concerning the heavenly bo- 
dies, Eudoxus, agreeing on this head with Plato, founded 
the first astronomy worthy of the name upon the basis of 
mathematical researches, — an astronomy which even with 
the meagre means at its disposal addressed itself to com- 
prehending the movements of the planets. And to the 
Athenians he rendered a special service, by regulating 
their civil year, and materially improving the Attic calen- 
dar through the introduction of the rising of Sirius as its 
chief epoch, without at the same time destroying its tradi- 
tional and popular system.* 

When so wide-spread an activity prevailed Th Atti 
in all the departments of philosophy, of rhet- direct the 

r l * J ' organ of 

oric, of history and of natural science, Ian- Greek cui- 

' J ture and sci- 

guage could of course not fail to receive a ence - 
many-sided development. With the exception of Hippo- 
crates, all the authors wrote in the Attic dialect ; it be- 
came the organ of Greek science, the general means of 
communication among all educated men. That very lan- 
guage, which to Thucydides was still so brittle a material, 
which he could only with much labor force to lend itself 
to his ideas, had now become so flexible, as to admit of 
being poured like a liquid metal into any mould. In it 
moves the style of Gorgias with all its pomp ; it bends to 
the smooth periods constructed by Isocrates ; under the 

* Herodicus of Selymbria, in the period before the Peloponnesian war, 
discoverer of a methodical system of dialectics : cf. Sprengel, Gesch. der 
Arzneikunde, by Rosenbaum, i. 307. Acumenus and Eryximachus (nepinaToi 
icard. tovs oSou'v) : Plat. Phsedr. 268 ; Sympos. 176 ; Protag. 315. — Hippocrates in 
connexion with Herodicus, Gorgias, Democritus : Sprengel, 330. The libe- 
ral art of Hippocrates as contrasted with the larpevetv koltH. ypa^nara, Aristot. 
Polit. 87, 8. Medicine and philosophy: Boeckh, Sonnenlcreise, 112,149. Trav- 
els of Eudoxus: ib. 140, seq — Cleostratus, according to Censorinus (p. 37, 
Hultsch) the inventor, certainly one of the first elaborators, of the Oclseterii ; 
cf. E. M tillers, v. ' Annus,'' in Pauly, Realencyclop'ddie, i. 2 , 1005, seq.— Eudoxus 
gave to the octaeteris the form of a period of 160 years. Morning-rising of 
Sirius, July 23d. Inasmuch as Eudoxus retained the old vovix-qviai, his 
epoch-year is probably one in which the new moon after the longest day 
occurred somewhere near that date, i. e. the year 381 or 373 b. c. 


194 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

artist-hand of Plato it reflects the perfect charm of culti- 
vated conversation ; it becomes the expression of histo- 
rical exposition, both in the simple manner of Xenophon 
and in the more highly colored rhetorical style of Theo- 
pompus ; finally, in the orations of Lysias and Isseus it 
combines the utmost skilfulness both of narrative and of 
contending argumentation with simplicity of expression 
and terse brevity. It is thus that in these very decades, 
when the ancient State of the Athenians was perishing 
and when their poetic art was slowly fading away, Attic 
prose developed itself with youthful vigor, and reached 
that perfection in which it served Demosthenes for com- 
municating to the state itself a new elevation. 

Poetr at -^ or ar ^ * ne a S e was no ^ f avoraD l e » Poetry, 
Athens. as ft na( j flourished at Athens, presumes a 

healthy condition of public life, a happy and secure posi- 
tion as belonging to the State. It could not prosper, if 
men felt unsatisfied with that which had been handed 
down to them, and were morally and mentally in an un- 
settled condition. The dominant tendency towards the 
cultivation of the reasoning powers and towards the ex- 
tension of knowledge drove into the background the en- 
joyment of poetry, and in it the deepest requirements of 
all more generous natures found no satisfaction. It was 
not agreeable entertainment nor the idle play of fancy 
which they desired ; the mythology in which the poets 
lived was repugnant to them ; they sought after a truth 
which the popular region was unable to offer to them, 
after pledges of an inner happiness, capable of outlasting 
the decay of the states, after eternal possessions, the acqui- 
sition of which might improve and heal the individual as 
well as society. For this reason the greatest poetic genius 
of the age devoted himself entirely to philosophy ; and 
again Isocrates has esteem to spare for the poets, only in 
so far as useful and edifying maxims of morality are to be 

Chap - h.] ZVte Po% 0/ Athens. 195 

found in their works. The rest was considered dangerous. 
How great was the revulsion in the relations of men of 
culture to poetry, and what contradictions pervaded the 
consciousness of the people, when even sayings of jEschy- 
lus were deemed so immoral, that it was thought necessary 
to keep them away from the ear of youth ! Such e. g. was 
Plato's judgment concerning the maxim of the poet : ' The 
occasion is provided by the Deity itself, when It designed 
utterly to ruin a race/ 

And yet there was not wanting in the people E 
a lively sympathy for the treasures of ancient 
poetry. The rhapsodes were to be seen, in the solemn 
vesture of their long robes, reciting in the midst of 
devout circles of hearers in the public places the Home- 
ric poems. The art of recitation flourished greatly ; and 
with this art were also combined performances based upon 
the power of memory. It was a much-admired accom- 
plishment for a man to know by heart the entire Iliad and 
Odyssey, and to be ready to fall in at any point of the de- 
clamation. Youths of noble houses too, such as Nicera- 
tus, the son of Nicias, we find skilled in these arts, and 
constantly in the company of the rhapsodes. But in gene- 
ral the esteem in which these persons were held was on 
the decrease, and although individuals among them ap- 
peared in public much to their own satisfaction as late as 
the time of Plato, as e. g. Ion of Ephesus, yet men grew 
tired of their hollow pathos, and looked down with con- 
tempt upon the wandering mountebanks. Of new crea- 
tions in the department of the epos the Per sets of Cheer i- 
lus (vol. iv. p. 166) alone, already on account of its sub- 
ject, met with recognition at Athens.* Drama 

In the drama there was great liveliness of 

* Plato v. Republ. 380; cf. Stark, Niobe, 38, 92. Power of memory (cf. G. 
Curtius on the ayiov v7ro/ in Berichte der Sachs Ges. der Wissensch. 1866, p. 
163) in the instance of Niceratus : Xen. Symp. 4 ; cf. Cobet, Prosop. Xen. 70. 
Concerning the rhapsodes, cf. Plato's Ion. 

196 History of Greece. [ BoOK vn - 

movement. In this department, as is so often the case in 
periods of an aftergrowth, it became fashionable for the 
young men, who could not accommodate their tastes to 
more serious studies, to try their powers as poets. Plato 
himself is said, after having burnt his juvenile epics, 
to have had a dramatic tetralogy read for acting, when he 
found himself awakened to higher efforts by Socrates, and 
hereupon devoted this product of his poetic dilettantism 
with equal pitilessness to destruction. Other men of the time 
exhibited less severity against themselves, and in particu- 
lar in the Attic poet families (vol. iv. p. 89), there was no 
lack of writers of talent, who supplied the stage with new 
plays. But it was impossible for them to furnish creations 
of their own of original value and of really important con- 
tents ; the esteem in which the tragic poets were held de- 
creased, while in some measure the actors were more high- 
ly valued, and pre-eminently secured to themselves the in- 
terest of the public. Their art freed itself from its depen- 
dence upon the poets ; they formed a distinct class, which 
possessed its own institutions and held its own meetings. 
They associated themselves with one another in special 
groups, which were wont to appear on the stage in the 
same plays, with the protagonist at their head, and the 
performers of the second and third parts subordinated to 
him. Those among them who had secured public favor 
held a very brilliant position ; they received high pay 
flut of the public treasury, obtained large fees on their tra- 
vels, said to have arisen as high as a talent (243£ 15s.) 
Cor single performances, and were moreover distinguished 
*>y prizes of victory. Actors of proved merit took the 
place of the poets in the conducting of performances, and 
were left free by the authorities as to the choice of pieces 
and the distribution of parts. With the texts of the poets 
too they dealt as they liked, and permitted themselves al- 
terations, which might serve to display their own talents 
in a more brilliant light. At the same time the comic and 

chap. II.J The Policy of Athens. 197 

the tragic artists separated from one another as two dis- 
tinct classes ; and the latter acquired a quite special im- 
portance, by intervening in the study of oratory and being 
much sought after as tutors to the young rhetors. They 
were accounted the true models for the cultivation of the 
voice and of recitation ; their art was itself an oratory pro- 
ceeding by bodily exposition ; and as the art of oratory had 
its proper home at Athens, so the actors' art in its new de- 
velopment was likewise essentially Attic. In Athens Saty- 
rus, Neoptolemus and Andronicus worked and shone, who 
stood at the height of their fame in the times of Demos- 

Comedy suffered less from the effects of the Later 
circumstances of the times unfavorable to comedy, 
poetry, than tragedy. For comedy was naturally more 
flexible ; it was not bound down to a fixed range of sub- 
jects, and was better able to accommodate itself to the 
changes of taste. It gave up what could no longer be re- 
tained, above all, the chorus (vol. iv. p. 125) ; this was 
the element in comedy by which it had most fully proved 
itself to be an art rooted in public life. Herewith it 
gradually changed its entire character. The poets no 
longer stood in the midst of the conflict of the parties ; 
they no longer seized upon subjects of the same grandeur 
and boldness ; their joyous freshness was dried up, their 
diction came to approach the language of ordinary con- 
versation, their fervor of imagination grew feebler, as be- 
came an age in which reason predominated, and in which 
the general public could no longer be expected to elevate 
itself into ideal regions. The poets accordingly descended 
into the petty everyday life of the population, and here 
sought for the motives of pleasing productions, which 

* Prominence of the actors (Aristot. Iihet. iii. I., p. Ill, 11 : fieTfrv Svvavrat 
vvv Ttav ttoiijiw oc viroKpnai) and x°P° s <^acrKaAoi •' Helbig, Zeitschr. fur Gymn. 
1862. p. 104 seq.; Boeckh, Trag. Gr. Princ. 108. Korn, de publ. JEsch. Soph. Eur. 
fab. exemplari (cf. Rhein. Mus. xix. 130), actors of the age of Demosthenes in 
the inscription vnep tuv ntp\ rbv Aidwaov rexvi-Tutv, Philol. xxiv. 538. 

198 History of Greece. [Book vil 

rounded themselves off into cheerful pictures of society, 
in scenes loosely connected with one another and seasoned 
by love-adventures. At the same time it was in accord- 
ance with the philosophic impulse belonging to the age, 
that not individual personages, but general types of char- 
acter were represented, which repeated themselves in men 
of the same species ; thus there were brought on the stage 
the usurer, the gamester, the parasite, and again the dandy 
virtuoso, the cunning slave, the clumsy peasant, the 
heavy guardian, the braggart soldier, the fiery lover, the 
philosophers, physicians, cooks, &c. They appeared under 
fictitious names, which thereby acquired a universal sig- 
nificance ; or again historical names were taken, and va- 
cillation was depicted in Theramenes, misanthropy in 
Timon, and superstition in Lampon. At the same time, 
however, living personages were brought forward, poets 
whose queer phrases were mocked, statesmen whose excit- 
ing speeches were derided, philosophers, who were put on 
the stage with their eccentricities, now as cynics aud Py- 
thagoreans, who perversely refused the gifts of the gods and 
in voluntary self-abasement creep about poor, dirty, and 
discontented, pitiable fools, now as the fine gentlemen of 
the Academy, who make a point of appearing with trim 
hair and in choice apparel. Special attention was be- 
stowed upon Plato himself and the reforms proposed by 
him, and his doctrines as to the community of property, 
as to the emancipation of women, &c, furnished the most 
desirable materials for amusement. But in fact fun was 
made of all the philosophers in a body, and they were 
laughed at as time-killers and brain-sick pedants with their 
eternal questionings as to the real essence of all things, 
were it only of a cucumber. This was done with merry 
whimsicality and with delicate irony, but in a harmless 
fashion and without much keenness of attack ; for the art, 
feebler than of old, covered all its productions with the 
varnish of a smooth politeness, which avoided all conflicts 

c "**- n -3 The Policy of Athens. 199 

of a more serious kind. There was no intention of 
changing men or of improving them ; even their follies 
were taken to task without any real earnestness; the 
public was entertained with those matters of which in the 
times of Eubulus it best liked to hear. Exquisite banquets 
were described most perspicuously with the utmost display 
of culinary learning, and again splendid wedding-feasts, 
such as that of Iphicrates, when he was courting the 
northern princess (p. Ill), and when in the market-place 
of the royal city, " which was covered with purple ta- 
pestry as far on high as the Great Bear, many thousands 
of unkempt, butter-swallowing Thracians were assembled 
at the banquet, at which the flesh-pots were larger than 
cisterns, and the soup was served in a tureen of pure gold 
by father-in-law Cotys with His Majesty's own royal 
hands," — and similar diverting anecdotes of the day. 
The higher enjoyments of Attic social life were likewise 
turned to account by comedy ; the charm of fine conversa- 
tion, in which wit and humor displayed themselves, and 
notably the riddles in verse, which were a favorite amuse- 
ment in social meetings at Athens, also played a great part 
on the stage. Finally it was likewise a favorite theme of the 
latter species of comedy to review the stories 
of mythology in the spirit of the age ; which 
was done either in a very cold-blooded way, by attempting 
to explain them according to the standard of healthy 
common-sense, e. g. to interpret the turning of Niobe into 
stone as an expression for speechless stupefaction, or by 
making merry over the old myths and entertaining the 
public with burlesque representations of Cronus, dining on 
his children, of marvellous divine births, of the Seven 
against Thebes and other Heroes, who were seen seated on 
the form at school, reading books and going through all 
the ordinary experiences of common life. These travesties 
developed into a distinct species of public amusement at 
Athens, in which even competitive contests were instituted, 

200 History of Greece. C BoOK vn. 

like those in tragedy and comedy, in the dithyrambus 
and in rhapsodic recitations. A beginning had already 
been made in this direction during the Peloponnesian 
War, and Hegemon of Thasos is mentioned as the first 
who produced at Athens parodies of the Homeric myths 
concerning the gods. It is stated, that the public was 
amusing itself with his Gigantomachia on the day when 
the tidings of the Sicilian disaster reached the city. 

Such was the character of the later comedy as it flour- 
ished at full height, with its subsidiary species, parody, 
from the close of the Peloponnesian War down to the time 
of Alexander. Antiphanes, Alexis, Eubulus, Anaxan- 
drides distinguished themselves in it ; about sixty authors 
are mentioned, with more than eight hundred plays. 
Among these authors were genuine Athenians, such as the 
decendants of Aristophanes, and foreigners from Rhodes, 
Thurii, Sinope, &c. But the foreigners too were thorough- 
ly transformed into Athenians ; the varied life of the city, 
where men of all kinds of origin, even Egyptians and 
Babylonians, were to be found, mirrored itself in the 
productions of the stage ; and therefore Antiphanes could 
excuse himself before the Macedonian king, who was un- 
able duly to appreciate one of his comedies, by saying 
that it was indeed necessary to be thoroughly at home in 
Athenian society, to have taken part in Attic picnics, and 
to have received and given blows in quarrels about 
amours, if one wished to find Attic comedy thoroughly to 
his taste.* 

The fine With regard, lastly, to Fine Art, the flour- 
arts, ishing condition which it enjoyed in the city 
of Pericles (vol. ii. p. 596 seq.) was unable to survive the 
decay of that city itself. A public art, such as the Attic, 

* Comedy and Plato: Alex. ap. Athen. 226; cf. Becker, Charicles, p. 405 
[E. Tr.]. Iphicrates: Meineke, iii. 182; Rehdantz, 30. Riddles: Meineke, 
Hist. Orit. 277 ; Paul, de Symposii cenigmatis, 2 ; O. Ribbeck, Mittlere u. Neuere 
Comodie, 1857, p. 19.— Parodies : Schrader in Rhein. Mus. xx. 186.— Antiphanes 
and King Alexander ; Athen. 555. 

Ch * p - u -J The Policy of Athens. 201 

presumes a prosperous commonwealth, peace, and an 
abundant flow of public resources. The civic community 
must be internally united and animated by a free spirit, 
if it is to love what is beautiful and to esteem the condign 
cultivation of art a point of honor on the part of the State. 
Finally, there must be in existence men enjoying the con- 
fidence of the public, to whom full powers are accorded 
even for longer periods of time. All these presumptions 
were wanting in the case of Athens. The civic communi- 
ty was disintegrated by party-divisions ; the ideal tenden- 
cies were neglected ; passing agitations controlled the 
phases of public feeling ; the foreign policy of the State 
was capricious, vacillating and unsuccessful, — how then 
could the arts have found a favorable soil ? The age of 
great and corrected creations had passed away, without 
hope of return, with the death of Pericles. 

But art itself did not perish. In general, where the 
Fine Arts have ever found a vigorous and popular deve- 
lopment, they possess a certain independence as towards 
the life of a community ; they have a more fixed tradition 
than music and poetry. Indeed, they are even capable 
of receiving new impulses from such a crisis as that which 
occurred in Attic society after Pericles, and of appropria- 
ting through its agency fresh germs of life, which 
fruitfully develop themselves. For the lofty calm which 
characterized the works of Phidias, and which could easily 
pas3 into sameness, was substituted a greater degree of va- 
riety ; the artists were more daring, they designed with 
greater boldness, they placed their figures in clearer relief 
in comparison with the repose of the balance formerly 
maintained, and sought to preserve the most transitory 
movement. As to bodily movement, it is true . 

J Sculpture. 

that already the JSginetans and Myron (vol. and architec- 
ii. p. 602) had achieved what was possible ; 
but intellectual life had in their time not yet vindicated to 
itself its rights ; the countenances appeared cold and indif- 


202 History of Greece. C BoOK vil 

ferent ; the noble simplicity in the works of statuary on 
the Parthenon no longer satisfied the younger generation, 
which was full of inner agitation and eager for excitement, 
and which demanded novel attractions, if it was to take 
interest in the creations of art. The transition to this 
later style is already very perceptible in the frieze of the 
temple of Apollo, which Ictinus, the architect of the Par- 
thenon, erected for the Phigaleans at Bassse. Here it is 
already impossible to mistake in the groups of the contests 
of Amazons and Centaurs a greater degree of unquiet, a 
heightened vehemence of movement, showing itself in the 
flutter of the drapery, and an accumulation of motives of 
effect displaying an intention of creating it. These exam- 
ples of relieved work already have a relation towards the 
frieze of the Parthenon, similar to that between the diction 
of Euripides and the grand style of Sophocles. The influ- 
ence of the stage hereupon operated in causing plastic art 
likewise to attempt to give expression to emotional life ; 
the more ancient circle of the figures of the gods was 
therefore passed, and a predilection was shown towards 
those spheres of ideas, where opportunity was offered for 
effectively representing the various movements of the life 
of the soul. In Aphrodite was shown the power of love, 
in Dionysus the bliss of intoxication ; entirely new tasks 
presented themselves, when it was endeavored with psy- 
chologically delicate distinctions to express the whole 
serial succession of human sensations, pain, longing, ten- 
derness, ecstasy, madness. Man now for the first time be- 
came in full measure the subject of artistic treatment, i. e. 
man as he existed in those times, in which the ancient dis- 
cipline had vanished, the bonds of family had been 
loosened, and the power of passion had been set free. 
Sophistry sharpened the insight into the characters and 
temperaments of men ; for even famous situations in- 
vented by individual Sophists, such as the " Judgment of 
Heracles " (vol. iv. p. 140), were imitated by plastic art. 

<*ap. ii.] The Policy of Athens. 203 

Rhetoric likewise led in the direction of the treatment 
of emotions, as did the later style of music and 
the dithyramb ; everywhere we see prevailing a tendency 
towards the impassioned, which put an end to the reserva- 
tion of the earlier times, and called forth greater freedom 
of movement. 

In architecture, too, the age of rhetoric C ombina- 
manifested itself. Simplicity no longer suf- tion ot " both - 
ficed ; a greater wealth of ornament, novel and more tell- 
ing motives of effect, were demanded. This direction was 
particularly followed by a contemporary of Ictinus, Calli- 
machus, a man possessing all the many-sidedness and ardor 
of a genuine Athenian, but not the calm and the self-con- 
fidence which characterized the great temple-architects of 
Pericles. Under the full influence of the spirit of the age, 
he strove after novelty, and desire to outvie all his prede- 
cessors ; but he found no satisfaction in the endeavor ; for 
he lacked the true creative power, and therefore also the 
joyous self-confidence of an artist of true genius. But in 
inventive skilfulness as an architect, sculptor, and me- 
chanician he surpassed all. The much-admired palm-tree 
of bronze was his work, which was erected over the eternal 
lamp in the temple of Athene Polias, and which served to 
conduct the smoke of the flame out of the sanctuary ; he, 
again, invented the stone drill, in order by means of it to 
add to the treatment of marble a delicacy of execution 
previously unknown ; lastly, it was he who made the dis- 
covery, which led to many important results, of giving an 
entirely new formation to the capital of the pillar of the 
temple, by placing on the shaft of the column a basket- 
shaped calix of acanthus-leaves, thus transmuting with a 
surprising effect the severe, serious forms of the earlier 
style of architecture. This invention met with extraordi- 
nary applause, because it perfectly corresponded to the 
craving for change and fulness. It soon became an acqui- 
sition of Hellenic art; and the first temple, where the 

204 History of Greece. t BooK VIL 

three orders of columns were demonstrably applied, was that 
of Athene at Tegea, erected after the burning-down of its 
predecessor (01. xcvi. 2 ; b. c. 395), — the most glorious J 
work accomplished in Greece after the Parthenon. On 
the outside it was Ionic, like the Old-Attic temple of 
Athene, inside it was Doric, and in the upper story Corin- 
thian — for this name was given to the new style of Calli- 
machus, who was said to have borrowed his idea from a 
Corinthian sepulchral pillar. As the Phigaleans had sent 
for Ictinus, and the Eleans for Phidias, so the Tegeatae 
had summoned Scopas from Athens. It was his good for- 
tune to be able to construct, still in the manner of the 
earlier period, a great sacred edifice of national signifi- 
cance ; for the sacred authority of Athene Alea was recog- 
nized beyond the boundaries of Tegea and Arcadia. 
Scopas adorned the pediments of this temple with large 
groups of statues, the subject of which was taken from the 
popular legends of the Calydonian chase, and of the con- 
tests of the Arcadian Hero Telephus. Praxiteles himself 
contributed works for architectural purposes ; he enriched 
the pediments of the Heracleum at Thebes with composi- 
tions representing the labors of Heracles (vol. iv. p. 521). 
But in general the intimate connexion between sculpture 
and architecture was relaxed, just as music and poetry, 
and the drama and the histrionic art, had separated from 
one another. All the arts strove after independence, in 
order that each might develop its own special proficiency 
with all the more splendor ; and in particular plastic art, 
with its tendency towards expressing the life of the soul, 
could not fail to deem any subordination to architectural 
purposes oppressive.* 

Among the masters of sculpture it was Alcamenes (vol. 

* The judgment of Heraoles: Welcker, A. Denkm. iii. 310; Overbeck in 
Berichte d. k. Sachs Ges. d. Wissensch. 1865, 46. Callimachus : Brunn, Geschichte 
d. Griech. Kiinstler, i. 251 ; Lohde, Architektonik der Hellenen, 40. Temple at Te- 
gea : Curtius, Pelopcnnesos, i. 255. 

CuAP.ii.i The Policy of Athens. 205 

iv. p. 521 ; vol. iii. p. 45) who kept alive the school of 
Phidias. To the same school belonged Cephisodotus, upon 
whom was imposed the noble task of celebrating the vic- 
tory of Conon by a bronze statue of Athene and a magni- 
ficent altar to Zeus the Preserver in the Pirseeus.* After 
this there was a lack of occasions and of inclination for 
the execution of public sculptures ; and the Attic artists, 
in particular those who had immigrated from abroad, 
readily obeyed any summons holding out to them the pros- 
pect of the work they desired in other parts of Greece. 
Thus already Aristander, who was a member of the Pa- 
rian colony of artists at Athens (vol. ii. p. 638), labored 
for the glorification of the victories of Sparta, and wrought 
for one of the Amyclsean tripods (vol. iv. p. 170) the figure 
of the female lyre-player, which represented the city of 
Sparta. We have a yet more palpable in- Worksof 
stance of the migratory life of the artists of Scopas. 
that age in Scopas, who was probably a son B - c - 392-348, ; 
of Aristander. He returned from Tegea to 
Athens, where he lived and worked during the period, 
when the power of the city took a new rise in the second 
Naval Confederation ; then, about the time of the Social 
War, he went to Asia, where he was employed in adorn- 
ing sanctuaries of high consideration at Ephesus, Cnidus, 
&c, and notably at Halicarnassus created works in honor 
of the dynasty there. 

Scopas, the man of the greatest genius among the re- 
presentatives of the New- Attic school, combined in him- 
self all the attainments of the older masters ; in his repre- 
sentation of Asclepius, as a type of youthful beauty and 
health, he followed the artistic tendency of Polycletus ; he 
chiselled Hermse according to Attic taste in ideal perfec- 
tion, and was able to animate the marble as Phidias had 
animated it. But he went far beyond all previous endea- 
vors. He wrought a Bacchante, such as Euripides had 

* Cephisodotus; Brunn, u. ». i. 269. 

206 History of Greece. [BookVil 

represented upon the stage, in a state of utter ecstasy, with 
her head thrown back and her curls fluttering in the air ; 
all the pulses of living excitement seemed to be beating in 
the marble. On the other hand, he represented, in his 
Apollo playing on the cither, the mild power of the en- 
thusiasm inspired by the Music art ; a movement of lofty 
ardor pervaded the grand figure from the sole of the foot 
to the flowing hair ; the body was nothing less than the 
glorified organ of a blissful enthusiasm. Most remarkable 
of all was the transformation of Aphrodite. Already the 
more ancient style of art had conceived of her as the god- 
dess of beauty, and had therefore represented the upper 
part of the body without drapery. Thus she appears in 
the statue of Milo, which still displays a serious, Pallas- 
like character, and the lofty dignity of a work from the 
school of Phidias. The mythological connexion between 
the goddess and the element of water led the artists a step 
further. Was not this the time when the famous Phryne 
of Thespise ventured at a festival in Eleusis to rise from 
the sea as Aphrodite Anadyomene ? Thus the sculptors 
now likewise undertook to let all drapery fall, and to re- 
present the goddess of love in the fully revealed perfection 
of form. At the same time artists such as Scopas and 
Praxiteles still faithfully adhered to the principles of true 
art ; their purpose was not to seduce and stimulate, nor 
was the goddess in their hands converted into a bold he- 
tcera; they represented her as modest and chaste, as 
frightened and timid even in the solitude of the bath ; but 
the goddess became a woman, the deity which inspired 
love became a being which felt and needed it, just as in 
Apollo the Music enthusiasm, and in Dionysus the Bac- 
chic, were represented. 

and of ^ ne ex * eil t to which, even in this period, 

Praxiteles. Greek art developed itself according to defi- 

b. c. 3G8-336, n ite laws, is very clearly manifest from the 
fact that the two contemporaries, Scopas and 

chap, ii.] ^Ae Policy of Athens. 207 

Praxiteles, notwithstanding all the difference in their re- 
spective tendencies, yet so fully agreed, that the works of 
the one were frequently mistaken for those of the other, 
and that it is consequently also impossible to consider the 
two artists separately. Praxiteles, probably the son of 
Cephisodotus (p. 204), was an Athenian by birth ; he was 
of more settled habits than Scopas, less comprehensive in 
his artistic labors, but in his own way even more highly 
esteemed. The material used by him was likewise chiefly 
marble, and his art was most masterly in the execution of 
the heads, in which he knew how to give reality to the 
mysterious action and reaction upon one another of body 
and soul. He was therefore thoroughly in his own sphere 
when he wrought a figure of Eros, whom he represented 
as a boy growing towards maturity, standing with his head 
dreamily bent down, as lost in the thoughts which, as yet 
not understood by himself, pass through his soul. In 
general, the art of this age displayed a great predilection 
for the soft and tender forms of early youth, contrasting 
herein with earlier times, when the gymnastic art flourished, 
and when the artists had before their eyes the human 
figures developed in the palcestrce and swelling with vigor. 
Apollo, too, was represented in a boyish form, and the an- 
cient god Dionysus was converted into a youth of effemi- 
nate presence, in whose eye languishing desire and the 
state of bliss produced by wine found expression. But, 
lest the dignity of the god should be lost, he was sur- 
rounded with a following of Satyrs and Maenads, in whom 
the power of Dionysus revealed itself. The Satyrs, too, 
were treated as youthful and ideal figures ; they served to 
express in an extremely pleasing way, a simple devotion 
to natural life, an easy dreamy existence in wood and field, 
while in the female companions of the god all the phases 
and degrees of Bacchic ecstasy were called into life. Thus 
a whole world of figures arose, in which a freshness of life 
displayed itself in a perfect natural simplicity, wholly un* 

208 History of Greece. [Book vii. 

dreamt of by the more solemn and serious art of the ear- 
lier age. A joyous rout of this kind, such as had formed 
itself around Dionysus, Scopas also transplanted to the sea, 
combining the Nereids and Tritons with dolphins, sea- 
horses, and other fabulous animals into a grand proces- 
sion, by which, as it would seem, the re-union of Thetis 
with Achilles was celebrated, and the homage of the deep 
was offered to her beautiful son. Here the loftiest poetry 
had been breathed into stone, and an opportunity had 
been offered to the artist of attesting at once the richest 
wealth of imagination and the most accurate knowledge 
of the forms of nature. Already the ancients considered 
the group of Niobe and her children as the highest effort 
of this school, without knowing to which of the two artists 
it was to be ascribed. In this work a mighty doom from 
on high is represented, but in such a manner that we see, 
not how it is sent, but only how it is met, — met by the 
mother, who is alone guilty, and by her blooming progeny : 
a doom, instigated by the greatness of soul and active love 
of the sufferers ; a tragedy in marble, which, in spite of all 
the confusion of woe, yet forms a whole in itself, and de- 
rives a certain calm from the circumstance that the com- 
position is arranged in rhythmical order, like the group 
of a pediment. 

Leoc hares "^J ^ e s *^ e °^ Scopas an d Praxiteles 
wrought Leochares. He produced a series of 
public monuments in the manner of the earlier masters, a 
Zeus on the Acropolis, a group of Zeus and the Demos of 
Athens in the Pirseeus, and a statue of Apollo in the Attic 
market place. But he also worked completely in the 
spirit of the later school, as is notably shown in the in- 
stance of his most famous creation, his Ganymede, a 
production in which the inert mass of the stone seemed to 
have been absolutely conquered ; for thus was the boy 
seen passing aloft, carefully and firmly borne by the eagle, 
not as a captive prey, but as one longingly striving heav 

chap. II.] The Policy of Athens. 209 

en wards *, while another celebrated group of Leochares, a 
slave-dealer by the side of a cunning slave, thoroughly 
corresponds to the character of the later comedy.* 

It is likewise characteristic of the practice Groupg 
of the art of this age, that frequently a work f^}^' 
of the later epoch was set up by the side of statuary, 
one of the earlier, in order, as it were, to repeat the same 
idea in a style according with the times. Thus the Apollo 
of Leochares, and the Artemis Brauronia of Praxiteles, 
were placed by the side of earlier statues of the same di- 
vinities. Thus, again in the sanctuary of the " Venerable 
Goddesses " (i. e. of the Erinyes) at Athens, the sculpture 
of Calamis stood between two by Scopas. The age was 
altogether one of a new and highly ingenious composition 
of groups, not merely such personages being, in accor- 
dance with earlier practice, combined as participated in a 
common action, in the capacity of witnesses or co-opera- 
ting agents, but the essential character of a divine individ- 
uality being illustrated by surrounding the central figure 
with subsidiary figures, as, e. g., that of Zeus the Preserver 
was associated with those of Asclepius and Hygeia ; and 
what a degree of delicacy of conception is it not permissi- 
ble to assume when we hear that Scopas in the sanctuary 
of Aphrodite at Megara gave visible expression to the 
essential nature of this deity by means of three statues of 
Bros (Love), Pothos (Desire), and Himeros (Longing) ! 
The group resembled a triad developing itself out of a 
key-note. Finally, it was a task of the art of this age, 
with its tendency to psychological delicacy, to represent 
personages of note in faithful accordance with their char- 
acters. This task was twofold. Either the object was to 
represent famous Hellenes in the grand monumental 
style, e. g. the masters of tragedy in the theatre ; or to 

* Urlichs, Skopati 1 Leben und WerJce, 1863. Venus of Milo: Urlichs, 122. 
" Leochares mangonem et puerum subdolae et fucatse vernilitatis," the 
reading in Plin. Hist. Nat. xxxiv. 17, which I follow Urlichs in preferring. 

210 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

produce the likeness of contemporaries after a fashion 
more corresponding to ordinary life, so as to preserve their 
memory in the circle of their friends. Thus the statue of 
Isocrates by Leochares was a monument of the pious 
reverence of Timotheus ; thus Silanion formed his figure 
of Plato, seated in an attitude of bending forward, engaged 
at his ease in deep converse with his friends, a work taken 
from life, and a valued remembrance for all Plato's grate- 
ful pupils. In these compositions, too, is to be recognized 
the tendency of the age towards the general and the typi- 
cal, as we found it in comedy. There was a fondness for 
representing such persons as might typify a species of men. 
Thus the portrait which Silanion made of Apollodorus 
(probably the odd disciple of Socrates) (vol. iv. p. 131) 
was such that it might at the same time be regarded as a 
type of indignation, and of self-tormenting discontent. 

The creations of the Attic artists were sought even in 
remote regions. Euclides, a sculptor belonging to the 
circle of Plato's acquaintances, wrought temple-composi- 
tions for Bura, which was rebuilt after it had been swal- 
lowed up in the earth (vol. iv. p. 435), and for iEgira in 
Achaia. The works of Leochares found their way to 
Syracuse, and the same artist afterwards likewise 
journeyed with Scopas, Bryaxis, and Timotheus to Hali- 
carnassus, where Mausollos had entered upon an Attic 
course of policy, had founded an Attic maritime dominion 
and a flourishing Attic art-life, and where a monument 
was erected in his honor, in the production of which the 
Attic artists emulated one another under the guidance of 

Painting ^ ne ar * °^ P amt ing is even less dependent 
than that of sculpture upon the condition of 

* Groups of more ancient and more recent statues of divinities: O. Jahn, 
Zeus Polieus in Nuove Memorie, p. 22. Figure of Plato: O. Jahn, Darstell. GriecJu 
DicJder, 1861, 719. Apollodorus ("non homo, Bed iracundia"), Plin. Hist. Nat. 
xxxiv. 21 ; M. Hertz, de Apollodoro staiuario et phil. (Breslau), 1867. — Mauso- 
leum : Philol. xxi. 453. 

chap. II.] ^he Policy of Athens. 211 

public affairs ; and, although it had attained to a certain 
perfection through Polygnotus, which in its way has never 
been surpassed (vol. ii. p. 597), yet it was precisely to this 
art that totally new courses were still open. It had 
hitherto remained essentially an art of design, in which 
plastic forms prevailed. Nor had it in truth yet attained 
to a consciousness of its special artistic resources, in par- 
ticular of the magic effect of light and color, of the supe- 
rior degree of freedom which it owes to its more uncorpo- 
real means of representation, and of its capability of more 
directly seizing upon, and making visible, the spiritual 
element in man. These sides painting had hitherto left 
undeveloped ; it was not till now that the time for effect- 
ing this had arrived ; and the whole tendency of the age 
was in a high degree favorable to such a progressive de- 
velopment of the ancient pictorial art. Apoliodorus of 
Athens, who established his fame towards the close of the 
Great War, was the first who contrived to give a new 
charm to his pictures by means of light and shade, and 
whose use of color created a remarkable effect. He en- 
tered upon this new course with timidity, and was immedi- 
ately far surpassed by Zeuxis of Heraclea, the acknow- 
ledged master of illusive effect and color. But that this 
art was not allowed to lose itself in sensual effects, is 
proved by the examples of Parrhasius of Ephesus, an 
artist of genius who contrived to represent the Demos of 
Athens :n such a way that all the whimsical qualities of 
the original were thought to be recognizable in the por- 
trait ; and of Timanthes of Cythnus, who in his picture of 
the sacrifice of Iphigenia was able admirably to indicate 
the various kinds and degrees of sympathy in the several 
personages depicted as present. 

The witty mockery of events of the day, which at this 
time flourished more than ever among the Athenians (p. 
147), likewise found expression in painting, as is proved 
by a famous picture of Timotheus. For inasmuch as the 

212 History of Greece. [Book vn. 

victorious general was modest enough to ascribe all his 
successes to Fortune, he was taken by his word, and de- 
picted as slumbering in his general's tent, while the god- 
dess Tyclie hovered over his head, and in a long trailing 
net dragged after her, like a haul of sea-fish, the confed- 
erate cities which Timotheus had secured.* 

The painters Athens was even less able to retain within 
her walls than the sculptors. Distinct schools were formed 
at Thebes (vol. iv. p. 520), and at Sicyon. The Sicyonic 
school perfected the technical part of the art ; it ventured 
upon grand historical subjects, as e. g. in Euphranor's 
picture of the battle of Mantinea, or speaking more pre- 
cisely, of the cavalry skirmish, so honorable to Athens, 
which preceded the battle — (vol. iv. p. 507) — a picture 
which was accordingly set up in the Attic Ceramicus.f 
Finally, this school also sought to establish a productive 
connexion between the art of painting and scientific, in 
particular mathematical, studies. After these endeavors 
had combined themselves with the perfection of color, of 
which Asia Minor was the home, there finally arose in the 
times of Alexander that development of painting, which 
it was possible to regard as the highest effort of national 
art, viz. the works of Apelles. 
« . .. The degree to which the Athenians took 

Painting on & 

pottery. p ar {, j n these several developments of art is 
only recognizable from their pottery. For the painting 
on pottery was not merely a preliminary school for higher 
art, and one of great importance (for on clay the Hellenes 
learnt to paint with rapidity and certainty, while such 
materials of art as afford more facility for effacing and 
correcting are apt to accustom artists to a timid and irres- 
olute manner of composition), but it also accompanied 
the pictorial art through all its stages, inasmuch as even 
on so humble a material and on surfaces so inconvenient, 

* Painting of Timotheus: JEM&n. Ver. Hist. xiii. 43; cf. Rehdantz, 188. 
f Euphranor: Sch'ifer, Demosthenes, iii. 2 11. 

CHAP - il 1 The Policy of Athens. 213 

the Greeks with indefatigable diligence sought to produce 
representations full of life and significance. 

It is true that vase-painting was more capable of repro- 
ducing the grand simplicity of the style of Polygnotus 
than of following the advances of the subsequent age, 
which were based upon the effects of color. Yet it is very 
clearly to be perceived how the severe and hard outlines 
gradually became fluid, how a greater freedom of grouping 
makes its appearance, how the countenances become 
more expressive, and the motions less forced. In con- 
nexion with the entire artistic development of the age we 
recognize a tendency towards sensual beauty, an inclina- 
tion towards the delicate and the effeminate. Dionysus 
with his companions, Aphrodite and Eros, Apollo with 
the Muses, and cognate circles, in which Scopas and 
Praxiteles preferred to move, come into the foreground. 
Social life is, after the manner of the later comedy, repre- 
sented with its enjoyments in charming pictures. Alle- 
gorical figures appear, either accompanying divinities, 
whose individualities they supplement and illustrate, e. g. 
Peitho, Himeros and Pothos by the side of Aphrodite, or 
again as independent beings, who owe their origin to an 
age of reflection and abstraction, e. g. Plutos or Wealth, 
Chrysos or Gold, Paidia or Merriment, Eudaimonia or 
Comfortable Prosperity, Pandaisia or the Pleasure of the 
Table, &c. Seriousness of meaning is less taken thought 
of; and less care is bestowed upon the drawing ; we per- 
ceive a striving after pretty and unusual shapes in the 
vases, for a mixed variety in the figures, for fanciful cos- 
tumes and more brilliant ornamentation. The ancient 
black and red no longer suffices ; the painting is done on 
a ground of white chalk, various colors are employed, and 
gold is laid on, in order to give a novel attraction to the 
vases. Thus it is possible even in these trivial remains 
of antiquity to recognize the change of taste, the transi- 
tion from simplicity to artificiality, from that which im- 

214 History of Greece. lbookvu 

plies its own meaning to that which is outwardly brilliant, 
from ancient faith to the Sophistic treatment of ethical 
conceptions. But this period of transition was a period 
of many-sided impulse for art, and imposed upon it tasks 
which strengthened it for ulterior developments.* 

Culture Thus Athens in fact still remained the 

and commu- focus of a many-sided and luxuriantly flou- 
rishing intellectual life. In spite of the com- 
petition, which on the one side was attempted by Syracuse 
under Dionysius, on the other by Halicarnassus under the 
Carian dynasts, Athens was still the intellectual capital 
of the Hellenes, the solitary spot where there existed from 
of old an uninterrupted development, a constant progress, 
and an abundance of the most generous forces. No new 
accession of culture became the common property of the 
nation until it had asserted itself at Athens ; and from 
Athens were summoned the men by whose admission other 
cities were to participate in the fame which attached to 
the cultivation of science and art. Nor can it be denied 
that the decay of of the ancient religiosity and code of 
manners gave a mighty impulse towards obtaining, by 
means of independent inquiry, a new certainty of life and 
thought ; and again that the relaxation of ancient usages, 
the freer movement of ideas, and the more passionate ex- 
citement of the minds of men likewise redounded to the 
advantage of the arts, and qualified them for achieve- 
ments, which in the times of greater simplicity, tran- 
quillity, and moderation would never have been brought 
to pass. But intellectual life at Athens was no longer the 
life of the community ; and the unity of a healthy organ- 
ism, where all forces served one final object, had been lost. 
From a scientific point of view Sophistry had been over- 
come; but the process of analysis and decomposition, 

* Gold-ornamentation (sparingly used already in vases of a more ancient 
date : Heydemann, Hiupersis, 10) : O. Jahn, Bemalte Vasen mit. Goldschmuck, 26. 

chap, ii.] The Policy of Athens. 215 

which it had commenced, continued without abatement ; 
and Socrates himself had only contributed to widen the 
rift which ran through human society. His stand-point, 
although it in many ways attached itself to the primitive 
wisdom of the temples, after all contrasted with every- 
thing which had preceded it ; he owed everything to his 
own meditations, and throughout insisted upon the inner 
tasks of life, upon the conscience of the individual, and 
upon his relation to the divinity. Morality separated 
itself from civic virtue, and the human individual sepa- 
rated himself from the state. There now existed two 
kinds of men : thinkers and non-thinkers. The latter 
swim with the stream, and sink deeper and deeper, since 
whatever could have offered them an anchorage has lost 
its strength ; the former constitute an intellectual aristo- 
cracy, they regard themselves in the light of a higher or- 
ganism as compared with all other mortals. The commu- 
nal feeling, so powerful in the Hellenes, has not been 
extinguished ; but there now arise in the schools of phi- 
losophers new communities, in which principles prevail 
wholly contradictory to the existing condition of things. 
An opposition of this kind notably developed itself among 
the followers of Socrates. This master, the most influ- 
ential man of his age, was of no account in the community 
of the state ; nay, the very man whom they deemed the 
purest of human beings and the greatest benefactor of his 
fellow-citizens, had been ejected by the state as one hurt- 
ful to the commonweal. For this reason there lay a deep 
gulf, and there prevailed an invincible repugnance, be- 
tween the followers of Socrates and the state of the Athe- 
nians. It is true that according to the Greek way of 
thinking the individual and the state continued to be con- 
ceived of as inseparable ; but the spiritual life of the indi- 
vidual henceforth became the standard whereby to judge 
of the commonwealth. Whatsoever acts as an obstacle to 
the citizen in the performance of his duty as a man, has 

216 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

no validity for him ; virtue, and the happiness of the indi- 
vidual which is based thereon, are the final object of the 
whole. Hereby an utter revulsion is brought about in 
the consciousness of the Hellenes ; civic legality loses its 
value, and the centre of gravity of spiritual life is laid en- 
tirely in the attainment of perfect knowledge ; and thus a 
movement without aims is occasioned. For definite results 
are reached only by a few and isolated elect, who pene- 
trate to the perfect tranquillity of soul belonging to the 
Wise ; and the followers of Socrates themselves diverge 
so widely from one another, that some of them, viz. the 
Cynics, spurn the whole culture of the people, while 
others contrive to find means of reconciling themselves to 
the enjoyments of the world. And in wider circles the 
entire movement simply has the effect of weakening all 
usage, and of causing a tendency to negation to spread 
further and further. 

Cosmo- ^ n ^ s t en dency shows itself in the growth of 

poiitanism. agitation in outward life ; the associations of 
home lose their significance ; educated men cease to care 
for their native city, and there gradually develops itself 
a citizenship of the world, in which all distinctions be- 
tween states and peoples vanish, even the contrast between 
Hellenes and barbarians, upon which the national con- 
sciousness was essentially based. It was among the Do- 
rians that a clear consciousness of this contrast was first 
gained ; it was among the Athenians that it was developed 
so as to become thoroughly justifiable; but it was at 
Athens that it also lost its sharpness and was in the end 
overcome altogether. For the Socratic idea of virtue 
could not allow those distinctions to remain valid, which 
traditional prejudices had established among men. 

As towards the demands of morality all men were 
equals ; and the same reasons, which induced the philoso- 
phers to protest eagerly against the neglectful treatment, 
of the female sex, and to advocate the rights of the slave 

chap, ii.] The Policy of Athens. 217 

(p. 159), likewise made it necessary to abandon the na- 
tional distinction of Hellenes as against Non-Hellenes, 
and to acknowledge, that whosoever was wise and just, 
to whatever nation and to whatever class he belonged, 
must be acceptable to the Divinity, and must therefore 
also have a right to claim full recognition from men. It 
is true that Isocrates even in these latter days preached war 
against the Persians as a sacred and national duty ; but 
the ancient enmity between Asia and Europe had become 
nothing more than a fine phrase, which was warmed up 
for the sake of special purposes. And Isocrates himself, 
it will be remembered, is already the representative of a 
new Hellenism, lying not in the blood, but in the senti- 
ments of the mind, which sentiments again can be acquired 
by all uncorrupted natures. An ideal Hellenism of this 
kind, such as the most eminent men of this age, Epami- 
ninondas (vol. iv. p. 522), Timotheus (p. 94), and others 
sought to represent in their own persons, developed itself 
more especially at Athens, because Athens was a city be- 
longing to the world at large, where members of the 
wildest variety of nations met, — Greeks from all the colo- 
nies, half-Greeks and barbarians, Thracians, Babylonians 
and Egyptians, — and where all these nations were repre- 
sented by their best men. Had not ever since the time of 
Solon those foreigners repaired to Athens, who were de- 
sirous of tasting Hellenic culture ? It was here that this 
culture first lost its local coloring, that men learnt to re- 
gard it as a world-culture ; here Mithridates, the son of 
Rhodobates, a Persian prince, was seen as an enthusiastic 
admirer of Plato erecting the likeness of his teacher in 
the Academy, and consecrating it to the Muses. Here it 
was therefore impossible to remain involved in the con- 
ceptions of a narrow patriotism ; and here the point was 
soonest reached, of acknowledging without restraint the 
defects of native, and the advantage of foreign institutions, 
instead of frequently admiring most what was different 

218 History of Greece. [BookVU 

from the ways of Athens. In defiance of all experience 
Sparta was still lauded as the seat of moral discipline and 
fidelity to the law ; and enthusiastic praises were bestowed 
upon the simple manners of the Northern peoples. And 
Tendencies * n particular the monarchical constitution of 
in favor of foreign countries received the tribute of sm- 

monarchy. ° 

cere veneration, and not only when based 
upon the legitimate foundation of popular statutes or 
usages, but also when established by force. In the dia- 
logue Hiero, attributed to Xenophon, the Tyrant converses 
with the poet Simonides ; for it is no less a personage than 
he whom the author has chosen as a representative of the 
traditional view of the enviable good fortune of a ruler's 
office. The Tyrant eloquently demonstrates its dark sides 
from his own experience ; he describes the weary feeling 
of want amidst the abundance of all good things, as well 
as the constant fear and the absence of freedom which 
accompany the tenure of absolute power. But Simonides 
is by no means converted into a republican ; on the con- 
trary, he adheres to his view that these evils are not ne- 
cessary concomitants of the calling of a ruler, and that 
an absolute sovereign is after all able to be a benefactor 
of his people, and a prince enjoying love and confidence.* 
The court of Perdiccas and Archelaus (p. 40), the 
magic charm exercised by the personality of the younger 

* Socrates mundanus: Hermann, Plato, 70. Gentle views with regard to 
slaves in Euripides (Schenkl, Politische Ansichten des Eurip. 15) and Xenophon 
(Zeller, ii. 1, 170). Plato is obscure with regard to women (ib. 570), and as to 
slaves less generous than Xenophon, who has a deeper conception of the 
idea of the family. Cf. Strumpel, PraJctische PMlosopkie der Griechen, 505. — 
According to Isocr. iv. 50, it was the desert of Athens, that the name of Hel- 
lenes was /unjKeri tow ye'vov? aAA& ttjs Scavoios. Rauchenstein ad Isocr. 12. — 
Mithridates, 6 'PooojSaTov ('OpovTo/SaTov), Diog. Laert. iii. 25. Unfortunately 
no details are known concerning the author of the dedicatory gift; but it 
after all remains probable that Mithridates was a contemporary of Plato 
and of Silanion (Whom Pliny dates 01. cxiii. but who must have been at 
work before that time ; cf. Brunn, i. 394), and that personal relations existed 
between him and Plato. Vaillant, Ach. imp. 14. introduces him as Mithri- 
dates IV. and identifies him with the friend of Cyrus (Anab. ii. 5, 35 ■ iii. 3 
1) and with the satrap of Lycaonia (ib. vii. 8, 25). 

Chap - il 3 The Policy of Athens. 219 

Cyrus, and the fame of Euagoras prove, what an attrac- 
tion monarchy possessed for the Greeks of this age. In 
speaking of Euagoras, Isocrates declares monarchical sway 
to be the highest of all possessions among gods and men, 
and all the art of rhetors and of poets to be inadequate to 
a worthy celebration of the true ruler. The same Iso- 
crates in his political orations and epistles addresses him- 
self mainly to princely personages, to Archidamus, to 
Dionysius, to Philip, to Timotheus the son and successor 
of the Tyrant Clearchus, and others. All this shows how 
strong a tendency existed in these times, to expect salva- 
tion for states not from popular assemblies and proposals 
of laws, but from a thorough vigor of action on the part 
of individual men. 

This tendency of the age, which presents Platomc 
itself to us with great distinctness in the politics, 
rhetors, as well as in the historical writers Theopompus 
and Xenophon, in the case of the philosophers appears as 
a dogma developed with perfect clearness. It is true that 
the philosophers of the Academy likewise occupy them- 
selves with the regulation of republican constitutions, and 
several pupils of Plato are mentioned, who were active as 
legislators, e. g. Menedemus at Pyrrha, Phormion in Elis, 
Aristonymus in Arcadia, and Eudoxus in Cnidus ; but 
these legislations, which have their origin in philosophical 
reflection, after all only prove how utterly their authors 
and the age had lost confidence in the independent vitality 
of the civic communities ; nor was Plato himself ever able 
to recognize the freely active spirit of a community of 
citizens as the foundation on which the true State might 
be built up. For of the idea of the state, which his mind 
pictured to itself, none but philosophically trained men 
could attain to a full consciousness ; according to his 
view, it could not be realized otherwise than through a 
man of eminence, who by the absolute force of his will 
controlled the whole, repressed the impulses of selfishness, 

220 History of Greece. [ BoOK vn - 

and as with the hand of an artist moulded a harmonious 

But, notwithstanding the clearness and inner consis- 
tency of these views as to the essential nature of the State, 
their application to existing circumstances was infinitely 
difficult ; and yet the Platonic school was unwilling to re- 
nounce it ; they wished to be practical politicians as well 
as philosophers, and in this endeavor involved themselves 
in the most contradictory results. For from their moral 
stand-point they were, in full accordance with the popular 
feeling, obliged to disapprove of whatever was accom- 
plished in the State by means of force ; while on the other 
hand the actual realization of their political system de- 
manded a form of government which could not be estab- 
lished without the perpetration of the most serious wrongs. 
Plato describes Tyrannical government as the most abomi- 
nable of all constitutions, and yet he is able to enter into 
the closest relations with the Tyrant Dionysius ; indeed, 
there existed Tyrants, who could boast themselves the 
pupils of Plato, such as especially the Clearchus mentioned 
above, who for twelve years (b. c. 363 — 352) held sway 
at Heraclea on the Pontus, as a model of Tyrannical 
guile and falseness, but at the same time also as a friend 
and patron of science. On the other hand, however, the 
two assassins of Clearchus, Chion and Leonides, are like- 
wise pupils of the Academy, as are the brothers Python 
and Heraclides, the murderers of Cotys (p. 110) ; they 
believed themselves to be acting in the spirit of their 
master, when they risked their life for the removal of foes 
of freedom. Now, although it would be extremely unjust to 
hold Plato and his philosophy accountable for the actions 
of individual members of the Platonic school, yet so much 
is evident : that it was impossible to derive from the 
teachings of the Academy a fixed position in the political 
questions of the age, or a safe standard for the estimation 
of persons and affairs. Is not this most clearly to be seen 

chap, il] The Policy of Athens. 221 

in the instance of Plato himself? When the younger Di- 
onysius, a prince endowed with abilities of great promise, 
had begun his rule at Syracuse and summoned Plato to 
his court (p. 192), Plato had expected from him the ac- 
complishment of the lofty task of philosophically mould- 
ing a state, but after for a brief time indulging in hopes, 
had seen himself most completely deceived. And yet the 
idea of establishing a philosopher's state at Syracuse was 
not abandoned. But the same prince, on whom the Pla- 
tonic school had counted, was now their worst foe. The 
undertaking of Dion, of which the object was the over- 
throw of Dionysius (b. c. 357), was a joint act of the 
Academy, whose association we see on this occasion ap- 
pearing as a political power. All these efforts, however, 
remained without result ; the ideal politics of Plato were 
indeed capable of inspiring enthusiasm in the minds of 
men, but unfit to furnish them with a fixed stand-point in 
the struggles of the present, and still less able to cure its 

The more that the philosophers themselves Philosophy 
became convinced of this fact, the more they |^ te the 
retired in deep vexation of spirit from public 
life ; they had lost all sympathy with the State as it ex- 
isted. They renounced all endeavors at influencing the 
multitude, and a broad gulf formed itself between them 
and the people. This division was a misfortune for the 
State. For while formerly the best forces had at the 
same time also been those which were the most effective 
in the civic community, and while even those who were 
thoroughly dissatisfied with the ruling party, yet with pa- 
triotic self-denial contributed their share of service to the 
commonwealth, — as e. g. Nicias did, — we now find the 
most gifted men averting themselves from it ; the State is 

* Platonic legislators : Hermann, Plato, 74. — Clearchus and his assassins : 
Egger, Etudes d'histoire et de morale sur le meurlre politique, 1866, p. 19. — Euphrseui 
and Platonic politics in Sicily : Bernays, Dial, des Aristotehs, 21. 

222 History of Greece. t B °°* vu 

to them a matter of indifference, of ridicule, and of 
offence. In proportion as their spirit is lofty and their 
judgment clear, they regard the existing condition of 
things with hopelessness. They despise the petty state- 
dom of Greece, in which the interests of the meanest sel- 
fishness are the determining element, and deride a com- 
monwealth, in which the chance of the beans determines 
who is to govern. Nor, again, is any interest left for the 
past of Athens. Plato condemns all, even the most glori- 
ous, statesmen of his native city ; he regards its acquisi- 
tion of the supremacy on the sea as its great misfortune, 
and in merely pronouncing the word ' democracy,' he as- 
sumes that all reasonable men will agree in condemning 
it. Now, inasmuch as from their point of view the 
Sophists likewise labored to undermine the authority of 
the institutions of the State, by setting up the individual 
as judge over them, and regarding all laws as arbitrary 
ordinances which owe their origin to compromise or force, 
— the two tendencies of the age which differed most from 
one another, Socratic philosophy and Sophistry, coincided 
in this point : that both undermined the feeling of devo- 
tion to the existing constitution and shook at its base the 
firm strength of the ancient civic State, resting as it did 
on the agreement between its laws and the sentiments of 
all its members. 

In this age we find only a few men in 

Severance ° J 

of the spheres Athens, who, like Timotheus, e. a., sought to 

of life. ' ' i» i t t . • i 

combine the performance of public duties with 
philosophical culture. In general the different circles 
came to exist apart, and the vital resources which still 
survived in the commonwealth separated from one another. 
The wise man avoids contact with civil business, as if it 
were a pollution, and intellectual interests have been re- 
moved into quite another field. Accordingly it seems a 
matter of course, that the conduct of public business should 
be left in the hands of men of a subordinate kind, selfish 

Chap, il] ^Ae Policy of Athens. <1 ( 1Z 

persons who lead the people by encouraging its foibles and 
flattering its thoughtless indolence. Meanwhile, the great 
mass of the Athenians believe it possible to preserve liber- 
ty and prosperity without exertions ; while apparently 
standing still, they fail to observe that they are retrogres- 
sing, although the feeling for civic honor and civic duty is 
growing duller and duller. They had shamefully aban- 
doned the last remnant of maritime dominion ; they had 
not even bestowed serious thoughts upon the security of 
their own city itself, and refused to see the dangers, for 
the aversion of which sacrifices were required. On the 
one side a wealthy intellectual life, floating in ideal eleva- 
tion, from the stand-point of which the Attic civic State 
was regarded as a thing without value ; on the other an 
indolent existence, swayed by selfishness, lazily sunk in 
obedience to daily habit, and unwilling to allow its com- 
fortable ease to be disturbed by any exertion. It was thus 
that the Athens of Eubulus drifted on, like a ship without 
a helmsman, with the current of the age. 

And now a foe had appeared, more danger- The 
ous than any with whom Athens had had to \ e ,? tion of 

J Athens. 

deal when at the height of her power, a great 
State of growing strength and of inexhaustible resources, a 
State which, securely directed by the foresight of a saga- 
cious mind, took advantage of every opportunity, by sea 
as well as by land, for mastering one after the other of 
the petty States of Greece, and which was lying in wait 
for the Athenians above all the rest. If, then, the city 
was not to drift into his grasp as a defenceless prey, and 
to perish dishonorably, there was need of an Athenian 
who refused to despair of his native city, although he 
thoroughly perceived its weak points, who united in him- 
self to high intellectual force and an idealizing spirit, a 
devoted patriotism, and who ventured to undertake the 
task of once more gathering all the forces of good which 
remained, of arousing the sense of honor which had been 

224 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

extinguished, and of bringing to pass a regeneration of the 
Attic commonwealth, so that it should once more take the 
field at the head of the Hellenes on behalf of the noblest 
possessions of the nation. Such a nan was Demosthenes ; 
and with him there begins once more a history of Athens* 



In the period when Pericles was extending the Attic 
dominion in the Pontus (vol. ii. p. 534), one of the remo- 
test points reached by it was Nymphseum, a port of the 

* Concerning the age of Demosthenes we possess a greater abundance of 
materials than for any other section of Greek history ; but no history of it 
has been handed down to us. Even in antiquity Demosthenes found no 
narrator of his public activity worthy of him ; and out of the works con- 
cerning the period of Philip (Theopompus, Philoehorus, lib. vi., Duris) there 
are left to us only meagre fragments, or tradition reaching us at second or 
third hand (Diodorus, Justin). Plutarch is of importance when he men- 
tions his sources ; in the same way Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose 
principal work on Demosthenes is unfortunately lost : of all those who have 
judged Demosthenes, he displays the greatest insight. The biographers 
are uncritical. We are therefore without a connected history ; instead of 
this, the age stands before us like a drama, in which we see historical per- 
sonages acting with all the clearness of living individualities. We find 
ourselves personally placed between the two parties. Herein lies the 
extraordinary charm of the Demosthenic age ; hereon, too, is based the 
difference in the conceptions formed of it; for it depends on the personal 
attitude which we assume towards Demosthenes, upon the moral impres- 
sion made upon us by his speeches, upon the truthfulness with which we 
credit him. All the attempts which have been made to whitewash 
JEschines (cf. Francke on Stechow devita JEsch. in Neue Jahrb. fur Philol., xii.) 
or to prove the representation of his character in Demosthenes to be a 
caricature due to political hatred (Spengel, Demosth. Vertheidigung des Ktesiphon, 
Munich, 1863), as it appears to me, by their want of success merely furnish 
a testimony in favor of Demosthenes. Equally unsatisfactory are the at- 
tempts to tack in a midway-course between Demosthenes andiEschines (cf. 
Frohberger on O. Haupt Leben des Demosth. in Neue Jahrb. fur Philol. 18G2, p. 
614). Without denying the character of a democratic party-orator to belong 
to Demosthenes, we shall yet be justified in regarding his speeches as 
genuine sources of history, if we believe in the truthfulness and honesty 
of his mind. In this respect I have from full conviction followed the view 
which was asserted by Niebuhr. Since his time science has labored un- 
wearyingly to bring order into the history of this age. I merely mention 
the labors of F. Ranke, Boeckh, Winiewski, Droysen, Bohneke, Vomel, 
Funkh'lnel, the critical and exegetical labors on the Orators of Sauppe, 
Westermann, Franke, Rehdantz and others, and the narratives of Thirl- 

10* 225 

226 History of Greece. t BoOK vu > 

Taurian peninsula, situate to the south of Panticapseum, 

on the Cimmerian Bosporus, which leads from the Pontus 

t, into the Palus Mseotis. These distant mem- 


thenes, the k ers f ^he Confederation were placed in a dif- 

son of De- * 

bo rn henes ' fi cu ^t position after the Sicilian calamity, inas- 

? 1,c qm;1 much as what had hitherto been their pro- 

His tecting power was no longer able to take care 

parentage. ° x - ° 

of them. There accordingly remained no course 
open to them but that of arriving at an understanding with 
their neighbors on their own account, and of attaching them- 
selves to these after such a fashion as to leave their commer- 
cial relations with Athens unhurt and secured. Pantica- 
pseum was the centre of the Bosporan empire, which was 
at that time at the height of prosperity under the Sparto- 
cidse (p. 137) ; it was upon friendly intercourse with them 
that the community of Nymphseum had to depend ; and 
an Athenian of the name of Gylon was one of those who 
negotiated the conclusion of an intimate union. Although 
he had hereby in no sense done damage to the interests 
of his native city, yet his proceedings were regarded with 
disfavor at Athens, so that an indictment was preferred 
against him, and he was sentenced to a fine. In conse- 
quence he repaired anew to the Pontus, where he met with 
a most honorable reception at the hands of the princes 
there. A place near Phanagoria, Cepi by name, was be- 
stowed upon him as a gift, and he married a native woman. 
From this marriage sprang two daughters, who, beiog 
possessed of a considerable dowry, came to Athens and 
wedded Attic citizens. The one of them married Demo- 

wall and Grote. The results of all these labors, manifoldly advanced by 
his own research, are combined in the work of Arnold Sch'afer, Demosthenes 
und seine Zeit (1856-S), the treasure-house of all that we know of the Phil- 
ippic age, to which, as a matter of course, my narrative too owes far more 
than it is possible to indicate by citations. Since the appearance of this 
work, the historical materials have not been increased to any important ex- 
tent; but I have endeavored to turn to the fullest possible account the gain 
which is to be obtained from the new Scholia to JSschines, from inscrip 
tions, and from coins. 

chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 227 

chares of the deme Leuconoe ; the other, Cleobule by 
name, became the wife of a manufacturer and merchant 
of position, Demosthenes of the deme Panama, who main- 
tained an establishment of two large workshops, in which 
arms, cutlery, and furniture were produced. This De- 
mosthenes and Cleobule were the parents of the orator, 
who was born at Athens three or four years after the 
peace of Antalcidas. 

These relations of parentage were, at a later date, when 
Demosthenes the son directed the politics of Athens, made 
use of by his adversaries, in order to represent him as an 
intruder, devoid of any claim to interfere in the affairs of 
the city, inasmuch as he was not even a genuine Hellene, 
but a foreigner and a semi-barbarian. His grandfather 
on the mother's side was declared to have forfeited his 
rights as a citizen by treason, his grandmother to be a 
Scythian woman, and indeed to belong to the Nomad 
race of that people. Doubtless this is an invidious con- 
ception misrepresenting the facts of the case. Before his 
death Gylon had paid the debt which he owed to his na- 
tive city, nor could any one of the opponents of Demos- 
thenes prove the existence of any obligation resting upon 
Gylon's family, or impugn on satisfactory grounds the 
rights of inheritance of his descendants. With regard on 
the other hand to the defect of descent, it is by no means 
unlikely that there was more of reason in this objection. 
For in the colonies on the Black Sea manifold family-con- 
nexions were formed between Hellenes and Scythians, 
(vol. i. p. 492). Had not even a chieftain of the Scy- 
thians, Scylles, the contemporary of Sitalces, born as the 
son of an Ionic mother, been educated in the Greek lan- 
guage and writing, and become an enthusiastic adherent of 
Greek manners and customs, even receiving the civic fran- 
chise of Olbia, where he had a Greek housewife ? 

It is true that he was overthrown by his brother, the 
son of the daughter of Teres (p. 14), the leader of the na- 

228 History of Greece. [BweVii. 

tional party ; but his story shows, how the influence of the 
Greek coast-towns had penetrated even into the very heart 
of the Scythian nation. Doubtless, therefore, the nation- 
alities had become blended far more fully in the coast- 
towns themselves, especially since the Thracians, whose re- 
lations were most intimate both with the Scythians and 
with the Hellenes, promoted this amalgamation. In gen- 
eral, intercourse with the peoples of the north was much 
less repugnant to the Hellenes, than e. g. with Phoenicians, 
Babylonians, and Egyptians ; indeed they were rather in 
a sense attracted to the former ; and if we call to mind 
the Athenians who were blood-relations of Thracian 
families, such as Cimon, Thucydides the historian, the 
philosopher Antisthenes (perhaps Themistocles also 
should be included in the list), we cannot avoid the obser- 
vation, that it was precisely men of great mark who 
sprang from mixed marriages of this description. 
Menestheus too, the son of Hippocrates by the Thracian 
princess and the son-in-law of Timotheus, caused a sen- 
sation in Athens by his early and peculiarly vigorous and 
manly development ; and when he was asked about his 
parents, he was wont to say he owed far more thanks to 
his mother than to his father ; for that while the latter 
had done his utmost to make him a Thracian, she had 
done her best to make him a Hellene. Now since the 
growing exhaustion of the Attic civic communities, as we 
have good grounds for assuming, connects itself with the 
fact that the majority of marriages were concluded among 
the sons and daughters of family-circles akin to one 
another, it seems extremely natural, that connexions 
formed with members of other nations should have con- 
tributed to invigorate the Greek families both physically 
and mentally, and especially, in the period of the gradual 
decrease of national energy, to call into life powers, such 
as were becoming more and more rare in purely Hellenic 
houses. Thus it may perhaps be also conjectured with 

chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 229 

reference to Demosthenes, that the extraordinary power 
of tension characteristic of his mind is connected with the 
circumstance, that some of the blood of the northern peo* 
pies flowed in his veins. 

But however this may have been, we may H is child- 
assume with certainty, that the foreign con- hood - 
nexions of his family furnished to him an impulse of 
great significance. His mother, whose birth-place was on 
the Pontus, could not but at a very early date lead the 
spirit of the boy beyond the circle of the walls of his na- 
tive city, while his father stood before his eyes as the im- 
age of an efficient and worthy citizen, of the type which 
had still survived in the better spheres of the civic popula- 
tion. He was capable of conducting an extensive business 
with circumspection and with a vigorous hand, was loyally 
devoted to the commonwealth, and deemed it his highest 
honor to fulfil with the utmost conscientiousness all his 
duties as a citizen. There was no lack either of means for 
education or of good-will and rational direction ; and 
thus Demosthenes, who grew up at home with a younger 
sister, was doubtless a boy exceptionally favored and for- 

But this good fortune was of brief endurance. When 

* As to the maternal descent of Demosthenes: ^sch. iii. 171, a passage 
doubtless based upon facts. That the Scythians were Mongols is convin- 
cingly disputed by Miillenhoff in the Monattberichte der Berlin. Akadem., 1866, 
p. 549. — Menestheus: Rehdantz, Iphicr. 235 f. With respect to the mingling 
of blood in the Attic families, it is worth pointing out that, according to 
Bernays (Dial, des Aristot. 134), Aristotle too was a half-Greek. (This will 
probably also explain many a peculiarity of diction in him.) — Demosthenes 
comes of age in the summer of 366, towards the end of 01. ciii. 2, or the 
beginning of 01. ciii. 3. The period of guardianship closes in the tenth 
year ; it begins 01. ci. 1, b. c. 376 ; Demosthenes was then seven years of ago ; 
hence he was born about 01. xcix. 1, b.c. 383. This calculation, which is 
based upon the chronology of the guardianship and upon Vit. X. Orat. 845, is 
contradicted by the incidental statement in the speech in Mid. 564, accord- 
ing to which Demosthenes was in the autumn of 349 b. c. thirty-two years of 
age ; which would make the year of his birth 381 (Dion, ad Amm. i. 4) or 382. 
Schafer assumes 32 to be a clerical error for 34. The year is not to be fixed 
with perfect certainty, but it is preferable to follow the former of these 
two calculations- 

230 History of Greece. f Bo °* vil 

Demosthenes was seven years of age, his father fell sick 
and died. He left indeed a house in good order behind 
Th _ him; there remained a property of at least 
dianship. fourteen talents (£3,400 circ.), invested in his 
01. ci. 3— ciii. own business and in other concerns, the inter- 

3 ( b. c. 376- t ' 

3G6). est of which was far more than sufficient to 

support his widow and children. Moreover, the father 
had most carefully provided for the management of this 
property. The nearest friends of the house had been ap- 
pointed guardians, viz. Therippides, and the nephews of 
the testator, Aphobus and Demophon, all of them well-to- 
do men, to whom he had moreover providently left special 
legacies on account of their trouble ; finally he had also en- 
deavored to make his two above-named nephews so thor- 
oughly members of his family by means of marriage-en- 
gagements, that according to his presumption they would 
care for it as for their own. 

But never has the last will of a faithful father of a 
family been more vilely contemned. For the friends of the 
house proved themselves its worst foes ; all the advantages 
which the will offered to them they greedily appropriated, 
without fulfilling the obligations imposed on them by its 
recognition. They paid no attention to any of the pro- 
visions of the testator, neglected and deprived of their value 
the manufactory and business, squandered and invested 
moneys, and instead of their augmenting the property of 
their wards, which an intelligent management might easily 
have doubled, their administration of it was of so uncon- 
scientious a character, that even the capital was for 
the most part lost. The complaints of the mother, the 
representations of honest friends, public opinion, which as- 
serted itself in favor of the orphans — all remained without 
effect; the guardians appealed to the powers conferred 
upon them ; and it was not until after the expiration of 
these powers that they could be called to account. It was 
from this side that the youth, as he grew towards man- 

chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 231 

hood, became acquainted with the world ; the first sensa- 
tions which took hold of his mind were those of indigna- 
tion at faithlessness and treachery ; and while other boys 
were joyously looking forward to the time, when, having 
outgrown domestic discipline, they might enjoy life, he 
was filled by the single idea, that he should like to be a 
man and a strong one, in order to avenge the shame cast 
upon his paternal home, and to chastise the crime com- 
mitted by ruthless selfishness against its children. Al- 
though, then, neither means nor opportunities were want- 
ing for intellectual development, yet the unfortunate con- 
dition of his family affairs entirely marred the joyous- 
ness of his youth. As a rule he remained at home with 
his mother, avoided the sports of boyhood, and entered in- 
to none of those genial connexions between comrades, such 
as were wont to be formed in the palsestrse and among the 
chivalrous exercises of youth ; he was pale and slender, 
and was mocked as a weakling by those of his own age. 
In their eyes he seemed awkward and saturnine ; he was 
incapable of being merry at his ease among them. He 
had in his mind only a single object, upon which he was 
intent with the whole energy of his intellect ; viz. to obtain 
the requisite weapons for the struggle incumbent upon him. 

To the effect of speech he was already no Demo th 
stranger. As a boy he had been present in nesand 

. . , J r Iseeus. 

the judicial chamber, where Callistratus was ~, ... n , 

. . 01. cm. 3 (b. 

subjected to an indictment of life and death on c - 366 )- 
the affair of Oropus (p. 105) ; he was witness of the bit- 
ter wrath of the assembly against the accused, and saw 
how by the power of his eloquence he changed the opinion 
of the jury, and at the close of the proceedings was con- 
ducted home like a victor amidst praise and congratula- 
tions. This experience was for Demosthenes an event of 
enduring effect ; he was resolved to become an orator ; 
and, as soon as he had come of age, applied to Isaeus (p. 
172), the foremost master of Attic law, and the advocate 

232 History of Greece. [BookVU 

of the most successful experience, particularly in questions 
of disputed inheritances. After having doubtless already 
previously been connected with him, Demosthenes now 
claimed his services exclusively for himself, induced him 
to come and live in his own house, and in return for a 
considerable fee (10,000 drachms = £367 circ.) to de- 
vote himself entirely to training him ; so that, although 
Isa3U3 did not in consequence leave off conducting cases 
and writing orations, he gave instruction in oratory to no 
one else. It was a close personal relation into which they 
entered, an intellectual armed alliance, in order with their 
united strength to carry on the contest of vengeance, which 
Demosthenes, like the Heroes of ancient mythology, un- 
dertook against the desolaters of his paternal home. 

opening of ^ n ^ contes ^ was waged in a succession of 
againsuhe stages. The first was the demand of an account, 
guardians. anc [ ^he preferment of a general complaint 
01 ii?7* 1 (B * with reference to the conduct of the guardian- 

c. 3f>4). o 

ship. Next, resort was had to the various 
ways of decision by arbitration ; but the guardians 
avoided all attempts at a compromise, and refused to ac- 
knowledge even the decision of the arbiters appointed by 
the State. There accordingly remained nothing but a 
formal action. In the third year after he had come of 
age, Demosthenes handed in his written accusation to the 
First Archon, whose duty it was to superintend the pre- 
liminaries of questions concerning the guardianship ; and 
in this indictment moved for a penalty of ten talents (£2, 
505) against each of the guardians. The matter was now 
fully set in motion. Demosthenes, who had right on his 
side as well as the most accurate knowledge of the law, 
and who, notwithstanding his youthful age (twenty years), 
possessed all the strength of character of mature man- 
hood, went on unshaken, and there was nothing left for 
his adversaries but to contrive new intrigues. For this 
purpose they took advantage of the institutions existing 

chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 233 

in Athens, the design of which was to avoid undue im- 
positions and injustice in the demands of public services 
from the wealthier citizens (vol. ii. p. 524). When a citi- 
zen considered that an excessive demand had been made 
upon him, and that the service claimed from himself 
ought with more justice to have been asked from some one 
else, he had the right of transferring the service to this 
other person, or of calling upon him for an exchange of 
property, undertaking to defray out of the property of the 
other the service in question, — whether it were the equip- 
ment of a ship or of a chorus. If in such a transaction 
no amicable understanding was arrived at, he who had 
proffered the exchange had the right of sequestrating the 
property of the other, being at the same time obliged to 
hold his own in readiness for the same purpose. Here- 
upon an inventory was made within three days of the 
property of either ; and on the basis of this inventory the 
judicial tribunal finally decided which of the two was 
rightfully called upon to undertake the disputed service. 
This institution, which owed its origin to Solon, was in 
general calculated upon simple and easily intelligible con- 
ditions of property. In later times it became more and 
more difficult, and, instead of affording a protection 
against arbitrary oppression, was not unfrequently used 
as an instrument of malicious intrigue, admirably adapted 
for suddenly disturbing fellow-citizens, whom it was in- 
tended to annoy, in the tranquil possession of their pro- 
perty, and preparing for them the most insufferable vexa- 

Such was also the case in the present F , 
instance. An Attic squadron was to be de- erarehyof 

* Demosthe- 

spatched from the port, and the contributions nes - 
requisite for the purpose had been imposed by oi.civ. 1 
the Board of Generals upon a certain number 
of trierarchs. Among these was Thrasylochus, the son of 
Cephisodorus and the brother of Midias. With him the 

234 History of Greece, t BooK VIL 

guardians entered into an understanding ; in consequence 
of which Thrasylochus, a few days before the judicial term 
at which the indictment concerning the guardianship 
was to be finally decided by sentence, appeared in the 
house of Demosthenes and offered an exchange of proper- 
ties, in case he would not voluntarily undertake the tri- 
erarchy. The intrigue was cunningly enough devised. 
For Demosthenes was either to perform this liturgy — in 
which case he would inevitably complete the ruin of his 
shattered finances ; or, he accepted the exchange. In 
this case his property with all his claims passed into the 
hands of Thrasylochus, who could hereupon, according to 
his agreement, quash the demands made upon the guar- 
dians as well as the entire lawsuit. Demosthenes, whose 
mind was wholly occupied with the suit, saw himself sud- 
denly surprised by these wiles ; at first he failed to see 
through the whole intrigue, and agreed to the exchange of 
property, because he opined that in spite of the transfer 
of his property he would be able to maintain his demands 
and to reserve his right to carry through the suit. But 
no such reservation was permitted to him ; whereupon he 
resolved, in order in no case to allow himself to be de- 
luded out of his suit, to cancel the transaction of exchange 
which had been commenced, and simply to undertake the 
expense of the public service forced upon him. Thrasylo- 
chus had already let it out for twenty minse (£81) to one 
of the speculators, who at Athens made a trade of under- 
taking such public services for others ; Demosthenes paid 
the sum, and had thereby incurred the loss of a consid- 
erable part of his remaining capital.* 

* The difficult passage, Dem. xxviii. 17, seems to me not to hare been 
made perfectly clear even by Boeckh, P. Ec. of Ath., vol. ii. p. 344 [E. Tr.]. 
According to Boeckh and Platner it would be necessary to assume two 
SiaStxao-iat, the one concerning the sum total of the properties of the two 
litigants, and another concerning the demands of Demosthenes and the 
reservation made by him. But it should be remembered that already in 
the former all the assets and liabilities must have been entered into. Twi» 
Xpovutv vnoyvtav ovrutv refers to the despatch of the fleet ; and we must 

Chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 235 

Such struggles and sacrifices were needed, before the 
matter could be as much as brought before the judges ; 
and even then it cost great labor, before the end could be 
reached. The most important documents, Hig g eeche8 
above all his father's will itself, had been as plaintiff, 
made awav with ; and it was no easv matter °J- c ^ v - 1 — 

J ' J CIV. 3 (B.C. 

for Demosthenes to furnish evidence and wit- 363—361). 
nesses, in order to establish the original amount of the 
property. And yet he succeeded in removing all doubt 
as to the guilt of the guardians ; he was able to prove 
with what results the property of other wards had been 
managed in the same period of time, and how he, who 
when entering upon his inheritance had belonged to the 
same property-class as Timotheus, the son of Conon, and 
others subject to the highest rate of taxation, would, had 
his guardians' administration lasted but a few years longer 
have been absolutely reduced to beggary. But not only 
did Demosthenes claim for himself and his sister the com- 
passion of the jury, not only did he seek to excite deep 
indignation at the crime committed against his dying 
father and his house, but he also pointed out how much in 
the public interest depended upon preserving those civic 
properties upon which the State could reckon, when in a 
situation obliging it to claim the performance of more ex- 
tensive services, which his father had invariably under- 
taken with patriotic ardor. 

Aphobus was the first accused. In spite of all the 
forensic tricks resorted to by himself and his associates, he 
was condemned. The other guardians met with the same 
fate, or before the decision consented to a compromise. 
The damage inflicted was, indeed, by no means thus made 
good. The adversaries of Demosthenes contrived by a 

assume that in consequence of the want of time no legal discussion took 
place, but that Thrasylochus was all the same able to force Demosthenes 
into such a position that he undertook the trierarchy. 'An-oKAeieiv probably 
only signifies the closing of a house before the beginning of 6tafii<ca<ria on 
an exchange of properties. 

236 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

variety of new tricks to escape from their obligations ; 
fresh vexatious law-suits were requisite, in order to fo r ce 
them to give up pieces of land which they kept back with 
perverse obstinacy ; and in the end Demosthenes was 
obliged to acquiesce in the loss of the greater part of his 
paternal inheritance. But in truth, from the first his 
main object had been, not the money, but to bring about 
the expiation of the wrong, the unmasking of the 
treachery, and the restoration of the honor of his house. 
In this point his victory was complete ; towards this end 
he had worked for years with indefatigable zeal, while he 
almost seems to have taken too little trouble to turn his 
victory to the fullest account. Although therefore com- 
passion may be felt for the young man, in that he was 
forced to occupy six of the fairest years of life with these 
vexatious quarrels, yet it is certain that he could have 
gone through no better school for steeling his inner 
strength and acquiring an inflexible force of will. It 
should be considered what was at that time the condition 
of things at Athens. It was a quite uncommon occurrence 
for a men to insist purely upon his rights and to advance 
unswervingly towards his object. The usage was to pur- 
sue none but crooked paths, and to settle everything by 
means of compromises, secret contrivances, and mutual 
concessions ; disputed cases were ordinarily brought to an 
issue from any point of view except that of simple justice. 
This explains the unheard-of audacity of the guardians ; 
and only thus is it possible to recognize the lofty spirit of 
Demosthenes, in whose eyes the struggle was a matter of 
conscience, to which he inflexibly adhered, a contest of 
honor, in which he fearlessly exposed himself to personal 
attacks even on the part of his nearest relatives. In the 
midst of these perils the youth rapidly matured into a 
man. At an unusually early period of life he became 
acquainted with the world from its worst side ; but this 
failed to embitter, and still more failed to discourage him. 

Chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 237 

Environed by numerous and crafty enemies, he, a de- 
fenceless youth, learnt to trust in himself and in a good 
cause ; and inasmuch as it in the end after all proved vic- 
torious, he in spite of all these dark experiences yet ac- 
quired confidence in the sound and honest spirit which 
lived in the better part of the civic community, — a confi- 
dence which never afterwards deserted him. 

At the same time he had been obliged in „. 

& His na- 

this contest immediately to apply such know- tural s ifts - 
ledge and skill as he had acquired by his studies in 
the department of the advocate's art ; he had thus con- 
verted these acquirements into independent possessions of 
his own, and could now enter the arena of life as a fully- 
equipped man. At the same time he was supported by 
his inborn gifts ; for he naturally possessed a keen under- 
standing, a lively and easily-moved mind, and an abun- 
dance of ideas which developed themselves out of a grand 
conception of life. But he still lacked much towards be- 
ing a perfect orator, and, in order to supply these defects, 
it was still necessary for him to give arduous proofs of his 
strength of will. 

Demosthenes, in accordance with his char- „ ,. 


acter, was too prone to consider everything to of*" 8 char * 

r . jo acter. 

depend upon the merits of a cause, and to 
trust to its justice, so long as it was lightly treated. Giv- 
ing way to this tendency, he neglected himself in externals 
which were frequently decisive in the eyes of the Attic 
public ; and in such matters he had been least able to 
learn anything from Isseus, who himself never came for- 
ward in public. Moreover, the young man, who after a 
life of retirement by his mother's side had immediately 
plunged into the most laborious studies, notwithstanding 
the firmness of his spirit, after all lacked proper assurance 
and that becoming ease of manner which is the fruit of in- 
tercourse with society ; there clung to him a certain shy- 
ness and clumsiness, which contrasted very strongly with 

238 History of Greece. [BookVil 

the effrontery of ordinary orators. He was also deficient 

. in physical strength. His organs of speech by 

ing and de- no means corresponded to the deep movements 

velopment m x 1 * 

as an ora- f hi s mmd, and the pathos of his eloquence 
became ridiculous when his voice failed him. 
His pronunciation wanted purity, his mouth was disad- 
vantageous^ formed, and his bearing was timid and awk- 
ward. In his heart he was firm and decided, for he was 
conscious of a lofty power, which he felt it his duty to 
turn to the best account on behalf of his fellow-citizens 
and his mission stood with immovable fixity before him ; 
he regarded liberty of speech as still the noblest possession 
of the Athenians, and their openness to the power of 
spoken words seemed to him their best quality. But he 
had to go through the severest struggles, in experiencing a 
succession of humiliations, while seeing shallow babblers 
without trouble reap a full harvest of applause, and in 
again and again coming to doubt, whether insignificant 
circumstances would not prevent him from ever reaching 
the goal for which he was striving with the exertion of all 
his strength. At the same time he was a solitary man, a 
stranger to his fellow-citizens, and obliged to rely entirely 
upon himself. 

Fortunately, some few men were found to encourage 
him when he lost heart, and to revive him by good 
counsel. Eunomus of Thria is said to have been the first 
to recognize in him a Periclean force of eloquence ; others, 
such as the actor Satyrus, in a friendly spirit pointed out 
to him the weak points in his delivery. Thus, in spite of 
all humiliations and failures, he ever again returned to 
his task and continued to labor at his self-development. He 
strengthened his chest and voice, by talking aloud while 
ascending steep declivities ; he set himself, however greatly 
it jarred upon his natural inclinations, to learn from the 
artists of the stage, in order to acquire a dignified bearing 
of body, an appropriate play of features, a correct accen- 

chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 239 

tuation and distribution of the breath ; and the numerous 
anecdotes, to which already at an early date currency was 
given, in order to deride him as an eccentric pedant, who 
allowed himself no rest at night, and who forced himself 
to the utmost seclusion, so as to live entirely for his 
studies, at all events prove that the iron strength of will 
with which Demosthenes pursued his end, created aston- 
ishment among his fellow-citizens. They regarded him as 
a man made of quite different stuff from the other folk 
who in the times of Eubulus filled the market-place of 

As to the character of his speeches, he re- His rela _ 

vealed the master to whom he had at so early tions fco th \ e 

f present, 

an age and under circumstances of such inti- 
macy attached himself. The nervous simplicity of expres- 
sion, the keen conduct of an argument, the brief queries 
which interrupt and animate a speech, — these and other 
peculiarities he had acquired from his teacher ; indeed, in 
the orations concerning the guardianship we find Demos- 
thenes verbally reproducing certain turns and even pass- 
ages of greater length from Isseus, which is explained by 
the circumstance that in the course of his training he had 
got by heart orations of his master's. 

But he was not merely a pupil of Isseus. It will be re- 
membered that from Callistratus too, and doubtless not 
only by a single hearing, he had received an impression 
for life. So ardent a spirit as his could not remain un- 
touched by the performances of the oratory of the times ; 
indeed, if he was desirous of controlling the minds of his 
contemporaries, it was indispensable for him to familiarize 
himself with all the intellectual currents of the age. Ac- 
cordingly he is likewise stated not to have left unnoticed 
the orations of the Sophists, e. g. those of Polycrates (p. 
150). But most especially, a significance could not but 
attach for him to the efforts of Isocrates, inasmuch as the 
latter was not only the most celebrated rhetor of his age, 

240 History of Greece. [BookVil 

but also the centre of an influential circle, which had a 
very decided political tendency of its own. At the same 
time, however, there prevailed between Isocrates and De- 
mosthenes as deep a contrast as it would be possible to 
conceive of between two contemporary orators. The one 
timidly retreated from the public gaze, and only felt at 
his ease when surrounded by friends and pupils who ad- 
miringly looked up to him ; the other boldly faced every 
peril, and courted the struggle in which he might stake 
his life in the cause of his conviction. Demosthenes was 
able to acknowledge the masterly skill in Isocrates, and 
zealously followed him in the neat elaboration, rhythmical 
grouping and rounding-off of his sentences. But what in 
the eyes of the rhetorical artist was the main thing, with 
Demosthenes subordinated itself to higher considerations ; 
the cold smoothness of the Isocratic periods could not ac- 
cord with his fiery spirit ; and however finely his ear was 
trained, yet he could not consent to bind himself down to 
external laws of euphony (p. 179), such as had been es- 
tablished in the school of the rhetor ; at all events in his 
forensic speeches he was not painfully anxious to avoid 
the hiatus* Moreover, already on the occasion of the first 
contest which Demosthenes had to wage, Isocrates was on 
the enemy's side ; for he was the tutor of Aphobus' 
brother-in-law Onetor, of whom he expressly boasts as his 

The other circle, which at that time was an intellectual 
power at Athens, was that of the followers of Plato. To- 
wards them, too, Demosthenes stood in an attitude of di- 
rect opposition ; for he could not but be averse from any 
philosophy which estranged man from his civic duties, and 
removed him from the sphere of practical efficiency into 
the realms of ideas. He was therefore more attracted to- 
wards the Megaric school, because its members prepared 

* The hiatus in Demosthenes: Sch&fer, iii. 2 , 317. Of very rare occurrence 
only in the speeches on affairs of State. 

Chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 241 

the mind by dialectical exercises for the task of public 
life ; and Eubulides (p. 151), with whom he felt connected 
in political tendencies also, is mentioned among the men 
who advanced Demosthenes in his development. At the 
same time neither can the labors of Plato have passed him 
by without leaving their traces. Plato's Socratic dia- 
logues could not fail to make the most animating impres- 
sion upon all who devoted themselves to acquiring an ar~ 
tistic command over the language, or to stimulate them to 
follow with ardor in the same direction. And in the in- 
nermost tendency of mind there undeniably likewise ex- 
isted a deep connection, in spite of the great contrast, be- 
tween these two Athenians. For both possessed an invin- 
cible faith in the moral forces in the life of man ; both 
made it the task of their life to assert these, and not in the 
individual only, but in the whole community ; but the one 
desired by means of the divine ideas to create a new State- 
commonwealth, while the other wished to elevate the ex- 
isting State to the height at which it might correspond to 
the idea of a true civic State. 

Demosthenes, however, not only drew men. j***i.. 

' ' J and to the 

tal nourishment from that which was offered P ast - 
by the present, but also possessed himself of that which 
was great and typical in preceding ages ; nor could a pa- 
triotic Athenian have done otherwise. He reverentially 
contemplated the monuments of art, the dedicatory gifts, 
the statues of citizens of desert, the documents in stone, the 
memorials of victory, which, he declared, were set up, not 
in order to be idly gazed upon, but in order to stimulate 
to imitation of their authors. He closely studied the 
ideas of Solon, in whose sayings and laws he found the 
moral mission of the Attic state most perfectly expressed : 
he drew strength from recalling the great past of his na- 
tive city, and already for this reason loved Thucydides 
more than any other author; to him he felt inwardly 
akin ; the work of Thucydides was to him, so to speak, 

242 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

the canonical book of the Attic spirit ; he is said to have 
copied it out eight times with his own hand, and to have 
known the greater part of it by heart. 

Thus the intellectual being of Demosthenes is rooted in 
the best elements which native tradition had to offer ; and 
by appropriating these to itself in a life-like way, his 
mind, in which there was by nature a want of elasticity 
and receptivity, became flexible and many-sided ; he thus 
gradually acquired for himself the full facility of motion 
belonging to the Attic character. Hence the variety of 
expression, in which he surpasses all his predecessors, the 
difference of manner, according as he treats of public or 
private affairs, and the abundance of changes of style in 
his orations. In them we find the sharpness and severity 
of the old style, the sententious brevity, such as from the 
lips of a Pericles mightily moved the minds of men, and 
such as still finds an echo in Thucydides ; but Demosthe- 
nes' form of expression never lacks transparency or ease ; 
on the contrary, where it suits the subject, he passes into 
the light flow of the eloquence of Lysias. But he is every- 
where more full of vigor than the latter, he always 
marches in his panoply, equipped with the ready logic of 
the Megaric school. He has the dignity and sonorousness 
of Isocrates, but at the same time an infinitely greater va- 
riety of movement ; he is fresh, warm and dramatically 
animated like Plato, but, as befits an orator, more measured 
and severe. Thus in full truth the eloquence of Demos- 
thenes is sustained and nourished by the rich culture of 
his native city ; it is the acme and perfection of all that 
had preceded him, while at the same time he had by no 
means forfeited his peculiar characteristics. For his tal- 
„. . . ents, it must be remembered, had not easily 

His ongi- » . 

naiity. an( } lightly developed themselves by following 

the prevailing tendencies of the age ; on the contrary, he 
was opposed to all the tendencies of the present, to rheto- 
ric, to sophistry and philosophy, and similarly to the 

Ohap. hi.] Athens and King Philip. 243 

great world and to the political sentiments which domina- 
ted over the citizens in the times of Eubulus. It was in 
solitary struggles that he labored and strove to form him- 
self, and it was thus that he impressed upon his develop- 
ment the perfect stamp of his own individuality. The 
weight of the seriousness of his life is impressed upon his 
eloquence ; hence his aversion from all phrase-making 
and from rhetorical verbiage. His style is short and con- 
densed ; he adheres strictly to the subject, seeking to seize 
it in the most thorough way possible from every side, and 
to cut off by anticipation all possible objections. With 
this mastery over the dialectical art are combined a force 
of moral conviction and a passionate hatred of all that is 
base, an inflexible courage and a fervent love for his na- 
tive city, so that thus the art of the orator becomes the ex- 
pression of the entire man. In him, character and elo- 
quence, word and deed, were one ; and after he had de- 
veloped the rich gifts bestowed upon him by nature, with 
the fidelity and persistency which are the tokens of true 
genius, after he had possessed himself of all the impulses 
to be derived from rhetoric, from philosophy and from 
dramatic art, he finally bestowed the supreme consecra- 
tion upon his art, by allowing no vanity or selfishness to 
beset it, so that, sustained by the nobility of a pure spirit, 
it became the organ of a mind filled with enthusiasm for 
the loftiest ends.* 

That which Demosthenes had acquired by Demos- 

solitary study as well as by intercourse with an e advo^ 3 
remarkable men, was brought to perfection by cate - 
the tasks of practical life. His art was first applied by 
him as an advocate. It was in this capacity that he de- 
rived most benefit from the schooling through which he 
had passed under Isseus, above all from the thorough 

* Dionysius, n-epi rrjs Ach-ti^t}? A. fieii/drrjTos, on Demosthenes as the 
orator who united all previous stages and species. Cf. Blass. Griech. Br 
redtsamkeit, 1865, p. 180. 

244 History of Greece. [Bookvii 

knowledge of civic law which he had acquired. It is true 
that the profession adopted by him enjoyed no very high 
repute among the Athenians, although in general they by 
no means took rigorous views of morality ; the word 
" logographos" (writer of forensic speeches) was now em- 
ployed as a term of abuse, because in no kind of business 
was more dishonesty wont to occur than in this ; and thus 
the activity of Demosthenes himself as an advocate was 
in every way taken advantage of by his enemies, in order 
to impugn his good name and to cast suspicions upon his 
character.* There is, however, no reason for assuming 
Demosthenes to have trodden this slippery path otherwise 
than with the most absolute regard for honor. For as- 
suredly no one will blame him for having availed himself 
of his labors in this field, in order to regulate his shattered 
fortune, to provide for his mother and sister, and to found 
a domestic establishment for himself. He rather proved 
himself an Athenian of the ancient stamp by the very fact 
that he w T as a good economist at home; and the same 
demand he necessarily made upon every citizen for the 
sake of the commonwealth. He was convinced that the 
welfare of the State rested upon the well-to-do civic fami- 
lies ; it was in them that he found patriotic sentiments 
surviving ; and for this reason he, as a member of the 
upper class of citizens, was animated by a proud self-con- 
sciousness as towards all adventurers and dubious upstarts. 
At the same time he sufficiently proved by his whole 
course of conduct, that it was not his own comfort which 
he had in view, when decently providing for an augmen- 
tation of his property, but the honor of his house and the 
advantage of the State. It amounted to a triumph for 
him, that already in 01. cv. 2 (b. c. 359) he could under- 
take a trierarchy by virtue of his own property, and on 

* AoYoypdtyo?, ap. PI. Phcedr. 257 (from Archinus according to Sauppe) 
Dem. xix. 246. 

Chap. III.] Athens and King Philip. 245 

this occasion prove himself to be, like his father, a man 
who did more than his mere duty.* 

The lawsuits, in which he supported with his counsel 
and his art fellow-citizens in difficulties, introduced him to 
greater intimacy with all conditions of society. He had 
opportunities of becoming acquainted with the forces of 
party-feeling and love of lucre which were destroying the 
peace of the community ; he observed how the difference 
between rich and poor was becoming more and more 
broadly marked ; the wealthy citizens erected mansions 
which surpassed the public edifices in beauty, and bought 
up lands of great extent, while the poorer classes fell into 
relations of dependency, and lost all inclination for hus- 
bandry and for activity on their own account. These 
social evils were closely connected with the political state 
of things ; for while, as the apathy of the multitude grew, 
the members of a party joined hands and took possession 
of the conduct of public affairs, they turned to every pos- 
sible account the advantages of their position, became 
wealthy and arrogant, and abused their power. Accord- 
ingly, neither was Demosthenes able to derive lasting 
satisfaction from his practice as an advocate. His spirit 
demanded a wider sphere of action ; it behooved him to 
penetrate to the bottom of the evils of public life, and freely 
to oppose himself to the abuses of the administration.")" 

The first opportunity presented itself to him, g eeoh of 
when in the summer of 01. cvi. 1 (b. c. 356) Demosthenes 

v ' against An- 

Androtion brought forward a motion, to honor drotion. 
the Council which was quitting office with a crown. The 
orator Androtion (p. 186) was one of the partisans of Aris- 
tophon, who formed a close group of persons regarding 
public affairs as their private domain, glorying before the 
people in their business life as statesmen, proposing motions 

* Trierarchy under Cephisodotus, cf. p. 104, Note. 

t Rich and poor: Dem. xiii. 30; cf. Freese. i>arteikampf der Beichen uni 
Armen, 75. 

246 History of Greece. [Book va 

upon motions, contriving to escape from the rendering of any 
account, and in many ways abusing the influence which 
they thus acquired to the damage of the State. Androtion's 
motion on the present occasion was not of much significance; 
but the object of the opposition offered to it was to let it be 
seen that the men at the helm of affairs were not at liberty 
to manage everything according to their liking, and that 
there still existed citizens who paid vigilant attention to 
the laws of the State. Now, the motion proposed to the 
civic assembly was out of order, because it had not been 
preceded by a decree of the. Council, and because the 
Council had by no means acted up to its obligations, more 
especially with reference to the fleet (vol. ii. p. 243), to such 
a degree as to be lawfully entitled to the honor proposed 
Accordingly, Euctemon and Diodorus came forward 
against Androtion, and Demosthenes composed for Diodo- 
rus the speech, in which the illegality of the motion was 
demonstrated. He disregarded the fact, that the accusers 
had been irritated by personal acts of hostility on the part 
of Androtion; he had nothing but the State in view, and 
in the public interest seized upon this opportunity, so as to 
bring to light the unconscientious intrigues which the 
mover, trusting in his powerful connexions, permitted to 

and Before this year was at an end (01. cvi. 2 ; 

Leptines. B# c> 355-4) Demosthenes came forward in a 

01. cvi. 2 y ' 

(b. c. 354). second case, and this time in his own person. 
The object was to resist the financial law, proposed in 
the preceding year by Leptines, a well-known popular 
orator, — one of the many laws designed to open new re- 
sources for the exhausted public exchequer, without in- 
conveniencing the citizens. Leptines had pursued the 
course of proposing that all relief from public services for 
the state-festivals should be abolished; with the solitary 

* Androtion : (cf. Note to p. 186) Sch&fer, i. 31G, seq. 

chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 247 

exception of the honorary rights conferred upon the 
descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton, all favors of 
this description were to cease, and no privileges of the 
kind were in future to be granted, either to citizens or to 
resident aliens. 

The law had been urged on with great haste, and had 
been adopted without the constitutional formalities being 
observed ; it was a popular law, because it promised in a 
genuinely democratic spirit to remove unjust inequalities, 
to diminish the civic burdens, and to assure the splen- 
dor of the public festivals ; accordingly Leptines had 
succeeded in fortunately escaping the first attacks during 
the year in which he was as mover responsible for his law. 
But in the following year Apsephion and Ctesippus, the 
son of Chabrias, came forward against the law of Leptines, 
and proposed an amended draft of an act, the contents of 
which designed to subject one and all of the privileges 
conferred by the State to a careful control, to abolish those 
which were without a legal foundation, or which had been 
procured by unworthy proceedings, and for the future to 
prevent all abuses. Ctesippus had Demosthenes for his 
champion, who with victorious eloquence proved the ob- 
jectionable character of the law of Leptines. It was 
virtually quite useless to the State ; and its very dubious 
advantages stood in no proportion to the damage which 
the State must suffer by the loss of honor and confidence 
which it would incur by offending and disgracing its bene- 
factors. Athens ought never to be false to her ancient 
principle, of joyfully honoring and liberally rewarding 
all desert.* 

* The motion of Leptines was dealt with unconstitutionally : Dem. xx. 
94 (probably it was immediately brought before the civic assembly). The 
death of Bathippus and the withdrawal of his associates put an end to the 
first indictment; hence the second indictment, 7rp6s \iTrrivi\v. The follow- 
ing were the actual terms of the law of Leptines, according to Funkh'lnel, 
N. Jahrb. 1866, p. 559: 07ru>? av ot TrAoucritoTaroi Aeirovpywo-i, fir)Seva areAij ctfcu 
fiTjTe tuiv itoAitwi/ /AJjre Ttav iaoreAtoi/ ju.rJTe twi> £evu>v ir\r)v toiv a<$>' 'Ap/uoSiov K<u 
"Apta-ToyeiToi'O? p.r)Se to Aotnw efeifcu. But cf. Sauppe, Philol. XXV. 265. 

248 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

The following year brought him once more into conflict 
with Androtion and his associates, whom a law originating 
in their own party had placed in a situation of great em- 
barrassment. Aristophon had proposed the institution 
of an extraordinary commission, whose task it was to be to 
investigate all outstanding demands of the public exche- 
quer, and to find out all its solvent debtors. Of this, 
advantage was taken by the cunning Euctemon, who gave 
information that the vessel in which immediately after 
the close of the Social War Androtion had sailed in the 
company of others as envoy to Maussollus, had on the way 
captured an Egyptian merchantman ; that the latter had 
been condemned as a prize of war ; but that the legal 
duty had never been paid on account of it to the public 
treasury. The facts were found to be as he had stated ; 
and since Androtion and his associates had acknowledged 
their ownership of the prize money, they were forced 
either to pay down immediately the sum, which had in 
the meantime swollen to double the original amount, or to 
submit to arrest as lagging debtors of the State. 

Demos- ^ n ^ nls difficulty they resorted to a desperate 

Smo e crates nSt ex P e dient. They interested Timocrates on their 
01. cvi. 4 behalf, a popular orator of evil repute on ac- 
count of dishonest doings; they contrived in 
the first assej ably of the new year (01. cvi. 4) to induce 
the civic community to summon a legislative commission 
for the next day, the twelfth of Hecatombseon, while, in 
order to make the matter appear extremely urgent and 
important, the rumor was spread, that the question to be 
discussed was the obtaining of pecuniary means, in par- 
ticular for the expenses of the approaching Panathensea. 
But instead of this, Timocrates suddenly came forward 
with a proposition, containing an essential change in the 
existing legislation with regard to the public debtors, to 
whom it was in future to be permitted to free themselves 
from personal arrest up to the end of the year by bringing 

Chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 249 

forward others as securities. The audacious scheme suc- 
ceeded; the law was adopted; and the immediate danger 
threatening Androtion seemed to have been happily 
averted. Euctemon and Diodorus, the unwearying adver- 
saries of Androtion, instead of abandoning their case, 
indicted the mover for illegality; and Demosthenes com- 
posed the speech of accusation for Diodorus. All the 
informalities of the law were laid bare, in particular the 
neglect of the terms of time and of the preliminaries im- 
posed by statute, the false and delusive pretences by which 
the motion had been prefaced, and its conflict with pre- 
vious laws of the State; next was demonstrated the danger 
to the public credit involved in such a law as this, and 
finally it was shown, how this law, which was so utterly 
informal, and fraught with peril for the State, had origi- 
nated by no means in ignorance or want of intelligence, 
but in evil intentions; for evil it was to be called, when 
laws were proposed in order to help bad men out of a diffi- 
culty, and unjust and criminal, when in the case of certain 
public debtors, such as the farmers of duties, the old penal- 
ties were allowed to remain in their full rigor, while in the 
case of others, — and these others men who had fraudu- 
lently retained public moneys, — the legal punishment, and 
thereby at the same time the security of the State, were 
diminished; and when, finally, a retrospective force was 
attached to such laws, in order that they might be imme- 
diately made use of for selfish party-purposes. 

On this occasion Demosthenes is no longer political 

the pupil of Isseus, the advocate learned in the character of 

r r his forensic 

law and the confidential counsel of individual speeches. 
fellow-citizens; but he comes forward as a 
public personage, as a man who viewed his duties as a citi- 
zen of the State in a serious spirit, such as had long since 
fallen out of use at Athens. In the Attic free common- 
wealth it was in truth the mission of every citizen, to exer- 
cise a control over public life, and to see, so far as in him 


250 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

lay, that no unwarrantable act was allowed to go without 
its punishment. This end was served by the indictment 
for illegality ; and it was this which Demosthenes took 
into his hands like a sharp sword, in order to wield it 
without consideration of persons against every enemy of 
the Right. At the same time he had in view not the letter 
of the laws, but their spirit, which had been impressed 
upon them by the wisdom of bygone generations. Con- 
ceived of in the sense of these, the laws were to be held in 
honor, because with them the good name of the city was 
indissolubly connected ; they were to be defended as the 
most sacred jewel of the State against all arbitrary per- 
versions and misrepresentations. For this reason we find 
Demosthenes contending with inflexible wrath against 
those venal creatures, who, like Timocrates, delude the 
people by making laws on behalf of their own friends ; he 
tears the mask off those men who by reason of their busy 
officiousness wish to be accounted patriots of merit, and 
who force an entrance into all the commissions ; he refuses 
to permit impure hands, like those of Androtion, to con- 
cern themselves with the affairs of the community.* 

Thus, then, Demosthenes, starting from domestic and 
personal matters, had entered into wider and wider spheres 
of activity, first as an advocate in private suits, then as a 
legal counsel in matters of public business, and even in 
the latter capacity at first only writing speeches for others, 
but afterwards taking the full responsibility by appearing 
in his own person. Simultaneously he steadily advanced 
his activity to higher and higher points of view, since all 
personal relations at the bottom of questions in dispute 
fell into the back-ground, so soon as Demosthenes took 
these questions in hand. It was herein that he so essen- 
tially distinguished himself from the orators who had pre- 

* Timocrates already on a previous occasion assisted Androtion in a 
commission for the levying of an outstanding property-tax : Boeckh, Publ 
Se. of Ath. vol. i. p. 212 [Eng. Tr.]. 

i?hap. m.j Athens and King Philip. 251 

ceded him, who like him combated the abuses and the 
slackness prevalent among the Athenians, as did the fiery 
Aristophon, but who always had the particular case only 
in view. Thus, e. g., after the mishap at Peparethus (p. 
107) all the trierarchs who had caused their services to be 
performed by substitutes, were, as if they alone had caused 
the calamity, indicted by Aristophon with unmeasured ire 
as traitors, a charge on life and death being preferred 
against them. Demosthenes everywhere had the whole in 
view ; he invariably penetrated to the root of the evil ; he 
knew how to elevate every question concerning a point of 
legislation in the domain of the laws of debt, of privileges, 
&c, to the height of one involving the vital interests of 
civil society, and to give to it an ethico-political signifi- 
cance. Thus, then, he had already with his forensic 
entered the sphere of public speeches ; and a year after he 
had spoken against Leptines, he now also for the first 
time succeeded in obtaining a hearing as a popular orator. 
Herewith begins his participation in the direction of the 
community and of its public affairs.* 

Athens stood in greater need than ever of a The .... 
leader. When summoned once more by the situation. 
death of Epaminondas, which occurred about the time of 
Demosthenes' lawsuits against his guardians, to play a 
more important part in Greece, she had shown herself in- 
capable of responding to the call. During the whole 
period in which Aristophon was the leader of the citizens 
(p. 109 seq.) the power of the State had retrogressed. 
After an inglorious feud, Athens had concluded the most 
shameful of pacifications, and had at the same time lost 
her best generals (p. 121). Eubulus assumed the leader- 
ship among the citizens ; but this failed to secure to them 
a firm guidance ; there existed among them no man emi- 
nent above the rest by his character, no regularly disci- 
plined party, openly and honestly pursuing a definite line 

* Aristophon after the discomfiture at Peparethus : [Dem.] li. 8. 

252 History of Greece. [Book vn. 

of policy. The Athenians lived on thoughtlessly, or 
swayed in their conduct by changing phases of feeling, 
although the situation of affairs was an extremely serious^ 
one. The Phocian War threatened to extend its limits 
further and further; Philip was since the conquest of 
Amphipolis actually at war with Athens (p. 139) ; Maus- 
sollus was spreading out his dominion over the islands, and 
in his rear there rose menacingly the Persian empire, 
which since the accession to the throne of the third Arta- 
xerxes, called Ochus (01. civ. 2, b. c. 362), sought to re- 
cover its ancient position of power in the Mediterranean. 
Ochus was an enterprising prince, surrounded by energetic 
generals and Greek mercenary troops ; the support which 
his satraps who had revolted against him had received 
from Athens (p. 120) had aroused in him the utmost 
wrath ; and, although in consequence of his threats the 
Athenians had abased themselves so deeply, yet the feel- 
ing of ill-will continued even after the termination of the 
Social War. In the interior of the empire extensive arma- 
ments were in progress ; and when the tidings of these 
reached Athens, the civic community became extremely 
excited ; they could not resist the belief that a new Per- 
sian War was in prospect ; and utter discouragement was 
suddenly succeeded by a warlike phase of public feeling, 
which was eagerly fostered by the orators. Many of them 
seized the welcome opportunity for indulging in the fa- 
vorite reminiscences of Marathon and Salamis ; the me- 
naces of the barbarians, it was declared, could only serve 
to restore the ancient glory of the city ; the attacks of the 
Great King ought to be anticipated ; and the citizens 
already dreamt of heading the Hellenes in expeditions 
leading to new victories on the Eurymedon.* 

* Artaxerxes Ochus (who once more restored with ruthiess energy the 
authority of the Achaemenidae, Plutarch, Artax. xxvi. 30; Diod. xvii. 5) from 
01. cv. 2 ; b. c. 359. It was in his interest that already Maussollus had been, 
actire against Athens. Cf. Schafer, i. 413. 

Chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip, 253 

Demosthenes must have confessed to him- Demog . 
self, that there could be no more thankless ^Sthe 
task for his first oration on affairs of State, Persian War. 
than that of confronting this patriotic enthu- ^^^ 
siasm with the opposition of sober caution. But 
such a man as he was not watching for opportunities fa- 
vorable to him, in order to make a public appearance of 
especial brilliancy or admitting of easily gained applause ; 
he simply followed his sense of duty, which bade him in the 
face of a dangerous excitement raise the voice of warning. 

Undoubtedly, he told the citizens, Persia was the here- 
ditary foe of the Hellenes ; but whosoever the adversary 
might be, it was unreasonable to enter into hostilities with 
any power, without having made sufficient preparations 
for them. Laudation of our forefathers was an admirable 
subject for orators desirous of displaying their art ; but 
for the civic community it was assuredly more salutary, 
if one even less gifted with eloquence showed forth the 
conditions under which alone a contest could be waged 
leading to glory, such as former generations had achieved. 
" If," he continued, " we commence a war against Persia 
without just cause, the consequence will be that we shall 
stand alone, while the Persians find allies among the Hel- 
lenes. The only rational course is this : to irritate no one, 
but on the other hand to prepare ourselves for war with 
all possible ardor. When hereafter the hour of danger 
arrives for us, the remaining Hellenes will follow us, the 
well armed, as those who have a mission to fight in the 
van. This, then, is the task of the true orator of State : 
to show forth the means, whereby Athens can advance her 
military strength, in order once more to assume a position 
worthy of her forefathers." 

But what was the actual condition of the condition 
military strength of Athens, and in particular JjJtfcnav 
of her navy, upon which everything depended, 
inasmuch as by sea alone she was still capable of effecting 

254 History of Greece. [BookVil 

anything ? The ancient institutions, which had once made 
Athens powerful by sea, still existed ; the law of Periander 
(p. 119) had transformed them in accordance with the 
times ; but these changes were from no point of view suf- 
ficient. The navy was no longer a power ready to strike 
a blow when called upon ; Athens had become an unwar- 
like city ; and on every occasion when the civic assembly 
had decreed the despatch of a naval squadron, a confused 
hurrying to and fro commenced in city and harbor, during 
which the most precious time was lost. First the Board 
of Generals had to provide for the levy of the crews and 
for the appointment of the trierarchs ; eventually also for 
the imposition of a war-tax. Next, it was the business of 
the ten dock superintendents to distribute ships and ships' 
furniture among the trierarchs ; whereupon again another 
commission of ten came into play, whose duty it was to- 
gether with the Council to superintend the despatch of 
the fleet. The Council itself held its sittings on the harbor 
mole; final terms of time were fixed, penalties threatened, 
prizes offered. But it would not answer to take very se- 
rious measures as to the punishments, because the carrying 
out of these only threatened still further to impede the 
armament; and the golden wreaths merely led to vexatious 
lawsuits. Indeed, even with regard to the obligation of 
individuals to undertake trierarchies, with regard to pro- 
posed exchanges of property (p. 223), and other such like 
matters, further suits were carried on, which occasioned 
frequent judicial sittings under the presidency of the Ge- 
nerals ; and it was found, that of the citizens under obliga- 
tions of public services more than one-third contrived to 
escape from their duties. Of those, on the other hand, 
who fulfilled them, the majority merely provided for taking 
the matter as easily as possible ; and many of them en- 
tered into contracts with substitutes, who undertook in 
their stead the personal service and the equipment of the 
vessel ; and these substitutes again had no other interest 

chap, in.] Alliens mid King Philip. 255 

except that of making a profitable transaction out of the 
contract, and of course did as little as they could for the 
State. The ships' furniture offered by the State was fre- 
quently so old and bad, that it seemed more advantageous 
to take one's own. The crews, rapidly brought together 
at the moment, were not to be depended upon, hard to 
keep in order, and unfit for acting in unison ; it was ac- 
cordingly necessary to give them a preliminary drilling. 
Moreover, the crews of the individual ships so frequently 
fell short of the right numbers, that it was impossible pro- 
perly to fill the rowers' benches. Under these circum- 
stances the trierarchs, if their intentions were honest, could 
not but be placed in the most painful of situations ; they 
were obliged to make the greatest sacrifices, if their ships 
were only to some extent to meet the demands made upon 
them. The rest had sufficient excuse for their defective 
equipment, while the authorities were forced everywhere 
to proceed considerately ; and it may be easily conceived, 
what was the general character of the ships of war, which in 
the end were passed as fit for sea by the inspecting officers.* 
Such a condition of things could not fail to Reforms 

fill Demosthenes with shame and indignation. by r Demos- 
He therefore took advantage of the very first thenes. 
opportunity, to indicate the defective points in the organ- 
ization for war purposes, and to propose changes intended 
to bring about a more equitable distribution of the public 
burdens. He in the first instance demanded, that a larger 
number of citizens, 2,000 in all, should be included in the 
lists of those liable, in order that after all those had been 
subtracted who could on any grounds claim exemption, 
at least 1,200 might be reckoned upon as being more than 
mere names on the lists. The twenty symmories or taxing 
associations were to be left standing, but each of these was 
again to be divided into five sections, in which citizens of 

* As to the condition of the Attic navy: Kirchhoff, "Rede vom trierarch. 
Kranze" in Abhandl. ckr Preusa, Afoul, der Wissenach., 1865. 

256 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

different property classes were to be grouped together. 
These sections, the expenses being equitably distributed 
among the members of each, were to undertake to provide 
for three ships of war ; so that the result was a normal to- 
tal of 300 vessels. Secondly, the pecuniary resources of 
the country were to be organized in a corresponding way, 
in order that there might be a certainty of regularly se- 
curing the additions which necessarily had to be made to 
the disbursements of the trierarchs, for defraying the pay 
and food of the crews and other expenses. Accordingly, 
the sum total of property -tax collected out of the paying 
capital of the citizens (p. 91), which was reckoned in all 
at 6,000 talents (1,465,500£), was not in the first instance 
to flow into the public treasury, but was to be at once di- 
vided into one hundred parts, so that each section should 
receive and expend its quota of the tax. Furthermore, 
the entire materials of the Attic naval power, the existing 
establishment of hulks, ships, and ships' furniture, was to 
be divided according to the new symmories, so that these 
were themselves to have the right and duty of controlling 
it, and a title for demanding all the State property, which 
might happen to have remained in the hands of negligent 
trierarchs. Finally, with regard to the crews, who were 
levied out of the ten tribes of the civic community, to each 
tribe were to be assigned by lot thirty ship-sheds lying near 
together ; for which it was under the superintendence of 
the public authorities to furnish the requisite number of 
men. Indeed, the group of thirty ship-sheds, as well as 
the whole body of the tribesmen, were again divided by 
three ; so that to each third of a tribe were assigned ten 
vessels as its particular sphere of duty.* 

* The 6,000 talents are the capital subject to taxation of all the citizens 
liable to it (Boeckh, Publ Ec. of Ath., vol. ii. p. 292 [E. Tr.]); but the property 
of the people itself amounted to far more than five times that sum (cf. ant&, 
p. 91), without counting in the state-property which was exempt from taxa- 
tion (Boeckh, vol. i. p. 252). It is not clear on what principle Euripides' 
estimate of 20,000 talents (vol. iv. p. 297) was based. 

chap, iii.j Athens and King Philip. 257 

The practicability and expediency of these Speech 
reforms may be open to some doubt; and concerning 

J * ' thesymmo- 

there was perhaps reason for objecting to them ries. 

as a scheme elaborated with excessive artifi- 01. cvf. 3 (b. 

c. 3M). 

ciality. But the points of view from which 
they were devised were undoubtedly those of a truly high- 
minded statesmanship, and the means for their achieve- 
ment thoroughly corresponded to the spirit of the Attic 
constitution. Demosthenes desired to stay the abuse 
which the rich made of their social position, to cause the 
citizens to participate in larger numbers and in a higher 
degree in the equipment of the vessels, as well as to pro- 
vide for the whole matter becoming more perspicuous and 
more definitely regulated. At the same time he followed 
the existing institutions as closely as possible, and was far 
removed from an impatient craving for innovation. 

For the rest, the proposals of Demosthenes were by no 
means intended immediately to acquire the force of law ; 
they were merely to open the eyes of the citizens to the 
real points at issue, if the glory of former ages was to be 
revived, as their orators punished them ; and it at all 
events amounted to a very important success, that Demos- 
thenes not only completely achieved his main object by 
recalling the Athenians to calm reflection from their dan- 
gerous dreams of possibilities, but also upon the whole 
made an evidently favorable impression upon the assem- 
bly. He had come before it for the first time, without 
followers, without powerful friends, without the recommen- 
dation of an attractive personal appearance, with a speech 
bitterly in earnest, which, notwithstanding the reticence 
observed in it, still amounted to a severe rebuke of the 
citizens. That they should notwithstanding have listened 
to him, and have even received with applause the dry ex- 
position of his projects of reform, is only to be explained 
by the fact, that the manly maturity of this youth of nine- 
and-twenty years of age, the unadorned simplicity keeping 

258 History of Greece. [BooxViL 

only the cause itself in view, and the serious labor of 
thought, which were perceptible in the speech, did not 
miss their effect. To these reasons were added the impres- 
sive brevity, which he took over into State-oratory from 
that of the law-courts ; he invariably kept his opponent in 
view, anticipated every possible objection, and contrived to 
establish the truth of his views by proofs from the con- 
vincing force of which it was simply impossible to escape. 
War-and- Thus on this occasion was first formed a re- 

peace-par- lation between Demosthenes and the civic as- 


sembly ; he came to have confidence in himself 
and his fellow-citizens, who knew how to appreciate what 
he offered them ; and he saw his adversaries disarmed not- 
withstanding all the advantages which they had on their 
side. And this was a double gain, inasmuch as not only 
those were in question, who, excited by a sudden outburst 
of enthusiasm, were rushing headlong into war without 
having realized to themselves their own intentions ; there 
doubtless also existed another class, whose political views 
were not determined by so simple-minded a sentimentality, 
and who supported the reckless clamor for war, not only 
because it gave them an opportunity for fine speeches, but 
because it diverted the attention of the Athenians from 
the real dangers of war. They meant to take advantage 
of the warlike enthusiasm fostered by Isocrates and his 
friends, in order to involve Athens in complications of a 
kind which would force her to seek for allies in arms; in 
this case she would also be unable to proceed without the 
help of Macedonia ; and it was to be foreseen, that, if the 
Greek continent should engage in hostilities with Asia, the 
leadership of the former must, sooner or later, fall to the 
lot of that State, which alone had at its disposal a standing 
armed force, and which commanded the Thracian coast- 
towns and mines, With this policy, moreover, all those 
agreed, who, without being adherents of Philip, would not 
hear of their native city playing the part of a Great 

chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 259 

Power, and who had therefore supported Eubulus, when 
he advocated peace at any price (p. 142). It was in this 
strange relation of attitudes that the parties confronted 
one another. Those who demanded war, and who called 
to mind the deeds of Cimon, were at bottom the men of 
peace, the enemies of the democracy, and the representa- 
tives of a policy befitting a petty city, while in the peace- 
oration of Demosthenes was concealed a bristling declara- 
tion of war. A tone of delicate irony pervades the 
speech ; it destroys the fictitious clamor for war, and indi- 
cates the real enemy ; it admonishes the citizens to be 
calm, and calls for the most serious armaments ; it lays 
bare all the weak points of the city, because in a clear 
perception of these lies the only way to make it strong and 
great again. Thus this earliest of Demosthenes' orations 
of State contains the fundamental ideas of his subsequent 
political activity, and was therefore already by ancient 
critics called his first Philippic.*' 

The Athenians had no cause to repent of having obeyed 
the sober voice of Demosthenes ; they soon convinced them- 
selves what insanity it would have been for them to have 
lightly thrown themselves into the midst of dangers of war 
abroad. The clamor for war in Asia soon died away, while 
the real enemy was approaching into a more and more 
menacing closeness, and while his newly created navy was 
already showing itself on the coasts of Attica. S parta's 
Simultaneously the war spread further and ^esSraifion 
further from Phocis ; and the Spartans, full of 
malignant pleasure in the troubles of Thebes, took advan- 

* Inasmuch as since the beginning of the quarrel concerning Amphi- 
polis partisans of Macedonia were beyond doubt already at work in Athens, 
they doubtless bore a hand in adding fuel to the clamor for war; for no- 
thing could have better suited Philip than that a Persian War should have 
actually been brought to pass, in which he would then simply have had to 
intervene. Accordingly, Dionysius, liket. viiL 7, calls the oration nepl 
o-u/x/Aopiwi', the First Philippic. There can be no doubt as to the meaning of $ 
11 : n tov? bfioXoyovvTa? i\0povt fx OVTe< > «Tepovv fijTou/iev, &c. 

260 History of Greece. t Bo0 * VI1 

tage of the conjecture, in order if possible to overthrow 
everything which had been done to their advantage in the 
times of Epaminondas. They allied themselves with the 
Phocians, for the purpose of restoring Platsese, Orchome- 
nus, and Thespiae, and at the same time intended to destroy 
in Peloponnesus whatsoever owed its origin to the fatal day 
of Leuctra. The Spartans had a martial king in Archi- 
damus (p. 174), their military force was ever lying in 
wait, and threatened from its ambush to invade, now this, 
now the other, land on their borders, while their menaced 
neighbors, Argos, Messene, and Megalopolis, lacked all 
external aid, and found themselves in the most perilous 
position. They turned to Athens ; and the question now 
was, whether Athens would come forward in the place 
of Thebes in the peninsula, or whether she would adhere 
to the Spartan alliance. 

Athens in ^ n * s <l ues tion first confronted Athens with 
league with reference to Messene; and in this case the civic 

Messene. ' 

assembly decided to enter into an alliance with 
the Messenians, whereby their territory and their inde- 
pendence should be guaranteed to them against any hostile 
attack. The Spartans in consequence abstained from a 
serious attack, but turned against Megalopolis, in order to 
dissolve this city, as they had done in the case of Manti- 
nea (vol. iv. p. 322). Considering the division existing in 
Arcadia, and the aversion from a united settlement which 
still continued to prevail in many of the former rural 
communities (vol. iv. p. 444), they thought that favorable 
prospects were in this quarter open to them. They set to 
work craftily, and announced a universal policy of restora- 
tion, in order by means of this programme to secure the 
good will of all who had suffered losses on the occasion 
of the late changes. The encroachments of Thebes were, 
they declared, to be regarded as an interruption by force 
of the state of things existing according to law; at the 
present time the Boeotian country-towns were to be re- 

Chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 261 

stored; to the Eleans the prospect was held out of the 
recovery of Triphylia (vol. iv. p. 493) ; the Phliasians were 
promised the evacuation by Argos of the castle of Trica- 
ranum situate above Phlius; the Athenians finally were 
made to expect back Oropus, the possession of which was 
still regarded by them as a most grievous loss (p. 104)« 
For themselves, on the other hand, the Spartans at present 
claimed nothing, except that they should be allowed 
liberty of action with regard to Megalopolis, so that the 
primitive condition of things might be once more restored 
in Arcadia. Thus the Spartans with crafty policy came 
forward in favor of the ancient institutions of public law, 
in order in this way to regain their position at the head 
of the states of the peninsula. They sent envoys to the 
several states, and at Athens appealed to the alliance 
which had been in existence between the Athenians and 
themselves since the Peloponnesian campaigns of the 
Thcbans; by this alliance, they declared, Athens had ex- 
pressed their disapproval of the revolutionary measures 
which the campaigns in question had brought about. 

The Megalopolitans were likewise represented at 
Athens ; but their envoys were in a far less advantageous 
position as towards the civic assembly. They had no party 
in the city; they could not, like the Spartans, appeal to 
an alliance, or make promises like theirs. They could only 
remind the Athenians, that, if the Spartans were to suc- 
ceed in carrying out their intentions, a greater danger for 
Athens would also immediately arise ; they expressed their 
confidence in the magnanimity of the city, which would 
surely protect the weaker side, and hoped that Athens 
would not reject the alliance offered to her. 

Both embassies found advocates among the oration for 
popular orators. The one side inveighed against Megalopolis. 
Thebes as the arch-foe of the city, the other (JJ* C ^ 2 ). 
against Sparta; and all the injuries which the 
one or the other State had at any time inflicted upon the 

262 History of Greece. tBooKvrt 

Athenians were recalled to the memory of the citizens, as 
if the sole object had been to inflame their passions. At 
such a moment Demosthenes could not hold his peace ; for 
he saw how precisely those considerations were neglected, 
which were alone entitled to determine the decision of the 
community. "All ancient grievances," he tells the citi- 
zens, "are put before you; but what is demanded in the 
present case by the interests of the city is stated by no man. 
And yet it is clear and manifest. For every Athenian 
must desire that neither Sparta nor Thebes should be too 
powerful. At the present moment Thebes lies low, and 
Sparta is anxious again to extend her power nor is Mega- 
lopolis alone in question, but Messene at the same time. 
But if Messene is in danger, we are bound to furnish 
succor ; and this being so, it is surely better for us to inter- 
vene now than at a later time. It is not we who are 
changing sides; but Sparta, by commencing war, forces us 
to determine our attitude accordingly. The order of things 
at present existing is the actually recognized one ; what 
will follow, if nothing is ever allowed to remain without 
being called in question ? A logically consequent policy 
consists, not in always remaining on the same side, but in 
immutably following the same principles. Now, it is the 
principle of Athens, ever to give aid to those who are un- 
justly exposed to pressure, and to secure confidence by 
opposing all encroachments of lust of dominion, from 
whatsoever quarter they may proceed. But if we intend 
to purchase back Oropus, which is dangled as a bait before 
our eyes, by allowing the peninsula to fall back under the 
dominion of Sparta, at the very best the gain is out of pro- 
portion to the price demanded for it. If, on the other 
hand, we accord our protection to the confederates of 
Thebes, we have a right to demand that they shall per- 
manently adhere to us. If, then, the Thebans issue 
victoriously from their present troubles, they will at all 
events have been weakened in Peloponnesus t if they sue- 

Chap, iii.] Athens and King Philip. 263 

cumb, at least the states in the peninsula founded by them 
will have been rendered secure, and will continue to serve 
to restrain Sparta's lust of dominion. Thus the best pro- 
vision will have been made under all circumstances for the 
interests of Athens." 

In these recommendations we already find a clear ex- 
pression of the Hellenic policy of Demosthenes. Athen3 
is once more to step into the foreground, and to gather 
states around her, but, instead of by force or prematurely 
endeavoring to re-establish the former conditions of things, 
she is cautiously to take advantage of every opportunity, 
in order by means of a vigorous protection of the lesser 
states to secure grateful good-will and trustful allies. 
How could any one oppose a well-founded protest to the 
clear and simple policy of Demosthenes? And yet he 
failed to determine the civic assembly to arrive at resolu- 
tions corresponding to a just perception of the situation. 
The Athenians had too much accustomed themselves to 
live on carelessly from day to day, and to abstain from 
taking thought of what apparently lay in the distance. 
They allowed the Spartans to continue their hostilities un- 
disturbed against Megalopolis; and the disadvantageous 
results suggested by Demosthenes would have come to 
pass in full measure, had not the Phocian War suddenly 
taken a new turn, and thereby also given a quite different 
development to Peloponnesian affairs. The overthrow of 
Onomarchus (p. 79), before the year was out, The Thebans 

restored freedom of action to the Thebans; in Pelopon- 

and, with an energy which survived in them 

. . m Ohcvii. 1 (b. 

as a reminiscence of the days of Epami- c. 351). 
nondas, they entered Peloponnesus, united there with their 
confederates, and forced the Spartans to conclude a 

* Athens and Messene: Paus. iv. 28; Dem. xvi. 9.— Oration for the Me- 
galopolitans: Schafer, i. 465. Last incursion of the Thebans into Pelopon- 
nesus : ib. 470 ; ii. 162. 

264 History of Greece. [BookVii. 

The affairs ^ U ^ ^ rom ^ e overt brOW of OuomarcllUS 

of Thrace, sprang consequences of a yet more important 
character. For it must be remembered that this was the 
first occasion on which Macedonian arms had decided a 
Hellenic war, and determined the mutual relations of the 
Hellenic states. Philip was master of Thessaly, and had 
Thermopylae. He was, however, by no means minded to 
wait here in inaction, until an opportunity should offer 
for a further advance. He left the affairs of Thessaly to 
his civil and military officers, and himself hastened to the 
Thracian coast, where he was not less dangerous to the 
Athenians than at Thermopylae (p. 82). On the Thracian 
coast the Athenians had after protracted disputes and ne- 
gotiations with Cersobleptes at last achieved so much as 
this : that the important peninsula on the Hellespont, the 
Chersonnesus, was acknowledged to be their property (p. 
113). After their losses in the Social War, it was of all 
the more serious importance for the Athenians to make 
sure the remnant of their possessions ; and in the Thracian 
sea their supremacy as yet prevailed more than anywhere 
else. Here they held as their property the islands of 
Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. Thasos was allied with 
them, as were Tenedos and Proconnesos; and at the 
southern boundary of the Thracian sea, Sciathos, together 
with the groups of islands in its vicinity. Here, there- 
fore, their dominion still possessed a certain cohesiveness; 
here they had numerous harbors for their naval squad- 
rons, which kept a watchful eye upon the Thracian penin- 
sula. And yet the state of affairs in these regions re- 
mained very insecure ; and so soon as Cersobleptes was 
left free to act as he chose, he persistently pursued the 
one object of extending his dominion at the expense of the 
other two chieftains, Amadocus and Berisades. 

This condition of things precisely suited Philip for es- 
tablishing, by means of a crafty intervention in its internal 
disputes, a firm footing in the Thracian coast-land ; which 

chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 265 

was indispensable to him for his dominion by land and 
sea. He had made his first appearance here in 01. cvii. 1, 
B. c. 353, when accompanying his friend Pammenes 
(p. 48) on the occasion of the expedition of the latter into 
Asia (p. 77). At that time he had taken Abdera and Maro- 
nea, and had appeared on the border of the Thracian 
principalities, where he was vigorously resisted by Ama- 
docus, while Cersobleptes entered into negotiations with him. 

This expedition was merely a first reconnaissance; it 
passed by without any serious danger; indeed, Chares suc- 
ceeded in routing Macedonian troops on the river Hebrus; 
and although he failed in his attempt to seize upon the 
royal squadron on its return home, yet he took Sestus, the 
place commanding the Hellespont, which the Athenians 
had lost in the Peace of Antalcidas, had recovered in B. c. 
365 through Timotheus, but five years afterwards had once 
more lost to the Thracian princes through the guile of the 
city of Abydus, which was always hostile to them. Chares 
established a colony of citizens there, with the intent 
of securing this important place for Athens, as Lysander 
had formerly designed to do in his own interests (vol. iv. 
p. 167). 

The affairs of Thrace had now acquired an increased 
importance for Athens. The citizens occupied themselves 
more seriously with them than with any other subject 
of foreign policy ; and Demosthenes too, who, as will be 
remembered, might himself half regard the Pontus as his 
original home, and who had borne a personal share as 
trierarch in the expedition to the Hellespont under Cephi- 
sodotus (p. 112), found an opportunity, in the same year 
in which he had spoken on behalf of the application of the 
Megalopolitans, to discuss in public the condition of things 
in Thrace. 

Now, Cersobleptes stood in relations of great cerso- 

intimapy with Charidemus. For the latter had, and P chari- 
in 01. cv. 1 (b. c. 360-59), made a treacherous demus. 

266 History of Greece. C BooK VIL 

attack upon the Athenians who at his summons had come 
to the Chersonnesus under Cephisodotus, had defeated 
them, and forced them to acknowledge Cersobleptes in his 
dominion. The prince accordingly owed the most impor- 
tant success to Charidemus, and had made him his con- 
fidential friend and brother-in-law. Inasmuch, then, as 
Charidemus had since found opportunities of attending to 
the interests of the Athenians in several transactions, he 
was, by virtue of his eminent position, the man of the 
hour, upon whom the greatest hopes were placed, and 
through whose mediation it was hoped that all the wishes 
of Athens with regard to Thracian affairs, even the hope 
of recovering Amphipolis, might still be fulfilled. It 
therefore seemed to be in accordance with a sagacious 
policy to keep this important personage in good-humor, in 
particular as every distinction conferred upon him at the 
same time obliged Cersobleptes. After, therefore, wreaths 
of gold and other honors had already been bestowed upon 
him, Aristocrates proposed to place under a special pro- 
tection the person of Charidemus, whose oft-imperilled life 
ought to be dear above all other things to the Athenians ; 
accordingly, every one who ventured to lift a hand against 
him was to be an outlaw in the whole length and breadth 
of the Attic dominions ; and whosoever, whether an indi- 
vidual or a community, afforded protection to the assassin, 
was to be. ejected from the Confederacy of Athens. 

Against this motion Euthycles raised the 


thenes indictment for illegality. He had been trie- 

tocrates. rarch with Demosthenes in the above-men- 

(b'c^) 1 tioned naval expedition, which had come to so 
unfortunate an issue through the treachery of 
Charidemus; and Demosthenes drew up the speech of ac- 
cusation for him. The orator first exposed the contradic- 
tion between the motion of Aristocrates and the venerable 
ordinances of the primitive Attic law of homicide, and 
likewise that between the present proposal and the spirit 

Cha». iii.j Athens and King Philip. 267 

of the Attic constitution, which refused to allow of privi- 
leges in favor of individuals. And, he went on to observe, 
the particular person upon whom it was intended to bestow 
bo un-republican a boon, this captain of mercenaries and 
erratic partisan, seemed least of all to deserve that the 
community of Athens should go bail for his safety, and 
constitute itself his body-guard. And, in point of fact, 
every distinction conferred upon Charidemus signified 
nothing else than a demonstration in favor of Cersobleptes, 
and was for this reason desired by him. But neither for 
this was there any necessity ; for Cersobleptes was utterly 
and entirely untrustworthy, a prince, who merely used the 
Athenians for his own purposes, who showed himself ready 
to make concessions and to adapt himself to circumstances, 
when the Attic triremes appeared in his vicinity, but who 
at other times was hostile. Thus even at the present 
moment he was with the utmost obstinacy maintainiug 
his hold upon the town of Cardia, on account of its impor- 
tant situation on the peninsula connecting the Cherson- 
nesus with the mainland. If Athens advanced the designs 
of this ambitious prince, she would thereby sacrifice the 
others, who were now the allies of the city, and avert them 
from herself; while the gratitude of the favored Cerso- 
bleptes would not last any longer than the time during 
which he stood in need of the Athenians. 

We are unacquainted with the decision F .. 

arrived at by the court. But it is extremely ^ s .f s in 
probable that the jurymen could not resolve 
upon condemning Aristocrates, because it was not wished 
publicly to offend such men as Cersobleptes and Charide- 
mus. It was too prominent a feature in the character 
of the citizens of those days to give themselves up to care- 
less hopes with reference to particular individuals, and to 
expect everything from these without any exertions on 
their own part. It is, however, certain that the principles 
of Thracian policy recommended by Demosthenes were 

268 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

not adopted, and that the punishment very soon followed. 
For when Philip after his victory over Thessaly appeared 
for the second time in Thrace (p. 82), Amadocus, who had 
taken offence at the preference shown for Cersobleptes, 
and who had no prospects of Athenian protection, instead 
of offering any further resistance, submitted to the king. 
The towns on the Hellespont, on the Propontis, and on the 
Pontus, likewise placed themselves under his protection; 
whereupon he established despots who governed in his 
interest; and the favor accorded to Cersobleptes proved 
entirely useless. For he too submitted ; and, together with 
the schemes of his ambition, the hopes which the Athe- 
nians had attached to his person likewise irrecoverably 
. .. ,. While thus one domain of influence or pro- 

Applieation r 

Rh d d fr ° m P er ty after the other was lost, Demosthenes 
01. cvii. 2 was indefatigably engaged upon securing com- 
pensations for what had been lost, upon making 
good what had been omitted, and upon establishing anew 
advantageous and honorable connexions for his native city. 
Thus in particular with the island-states. Here was felt 
more keenly than anywhere else the absence of the strong 
hand, which of old had withstood all encroachments on 
the part of Asiatic potentates ; here first arose a condition 
of things which abroad too caused the need to be perceived 
of entering into a connexion with Athens. It became too 
clearly manifest how impossible it was for the island-world 
between Asia and Europe to remain neutral. Incapable 
of political independence, the island-states oscillated to and 
fro between oligarchical and democratical parties (p. 141); 
and as on the mainland Philip, so here the Carian dynasts 
interfered, establishing in defiance of law and treaties 
despots, who ruled the islands, and subjected them, in the 

* As to the voyage of Cephisodotns and the death of Cotys, cf. Note to 
p. 104. — Submission of Amadocus: Theopomp. ap. Harpocr. 'A/naSoKos. The 
son of Cersobleptes a hostage at the court of Philip : .SSschin. ii. 81. 

chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 269 

first instance to the influence of Halicarnassus, and in- 
directly to the suzerainty of the Great King. Such wag 
the case in Cos and in Rhodes. The democratical party 
in the islands, notwithstanding, refused to abandon all 
hope ; the death of Maussollus (351 b. c.) encouraged it 
anew, and brought about the despatch of an embassy 
of Rhodians to Athens in quest of support. 

They met with a very cold reception. The lax mood, 
which prevailed in the civic community under the guid« 
ance of Eubulus and his associates, concealed itself under 
the ill-will for which good reasons were thought to exist 
as towards the Rhodians. The Carian mercenaries, who 
occupied their citadel, constituted, it was said, a well- 
merited punishment for their defection from Athens (p. 
117) ; since they had complained of hard treatment from 
Attic hands, let them now learn what the oppression of 
Tyrants actually signified. 

But although this was the universal view, yet Demos- 
thenes courageously opposed it. He blamed it as petty, 
and unworthy of tha Athenians. Instead of rubbing 
their hands in delight at the distress of members of their 
own race, they ought to return thanks to the Gods, that 
distant states were once more sending envoys to Athens, 
and requesting aid from her. The present was not a 
question of persons, but one concerning a great cause. 
Granted that the Rhodians deserved no magnanimous 
treatment, yet their liberty was worthy of protection ; and 
Athens was the natural guardian of liberty. The exam- 
ple of Samos, which Timotheus had re-appropriated to the 
Athenians (p. 104), showed that the enemy, when calmly 
repulsed in illegal enroachments, was not on that account 
ready to declare war. Accordingly, neither was there in 
the present case any immediate reason to apprehend a 
Persian War ; and still less ought fear of a woman, of 
Artemisia, to deter Athens from doing her duty. But the 
treaties, it was urged, prohibited any intervention. Yet 

270 History of Greece. [BookVII. 

these same treaties had been most grossly violated by the 
other side ; if, then, Athens for her part still deemed 
herself bound by them, while the enemies were advancing, 
this was, not conscientiousness, but a cowardice which 
must inevitably bring the State to ruin.* 

The war- Every one of these speeches of Demosthenes 

Demo ° f was a P°liti ca l act - Loftily disdaining all 
thenes. ordinary means of acquiring influence, he 

fearlessly confronted the momentary feeling of the multi- 
tude, as well as the practices of the mighty. He desired 
to be nothing more than the voice of truth; and no 
movement of hostility, no ridicule, no humiliation, not 
even the fact of his exertions remaining without result, 
was capable of diverting him from service. 

It was not, however, a general conviction of the historic 
mission of Athens, which ever and again urged him for- 
ward to the struggle ; but the entire policy lying at the 
root of the speeches discussed above has reference to the 
existing situation, and to definite dangers which menaced 
the community from without and from within. In the 
Archipelago, the Athenians remaining inactive, the an- 
cient bonds were relaxed more and more ; the princes of 
Halicarnassus controlled the Carian Sea, and also held 
Chios occupied, while Lesbos was given up to Persian 
influence. But however humiliating this state of things 
was, yet there was no fear of any danger advancing upon 
Athens from this quarter. On the other hand, Philip 
had mounted the throne in the very year in which Demos- 
thenes was cruising with his vessel in the Thracian waters 
(p. 264) ; and in Philip he from the very outset of his 
public activity recognised the enemy of his native city, 
who would not rest until he had destroyed the remnant of 
its power and independence. Accordingly, the Athenians 

* Death of Maussollus, according to Plin. xxxvi. 30, and 47: Ol. cvii. 2 
/Diodorus, xvi. 36, dates it 01. cvi. 4). His successor Artemisia reigns up to 
B. 0. 349. 

ciiAP. in.] Athens and King Philip. 271 

could not be allowed to escape a struggle for their dearest 
possessions; and just as Themistocles foresaw the War 
with Persia, and Pericles that with Sparta, so Demosthenes 
saw the Philippic War, which was still being carried on 
in remote regions, approaching the walls of the city ; and 
like them he deemed it his duty as a citizen to prepare 
the city for the inevitable conflict. But the peculiar 
difficulty of his task lay in this : that he had not only to 
point out the proper ways of conducting the war and the 
resources by which it could be supported, but also to 
transform the community, and in truth to create the con- 
dition of public feeling which was necessary, if Athens 
was not to perish in shame and dishonor. 

This, then, was the reason why already in his speech 
against Androtion he combated the effete principles of the 
citizens and of their magistrates ; why he attacked the 
rotten financial laws of a Leptines ; why he rose so wrath- 
fully against those who by a fictitious clamor for war di- 
verted public attention from the real dangers ; why he de- 
monstrated the utter insufficiency of the naval institutions, 
and in his speeches for Megalopolis and for Rhodes in- 
sisted upon the necessity of Athens reviving her moral 
authority by means of a national policy : for he perceived 
that the former protegees of Thebes, being abandoned by 
Athens, would fall back upon Macedonia. In the speech 
against Aristocrates the figure of the Macedonian for the 
first time comes forward more clearly out of the back- 
ground ; in it express warnings are already uttered 
against the guile of the king, who had previously been 
merely indicated in general expressions. 

These were the skirmishes preliminary to the great con- 
flict itself. In them Demosthenes took up his public po- 
sition, clearly marked his stand-point, and with not less 
caution than firmness and persistency opposed the domi- 
nant party. But already in the same year in which he 
spoke on behalf of the Rhodians, indeed a few months pre* 

272 History of Greece. L B ^ K v ^ 

viously, he took the Macedonian question itself in hand, 
and made his first Philippic oration proper. 

Th Macedo- Frequently enough this question had 
nian ques- already been among the orders of the day : but 

tion : cur- J ° J ' 

rents of opin- the leading statesmen did their utmost to 

ion and sen- ° 

timent at keep it in the background ; for the influence 
of Eubulus would necessarily be at an end, so 
soon as the citizens should find themselves obliged to 
enter upon an energetic course of policy. It had there- 
fore been agreed among his following, that the serious na- 
ture of the situation should be concealed, and that all ex- 
citing discussions should be avoided. These intentions on 
the part of the statesmen met with a response from all 
careless Athenians, who were unwilling to have their com- 
fortable enjoyment of life disturbed ; and they found most 
zealous supporters in those who, in the interests of Philip, 
encouraged the feeling of security among the citizens. 
Now, already at this time the king was served at Athens 
by men who stood in his pay and kept him informed of 
everything that happened in the city; men devoid of 
character, ambitious upstarts, traitors, who are clearly 
pointed at already in the Rhodian speech. Through their 
agency the party of the Laconizers was likewise gained 
over, being made to believe that Philip was about to hum- 
ble the Thebans, and to carry out the Spartan policy of a 
Restoration (p. 258). To these influences was added that 
of the anti-constitutional tendency, which was so widely 
spread, and which loathed every popular agitation, every 
democratic forward movement. Whosoever agreed with 
Isocrates was full of aversion from those restless folk whc 
were incessantly sounding the alarm-bell and declaring 
the State to be in danger. The men of philosophical cul- 
ture were likewise hostile to every patriotic excitement, — 
not only those who on principle stood apart from all 
public business, but those, too, who served the State, and 
served it with as much distinction as Phocion (vol. iv. p. 

Chap, ill.] Athens and King Philip. 273 

391), the "honest man." He was senior by p hocion 
about twenty years to Demosthenes, — a man 
of the most rigorous conduct of life in the midst of the 
effeminate community, just and efficient as a speaker and 
as a soldier, but never occupied with more than the most 
immediate tasks, lacking all breadth and freedom of view, 
devoid of enthusiasm for the honor of the city and of con- 
fidence in his fellow-citizens, and therefore in spite of his 
personal valor a supporter of the peace-policy and a main 
prop of the party of Eubulus, which preferred Phocion to 
any other man as a member of the Board of Generals, and 
always most warmly favored his re-election. Demosthe- 
nes, therefore, had to contend against a powerful combina- 
tion of the most diverse tendencies. Easy love of enjoy- 
ment, treasonable sentiments, anti-democratic opinions, 
pusillanimity, narrowness of judgment, short-sightedness, 
and force of habit, — all united in supporting Eubulus. 
His policy was deemed that which suited the times, nay, 
that which was alone possible. Who took thought of the 
fact, that this system of government was consuming the 
very marrow of the body politic and that the existence of 
the fatherland was at stake ! This fact Demosthenes was 
the first, and for years the only, man to recognize ; he 
stood as a faithful sentinel upon the watch-tower, and let 
the light of truth shine in with gradually increasing 
brightness upon the sleepy civic community, full of craven 

The sixth year had now already arrived, A ] te . n . 
since the Macedonian War had been com- t[o ^ s . of J^ r 

and mdiffer- 

menced, in order to take vengeance on account ence - 
of Amphipolis (p. 58). From its outset it had dragged 
on like a consuming disease. Athens was continuously 
retreating; and instead of chastising the king in his ter- 
ritory, as had been intended, it was now thought matter 

* Phocion, o xf>i\(TT6<; t Diod. xvii. 15; Plutarch, Phoc. 10: Nepos, Phoc. 1. 


274 History of Greece. [Bookvu 

for congratulation, if the soil of Attica itself was left in 
peace. Had not Macedonian privateers already carried 
off the Sacred Vessel out of the bay of Marathon ?* How- 
ever greatly therefore the orators of the party of Eubulus 
might exert themselves in order to repress or explain away 
any apprehensions among the citizens, yet men's thoughts 
were occupied with Philip ; and after it had long been 
attempted to consider him of small account, the man 
of mystery, the incalculable one, who was always doing 
something new and unexpected, was now exciting a feverish 
anxiety in every breast. In the market-place and in the 
public assembly he was discussed ; and whoever had any- 
thing to tell concerning him, as to where he was, what 
were his designs, what sayings he had uttered, was in the 
eyes of the citizens the bringer of the most important 
news. And if hereupon occasionally a new act of violence 
was announced, a sudden flame of wrath was incidentally 
kindled, and men inveighed against the barbarian king, 
who dared to desire, against the established order of things, 
to rule over Hellenes. Menacing decrees were issued, and 
vigorous resolutions were passed ; but all measures re- 
mained unexecuted, or came too late; and after such 
ebullitions there again supervened an utter discourage- 
ment. The Athenians knew no way of reaching this 
detested foe; they were utterly without any plan to oppose 
to his unwearied energy ; and thus they relapsed into 
stolid indifference, and allowed the inevitable to approach 

Of a sudden, when in the spring of b. c. 351 

The First 

Philippic. the question of the Macedonian War happened 
£"a35ij! once more t° be awaiting discussion in the 
civic assembly, Demosthenes quite unexpect- 
edly came forward, anticipating all those who were gene- 

* Abduction of the Paralus shortly before the delivery of the Firsl 
Philippic, Dem. iv. 34; Philochorus and Androtion, ap. Harpocr. s. v. 

t«p& Tpir/prji;. 

Chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 275 

rally accustomed to speak on this subject. His intention 
was, not to repeat the ordinary declarations, but to put an 
end once for all to the way in which the matter had been 
hitherto treated. There was no crisis of pressing difficulty 
tor the moment, nor was the adoption of any speedy remedy 
in question. The orator was therefore able to call upon 
his fellow-citizens to take into consideration the whole 
question of the war, and to form a plan for the future. 

" Doubtless," Demosthenes tells his fellow-citizens, 
" you are in an evil plight, and have every reason for 
depression. Your affairs are in a sufficiently bad position, 
but in point of fact only because you have done nothing 
of that which is necessary ; and herein lies a consolation, 
which you would lack, had you done your duty and yet 
were as unfortunate as you are now. If you alter your 
ways, fortune may alter likewise; since fortune follows 
the brave and the vigilantly active. The power of the 
Macedonians, which has grown to so lofty a height from 
small beginnings, is assuredly no divine power ; it is sub- 
ject to all human changes, indeed it stands upon a very 
feeble footing. The worst foe threatening Athens is not 
the king of Macedonia, but your own effeteness ; which, 
were this Philip to die to-day, would call you forth anoth- 
er to-morrow. You desire to be possessed of Amphipolis, 
and are so badly armed that, were fortune to offer that 
town to you, you would be wholly unprepared to receive 
it. Forces of war must therefore be created, such as 
correspond to our means. A small force (for to march 
with a land-army against the king we are too weak), — but 
this force must be at all times in the field, lest we lose the 
season of action in preparations. For at present you 
experience in the matter of your armaments what the 
barbarian experiences in the boxing-match ; he is always 
feeling for the spot where he has just been hit ; and if his 
adversary directs a blow at another spot, his hands follow ; 
but to guard himself against the blow, and to see his ad- 

276 History of Greece. [BookVU 

versary's intention in his eye, he is too clumsy and unskil- 
ful. We must therefore have a force of operation 
stationed in the Northern waters, in Lemnos or Thasos, 
where petty warfare will enable it to inflict very consider- 
able damage upon the foe, and in particular to hinder 
him in his lucrative expeditions of pillage. Again, this 
armed force must not consist of untrustworthy mercenary 
troops ; of 2,000 soldiers at least 500, and of 200 horse- 
men 50, must be citizens with a supervision over the rest. 
Where citizens of Athens are found, there the gods of the 
city will accompany them. For this force of armed men 
ten fast vessels will suffice ; and the entire equipment of 
ships, infantry and cavalry, amounts to something over 
ninety talents (22.000^. circ), an armament which by no 
means exceeds your resources. But everything depends 
upon that which is done being done in a real and thorough 
way. For if I ask you how it comes to pass that your 
Dionysia and Panathensea are year by year celebrated at 
the proper time, you will find the cause to be, that every- 
thing is fixed by law, and that every one knows beforehand 
where his place is. Accordingly, neither ought the most 
important of matters to be left to the chances of an arbi- 
trary freedom from rule." 

The First Philippic constitutes an epoch in the history 
of Athens. Not as if the speech had achieved a great 
result ; but in the most important affair of the State a 
fixed programme had at last been put forward, and a free 
and open protest had been raised against the existing 
system of government. Demosthenes now confronted 
Eubulus as his declared opponent ; and, although he had 
as yet formed no following of his own, (for from the first 
he desired to have on his side not a party, but the civic 
community,) yet his words struck fire, and the minds of 
the citizens were after all seized with fear, when they 
heard his warning cry ; while you are sitting quiet, you 
are being surrounded on all sides, as by the huntsman who 

cuap. in.] Athens and King Philip. 277 

draws his nets closer and closer round his prey ! The 
opposite stand-points of policy had now been openly ex- 
pressed ; hereby the men of peace were likewise scared 
out of their tranquillity ; they bestirred themselves once 
more, and desired for their part to be accomplishing 
something, so as to escape the blame of remaining abso- 
lutely inactive. A suitable opportunity for this purpose 
presented itself in Eubcea. 

Pericles had made Euboea a portion of At- i mpor t ance 
tica (vol. ii. p. 451). Since this relation had $E U e b ^ ad 
been severed (vol. iii. p. 483), the island had 
never again known peace. It was incapable of forming 
a compact whole, united in itself and independent. The 
primitive conflicting distinctions between the several cities 
in the island were revived (vol. i. pp. 269, 293) ; and to 
the force of these were added the influences from abroad, 
which increased the fermentation within. For an island, 
which stretches along in the vicinity of the mainland, from 
Thessaly to Attica, could not remain untouched by the 
disturbances on the mainland itself. The Athenians could 
not renounce Euboea, because by means of its natural pro- 
ducts it formed the indispensable supplement of their own 
country, and, if in hostile hands, offered an intolerable 
menace to their shores. The Thebans regarded it as a 
natural appendage to Boeotia ; while the princes of the 
North, if they desired to control Central Greece, were 
above all obliged to seek to secure influence in Euboea. 
The unhappy island was therefore coveted on all sides ; it 
became an arena in which the political schemes of the 
most various states met, the party-feuds in the island be- 
ing fostered by the neighboring states, in order that they 
might acquire influence by supporting individual party- 
leaders. Thus Iason of Pherse (vol. iv. p. 468) had estab- 
lished the Tyrant Neogenes in Oreus, and the Spartans 
had expelled him, when they were masters of Boeotia.* 

* Neogenes : Diod. xv. 31. 

278 History of Greece. ibookVIL 

After the liberation of the Cadmea, Athens and Thebes 
went hand in hand ; and the island for a time belonged to 
the Naval Confederation of which both those states were 
members. These relations were evidently in every direc- 
tion the most favorable ; and the mere thought of Eubcea 
ought to have convinced the Attic statesmen, how strong- 
ly the considerations of a reasonable policy made it advi- 
sable to remain on friendly and neighborly terms with 
Thebes. For no sooner had hereupon, after the battle of 
Leuctra, the two states become estranged from one 
another, than a hostile rivalry commenced with reference 
to Euboea, the Attic and the Theban parties standing op- 
posed to one another in its towns. The Theban proved 
victorious; Themison, the Tyrant of Eretria, brought 
about the defection of the Oropians, which the Athe- 
nians felt so keenly (vol. iv. p. 490) ; and the whole of 
Euboea furnished its military contingent to Thebes, until 
by means of his successful campaign in b. c. 357 Timothe- 
us destroyed the Theban influence (p. 113). But no se- 
cure supremacy was hereby acquired. For no reliance 
was to be placed upon the towns to which absolute inde- 
pendence had been restored ; they fell anew into the hands 
of Tyrants, who acted in opposition to the wishes of the 
communities, and the conflict of parties again furnished oc- 
casion for foreign intervention. Philip began to stretch 
forth his hand from Thessaly (p. 81) towards the island ; 
he sent letters to the communities there, in which he gave 
them to understand how absurd it was for them to seek 
for protection from such a State as Athens, which was in- 
capable of defending itself ; he supported Callias, the Ty- 
Appiication rant a * Chalcis, and fostered the discord pre- 
piutorchu™ vailing in the states. This occurred about 
-., .. n , the very time when Demosthenes was deliver- 

OI. CVll. 2 (B. J 

c. 351-50). j n g hi s Philippic oration ; immediately after- 
wards Plutarchus, who reigned as despot at Eretria, 
applied for succor to Athens, because he was unable to 

chap, iilj Athens and King Philip. 279 

defend himself by his own strength against the adverse 
party in Eretria, which was headed by Clitarchus. 

Plutarchus possessed influential connexions at Athens, 
in particular with the house of Midias, an adherent of 
Eubulus. Midias was one of the wealthy men of the city, 
who vain-gloriously exulted in luxurious arrogance before 
the people (p. 124), a self-willed and overbearing kind of 
man, who thought that by reason of his social position 
everything was permitted to him. Together with him the 
whole party of Eubulus was in favor of the request of 
Plutarchus ; they wished to prove, that at the right mo- 
ment they too knew how to display energy ; and they pro- 
mised themselves a facile and fortunate result. And since 
undertakings directed towards the island-territory, which 
was at once near and indispensable, were of all the most 
likely to meet with approval, a great ardor for war was 
successfully kindled in the civic assembly. 

But Demosthenes opposed the project. With daring 
courage he came forward quite alone against the under- 
taking, and thereby excited a storm of rage against him- 
self. Invectives were hurled against the self-willed obsti- 
nacy of a man, who was incessantly urging the Athenians 
to action, who had only the other day been desirous of 
despatching their ships to distant Rhodes, and who was 
now opposing an enterprise, simply because it had not 
been originally mooted by himself. But Demosthenes 
was no noisy agitator, ready to welcome every clamor for 
war. With his fiery impatience he combined the highest 
prudence ; nor could anything be more offensive to him, 
than to see the slender resources of his native city wasted 
upon unworthy objects. And how was it possible for him 
to approve of an undertaking, in which the support of a 
Tyrant was in question, who was in conflict with his com- 
munity ? The Athenians ought to take arms only for na- 
tional ends, and on behalf of the freedom of Hellenes. 
Moreover, he perceived that the present casus belli had 

280 History of Greece. t BoOK vn. 

been brought about solely by personal relations and un- 
derstandings ; and he could foresee that, considering the 
untrustworthiness of the confederates, great sacrifices 
would in this case lead neither to honor, nor to increase 
of power. 

Phocionii ^ s P r °test remained without effect. The 
Eubcea. Athenians set out towards the close of Febru- 

01. evii 2 ary under Phocion, citizens and mercenaries, 

(b. c. 350). J 

foot and horse. Demosthenes himself took 
part in the expedition. The horsemen went on in ad- 
vance, and took up a position at Argura to the north of 
Chalcis, probably in order to ward off Macedonian aid. 
The remaining troops crossed to the nearest ferrying-sta- 
tion (Porthmus), and, the road along the coast being, as 
we may presume, blocked up, advanced towards the moun- 
tain-range, in order thus to reach Eretria. When they 
came to Tamynae, they suddenly found themselves sur- 
rounded in a gorge by the enemy, who was better ac- 
quainted with the locality than they. It now became 
manifest, that the whole of Euboea was under arms against 
the Athenians ; the Tyrants of Chalcis, too, had leagued 
themselves with Clitarchus. Phocion saw himself placed 
in the most dangerous of situations ; betrayed by his allies, 
he entrenched himself on a hillock, and was only with 
difficulty able to ward off the superior numbers of his ad- 

Most terrible reports reached Athens, and there awak- 
ened a general readiness for all necessary efforts. Wealthy 
citizens presented ships-of-war to the State, all the troops 
still remaining immediately took their departure, in order 
to relieve Phocion, who was cut off from the coast as well 
as hard-pressed in his position ; and, for the purpose of 
remedying the want of money, Apollodorus came forward 
with the patriotic motion, that the entire surplus of the 
year's income should be added to the war-fund. 

Meanwhile Phocion succeeded in fighting his way 

chap, hi.] Athem and King Philip. 281 

through the enemy in an engagement very honorable to 
him, and in effecting his return to Athens by the middle 
of the summer ; but the garrison, which he had left be- 
hind in the narrowest part of the island in the fort of Zar- 
etra, in order that he might here retain a firm footiug in 
at least one point in Euboea, through the treachery of Plu- 
tarchus fell as captives into the hands of the enemy. It 
had to be ransomed by the payment of fifty talents (12, 
5201.) ; the whole of Euboea was now lost, and all the 
efforts which had thoroughly exhausted the public purse, 
had led to no result, but that of a disgraceful defeat and 
of the deepest discouragement,* 

But this unfortunate campaign had yet Con{ j em . 
other serious consequences for Athens, as well I ? ati . < ? n , of 

* ' Apollodoru9. 

as for Demosthenes. Apollodorus, the son of 
the wealthy banker Paison, had indeed in other respects 
not contrived to conciliate much esteem at Athens. He 
had on a former occasion gone to Sicily as trierarch, about 
the time when Dionysius interfered in Hellenic affairs 
(vol. iv. p. 459), with the object of bringing about friendly 
relations between him and the Athenians (01. ciii. 1 ; b. c. 
368). Since that time he had made away with his pro- 
perty by a wasteful life, and had acquired a bad reputation 
in consequence of a number of lawsuits, in which he had 
sought again to procure money. He was a man of a care- 
less disposition and of an untrustworthy character, whose 
patriotism was of more harm than use to the State ; for 
from motives of vanity he observed as little moderation in 
his pecuniary services to the State as in his private expen- 

* With regard to the Euboean campaign, cf. jiEschin. iii. 86 seq., who 
represents the transactions in a light unfavorable to Demosthenes and his 
friends. The newly discovered Scholia to iEschines show, that not Callias 
and Taurosthenes, but Clitarchus, introduced mercenaries from Phalaecus. 
Cf. Ferd. Schultz in Neue Jahrb. fur Philol., 1866, p. 311, who accordingly 
makes the emendation napa $aAaiKov in iEschin. § 85. — March-out before the 
12th of Anthesterion : Dem. xxxix. 16. — Phocion at Tamynse: Plutarch, 
Dernosth. 12; ^schin. iii. 86 (to orpaToVeo'oi' ei? Tti>a? Sva-xutpia<; KaTa.KeK\ei(j.evoi>). 
Notwithstanding the victory, a ttoAc/jio? dSof os ko\ Sanavripos : Dem. v. 5. 

282 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

diture, and spoilt the mariners by accustoming them to 
over-indulgence on his ships. His motion in the Council 
was, however, honorable to his intelligence, as well as to 
his honest intentions and to his courage. His colleagues 
had assented to it, and had brought it before the civic 
assembly, by whom it had been accepted. The whole 
affair had been completely in accordance with rule. The 
motion was rendered necessary by the circumstances of the 
hour. Moreover, Apollodorus had proceeded as cautiously 
as possible, having proposed that the citizens should first 
vote on the question, whether the surplus should be paid 
into the war-fund or into the festival-fund ; it was merely 
left to them to decide, whether they would resolve upon the 
former alternative in the sense of the proposer of the 
motion. But when hereupon during the discussions on the 
subject better news arrived from the seat of war, an indict- 
ment of illegality was immediately brought forward against 
Apollodorus by Stephanus, who by means of a variety of 
intrigues succeeded in carrying his condemnation on the 

Stephanus, as we may assume, had been urged to this 
step by Eubulus; and, after it had prospered so well, 
Eubulus himself came forward, and proposed a law, that 
whosoever should henceforth venture to move the applica- 
tion of the festival-moneys to purposes of war, should incur 
the penalty of death. This law was drawn up in such a 
form, as if Apollodorus had proposed an innovation dan- 
gerous to the State, while in point of fact he had once 
more asserted against a rooted abuse the principle which 
alone was in accordance with the law. This abuse was 
now established by Eubulus as the regular and lawful 
practice ; and hereby the commonweal was impaired to an 
extent far surpassing the calamity which had been suffered 
in the field. The result of this unfortunate war was there- 
fore not, as would have been just, to cause that party 
which had, in spite of the protest of prudent citizens, pro- 

chap, /ii.] Athena and King Philip. 283 

voked it, to forfeit some of the public confidence reposed 
in it; but with remarkable audacity this party contrived 
to convert its defeat into a triumph, to consummate its 
terroristic sway, to abolish the best possession which tha 
Athenians still retained, viz. freedom of speech, and to 
establish the misgovernment which had hitherto prevailed 
more firmly than ever.* 

But it was not only from this lamentable ~ 

J Demos- 

tum in public affairs that Demosthenes had Mfdias. and 
to suffer ; he was also drawn into the conflict 01 cvii 2 _ 4 
in his own person. The heat of the parties had (B - c - 350 " 49 )- 
become intensified ; Demosthenes was an abomination in 
the eyes of the faction of Eubulus ; and in particular 
Midias had for political and for personal reasons (p. 232) 
made it his task to persecute him in every possible way, to 
inflict dishonor upon him, and to annihilate forever the 
authority which he enjoyed among the people. When 
therefore Demosthenes had voluntarily undertaken on be- 
half of his tribe the equipment of the course for the festi- 
val of Dionysus in the spring of the year in which the ex- 
pedition to Euboea occurred, Midias set all his influence in 
motion, in order to deprive him of the glory due to his 
patriotic liberality, and at last allowed the passion of a 
vulgar hatred to carry him to such a length, that on the 
day of the festival he publicly struck Demosthenes in the 
face. He succeeded in causing Demosthenes to lose the 
honor of the prize, but now fell into personal danger. 

* Apollodorus, after the death of his father, B.C. 370, trierarch on the 
occasion of the mission to Sicily, b.c. 308 (ef. Note to p. 95), and again, with 
much expenditure of money, on the Thracian coast, b.c. 302 (Dem. 1.). 
Involved in numerous lawsuits (Dem. xxxvi. 03), he had wasted his patri- 
mony (division of the inheritance, b.c 368-7), when he threw himself into 
public business and as member of the Council proposed the motion, cire 
doKel Td. 7repc6fTa xprj/xaTa ttj? 5ioi(ci}<rew? crTpaTiam/cA elvai ecTe decopiKa. [Dem.], 
lix. 4. Cf. Lortzing, de orationibus quas Demosth. pro ApoUod. scripsisse feriur, 1803. 
According to Hornbostel, Ueber die von Demosth. in Sachen ApoUod. verf. Gericht* 
reden, 40, Apollodorus was merely the agent of Demosthenes, which Lortzing 
rightly denies. It is more probable that Stephanus (Schafer, iii.s, 180) was 
a tool of Eubulus. 

284 History of Greece. [Book vil 

The civic assembly, which met in the sanctuary on the 
day after the festival, recognized the complaint of the ill- 
used choregus as thoroughly well-founded, and pronounced a 
uuanimous sentence of condemnation upon the unwarrant- 
ble act of his enemy. 

The personal contest was continued with the utmost in- 
tensity during the Euboean war. It was attempted in 
every way to frighten off Demosthenes from further pur- 
suing the course of legal procedure ; it was endeavored to 
cast upon him the blame of the failure of the campaign ; 
it was sought to stop his charge against Midias by means 
of the cross-manoeuvre of bringing the heaviest accusations 
against him ; it was tried to throw suspicion upon him as a 
runaway in the field ; he was accused of a share in a 
crime of murder, which had been committed by an ac- 
quaintance, Aristarchus. The whole body of the adher- 
ents of Eubulus combined, in order to effect his ruin. 
But their attacks upon the character of Demosthenes were 
all futile, though they were in so far successful, that the 
orator, who by the declaration of the citizens had received 
a complete satisfaction for his honor, in the end relin- 
quished the action for assault against Midias, and con- 
sented to a compromise.* 

Historv of 

Hardly had he escaped from these vexa- 
theeityof tious quarrels, when an event occurred, which 

Olynthus. * \ 

called him once more to the orators' tribune, 
and claimed his whole attention for public affairs. It was 
an event which he had long had in view, which he had 
anxiously desired, and the occurrence of which he had in 
all probability hastened. For the first manifestations of 
a more vigorous policy on the part of Athens could not 
fail to attract to her the eyes of those Hellenes who were 
even more directly menaced by Philip ; and thus it came 

* Dem. /card MeiStov irepl rov KovSvkov. ScMfer, ii. 85 seq. 

chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 285 

to pass, that the one power capable of offering resistance, 
which still existed besides Athens, renounced friendly re- 
lations with Philip, and offered its alliance to the Athe- 
nians, — viz. Olynthus (p. 83). 

Olynthus is one of the most remarkable cities of anti- 
quity. Lying on the outermost border of the Hellenic 
world, between Macedonia and Thrace, it owed its impor- 
tance precisely to this exposed situation, which brought it 
more into contact than all the other colonies with the 
realms of the North ; and the extraordinary energy con- 
sistently displayed by the citizens of Olynthus, doubtless 
finds its first explanation in the fact, that here Hellenic 
intellect happily combined with the vigor of Northern 
populations. For founded upon Thracian soil, and origi- 
nally a settlement of the Bottiseans (p. 22), thereupon 
about the time of the Persian Wars occupied by Chalci- 
dians, the city thenceforth had a mixed population, and 
nowhere was there a more favorable opportunity for the 
amalgamation of different nationalities than here ; no- 
where were Greek, half-Greek, and barbarian tribes 
dwelling so closely together, as in the highland district of 
the three Chalcidian peninsulas. 

It is true, that the great advance made by the city of 
Olynthus had not had its origin in its own civic commu- 
nity ; it had rather been brought about by Macedonian 
influence, which on this occasion for the first time asserted 
itself in Greek public affairs (vol. iii. p. 15). At the in- 
stigation of Perdiccas, Olynthus became the centre of the 
Chalcidian colonial district ; and it was he who encour- 
aged the expedition of Brasidas, from the consequences of 
which Athens never recovered (vol. iii. p. 179). After- 
wards, however, the Olynthians showed themselves inde- 
pendent in every direction. They asserted their autonomy 
against Athens (vol. iii. p. 207) ; they hereupon, when the 
Corinthian league was formed, rose against the supremacy 
of the Laced semonians ; and about the time of the Peace 

286 History of Greece. t BooK Vtt 

of Antalcidas they effected very quietly the formation of 
a State of the first class, which comprehended more than 
thirty formerly independent towns in a common military 
constitution with equality of civic rights, — a Greek em- 
pire, provided with all needful resources, admirably situ- 
ated for extending itself in every direction, a land and 
maritime power, which moreover had an excellent force 
of cavalry at its disposal. Whole tribes of the warlike 
Thracian people stood in relations of dependence towards 
it, and furnished their military contingents. No power 
could restrain the progress of the haughty republic, least 
of all Macedonia, which, itself weakened by internal 
troubles, now saw its most dangerous enemy in the State 
of which it had itself laid the foundations. The towns 
of Lower Macedonia with their population, akin by de- 
scent to the Greeks (p. 21), joined the Olynthians; 
Amyntas found himself in a situation of the utmost dan- 
ger ; and it seemed as if Olynthus had for ever taken out 
of the hands of the Temenidse their mission of forming a 
Graeco-Macedonian empire (vol. iv. p. 325). Olynthus 
also took thought for securing her acquisitions, and for 
strengthening her position as a Great Power by means of 
foreign connexions ; and with this object sought to enter 
into an alliance with Athens and Thebes (01. xcix. 2; 
b. c. 383). 

These schemes induced Sparta to intervene as the au- 
thority upon which devolved the execution of the Peace 
of Antalcidas ; and after a war of several years Olynthus 
was cast down from the height of her power (vol. iv. p. 
343). She was humbled, but not broken ; and Sparta 
was incapable of turning to account the victory which she 
had obtained. Instead of this, Athens now came forward 
as a menacing power with her Naval Confederation. In 
the year 373 the Athenians sought to establish a footing 
on the Thraco-Macedonian coast, and to recover the cities 
which had defied them in the times when their power had 

cha*-. hi.] Athens and King Philip. 287 

been at its height (vol. iv. p. 399). This Attic policy 
from the first met with the most vigorous resistance on the 
part of the Olynthians ; they braced themselves for new 
exertions, enlarged their city and army, extended their 
Confederation, so that Amphipolis after admitting Chalci- 
dian citizens furnished its contingent to their forces, and 
about 01. ciii. 3 (b. c. 365) were more powerful than ever 
before. For this reason Perdiccas III. so vigorously sup- 
ported the undertakings of Timotheus, who in 364 carried 
on the Chalcidian War with brilliant success, captured 
more than twenty places, and pressed close upon Olynthus 
itself (p. 104). But the city held out ; with indomitable 
power of resistance it frustrated all lasting results on the 
part of the Attic arms, and the successor of Timotheus, 
Callisthenes, found himself in a far more arduous position. 
For Perdiccas now suddenly renounced the alliance of the 
Athenians, after they had rendered him the services which 
he desired ; he took advantage of the fact that Olynthus 
had been weakened, in order to place under his protection 
the several towns which could no longer rely upon the 
protection of the city holding the primacy, and to defend 
them with his troops against Athens. The undertaking 
of Callisthenes ended with a pacification so disadvanta- 
geous in its terms, that he was sentenced to death at 
Athens ; and all the advantages obtained by Timotheus 
were already about the year 362 virtually lost (p. 108). 
When king Philip ascended the throne, he rtl .. 

° r ' Olynthus 

immediately perceived, how for him everything j"4.. Kin 8 
depended upon preventing the establishment 
of a connexion between Olynthus and Athens; and he 
accordingly sought in the first instance to satisfy both 
cities. He withdrew the garrison from Amphipolis, and 
made the Athenians believe, that this already practically 
amounted to a surrender of the city to them ; while in the 
same way he assumed towards the Olynthians the attitude 
of a friend and ally. They began indeed to feel appre- 

288 History of Greece. [BookVII. 

hensions, when the king made war upon Aniphipolis 
(p. 58) ; and already on this occasion they sent envoys to 
Athens; but Philip contrived to frustrate the object of the 
embassy, and to delude the Olynthians by the most gracious 
treatment. In the war, which after the fall of Amphipolis 
broke out between himself and Athens, he induced them 
to take his side, and gave up to them Anthemus and Poti- 
daea (p. 82) ; they felt happier and more secure than ever 
before, and with blind confidence abandoned themselves to 
the idea, that it was the serious intention of the king to 
remain content with the districts of territory gained by 
him, and to leave their city with its confederated towns in 
undisturbed continuance as an independent State on the 
borders of his empire. But when hereupon Philip in the 
rear of Olynthus extended his dominion toward Thrace, 
when he had subjected Thessaly, and overcome the Pho- 
cians, and had made it clear, even to the dullest eye, how 
he was wont to treat his friends and allies, — the Olynthians, 
too, could no longer deceive themselves as to their situa- 
tion. They perceived with terror their awful isolation, 
which they had themselves been guilty of bringing about 
by their hostility against Athens ; they became aware, 
that the continuance of their independence was nothing 
better than a term of grace conceded by Philip, and 
measured out according as it suited his interests. Though 
therefore the party among them, which in every way 
worked for the purposes of the king, was both powerful 
and active, yet the ancient spirit of liberty once more 
gained the upper hand in the civic community. The 
Olynthians resolved to prepare for a last struggle on 
behalf of their independence, and for this purpose it was 
impossible to find any better ally than Athens, who, by 
the occupation of Thermopylse (p. 80), had shown, that 
she had not yet forgotten her ancient mission of standing 
forth as the champion of Hellenic independence.* 

* Concerning the history of the city of Olynthus ; Voemel, de Olynthi rite, 

chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 289 

The Olynthians proceeded cautiously. In oiynthian 
the first instance they sent envoys to Athens, ^"^hensf 
in order to put an end to the state of war which (oi. cvii. 1-3 
they had four years previously re-opened, con- 
jointly with Philip, against Athens (01. cvii. 1 ; B. c. 352). 
This was not yet equivalent to a rupture of their peaceable 
relations with him ; for it is not to be assumed that the 
Olynthians had renounced the right to pass such resolu- 
tions. The king indeed regarded this step already as a 
revolt. He, however, abstained from immediate interven- 
tion ; and left it to his partisans to counteract the agita- 
tion. They were influential enough, even now, to carry 
the banishment of certain spokesmen of the patriot party, 
notably of Apollonides.* 

On the occasion of the first embassy a more intimate 
connexion, for which some inclination was felt at Athens, 
was as yet cautiously declined ; but soon it was felt that 
practically a rupture with the king had already taken 
place, although he still refrained from giving utterance to 
his anger, and only on the occasion of his Thracian 
campaigns made a threatening appearance on the frontiers 
of the territory of the Oiynthian Confederation. He even 
sought to persuade the deputies of the city, that there 
was no cause for fear. But the citizens mistrusted him, 
and, when he was engaged in Illyria and Epirus, de- 
spatched a second embassy to Athens and requested auxi- 
liary troops for the protection of their territory. 

The danger now grew ; and the general feeling of anx- 
ious expectation was intensified by a special occurrence. 
A step-brother of the king had taken refuge at Olynthus ; 
the king demanded his surrender, which the city refused. 

&c. 1829; Abel, Makedmiien; Bbhneke, Forschungen, et al. Amphipolis Chalci- 
dian: Aristot. Polit. 205, 10. Callisthenes: iEschin. ii. 30. Amphipolis occu- 
pied by Perdiccas to defend it against Athens, and subsequently evacuated 
by Philip, according to the conjecture of Grote, vol. x. p. 510, and vol. xi. 
p. 100. 

* Apollonides: Dem. ix. 56. 


290 History of Greece. [bookvh 

For since the Olynthians had once resolved upon the con- 
test, they thought it their duty not to give way in this 
point, as to which their rights were beyond all doubt. For 
how could a community with a sense of honor voluntarily 
renounce the sacred right of protecting those who were 
enjoying its hospitality ? Morever, the person of the royal 
prince may have been of some importance ; indeed, the 
passionate pursuit of him by Philip leads us to conclude, 
that the prince had adherents in Macedonia. This 
made the outbreak of war inevitable. The Macedonians 
advanced upon the recalcitrant city, and the third embassy 
hastened to Athens, in order without delay to arrive at an 
understanding with regard to a joint conduct of the war.* 
Q . , The situation of affairs resembled that of 

State of 

P ubl l°/2?" the time when Amphipolis sued for succor 

ingat Athens. l l 

against Philip (p. 57). Both Olynthus and 
Amphipolis were confederates who had fallen away from 
Athens ; both the one and the other had inflicted the 
greatest damage upon her ; both were brought back to her 
by nothing but their own distress. But in the one case it 
had still been possible for the Athenians to deceive them- 
selves as to the real intentions of Philip ; now, these were 
palpable ; nor could any one who was willing to use his eyes 
fail to perceive that it was impossible, without Athens being 
herself endangered, to allow Olynthus, the last outwork 
of the Attic dominion capable of offering resistance, to fall. 
_. _. Accordingly at Athens there was by no 

The Olyn- . 

thiac Ora- means any desire from petty motives of selfish^ 

tions of De- J . 

mosthenes. ncss to punish the Olvnthians for the wrong 

01. evii. 4 (b. . 

c. 349). formerly committed by them, as had been done 

* King Amyntas had three sons by Gygsea, viz., Archelaus, Arrhidasus, 
Menelaus: Justin, vii. 4. Arrhidaeus was at that time in Olynthus. Mene- 
jaus seems not to have gone thither till a later date, when the city, supported 
by Athens, became the head-quarters of the resistance against Philips 
Schafer, ii. 116,131. Both were executed: Justin, vii. 3.— The embassies 
Philochor. Fragm. 132 ; Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 405. Their intercourse with Demos 
thenes : Cbhneke, Fwschuncjen, i. 1G1. 

chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 291 

in the case of Amphipolis ; but public opinion was not- 
withstanding lukewarm ; nor was there any one among 
the orators who treated the affair with the necessary seri- 
ousness, except Demosthenes. His previous orations of 
State had already found an echo in the Chalcidian towns ; 
to him the envoys had applied ; and it was now his task, 
as he had formerly encouraged the citizens to carry on the 
petty warfare which they had commenced of their own ac- 
cord, so at the present moment to kindle in them a readi- 
ness for the greater contest, — for a contest which they could 
not avoid without hazarding their honor and indepen- 
dence. There was no necessity for him to speak against 
Philip and for Olynthus in general ; but it behooved him 
to commend to the profoundest consideration of the citi- 
zens the whole mighty importance of the moment, and the 
duties which it imposed upon them. His The -.. 
Olynthiac Orations breathe the same spirit and 
are based upon the same principles as his previous public 
speeches ; but the high significance of the decision 
which had now to be formed, gave to them a yet loftier 
afflatus, yet more of impressiveness and assurance. For 
now, he reflects with joyous confidence, every pretext has 
been taken away from the Athenians for neglecting their 
duty. Amphipolis they have allowed to fall, and Pydna, 
and Methone ; Potidsea and Pagasse they have allowed to 
pass into the hands of the foe ; Olynthus, and Olynthus 
alone, is left. And this city, which during eighty years 
has been hostile to Athens, which holds the primacy over 
thirty-two towns, now comes of its own accord to seek our 
protection. This is an event which is offered like a boon 
of good fortune of the rarest kind by the hands of the 
deity. For it is impossible that the inevitable contest 
should be opened at any more suitable season. So long 
as Olynthus remains standing, the choice is left to the 
Athenians, whether this contest is to be fought out on the 
frontiers of Macedonia, or whether Philip is to be allowed 

292 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

to approach the walls of the city. Upon the Athenians it 
now depends, whether a turning-point shall occur in their 
destinies. The population of Thessaly is in full ferment ; 
it is wroth with the king, who retains for himself the Pa- 
gasaean harbor-dues, and who is erecting fortifications in 
Magnesia. Neither is his dominion by any means well 
assured in the Northern mountain-land. Only let an 
armed force show itself in the vicinity of Macedonia, and 
the Paeon ians, lovers of liberty, as well as the Illyrians, 
will rise anew. An embassy must therefore be despatched 
to Olynthus, to announce the approach of succor, and to 
encourge its citizens. Next, a two-fold force must be sent 
out, the one to protect the menaced city, the other to at- 
tack the territory of the king, and to prevent him from 
massing all his resources against Olynthus. But, in her 
present circumstances, our city cannot satisfy such de- 
mands. She is in no want of resources, but she is tied 
down in the employment of them. She must therefore 
free herself from the fetters which she has imposed upon 
herself, by devoting the surplus of her income to the festi- 
vals. Either this surplus must be restored to the war- 
fund, in which case the means for war will have been se- 
cured, or we must all contribute according to our proper- 
ty. Either the one, or the other, — there is no third way 
possible, for money must be obtained, the war is necessary, 
if Athens is not willing to abandon herself. 
These d "^ knowledge of the circumstances of the 
times existed ; but the fear of the omnipotent 
king, which became intensified as the subject of the war was 
more closely considered, had taken possession of the minds 
of the citizens, and crippled their good intentions. Ac- 
cordingly, Demosthenes about the same time made an ad- 
dress to the people, the essential object of which was to 
moderate the exaggerated terror inspired by Philip. 
" The king," he says, " is by no means the invincible man, 
whom you picture to yourselves. True power must rest 

Chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 29 


on other foundations. He is nothing but an ambitious 
lover of self, who allows no one to share the fruits of vic- 
tory with him ; for which reason neither the people, to 
which his wars bring nothing but suffering, nor the kernel 
of the nobility, feel any attachment towards him. For he 
suffers no man of independence near his person. The 
best officers he removes to a distance ; his court is a meet- 
iug-place of adventurers and drunkards ; his allies are 
only lying in wait for a discomfiture, in order to fall away 
from him. His whole power, though outwardly splendid, 
is rotten in itself; and this will become clearly manifest, 
so soon as he is involved in serious, i. e. domestic wars, 
just as, when a disease seizes upon the human body, the 
defects and hurts hitherto concealed in it come to light. 
Philip's good-fortune rests upon no secure foundations, be- 
cause it is not based upon justice ; but it is not on that 
account the creature of chance ; for it has been brought 
about by means of his incredible activity and of absolute 
inaction on our side. If, therefore, it was the necessary 
consequence of our dilatoriness that one possession after 
the other was lost, on the other hand, if we begin to do 
our duty, the contrary result will eusue, and the gods will 
much prefer to be on our side than on his. " 

The Third Oration seems to belong to a The Third 
somewhat later stage of these transactions. 
In it the Olynthians are already spoken of as allies, and 
it is assumed that all are at one as to the necessity of ac- 
tion. Indeed, the want of courage among the popular 
orators has already changed into the direct contrary ; they 
talk of the chastisement of the king, and dangle victorious 
successes before the eyes of the citizens, without explain- 
ing to them the means and methods which are requisite, 
if only for escaping defeat. Even to achieve this result, 
it is necessary to break utterly with the existing system 
of government. "For in these days," Demosthenes de- 
clares, " things have come to such a pass, that one may 

294 History of Greece. [ BooK VU 

not even tell his fellow-citizens the truth, without uselessly 
risking his life. This must be changed. Therefore, sum- 
mon a legislative commission, not however with the ob- 
ject of giving, but with that of abolishing, laws, in partic- 
ular the law with regard to the war-moneys, which are at 
present distributed among those citizens who do not march 
out to the war. But demand the abolition of this law 
from the same persons who have passed it. For it is un- 
fair, that they should gain your affection by pernicious 
laws, while others are to take upon themselves the invidi- 
ous labor of removing the bad laws in opposition to your 
inclinations. It is anything but a pleasant task to oppose 
oneself to those who are mighty in the city, and at the 
same time to your own wishes ; but I deem it the duty of 
an honest citizen, to esteem the welfare of the city more 
highly than the applause of the audience. Such was like- 
wise the custom of the men who addressed your ancestors 
— of an Aristides, a Nicias, a Pericles. In our days all 
this has changed. Now you have orators, who go about 
among you and inquire : What do you wish ? Wherewith 
can we serve you ? What motion would you like us to 
make ? The result is, that with you everything is in a dis- 
graceful condition, while those ancient orators made the 
city great and glorious. Your foreign power you have 
forfeited ; and at home in the city you are the servants of 
those who are filling their pockets at your expense. From 
them you take the bait of the distribution of moneys for 
the festivals, which they dangle before you, so that you are 
altogether unable to perceive your own shame; indeed, 
you actually feel under an obligation of deep gratitude to 
those persons who provide for your feastings, although 
what they do is done out of your own resources, and tends 
to your ruin. Even now it is not too late. Renounce the 
foolish fancy, that it is possible to reconcile irreconcila- 
bles or, in other words, to waste all the existing pecuniary 
resources in unnecessary expenditure, and yet after that 

chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 295 

to possess the means for necessary purposes. You must 
clearly realize the actual state of things ; you must arrive 
at a decision, which you cannot avoid. If you now take 
courage, so as to act in a way which becomes your city, to 
perform military service, and to stake the surplus moneys, 
which are now distributed and are of no real use to any 
one, upon the war, then, Athenians, it may perchance still 
be given to you to attain to a great and glorious posses- 
sion, to the rise of your native city. " 

Thus Demosthenes with unsparing earnestness lays bare 
the rotten places in the life of the community, without at 
the same time raising his demands to an excessive pitch ; 
on the contrary, it is with a sagacious moderation that he 
opposes himself to the prevailing abuses. For he has no in- 
tention whatever of denying the claims of the citizens upon 
the funds of the city ; he merely asks for certain services in 
return on the part of each citizen, and desires that a dif- 
ference should be made between times of war and times 
of peace. In periods of calm, he opines, let every man re- 
ceive his share at home ; but when the times are such as 
the present, the citizen who is capable of bearing arms 
ought, in return for what he receives from the State, also 
to come forward in his own person for its protection ; and 
as for those who have passed the age of service, let them 
arrange and superintend what has to be done, and receive 
their share for this kind of public labor. In other words, 
it is merely necessary that order and equitable proportion 
should take the place now usurped by arbitrary choice 
and chance. According as the services are in succession 
undertaken, so the money ought to be distributed accord- 
ing to the measure of each. For the money is due to the 
active, and not to the idle, who lounge about at home and 
babble to one another concerning the military exploits of 
the mercenaries. 

The three Olynthiac Orations attest Demosthenes' con- 

296 History of Greece, [Book vil 

The oiyn- ception of the situation, and the use made of 
thian War. ft ^y hi mj m or( ] er to raise his native city 
{B.'c. 349-8). from its humiliation. They form only a small 
portion of his activity; he labored indefatiga- 
bly to influence both young and old, and for the first time 
had the satisfaction of exercising an effect, which determined 
the policy of the Athenians. Olynthus was admitted into 
the Attic Confederacy on very considerate conditions ; and 
thirty vessels, which already formed a squadron under 
Chares, together with eight newly manned, took their 
departure for the Chalcidian peninsula, where the war was 
already in full progress (01. cvii. 4; b. c. 349-8). 

Its outbreak was in several respects very unwelcome to 
Philip. Hitherto he had always been accustomed to let 
the impulse to everything which occurred proceed from 
himself; now, he found himself obliged to relinquish other 
schemes, in order to confront a sudden resistance. He 
had expected that the Chalcidian towns would willingly 
submit to the position of Macedonian vassal-states, and 
would gradually pass among his dominions. The rising 
on the part of Olynthus was therefore a very unwelcome 
sign to him of the spirit of independence, which was still 
alive in the Greek communities, and which was powerful 
enough to overcome the ill-will of the Olynthians towards 
Athens, and to unite those who had long been mutual ene- 
mies against himself. Olynthus was still a dangerous foe, 
a town of 10,000 citizens, lying in a strong position and 
provided with a good military organization; its proximity 
to his kingdom enabled it to be in readiness to seize any 
favorable opportunity ; and, if the territory of its Confede- 
ration with its numerous harbors became the regular 
station of an Attic naval force, this would be placed in 
possession of all the advantages which hitherto the king 
had had in his favor as against the Athenians ; and every 

chap, iii.j Athens and King Philip. 297 

success obtained by them might occasion risings in the 
newly conquered portions of his dominions.* 

But the Athenians even in the critical mo- Three 
ment did everything by halves, so that such Seditions 
sacrifices as they made were likewise uselessly 01. cvii. 4. 
wasted. No citizens had sailed out under (B ' c 
Chares ; a property -tax had been proposed, but not carried 
out; the surplus moneys were expended upon the festivals 
just as before, as if absolute peace had reigned ; and the 
government was, in spite of all the assaults of Demos- 
thenes, strong enough to prevent, as unnecessary innova- 
tions, the financial reforms demanded by the war. Even 
now the civic community was not united, but divided into 
parties. Each party had its spokesman, by whom it was 
led, its general, whom it favored, and a clamorous follow- 
ing, which thoughtlessly gave its assent. One party was 
for Chares, the other for Charidemus. Against the serried 
ranks of these parties a solitary orator w T as unable to effect 
anything; and the misfortune of the city lay in this, that 
when order ought to have reigned, arbitrary decisions pre- 
vailed, and where freedom ought to have obtained, there 
force and dependence held sway. 

The Olynthians sent a second embassy ; whereupon a 

* As to the dates and sequence of the Olynthiac Orations: the First (accord- 
ing to Dionysius, the Third) mentions the alliance in process of formation 
between Olynthus and Athens : the Second (the First according to Dionys.) 
especially insists upon the ethical points of view, which would be unsuitable, 
were the action to be supposed already set afloat; and in truth in the Third 
(the Second according to Dionys.) we have the earliest endeavor to 
determine the Athenians to action. In all three there is no hint of any 
succor as having been actually furnished. Cf. Rehdantz, Demosth. ausgew. 
Reden, 1865, p. 29. — Admission of Olynthus into the Confederation: Boeckh, 
PubJ. Ec. of Ath.,vo\. i., p. 117, Note [Eng. Tr.]; Boh n ek e, Forschungen, 161. — 
The three expeditions of succor: Philochorus ap. Dionys. ad Amm. i. 9, 734; 
Schafer, ii. 151, where, according to the supplementation of the Fragment 
suggested by von Herwarden (Dimiys. Epist. Crit., 1861, p. 10), the reading now 
stands : Tpirjpeis 8e rpiaKOvra. Td? fuera Xaprj-ro? koX w? avvenX^fKaaav oktw (the 

30 were accordingly a squadron already assembled, the 8 a subsequent 
addition). Between the words avwxaxCav inoirjaavro and <eat /SoijOeiav 
inefi^av there is in the Ambrosianua a. lacuna of eighteen letters. 


298 History of Greece. [Book vu 

second body of auxiliaries was despatched, this time under 
Charidemus, who from the Hellespont gave aid to the 
hard-pressed city with 4,000 light-armed troops and 150 
horsemen ; joint raids were made upon the royal territory, 
and prisoners were brought in, among them some Macedo- 
nians of high rank. 

But these petty advantages soon disappeared, when 
king Philip, having returned from Thessaly, opened a se- 
cond campaign, and now showed himself thoroughly in 
earnest. He rapidly took one federal town after the other. 
The majority surrendered on his approach ; the gates of 
others were opened by treason. The Olynthians, routed 
in two set battles, attempted the course of negotiation, but 
were harshly rejected ; for, they were now told, the alter- 
natives were, that they must evacuate Olynthus, or king 
Philip Macedonia. They had accordingly to arm for the 
final struggle. Their w T alls were still intact, they still re- 
tained freedom of movement towards the side of the sea, 
and looked out with anxious expectation for the Attic 
ships. For they had sent to Athens for a third time ; and 
on this occasion the Athenians had actually resolved upon 
making a levy among the citizens. For this had been ex- 
pressly requested by the Olynthians in consequence of 
their experiences with regard to the mercenaries of Chari- 
demus. But of 4,000 hoplites only half assembled under 
Chares ; and even these came too late. The Athenians 
had deceived themselves as to the power of resistance in 
the Chalcidians ; their numerous towns were severally 
hard to defend, their civic communities with their many 
non-Greek elements were untrustworthy, and were more- 
over rendered effete by luxury and Thracian love of 
drink. Again, more protracted troubles in Thessaly had 
been reckoned upon. Finally it was the north-wind, the 
officious ally of king Philip, which about the middle of 
the summer kept the approaching vessels at a distance 
from the coasts. Before they arrived, Olynthus fell by 

Chap. III.] Athens and King Philip. 299 

treason. The two cavalry commanders, Las- Fall of 
thenes and Euthycrates, having been gained oiynthus. 
over by Macedonian gold, contrived so to ^ )I ^ 4 c 8 v ) iii - x (B * 
arrange matters, that on the occasion of a 
sally on the part of the besieged a considerable division of 
the cavalry was cut off by the Macedonians, to whom at 
the same time an entrance was opened into the city. 

Philip in the fullest sense carried out his threat. A 
judgment of unexampled severity was to quench every 
remnant of the Hellenic spirit of liberty ; the flames of 
the burning city, and of the towns of its Confederation, 
#ere to shine across to all the shores of the Archipelago 
&s a terrible sign of warning. A considerable part of the 
Greek nation was annihilated together with its habita- 
tions ; numberless citizens, who had hitherto led a prosper- 
ous life, became fugitive mendicants. And indeed the lot 
of those who saved life and liberty was happy in compari- 
son with the fate of those who, like the majority of the 
Olynthians, fell into the hands of the conqueror and were 
sold into slavery, while their possessions were burnt to 
ashes or flung as booty to the mercenaries. The haughty 
city of Olynthus vanished from the face of the earth, and 
together with it thirty-two towns inhabited by Greeks and 
flourishing as commercial communities. The mines con- 
tinued to be worked for the royal treasury ; with this ex- 
ception the whole of Chalcidice became a desert ; and 
the seal was set upon the shame of the overthrow by the 
fact that Hellenes, such as e. g. Anaxandrides (p. 199) 
and Satyrus (p. 195), condescended to glorify by their 
arts the festival of victory held by the king at Dium ; 
nor could anything more clearly attest in his eyes the de- 
cay of the nation, than to find the Greeks willing to turn 
to account the ruin of the Chalcidian towns, inasmuch as 
they were not ashamed to accept gifts of landed property 
and of articles of value, Greeks being actually seen re- 
turning from the scene of the calamity accompanied by 

300 History of Greece. [Book vix 

women and children in fetters, whom they owed to the 
grace of the conqueror. 

Reception ^ * s true, that such a spectacle roused in-* 
thSis at yn dignation in all more generous minds ; and, 
Athens. after the first paralyzing impression of terror 

01 - eyiii- 1 (»• had passed away, sympathy and readiness to 
help were shown in many places, and most of 
all in that city which was most nearly interested, and 
which after a long-enduring quarrel had in the last hour 
allied itself with the Olynthians, who since the advance of 
the Macedonian power ought to have recognized its one 
support in Athens. The overthrow of Olynthus was a ter- 
rible judgment upon the jealousy between Hellenic cities. 
But Athens too could not fail to be now seized by a simi- 
lar feeling of shame to that which had followed upon the 
fall of Miletus and upon that of Platsese, who had likewise 
been so bitterly deceived in the hopes they had set upon 
her. On the present occasion there again remained noth- 
ing for the Athenians but to mitigate the distress of indi- 
viduals to the utmost of their power. The fugitives were, 
like the Platseans, admitted as citizens under the protec- 
tion of the city ; the courts condemned those citizens who 
ill-treated captive Olynthian women ; and the curse of the 
community was pronounced upon the two men who had 
betrayed Olynthus.* 

Turn in the ^ ne ^ a ^ °^ Olynthus signified a fresh defeat 
e° h C ^i °<f ^ or Athens ; and it might be supposed, that it 

would have at the same time inflicted a defeat 
upon the national party, who had urged on the war, and 
that their opponents would have held sway more absolute- 
ly than before in the city. The citizens had been deeply 

* Charidemus (second expedition): Philochorus; Theopomp. ap. Athen. 
436 (Capture of Derdas, who was probably a brother-in-law of Philip : Boh- 
neke, «. s. 674). Chares (third expedition, first levy of citizens) : Schafer, ii. 
133, 141. Fall of Olynthus : Diod. xvi. 53. Olympic festival : Dem. xix. 192. 
Psephism against the traitors, § 267. 

Chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 301 

stirred by these great events ; and during their course De- 
mosthenes had acquired an entirely new position. He was 
not made responsible for the useless sacrifices and exer- 
tions ; it was felt that their failure had been nothing but 
a justification of his views : and the penetrating effect of 
his words is best shown from the fact, that the government 
party, which he had so uncompromisingly attacked, now 
saw occasion to approach its policy to that of Demosthenes. 
Eubulus had indeed at all times wished to see the honor 
and property of the State safe ; he had, moreover, invaria- 
bly expended part of the surplus upon the navy and the 
harbors-of-war ; he was no adherent of Philip's ; but he 
believed it necessary for the Athenians to confine them- 
selves to defending their own, instead of irritating the king 
and advancing independently. But now he took courage 
for conducting the affairs of the State in a more manly 
spirit. As if his eyes had been suddenly opened, he now 
perceived the threatening cloud, to which Demosthenes 
had been so long pointing, and now for his part too recog- 
nized the necessity incumbent upon the State of abandon- 
ing its attitude of expectant inaction, securing allies to its 
side, and at the head of states holding the same views as 
itself confronting the enemy of the fatherland. By reason 
of the extreme flabbiness and want of fixity which charac- 
terized his political views, he had little difficulty in mak- 
ing this change of movement ; moreover, he found among 
his adherents men enough, who readily exerted themselves 
in order to use this occasion for putting down him who 
had hitherto been the spokesman of the national policy. 
In particular he was assisted by a man who, while more 
able than any of his contemporaries to meet Demosthenes 
on equal terms as an orator, was decidedly his superior in 
many oratorical gifts which exercised a great effect upon 
the people, especially in the self-ingratiating charm of per- 
sonal appearance and in euphony of speech. This was 
iEschines, the son of Atrometus. 

802 History of Greece. [Booevh 

^schines ^ e was descended from an ancient civic 
the orator. family, but one which had lost its position 
during the Peloponnesian War, had therefore taken to 
migratory courses, and had fallen into all kinds of adven- 
turous industries. His father had for a time moved about 
as a mercenary in foreign service, and had then set up a 
primary school at Athens ; his mother is said to have filled 
the place of priestess in the foreign Mysterious cults, which 
at that time were very much in fashion (vol. iv. p. 82), 
and to have made commercial profit out of the superstition 
of the multitude. This restless industrial activity had 
likewise descended to their sons, all three of whom by 
means of flexibility of manner and a variety of talents con- 
trived to work their way up to considerable connexions 
and influential positions. This was the direct contrary of 
the position in life of Demosthenes, who opposes him- 
self to them with all the pride of the citizen-class estab- 
lished in its paternal inheritance, regarding as dishonorable 
not so much particular professions followed by the father 
and the brothers of iEschines, as rather the restless transi- 
tion from this to that, the incessant change, the want of 
dignity, the dependence on party-leaders, and above all the 
concentrated attention to making a way in the world, 
which determined their entire course of action. Most va- 
riegated of all was the life of JEschines himself. Born 
about 01. xc. 2 ; b. c. 390, he first began in his father's 
school-room to deserve well of his kind by grinding ink 
and scrubbing benches, then he served in the field, at 
Mantinea and in Eubcea, whence he was permitted to 
bring home the despatch announcing the victory of Pho- 
cion (p. 278) ; next, he did duty as scribe to all manner 
of subordinate public officers, wherein he acquired a routine 
experience as a " porer over records," and rose from the 
position of copying-clerk to the work of compiling state- 
papers. But he felt within him a soul for higher things, 
and a need for a wider recognition. He was a bel-esprit, 

chap, iii.i Athens and King Philip. 303 

and obeyed the impulse which called him to the stage. He 
let himself out to wandering protagonists or theatrical 
managers (p. 194), until he threw himself once more into 
public affairs, and now from his former subordinate posi- 
tions rapidly rose to higher places. He was several times 
chosen writer to the State, — and this through the influence 
of the omnipotent party-chiefs, of whom he became an 
officious follower, first of Aristophon and then of Eubulus. 
In these days, when all power lay in the hands of well- 
organized party-associations (pp. 126, 295), it was possible 
by means of skilful ways and servile officiousness to secure 
the favor of those in power, and, even without being a per- 
son of mark, to be brilliantly successful in candidatures 
for the offices of honor in the republic. Thus _ . . 
the brothers of jiEschines became generals and and Eukuiua 
envoys, and he became himself the confidential friend of 
Eubulus, and an orator and leader of public affairs. As 
an orator too he was the direct reverse of Demosthenes ; for 
his eloquence was not based upon serious studies, but upon 
happy presence of mind and natural versatility, which were 
supported by imaginative power, vivacity of sentiment, 
a fine intelligence and extensive practice in delivery. 
iEschines always remained an actor, who regarded the 
cause which he advocated as a part in a play, in which it 
behooved him to display his skill, and to keep his own in- 
terests in view. 

Thus he was now all the more ready to attach himself 
to the policy of Eubulus, inasmuch as it offered him the 
most welcome opportunity for brilliant orations. He too 
might now deliver Philippics, and speak with great pathos 
of the mission which had been bequeathed to the city of 
Athens by her ancestors. As at the time of the Persian 
Wars, so Athens must now also gather and array the 
resources of the population for the struggle imminent on 
behalf of her hearths and her freedom. In Peloponnesus 
the tendency of public opinion was favorable ; here a 

304 History of Greece. [ BooK VIL 

body of adherents ought to be formed, a strong patriot 
party, before Philip should have succeeded in bringing 
over the lesser states to his side. He spoke as a prophet 
speaks, and bore himself precisely as if the evil foe of the 
fatherland were a discovery of his own. The confederates 
ought to be summoned to a congress, and thus the city of 
Athens ought to be made once more, as in the days of 
old, the centre of free and freedom-loving Greece. 

This congress-policy was at bottom nothing but a 
feebler version of the policy of Demosthenes. The advo- 
cates of the former desired to turn to account for them- 
selves the high spirit which he had awakened ; they desired 
to appropriate his patriotic points of view, without their 
inconvenient consequences ; unwilling at once to renounce 
the easy comfort of the system of Eubulus, they intended 
to seek to renew the glory of the past by means of 
speeches and negotiations, instead of by personal service 
and pecuniary sacrifices. The citizens of course gladly 
gave themselves up to this delusion ; and great expecta- 
tions followed the envoys who were despatched to the 
widest variety of regions in Hellas, as in the times of 
Themistocles (vol. ii. p. 301). iEschines repaired to 
Megalopolis, where he made indignant speeches against 
all the traitors who took the side of the barbarian king ; in- 
deed, the very communities which at the critical moment 
„ . . had been left in the lurch (p. 261), were 

in Peio- called upon to confide in Athens and to ally 

ponnesus. r t J 

... , themselves with her, as the Great Power 

01. evin. 1 

(b. c. 348). whose mission it was to direct the affairs of the 
nation. At Athens itself, in consequence of the terror 
immediately inspired by the fall of Olynthus, serious 
armaments were entered upon. The city seemed now to 
be exposed without defence to the vengeance of the king ; 
the walls were repaired ; the Chersonnesus was made 
secure ; the watch over the sea was intensified.* 

* Concerning JSschines : ScMfer, i. 19L The year of his birth according 

CHAP, in.] Athens and King Philip. 305 

This warlike state of feeling was, however, neither 
universal nor thoroughly effective. On the contrary, 
already during the conflict on account of Olynthus the 
first manifestations of a longing for peace, which longing 
had been momentarily repressed, but had already grown 
to a considerable strength, had revealed themselves ; and 
a quite peculiar occasion had allowed this tendency to find 
open expression. A citizen of Athens, Phrynon by name, 
had during the season of the Olympic festival (01. cviii. 
i. ; b. c. 348), been captured by Macedonian privateers, 
and had then been liberated for a ransom. The 
Now, Phrynon considered, that, because his phrynon 
capture was a violation of the Sacred Peace, 
he could claim a repayment of the ransom ; and he sup- 
plicated the civic assembly to acknowledge his claim and 
to take up his case. Matters of personal interest of this 
kind were habitually treated with special favor at Athens ; 
and thus this affair too was in the midst of the war deemed 
of sufficient importance to cause the despatch of an en- 
voy concerning it into the Macedonian camp. 

To the king this mission was extremely welcome. It 
suited his wishes to find himself regarded as a prince with 
whom business was carried on according to Hellenic 
federal law; no equally admirable opportunity could 
have been furnished him, for playing a magnanimous part 
in a matter which was without the slightest D , 

° Phrynon 

importance to him, and for thus testifying his »™J . 
respect for the national ordinances ; lastly, he in Philip's 
was gratified to observe what petty affairs occu- 
pied the Athenians, at a time when they appeared to be 
confronting him in a more threatening attitude than ever 
before. And the king was at all times specially skilful in 
taking advantage of insignificant occurrences of this de- 
scription, so as to confer obligations upon men of note, and 

to the same, i. 49. TpaixfiaTOKv^utv : Dem. xviii. 209. Tpannarevs it}* iroktwt; 
xix. 249. Envoy : § 10 and 304. 

306 History of Greece. t BooB - vil 

in the midst of his camp to begin to weave the unobserved 
threads, which for his ulterior purposes he desired to hold 
in his hands. 

As he had intended, Phrynon and Ctesiphon, the en- 
voy, returned in a highly contented frame of mind from 
his headquarters, and reported to the civic assembly the 
extreme courtesy with which they had been treated by the 
king. He was, they stated, anything but the raging fiend 
and barbarian, as which he was usually depicted on the 
orators* tribune, but on the contrary, obliging, affable, and 
devoted to Hellenic manners. The impression received by 
them communicated itself to the civic assembly ; and such 
was the mood produced, that Philocrates, one of those who 
had earliest entered into relations with the Macedonian 
court, was able immediately to move that, in case the king 
entertained an intention of concluding peace, he should be 
permitted to send a herald. This contravened a previous 
proposal which, in accordance with a precedent of earlier 
times (vol. ii. p. 334), had made penal any negotiation 
with the enemy of the land. The motion was passed ; 
and, although it remained for the present without results, 
yet the path had been opened, and Philip had through his 
partisans established a firm footing at Athens. 

If, then, already during the war a tendency towards 
peace made a way fur itself, how much more was this the 
case after the war was over ! The king now held all the 
coasts and port-towns of Thrace completely in his hands ; 
h his armies marched unopposed from the 

for peaoe on southern border of Thessaly up to the Helles- 
pont and the Bosporus. Whatsoever, there- 
fore, still remained to the Athenians of possessions beyond 
the sea, was now in immediate peril ; and if the war were 
now to continue, what means existed for rendering them 
secure, after the one ally had fallen ? With reference to 
Amphipolis also, it will be remembered, the sole hope of 
the Athenians was based on the attempt to give validity 

chap, in.] Athena and King Philip. 307 

to their claims by means of a peaceable understanding with 
Philip. The king himself, it was well known, had no in- 
terest in seeing the war continue ; the coasts of his empire 
suffered heavily from it, the mercantile navy could not de- 
velop itself, nor general prosperity prevail. By land 
Philip felt himself not less impeded by Athens ; for he re- 
quired to seek to obtain, by means of a pacification, free- 
dom of action for his operations in Central Greece. Last- 
ly, he was much interested in establishing relations of alli- 
ance and friendship with the Athenians, because their 
course of conduct determined that of the other Hellenes, 
who still shrank from any overtures on his part. Under 
these circumstances the conclusion of a peace on fair terms 
might be regarded as possible ; and even the most zealous 
patriots seriously contemplated such a transaction. 

Thus strangely, then, had the relations between the 
several parties shifted. While Eubulus and ^Eschines 
eagerly preached the prosecution of the war, Demosthenes 
supported the motion of Philocrates, and declared it to be 
folly to bind oneself down to perpetual hostilities. He 
was at this time again the one man who pursued a fixed 
policy. He perceived how, under present circumstances, 
Athens could only lose by continuing the war, and that in 
her present exhaustion she urgently needed a period of a 
cessation of arms, in order to gather fresh strength and to 
form a league of allies, which could not be brought to- 
gether during the war. 

Those who were Macedonian at heart encouraged the 
inclination for peace, and were most vigorously supported 
by the king, when a new opportunity was afforded him for 
conferring a favor. The question was as to the fate of the 
Athenians who had been taken prisoners in Olynthus. 
Aristodemus, the actor, was sent to Macedonia on business; 
and since he as well as the Athenians who had been at 
once liberated unanimously testified to an urgent wish on 
the part of the king, to convert his hostile relations with 

308 History of Greece, £ BoOK vn - 

Athens Into peace and an alliance, Philocrates took the 
second step in his well-considered course of action, and 
proposed the despatch of an embassy, which should call 
upon the king to send plenipotentiaries to Athens, in order 
to negotiate with the city. It was on this occasion, then, 
that for the first time men of the most diverse party-stand- 
points combined ; for Eubulus, too, had again receded from 
his war-policy, which had not been so very seriously intended, 
and came forward in support of Philocrates. Amidst uni- 

Embassy versal assent and joyous expectations an em- 
to Peiia. bassy was named in February 346, consisting 

(u/cHSe). °f ten men, among them Philocrates as pro- 
poser of the motion, Aristoderaus, Phrynon, 
iEschines, to whom, on the suggestion of Philocrates, was 
added Demosthenes. The eleventh was a representative 
of the Attic Federal Council, Aglaocreon of Tenedos ; for 
it seemed to be in accordance with the dignity of the city, 
as well as with the interests of the confederates, that 
Athens should not treat as a single city, but as that hold- 
ing the primacy among her confederates. 

Instructions in a definite form could not be given to the 
envoys on their mission ; for they were merely to find out 
the intentions of the king. But all sincere statesmen at 
Athens were at one on this point : that there could be no 
thought of any honest peace, unless the king, in accordance 
with his promise, were to surrender Amphipolis, and to 
give pledges for the status quo of territorial possessions, 
particularly in the Chersonnesus. 

For king Philip it was a triumph, compensating for 
many campaigns, when he gave audience at Pella to the 
Attic embassy, the mere composition of which clearly 
proved to him that the desire for peace united all parties, 
and brought to his court his most decided adversaries. He 
now had them before him in a sphere of action where he 
was to a far higher degree their superior than even in land 
or maritime war. 

chap, in] Athens and King Philip. 309 

He listened benevolently to the orations of ^ sc hines 
the envoys, one after the other. The fullest f" d Der " os - 

J ' thenes at 

and best composed was that of JEschines, who Pella - 
spoke before Demosthenes, the youngest and the last of the 
envoys ; Demosthenes is said to have found himself falter- 
ing, and in the end, notwithstanding the encouragements 
of the king, to have lapsed into silence — so ^Eschines re- 
lates, doubtless exaggerating. But it may well be believed, 
considering the awkwardness which clung to him by 
nature, that Demosthenes felt confused among surround- 
ings which were utterly strange to him. His passionate 
character made him ill-suited for the artistic orations of 
diplomacy; and, moreover, he could not but feel specially 
ill at ease in the presence of a prince whom he had so vio- 
lently attacked. Finally, if iEschines, in order to put 
himself forward at the expense of others, discussed the 
subjects which according to a previous agreemeni he was 
to have left to the speaker succeeding him, it is not hard 
to understand that in this audience Demosthenes found 
no opportunity for giving proofs of his art as an orator. 
But in the ears of the king, the phrases of iEschines 
must have likewise had a very ridiculous sound, when that 
orator went back to the times of Theseus in order to 
demonstrate the claims of Athens upon Amphipolis, as if 
the question were one concerning a disputed inheritance, 
which admitted of being settled by the evidence of family 
papers. But Philip, instead of allowing his real sentiments 
to become apparent, most graciously responded to the 
speeches which he had heard, and was gratified by the sur- 
prising impression palpably made upon all by the skilful- 
ness of his answer. With regard to the point at issue, he 
declared gently, but firmly: that in the interests of his 
kingdom he could not give up such places as Amphipolis 
and Potidsea; the status quo of the possessions held on 
either side he was gladly ready to acknowledge as the basis 
of a peace; and, in conclusion, he held out to the Athe- 

310 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

nians the prospect of the greatest advantages from the 
actual conclusion of an alliance. 

Those who heard the report of the envoys on their re- 
turn home, could not long fail to perceive how admirably 
Philip had turned the entire mission to account for his 
own interests. Philocrates and iEschines had become de- 
cided partisans of the king. They represented everything 
in the most satisfactory light, and never wearied of extol- 
ling their reception at court. The terrible enemy of the 
nation had become an unselfish friend and benefactor, 
the barbarian a perfect Hellene. Demosthenes alone 
maintained a dignified bearing. To him it was a necessity 
of life to carry on everything in which he engaged with 
full seriousness ; and for this reason he had, from the mo- 
ment when — according to his most thorough conviction — 
he was bound to advise against the continuance of a hope- 
less war, worked with the most single-minded zeal for the 
consummation of the peace. In his view, everything de- 
pended upon that peace being brought about soon, in or- 
der that by its settled conclusion the hands of the king 
might likewise be bound, and he deprived of his oppor- 
tunities for further intervention. For this reason he had 
to the utmost of his power hastened the despatch of the 
embassy ; for the same reason he now met with severe re- 
monstrance the futile talk about the personal bearing of 
Philip. He demanded that the question at issue should 
alone be kept in view, and did what he could to have the 
necessary preparations made for the reception of the en- 
voys who had been announced, and to have the business 
speedily settled.* 

It was the festival of the Dionysia, when the envoys ar- 
rived. In order to show himself polite towards the 
Athenians, Philip had selected personages of the highest 

* Phrynon: JEschin. ii. 12. Philocrates: §18. Audience at Pella: £22 

Debates in 
le civic as- 

Chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 311 

rank — Enrylochus, and with him the king's two most inti- 
mate associates, of best-proved experience in 
the field and at the council-board, Antipater th { 
and Parmenio.* Demosthenes provided for cern^ngTho 
their reception ; as to outward forms nothing Peace - 
was to be neglected, in order worthily to return J? 1 ^ 111- 2 (B ' 
the hospitality shown to the Athenians. There- 15th A rf . 
upon ensued the decisive discussions in the 
civic assembly, on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion 
(April the 15th and 16th). They were livelier than the 
Macedonians might have expected after their first impre$ - 
sion as to the state of opinion at Athens ; the royal mes 
sage exercised no satisfactory effect. And how could it 
have been otherwise? 

True, the message sounded very gracious. The potent 
king solemnly declared his wish to conclude a peace with 
Athens, in which both states with their allies on either 
side should guarantee to one another the status quo of 
their territorial possessions, and at the same time enter 
into a mutual promise of armed aid against all acts of 
hostility. Freedom of intercourse was to begin at once ; 
to the Athenians it was to be reserved to render the sea 
secure, and any State practising piracy was to be treated 
as an enemy by both parties. But, examined more nar- 
rowly, this message was in itself, according to the signifi- 
cation of its terms, the most disadvantageous of bases for 
an agreement. For in the case of a State, which had, 
during the last ten years, invariably lost ground, the ac- 
knowledgment according to the forms of international law 
of the status quo signified nothing short of an absolute con- 
fession of defeat ; while, in the case of Philip, who by 
craft and by force had everywhere over-reached the Athe- 
nians, it meant victory, pure and simple ; and it was in 
truth merely a bitter mockery, that conditions such as vic- 

* Antipater and Parmenio; Dem. xix. 69. 

312 History of Greece. [ b °<>k vil 

tor dictates to the vanquished, should be clothed in the 
form of a league of friendship desiderated by the victor. 
The advantages of free traffic likewise principally fell to 
the lot of the Macedonian coast-towns, which suffered most 
during the blockade on trade ; and the seemingly honora- 
ble recognition of the maritime supremacy as due to the 
Athenians was after all at bottom simply an onerous obli- 
gation, w T hich they w r ere to undertake on behalf of Mace- 
donia. The sum of the advantages gained was therefore 
to be limited to this : that Philip bound himself to leave 
to the Athenians, their actual possessions, of course for 
precisely so long as it suited him to observe the treaty. 

There accordingly arose lively manifestations of opposi- 
tion, when Philocrates placed this message before the as- 
sembly as the basis of the peace, and recommended its 
adoption. But the force of opposition was crippled from 
the outset by the fact, that it was impossible to suggest 
any change of this proposed basis ; it stood there unaltera- 
bly fixed ; any counter-motion was out of the question ; 
there accordingly only remained the choice between ob- 
taining the ardently desired repose of peace on these con- 
ditions, or rushing at once into a more violent war, and 
one which would have to be carried on without allies, 
against an enemy of overpowering strength, whom noth- 
ing could prevent from inflicting upon Athens her death- 
blow by means of the conquest of the Chersonnesus, — 
against an enemy, who had quite recently shown how he 
was able to chastise the defiance of his adversaries. 

The voices of impassioned patriots, who desired to see all 
negotiations on such a basis broken off without further 
ado, were therefore unable to create an impression. There 
was not, however, the same objection to an attempt being 
possibly made, by means of an alteration in the terms in 
which Philocrates had drawn up his proposals, to gain 
something for the honor and the advantage of Athens. 
Philocrates had introduced a clause, whereby of the con- 

chap, ihj Athena and King Philip. 313 

federates of Athens, to whom the peace was to be ex- 
tended, two were expressly excepted, viz. the inhabitants 
of Halus in Thessaly, on the Pagassean gulfe, and the Pho- 
cians. The former were at war with Philip, the latter 
with Thebes. Of course this clause had been drawn up 
in the interests, and by command of, Macedonia ; but it 
was not included in the royal message. Accordingly 
there was more freedom of action left on this head ; and it 
was at this point that Demosthenes intervened in the de- 
bates, in order to combat the proposals of Philocrates. In 
this endeavor he could appeal to a decree of the deputies 
of the Attic Naval Confederation, which empowered the 
Athenian assembly to conclude peace with Philip for the 
confederates as well as for themselves, but with this addi- 
tion, — that an interval of three months should be fixed, 
during which the other Hellenic communities were like- 
wise to be permitted to accede to the treaty of peace. 

This demand was based upon a very intelli- The reso 
gent judgment of the existing state of affairs ; p e "° e ° a ° fthe 
and the idea readily suggests itself, that De- council, 
mosthenes had borne a part in the drawing-up of this 
resolution. In no other way was an honest and lasting 
peace possible, and one which could not at any moment be 
called into question by Philip. In this case Athens would 
re-assume her mission of providing for the safety of Hellas, 
and her present confederates would be all the more secure 
of their rights and liberties, in proportion as the greater 
number of parties joined the treaty of peace. Mytilene 
had quite recently freed herself from her Tyrant, and re- 
newed the league with Athens. If this example was fol- 
lowed, a league of Hellenes might once more form itself, 
which would challenge respect, and the treaty with king 
Philip might receive a national significance. This resolution 
of the confederates was therefore recommended by Demos- 
thenes to his fellow-citizens as the basis of the peace ; they 
recognized the truth, that thus alone the honor of the city 

314 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

would be satisfied, and a real peace secured ; and it was 
only the advent of evening which prevented the adoption 
of a decree in this sense.* 

Second ^ n tne next ^ a y> on wn ^ cn this important 

debate. question was to be decided, the same current of 

(B.'cTSi6). opinion prevailed. Demosthenes renewed his 
propositions ; and the assembly was so decidedly 
against an unconditional acceptance of the basis brought 
forward by Philocrates, that its author was prevented by 
clamor and hisses from being heard. But hereupon it 
appeared, that under these circumstances there was danger 
of the entire project of peace coming to nothing; for the 
Macedonians declared themselves obliged to adhere to the 
motion of Philocrates as the one admissible basis ; they 
very well understood that their king was in a very essen- 
tial degree more fettered by the additional paragraph 
suggested ; and that, in case of the latter receiving the 
sanction of the assembly, it was only by means of an open 
rupture of the peace that he would be able to execute 
ulterior schemes of war in Hellas. Only if his intentions 
had been honestly pacific, could he have assented to the 
proposition of Demosthenes. Under this aspect of affairs 
the peace-party was obliged in the second assembly to un- 
dertake the serious task of inducing the citizens to change 
their views ; and no hearing being accorded to Philocrates, 
it was now the turn of iEschines. He was still supposed 
to share the political sentiments of Demosthenes; indeed, 
on the journey to Pella he had called upon the latter to 
join him in keeping a strict watch over the members of 
the embassy who were less to be depended upon in their 
relations towards Macedonia. And in truth on the first 
day of the assembly he had spoken in lively terms against 
Philocrates. "Never," he had said, "so long as a single 
Athenian remains alive, shall I advise the adoption of such 

* Resolution of the Federal Council : ^Eschin. iii. 69. Mytilene joins the 
Confederation : Rangab*, Antiq. Hellen. ii. 401. 

Chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 315 

a peace as this;" but at the same time he had energetically 
insisted upon the necessity of concluding peace. He now 
abandoned his attitude of opposition, and very skilfully 
passed over to a recommendation of peace at any price. 
The Athenians, he now said, ought not only to imitate the 
greatness of their ancestors, but also to avoid their faults. 
It was reckless popular orators who had driven the Athe- 
nians to the siege of Syracuse. A prudent estimation of 
what under the circumstances could be secured, was alone 
capable of saving the State at dangerous crises. The pro- 
posal for taking into consideration the Hellenes who had 
not yet acceded, the cunning orator contrived to represent 
in such a light, as if it revealed an unintelligent weakness 
and want of independence. Athens was perfectly free, 
being supported by no other State, neither need she take 
any other into account ; nor was she bound to let her reso- 
lutions as to war and peace depend upon the assent of 
others. This Sophistic reasoning, which contrived to repre- 
sent the national policy as an unfree one, and a craven 
pursuit of particular state-interests as the only policy 
worthy of Athens, was supported by ^Eschines with the 
whole force of his eloquence. It behooved him on this 
day to let the Macedonians see a proof of his influence; 
and in this attempt he derived advantage from his reputa- 
tion for patriotism, and more especially from the actual 
situation of affairs. The peace, which all were agreed in 
desiring, was not to be secured without an alliance; equally 
impossible was it to obtain an alliance open to communi- 
ties which might accede afterwards, and to the Phocians. 

Philip was the one power feared, and the power feared 
by all. In his hands still remained the captive Athenians, 
whose lives were in danger, unless the peace were consum- 
mated. It is therefore not wonderful that the citizens 
should have gradually inclined to unconditional accept- 
ance, in particular since at all events the express exclusion 
of the Phocians and Haleans was omitted from the treaty. 


16 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

This served tlie Athenians as a species of consolation, 
although what it really amounted to was, that it was now 
left to Philip to decide, whom he would reckon among the 
confederates. The royal envoys expressly denied any 
willingness on the part of Philip to include the Phocians 
in the term ; notwithstanding which, Attic orators were to 
be found, who believed that they knew better, and that 
they were able to promise more ; Philip, they said, from 
consideration for the Thessalians and the Thebans, could 
not well at the present moment admit the Phocians into 
the alliance; this state of things would change, and the 
king would soon do of his own accord what the party of 
Demosthenes was now attempting to force him into doing. 
™ „ The Athenians allowed themselves to be de- 

The Peace 

accepted. luded by such pretences as these ; and when 
lastly Eubulus came forward, who told them point-blank 
that they had at the present moment to choose, whether 
they would immediately take their seats on the rowers* 
benches, pay war-taxes, and renounce the festival -moneys, 
or accept the motion of Philocrates, — then, under the ter- 
rific impression created by this alternative, the vote was 
taken and the motion was adopted.* 

Embas -^ ^ n * s P eace muc h had been given up, and 

of ratifica- little had been gained ; but even this slight 
gain was anything but well assured. For 
while in general great importance was attached to the 
rule, that the envoys of foreign powers should come to 
Athens with absolute powers (vol. iii. p. 306), this was 
not the case with the envoys of Philip. For the king had 
from the first so arranged matters that, after the Attic 
community had bound itself down to certain terms an 
interval of freedom of action should still remain for him- 
self, until it should seem suitable to him to bind himself 

* iEschines formerly in agreement with the views of Demosthenes : Dem. 
xix. 344, $eq. ; Westermann, Qucest. Dem. iii. 36. 

chap, iilj Athens and King Philip. 317 

in his turn. It had therefore been settled, that after the 
departure of his envoys, who were to receive the oath of 
the Athenians and of their confederates, an Attic embassy 
should come to Pella, in order that there by the adminis- 
tering of an oath to the king and his allies, the whole 
peace-negotiation should arrive at its consummation. For 
this reason Demosthenes was at once intent upon urging a 
speedy administering of the oath to the king, lest the 
advantages of the treaty, the conclusion of which he had 
been unable to prevent, should in the meantime be cur- 
tailed. But this danger was very imminent. For, while 
Athens immediately abandoned all ideas of war, and 
surrendered herself to the long-desired enjoyment of peace, 
the king was in the midst of war against Cersobleptes, — 
in other words, in the region most dangerous to Athens. 
Here, while the Athenians were delivering orations, he 
was taking one town after the other ; the peace was based 
upon the status quo ; whatsoever, therefore, Philip should 
have conquered, whether by force or by sleight, before 
taking the oath, the Athenians would according to the 
terms of the peace be obliged to recognise as his property.* 

For the administration of the oath the same eleven 
men were chosen who had composed the first embassy. 
This time it was only with inner repugnance that Demos- 
thenes brought himself to take part in it ; he foresaw, 
that it would bring him nothing but vexation and anguish 
of heart, without his being capable of rendering any effec- 
tive service to his native city ; for he could not place 
confidence in a single one of his colleagues ; they were all 
untrustworthy, or pursued directly different interests from 
those of their native city ; and this absence of patriotism 
was the more alarming, inasmuch as the welfare of the 
city was absolutely placed in the hands of the envoys. 
The slight amount of confidence reposed in them by the 

* Peace on the basis of the status quo — exarepovs ex«v 8. lx ov<Tlv '• [Dem.] 
vii. 26. 

318 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

civic community itself, is already evident from the instruc- 
tions given them on their departure, to the effect that 
none of them should negotiate singly with the king. 
Demosthenes seems to have been the leader of the embas- 
sy, the trusted agent proper of the civic community ; nor 
could he have given any more splendid proof of his self- 
denying devotion than by accepting this office. 

Already at Athens the most vexatious disputes com- 
menced. Demosthenes demanded an immediate depar- 
ture ; while his colleagues allowed day after day to go by. 
A fortnight after the oath had been sworn at Athens, he 
obtained a decree of the Senate in accordance with his 
views, whereby at the same time the commander of the 
Attic naval station on the north coast of Eubcea, was 
instructed to transport the envoys immediately to the 
point where Philip might happen momentarily to be. 
These express orders were not executed ; and, instead of 
joining the king by the shortest way, the envoys tra- 
velled through Thesssaly and Macedonia by easy stages 
The envoys to ^ >e ^ a j there to await the king. Thus, a 
atPeiia. business which might have been settled in 

(b. c. 346). eight days was protracted through as many 
June. weeks ; and this procrastination was due to a 
secret understanding with the Macedonians, whose hints 
were submissively obeyed by the envoys, while they con- 
temned the commands of their own city. Philip was 
desirous of bringing to an end the Thracian campaign, 
which he had opened in person at the beginning of spring, 
without being troubled by the expression of wishes on the 
part of the Athenians. The Chersonnesus he had 
promised to spare ; but there was no obligation to prevent 
him from taking several places occupied by Athenian 
garrisons, from forcing Cersobleptes to submit to his 
suzerainty, and from gathering in at his ease the whole 
harvest of the war, while the envoys were waiting in his 
palace, where the full splendor of royalty quenched the 

chap, iii.] Athens and King Philip. 319 

last remnants of republican sentiment, and the multitude 
of deputies from the widest variety of states produced the 
impression, that Pella was the spot where the destinies of 
the Greek world were decided. 

When, therefore, the Athenians brought forward their 
demands, it was in a very tame and timid fashion. There 
was no longer any serious question as to the restoration 
of the places which had been taken since the conclusion 
of the peace ; attention was already exclusively occupied 
by what was about to happen. For it was soon perceived 
that Philip had not the slightest intention of disarming ; a 
general peace, which had been hoped for at Athens, by no 
means formed part of his plans ; and the envoys thought 
themselves obliged to arrange their proceedings accordingly. 

This occasioned fresh quarrels among them. Demos- 
thenes, ever conscientious, insisted upon its being their 
duty simply to accomplish the orders of the civic assem- 
bly, while iEschines entertained a totally different 
opinion. He conducted himself in a very lordly style, 
and in his culture as a man of the world felt himself far 
superior to the plain burgher, the uncommunicative and 
sullen Demosthenes. In the eyes of iEschines, the ad- 
ministering of the oath was a quite secondary matter ; his 
desire was not to do mere messenger's duty, but to engage 
in statesmanship on his own account. It behooved the 
embassy, he opined, actively to advance the interest of 
Athens according as circumstances permitted ; this was 
the reason why the instructions given to them had been so 
vague ; and if Philip, as he indubitably would, marched 
into Phocis, the interests of Athens involved in the immi- 
nent war ought already at the present moment to be as- 
serted. But these very interests were viewed by iEschines 
from a thoroughly narrow-minded party-stand-point ; for 
he begrudged the Thebans the friendship of Philip, and 
sought to irritate the latter against Thebes, by approv- 
ing in general of his intended intervention in the affairs 

320 History of Greece. [Book va 

of Delphi, and merely wishing to bring about, in con- 
nexion therewith, a humiliation of Thebes. 

Demosthenes was powerless as against his colleagues, 
yet he was indefatigably at work ; even now he sought to 
make the conditions of the treaty more comprehensive, 
and to provide for the accession to it of other states. But 
in this respect again Philip would not consent to let his 
freedom of action be fettered. He insisted upon the Pho- 
cians being expressly excluded ; Cersobleptes, too, was to 
be mentioned no longer as an Attic confederate, but as 
one of the allies of the king ; and similarly the inhabitant? 
of Cardia. In giving way on this head, the envoys mani- 
festly exceeded their powers; but the king was deter- 
mined upon having the result of the last few weeks of war 
recognized as an accomplished fact ; and all that Demos- 
thenes was able to obtain was, that on his application the 
king promised the liberation of the Attic citizens who 
were still living as prisoners-of-war in Macedonia ; even this, 
however, was not granted immediately, but merely promised, 
in order that the fulfilment might be a fresh benefit 
conferred by the king, and as such might exercise its ef- 
fect at the proper time. The services, which by means of 
representations, advances of money and gifts, Demosthenes 
was able to render to his fellow-citizens, were in the end 
the solitary bright points in the dark proceeding at the 
royal court, which daily became more intolerable to him. 
For he had to see the envoys from Sparta, Thebes, Thessa- 
ly, Phocis, assembled in the presence of the king, seeking 
a cure of their ills from him, courting his favor, submit- 
ting to his decision, quarrelling with one another before 
his very eyes. And in the midst of his deep grief he had 
not even the satisfaction of being able to send tidings of 
the truth to Athens ; for the report was drawn up in the 
sense of the majority. In this fatal Pella he was as it 
were betrayed and sold by his adversaries. He wished 
to return home alone ; even in this he failed. Philip was 

chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 321 

not willing, that already at the present moment informa- 
tion should reach Athens as to the condition of affairs', 
and Demosthenes found himself obliged to accompany the 
king conjointly with the other envoys on his military ex- 
pedition into Thessaly. 

The invitation to this journey was appar- The envoys 
ently a special honor ; for Philip pretended p^ff/"^^ 
that he desired to claim the mediation of the Thessaly. 
envoys with reference to the city of Hal us, whose case 
Athens had advocated. But in point of fact it was mere- 
ly an application of force, to which the envoys, partly vol- 
untarily and partly against their will, submitted, and an 
artfully calculated advantage to Philip. For to him it 
was of the utmost consequence to give a peaceable aspect 
to the march of his army, to invest his personal dignity 
with splendor by means of a suite composed of a series of 
Greek embassies, and as long as possible to conceal his 
real intentions. Lastly, the envoys likewise served him 
as pledges, that in the meantime no dangerous resolutions 
would be taken at Athens, which, considering the general 
agitation excited by the king's new armaments, was in it- 
self not impossible. Incidentally, the march through 
Thessaly was made use of in order to swear the towns of 
the land as allies of Philip to the peace concluded be- 
tween him and Athens. This was done at Pherse. But 
this act in more than one respect signified in reality only 
a new mockery of legal right. It was performed in an 
utterly informal way at an inn ; and the representatives 
of the communities were private individuals, whom the 
king had seen fit to summon to this comedy, while several 
towns were not represented at all. But since a further 
circuit on the part of the envoys was not at the present 
time in accordance with his plans, he assumed the respon- 
sibility for the defective execution of their instructions, 
and furnished them with a letter in reference to this point 
to the Council and civic assembly. This disgrace again 


322 History of Greece. [BookVK 

was submissively accepted by the envoys ; and thus, after 
an absence of seventy days, they returned to their fellow- 
citizens who were awaiting them with impatience.* 
w . . Among them Demosthenes alone could cross 

Report of ° 

the embassy the frontiers of his native state with a good 

in the Coun- ° 

cil - conscience, rejoiced to have exchanged the 

P 1, cv J!h 2 atmosphere of the Macedonian court and the 

(B. c. 316). t r 

odious company of traitors for the Attic soil, 

9th July. 

where he could again breathe and speak with 
freedom. At last he found himself once more in the 
midst of the Council, the majority of which knew how to 
appreciate him ; and here, many other witnesses being 
likewise present, he gave a full account of the entire 
course of the embassy. He showed, how from the outset 
all the orders given by the city had been treated with 
contempt, and all its interests neglected ; he showed, how 
by means of malignant delays Cersobleptes and the Thra- 
cian towns had been sacrificed ; he laid bare the continual 
private understanding with the king, the officious promo- 
tion of all his designs, the unwarranted interference to the 
disadvantage of Thebes ; he described the march through 
Thessaly, on which the envoys, detained under deceptive 
pretexts, had been obliged to accompany the king as far 
as Thermopylae, where he now stood at the head of all 
his forces, in order, so soon as he saw fit, to penetrate into 
the centre of Hellas. In fact, Athens could hardly have 
suffered greater losses by an unfortunate war, than by this 
embassy of peace. The Council thoroughly shared the 
indignation of Demosthenes ; a decree of the Council was 
drawn up in his sense, and laid before the civic assembly. 
From the latter, too, a similar judgment was to be ex- 

* Decree of the Senate for hastening the embassy, obtained by Demos- 
thenes on the third of Munychion (April 29th) : JSschin. ii. 91, seq. He is to 
be regarded as the leader of the embassy ; cf. Sch&fer, ii. 241. The envoys 
at Pella : Dem. xix. 255, seq. ; napovrtov T<av Trpe'cr/Sewv w? cwos etrrcii' ef andarfi 
t»j? 'EAAafio?, jEschin. ii. 112.— Philip sworn (after the middle of June): Dem, 
xviii. 32. The allies sworn : id. xix. 158. 

Chap, iii.] Athens and King Philip. 323 

pected; and in that case the whole situation might still 

In the assembly, however, the debates took a Debate8 in 
totally different and unexpected course. Here the assembly. 
the Macedonian party had prepared every- ^ c cv ^- 2 
thing in the best possible way for gaining over 
the credulous multitude. ^Eschines again 
played the principal part. He had not the least inten- 
tion of justifying himself; the powers of the envoys were 
hardly mentioned. All the more fully he discussed the 
entire general situation with an assured insight, such as w r as 
only to be secured by a politician initiated into the secrets 
of the great. Undoubtedly, he said in a light tone, Philip 
was standing at Thermopylae, but upon that nothing de- 
pended ; the real point at issue was the nature of his in- 
tentions. Now, he could assure them that Philip was 
standing there as a friend ; for through the successful 
mediation of her envoys, Athens had secured the good-will 
of the powerful king to such a degree that she was on that 
account envied by all states. Neither had Philip any evil 
designs as against Phocis; on the contrary, he had the 
ruin of another city in view, — and here the orator was not 
ashamed to place before the citizens the prospect of the 
overthrow of Thebes as a piece of good fortune, which 
would not be paid for at too dear a price, even were 
Philip on this occasion to chance to penetrate, arms in 
hand, into Hellas. Thus he took advantage of the base 
impulses in the character of the Athenian people in order 
to gain applause. He concluded in the favorite style, by 
stating that for the present moment he was unfortunately 
still obliged to preserve silence as to the greatest advan- 
tages of all, which were to be expected from the king, and 
left it to the fancy of his hearers to interpret this to mean 
the acquisition of Eubcea and Oropus, the restoration of 
Platsese, &c. 

Demosthenes, desirous of warning the Athenians who 

324 History of Greece. [BookVU 

were intoxicated by delusive hopes, could not obtain a 
bearing ; bis voice was drowned in clamor, be was de- 
rided and pusbed back. Philocrates and bis associates 
were in command of the assembly ; be was even able to 
carry tbe motion, tbat the blessed bond of peace which 
had now been knit, had best be at once made obligatory 
upon all subsequent generations, and that the Athenians 
should immediately declare their readiness, in the case of 
a prolonged resistance on the part of the Phocians against 
the general peace, to furnish aid to the king for its estab- 
D .„. mA This motion was of course likewise based 

f nmp and 

Thermopylae U p 0n an agreement with king Philip, from 
whom, so soon as everything had been duly prepared, a 
letter arrived, in which he invited the Athenians, as his 
newly-gained allies, to march out with him against Phocis, 
in order, in the interests of the public security, to put an 
end to the abominations in progress there. The actual 
despatch of an auxiliary force can hardly have been ex- 
pected ; to the king it sufficed to feel himself safe on the 
side of Athens in his Phocian schemes ; for this was to 
him the main point, which he had from the outset had in 
view during the whole of the transactions concerning the 
peace. For was not the Attic power in Thrace so near to 
a collapse, and was not the advantage there in every re- 
spect so decidedly on the side of Philip, that he could at 
any time execute his wishes according to his own choice ? 
But the case was different with his schemes in Greece. Here, 
Athens was a power which might cause him serious diffi- 
culties. For if he wished to secure his immediate object, 
it was requisite for him to be master of Thermopylae, which 
inlet was at present controlled by Phalsecus with his 
garrisons at Nicsea and Alponus. The king was unable 
to advance, so long as the Athenians were ready to support 
Phalaecus and again to throw troops into the pass by way 
of the Euboean Sea (p. 80) ; nor, again, was Phalsecus able 

chap. in. j Athens and King Philip. 325 

to hold the pass, unless, if it should prove necessary, the 
Athenians covered his rear and flank. For either side, 
therefore, everything depended upon the attitude of 
Athens ; and as to this Philip had to be on his guard. 
For while it was of course by no means part of his inten- 
tion to take the pass by storm like Xerxes, yet he was well 
aware that whatever remnants of national feeling still sur- 
vived among the Greeks were roused by the name of Ther- 
mopylae ; it was even now an idea intolerable, nay all but 
inconceivable, to them, that a foreign king should appear 
with an armed force on the hither side of that pass. The 
entrance into the interior, therefore, still remained a diffi- 
cult task for Philip.* 

All other respects circumstances had as- p ni u P 
sumed as favorable an aspect as possible for | u ^™t ned 
Philip. The Phocians had, notwithstanding Phocis. 
the defeat of Onomarchus (p. 79), remained invincible to 
the Thebans, and were still masters of a great part of the 
Boeotian country, holding fortified places such as Orcho- 
menus and Coronea. Raids incessantly occurred from the 
one territory into the other; and although the Thebans 
not unfrequently fought with success, yet upon the whole 
the war was far more ruinous to them than to their adver- 
saries, because they mostly conducted it on their own soil 
and by means of their own men, whose places were not so 
easily filled as those of mercenaries. The war protracted 
itself from year to year; it became a more and more in- 
tolerable national pest to all Hellas ; nor could the convic- 
tion be escaped, that it would not be brought to a decision 
by the contending parties. Now, if a third power was to 
intervene, it could only be the Macedonian, to which all 
eyes turned. In this respect the Macedonian party 
had long been active ; it had, indeed, brought about an 

* Report delivered before the Council : Dem. xix. 31 ; in the civic assem- 
bly, gl9; ^schin. ii. 121. Motion of Philocratee: Dem. xix. 47. Philip's 
letter: §51. 

326 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

application on the part of Thebes to Philip ; following the 
example of Thessaly, from whose fate they were unable to 
take warning, the Thebans supplicated for succor at the 
same court, which had once been in a relation of inde- 
pendence towards them (p. 44). The Thessalians too 
demanded a Phocian war under Macedonian leadership; 
and inasmuch as it was still an arduous task to govern 
them, Philip now had the best opportunity of diverting 
them from home affairs by means of a war which satisfied 
their ambition as well as their craving for vengeance, and 
of thereby at the same time gaining his personal objects. 
He was able in a season of dire national distress to appear 
among the Greeks as their one possible preserver, whose 
services in this capacity were on several sides actually de- 
sired ; and his sole fear was that the power of the Phocians 
might possibly without his intervention collapse, like a fire 
at an end of its fuel. 

And in truth the resources of the robber-state could not 
but gradually exhaust themselves. Out of the Delphic 
treasury gold and silver to the value of more than two 
millions sterling are said to have been coined, and ex- 
pended upon the court of the Tyrants and the pay of 
the soldiery (p. 75). Finally the ebb appeared, without 
new resources opening themselves. This also involved the 
internal affairs of Phocis in worse and worse complica- 
tions. After the death of Phayllus, Phalsecus, the son of 
Onomarchus, had become captain-general of the land. 
Under him disturbances broke out, by which his rule too 
was temporarily interrupted. Since the temple had now 
been emptied, a hunt was made for moneys fraudulently 
appropriated, which it was sought to force out of the 
hands of their possessors by means of penal indictments. 

Hereupon, however, it became unavoidable to look 
around for help from abroad ; and for this purpose 
Athens was by far the most important State. Upon the 
relations between Athens and Phocis depended the future 

Chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 327 

of Greece. As on a former occasion the Thebans, so now 
the Phocians sued for the federal aid of Athens for the 
warding-off of foreign intervention in Central Greece ; for 
since the meeting of envoys at Pella the Athenians might 
know with certainty, that they would be the next object 
of the political designs of Philip. 

The relations between Phocis and Athens 


had originally been anything but unfriendly. and Phocis. 
The Athenians had formerly favored the claims of the 
Phocians upon Delphi ; and Pericles had not mistaken 
the fact, that the existence of an autonomous priestly state 
in Central Greece, ever ready to attach itself to Sparta, or 
even to powers whose interests were yet more foreign to 
those of Athens, could not be in accordance with hers. 
The Phocians had therefore, even in the most calamitous 
moment of Attic history, given their vote in opposition to 
Thebes for the preservation of Athens (vol. iii. p. 570). 
They could reckon upon the support of the anti-Theban 
and of the national party. But at the same time their 
case seemed, on the other hand, in many respects a very 
unfavorable one. The present government by dynasts 
could not arouse any sympathy, and with incomprehensi- 
ble blindness Phalsecus had treated Sparta as well as 
Athens with utter scorn ; he knew very well, that if they 
furnished aid, this was far from implying that they sup- 
ported his sway, the real object of Sparta being to take 
advantage of this opportunity for restoring her patronship 
over Delphi (vol. i. p. 282), and of the Athenians, to 
bring into their possession the fastnesses near Thermo- 
pylae, which were situate in the entirely dependent country 
of the Locrians. He had therefore rejected the offers of 
the Athenians, when they had equipped fifty vessels under 
the general Proxenus, in order to occupy the Locrian 
places which had been solemnly promised to them. This 
occurred about the very time when the Athenians were 
opening their negotiations with Philip. In how utterly 

328 History of Greece. [BookVii. 

different a manner might not Demosthenes have asserted 
himself in the course of these negotiations, had Proxenus 
gained his object, and had the city been under an obliga- 
tion of honor to guard the frontier-posts of the common 
fatherland ! At present the Athenians were deeply vexed 
on account of the unfair treatment which they had experi- 
enced, and the agents of Philip accordingly found their 
game much easier to play, when by order of the king 
they incessantly labored to separate Athens from Phocis, 
and to cripple the sympathy of the two parties, whose po- 
litical stand-point would necessarily have inclined them to 
take a warm interest in the fate of the Phocians. The 
national party was disarmed by the guileful procrastina- 
tion of the peace- negotiations ; while the other and far 
more numerous party which hated Thebas and begrudged 
it any advantage, were simply told a lie, being made to 
believe that the king's friendship towards the Thebans and 
hostility against the Phocians were merely a pretence. 

Thus by his own fault Phalsecus was placed in the most 
desperate of situations. He saw the Macedonians approach- 
ing for the decisive attack, while at the same time his 
resources were coming to an end, his dominion in his own 
country was tottering, and all prospect of support was 
vanishing. For Archidamus, who was still in Phocis at 
the head of a thousand men of heavy infantry, for the 
purpose of observing the progress of events, and who 
perhaps might even at the last moment have resolved to 
follow the example of Leonidas and defend Thermopylae, 
returned home at the critical moment, after the delusive 
prospect had been opened to the Spartans at Pella, that 
they would through Philip recover their ancient rights at 
Delphi. The Phocians were equally unfortunate at 
Athens, where they were not indeed represented by envoys 
with regular powers, but where at the same time they had 
their agents, who reported as to the course of events there, 
and followed the progress of the peace-negotiations with 

chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 329 

the most eager anxiety. For a time they ware able to 
hope that they would, in accordance with the proposal of 
Demosthenes, be admitted among the confederates to be 
included in the treaty of peace; but they soon found 
themselves deceived in this expectation, and finally the 
motion of Philocrates (p. 324) completely destroyed any 
hope of a succor which might perhaps even now be 
granted at the last hour. Phalsecus had now nothing but 
enemies in his front and in his rear ; there accordingly 
remained to him no means of preservation except an 
understanding with Philip. In the middle of July he 
declared his readiness to hand over the fastnesses of 
Thermopylae to the king, being in return Ca .. _ 
granted free departure for himself and his *i? n , of 

° * Phala±cus. 

8,000 mercenaries. For, however great a 
display Philip had made of his pious zeal on (»■ 
behalf of Delphi, yet he had very little inter- 
est in carrying out the punishment of the despoilers of the 
temple, and in causing those who were the really guilty to 
pay the penalty of their transgression. He had achieved 
his object. He had the keys of Greece in his hands, and 
could advance with his Macedonian army through the open 
passes into the interior of the land. He came, not as a 
foreign conqueror, but as the elected federal general of 
Thessaly, and as the confederate of Thebes. The Thebans 
now immediately reassumed what had long been denied 
to them, possession of the entire territory of Boeotia. 
Then, the allies jointly entered Phocis ; and the king en- 
joyed the triumph of having by the mere fact of his 
approach, without striking a blow, put a sudden end to 
the ten years' war under which Hellas had suffered so 

* Thebes summons Philip : Diod. xvi. 59.— Phaleeeus 1 seornfulness towards 
Athens and Sparta: ^Eschin. ii. 133. Proxenus : Dem. xix. 74. The Pho- 
cians had agents at Athens (SpojiOKjjpuKes) : iEschin. ii. 130. Demosthenes 
less accurately terms them irpeafieis, xix. 59. Capitulation of Phalaecus oa 
the 23d of Scirophorion (17th of July). 

330 History of Greece. [BookVil 

Phiii at "^ ne treaty with Phalsecus had been conclu- 

Deiphi. d e( j by Philip in virtue of his position as 

commander-in-chief with absolute powers. The subse- 
quent steps he took in conj unction with his allies ; for he 
wished, not to interfere arbitrarily in the system prevail- 
ing in Greece under the sanction of public law and 
treaties, but to appear in the character of a benefactor of 
the nation, who restored its national institutions, after they 
had been subjected to a criminal interruption. And this 
restoration of law and order was at the same time to serve 
to obtain for him and his dynasty a lasting position in the 
Greek confederation of states, and to form a legal basis 
for all his ulterior schemes with reference to Greece. 
Already his sojourn at Thebes had made him intimately 
acquainted with the Delphic ordinances ; he had studied 
the policy of Iason (vol. iv. p. 470), as well as that of the 
Theban statesmen (vol. iv. p. 427), accurately enough to 
be aware, even without advice from any other quarter, 
which of the Delphic statutes he could use for his pur- 

Del hi As a general victorious in a Sacred War, he 

reforms. claimed the same right, which had of old after 

the termination of the first Sacred War been exercised by 
Clisthenes and Solon, when he restored the ancient ordi- 
nances, and at the same time established new institutions 
for the protection, as well as for the superior glorification, 
of the national sanctuary (vol. i. p. 284). Thus Philip 
also, in conjunction with his two allies, in the first instance 
re-established the temple-authorities, with which proceed- 
ing was doubtless combined the purification of the temple 
and of its domain. Hereupon, an assembly of the Am- 
phictyons was summoned. But this again was to be a 
purified one. For whosoever had more or less directly 
taken part in the criminal spoliation of the temple, had, 
according to the view of the allies, forfeited his seat and 
voice in the Federal Council. But in the matter of this 

chap, hi.] Athens and King Philip. 331 

exclusion a distinction was drawn. Sentence of ejection 
was pronounced in the case of the Phocians, who were de- 
clared to have forfeited their double vote once for all, so 
that it could be transferred as a grateful acknowledgment 
of his victory to Philip, who had freed the sanctuary out 
of their predatory hands. The Spartans were likewise ex- 
cluded, because they still remained under the ban (vol. iv. 
p. 427), and had since polluted themselves by association 
with the Phocians ; but their vote seems not to have been 
considered as vacant and transferable. A third kind of 
degradation consisted in this, that certain states were not 
summoned to the first meeting of the Amphictyons ; which 
course was pursued in the case of Athens. The Athenians 
had not responded to the invitation of the king, bidding 
them to join him as allies by virtue of the treaties recent- 
ly concluded. Now, participation in the re-organization 
of the Hellenic League of states was to be a right of honor 
reserved to those who had taken arms on behalf of the 
Delphic god, in other words, especially to the Thessalian 
and CEtsean tribes, also to the Dorians at the base of 
Mount Parnassus, to the Locrians and the Dolopes, whose 
habitations lay between Thessaly, iEtolia and Epirus. 
Thus the centre of gravity of the League had been once 
more entirely transferred to the North, where it had lain 
in the earliest times (vol. i. p. 126) ; the mountain-tribes, 
which the remaining Greeks despised, and which had long 
lost all importance, — the very tribes which in the Wars 
of Liberation had fallen away from the national cause, and 
had by the recognition of the Persian supremacy forfeited 
their good name (vol. ii. p. 304), — now re-entered history; 
and most especially it was a deep satisfaction to the ambi- 
tion of the Thessalians, that they, who had so long been 
treated with contempt and excluded from Greek history, 
were now again becoming respected in Hellas and saw the 
plans of Iason attain to a splendid consummation. How 
strangely the oldest and the newest elements were no\f 

332 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

placed side by side in the Delphic Diet ! For there now 
existed in the newly-regulated League three kinds of 
states, which severally belonged to the most different 
periods of history : first, the Thcssalian tribes, which had 
adhered to the standpoint of cantonal district constitutions, 
such as the Perrhsebians and others ; next, the tribes 
which had become states, such as the Athenians and The- 
bans ; and lastly, in the midst of these rural or city re- 
publics an Imperial State, which did not in consonance 
with Hellenic international law take part as a popular 
community, but was represented in the person of its king, 
who received the federal votes of the Phocians as a right 
to be hereditary in his dynasty. 

Doom Hereupon further debates were held on the 

of the subject of the Phocians themselves. The loss 

Phocians. " 

of their right of voting appeared to be an in- 
sufficient punishment for their violation of the peace, 
although the really guilty, who had by means of foreign 
troops maintained a rule of terror, had either fallen during 
the war, or had escaped unhurt at its conclusion, while on 
the other hand the Phocian towns, which had suffered most 
severely of all from the doings of the mercenaries, after 
the departure of the latter offered no resistance at all, but 
at once surrendered unconditionally. And yet the hos- 
tility of the neighboring tribes refused to be appeased ; 
they were unwilling to relinquish their hold over their 
victims, until they should have thoroughly glutted their 
hereditary lust of vengeance (vol. ii. p. 306). Indeed, the 
CEtseans went so far as to propose that all the inhabitants 
of Phocis, who were of an age liable to service, should be 
hurled from the rocks as sacrilegious despoilers of the 

Against such brutality on the part of members of their 
own race — a brutality all the more revolting in that savage 
hatred assumed the mask of religious zeal — it became 
incumbent upon the foreign chief of the army to protect 

chap, iii.] Athens and King Philip, 333 

the Phocians. He was solely interested in completely 
disarming the land, and in taking care that no fortified 
positions should be left in it, which might serve as bases 
for vigorous risings, inasmuch as any rising on the part of 
the Phocians might endanger the advantage which he had 
derived from the war. Accordingly, two-and-twenty towns 
were deprived of their walls, and their citizens being dis- 
persed in villages, which were moreover prohibited from 
exceeding a certain number of houses ; the inhabitants were 
left in possession of their lands, but were forced to pay out 
of the proceeds of these a tax to the temple, which was to 
be levied until the temple-treasure had been again made 
good. All the horses were sold, all the arms destroyed ; 
and all the measures of this judgment, which was actually 
to be regarded as a manifestation of royal clemency, were 
intensified by the provision that their execution was com- 
mitted to the most vengeful enemies of the Phocians. The 
land sank into unspeakable misery. Whoever had it in 
his power took flight ; and it was once more the sad lot of 
the Athenians to be able to do nothing for a confederate, 
whose ruin their inaction had allowed to take place, 
beyond offering hospitality to the fugitive inhabitants. 
It is true that the present case differed from that of Olyn- 
thus, inasmuch as real relations of confederacy had been 
impossible with the Phocian Tyrants. All the greater, on 
the other hand, was the damage which this victory of 
Philip had inflicted upon Greece proper, and all the 
stronger was the feeling of vexation on the part of the 
Athenians, that they had allowed themselves to be so 
vilely deceived by their own envoys. 

At Athens the mood of public feeling had The Athe _ 
soon changed. The last resolutions of the civic ni ? ns _ unde - 

° ceived. 

assembly had been passed under the terrori- 
zing sway of the Macedonian party, which contrived to 
take care that no other tendency should assert itself, and 
no speaker of opposite sentiments should be allowed a 

334 History of Greece. [BookVU 

hearing (p. 324). But the Athenians had after all begun 
to experience a feeling of great uneasiness, as the king 
drew menacingly near; they could not remain contented 
with the promises with which jiEschines had calmed their 
apprehensions ; and they resolved upon a new embassy to 
Philip, in order that he might be observed close at hand, 
and exhorted to fulfil his promises. It was natural that 
for this purpose the same men should be desired, who had 
brought home the tranquillizing utterances of the king. 
But ^schines saw fit to withdraw, since the despatch of 
this embassy had not been proposed by his party, and 
since no glory was to be gained by him from the business. 
For if his information proved unauthentic, the result 
would be either that Philip had told him lies, in which 
case he must indignantly abandon the king, or that he was 
himself revealed to be a liar, and exposed to the just ire 
of the civic assembly. He accordingly caused himself to 
be reported sick, and remained at home. Demosthenes 
likewise on this occasion gave a most decided refusal. 
And the envoys who took their departure for the royal 
head-quarters never reached the goal. On the way they 
learnt that Philip had occupied Thermopylae and disarmed 
Phocis ; and with these tidings of terror they in a few days 
returned to Athens. 

Here, after the brief intoxication of vain hopes, a bitter 
disappointment now ensued. Instead of being enabled 
through Philip to triumph over their enemies, the Athe- 
nians saw that the direct contrary of all that they had 
fancied to themselves had taken place. It was they, and 
not the Thebans, who found themselves deluded ; advan- 
tage had been taken of their credulity, to secure Ther- 
mopylae, to ruin their allies, to aggrandize their enemies. 
They had supposed themselves to be by the much-lauded 
peace once more acknowledged as a Great Power, — and 
now they were more than ever excluded even from Hel- 
lenic affairs. Without any regard being paid to them, 

Chap, ill.] Athens and King Philip. 335 

great armies were passing through the midst of Hellas, 
and giving it a new constitution. Indeed, they felt inse- 
cure in their own proper country ; for Attica was envi- 
roned by overbearing foes, without allies, open and defence- 

Though the indignation was great among phili 
all citizens of patriotic sentiments, yet it ^g s e e n s s 
seemed for the moment impossible to give ex- 01. cviii. 3 
pression to this current of feeling, unless the 
evils of the situation were to be further in- 
creased. Moreover, Philip had done his utmost to calm 
the citizens : he had immediately after his entrance into 
Phocis written them a letter, and had, so to speak, excused 
himself with the pressure put upon him by the Thebans 
and the Thessalians, which it had not been well possible 
for him to resist. In truth it was a bitter token of con- 
tempt, that he should dare to seek to satisfy the Athenians 
with such mere phrases ; but being seasoned with a varie- 
ty of blandishments, they did not miss their effect. Of 
this effect his party helped to make the most ; and they 
even cast a share of the blame upon the Athenians, as not 
having taken an active part as the allies of the king. At 
the same time occurred the sending home of the Attic 
prisoners, which had been reserved for this point of time ; 
and in the end there remained nothing for the Athenians 
but to suppress their ire, and once more to despatch an 
embassy, which was to attend to the interest of the city in 
Phocis. This time ^Eschines did not refuse ; indeed, he 
put himself forward, and subsequently credited himself 
with the fact, that his influence had succeeded in defeating 
the sanguinary proposal of the CEtseans. 

* Doom of the Phocians: Diod. xvi. 60; Paus. x. 3. New regulation of the 
League : Schafer, ii. 267.— To the Thessalians were restored their ancient 
honorary rights which the Phocians had kept from them; in addition to 
which, they received special rights connected with the presidency (Dem. v- 
23 ; vi. 22.). 

336 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

Phili cele- ^ n °^ er respects the envoys were simply the 

Urates the witnesses of the brilliant triumph celebrated 

... by Philip. With an exulting multitude 

(b. c. 346). surging around him, he enjoyed in more than 

Middle of full measure the honors thought to be due to 

August. # ° 

a man who had purified the most venerable 
sanctuary of the nation, and had restored the interrupted 
rites of divine worship. The lamentations which filled 
the valleys of Phocis were forgotten ; the ulterior conse- 
quences for Greece remained unperceived. The impres- 
sion of the most recent events overpowered all other 
thoughts. The wretched pettiness of the condition of af- 
fairs at home intensified the admiration of the man, with 
whom to will and to act, to come and to conquer, were 
one. In addition, there was the influence of the splendor 
of royalty, to which this age was so open (p. 217), — of 
the overwhelming dignity attaching to a supreme lord of 
war, for whom thousands were ready to risk their lives in 
unconditional obedience. From these impressions the en- 
voys of Athens too were at once unable and unwilling to 
escape. They found Delphi in the intoxication of a festi- 
val of victory, which was celebrated by means of heca- 
tombs, gorgeous processions, dedications and consecrated 
gifts ; JEschines notably had no scruple about fully enter- 
ing in the innocence of his heart into these festivities, as 
if nothing had occurred of a nature to annoy an Athenian, 
although at Athens itself men were able to recognize in 
the victory of Philip a grievous defeat of the city. 

Philip could not long remain with his numerous hosts 
of soldiers in the desolated land ; but neither was he will- 
ing to quit it, until a reorganization of the state of thiugs 
should have issued from Delphi under the solemn sanction 
of its authorities. In order to have this settled, it was a 
favorable circumstance, and one which Philip doubtless 
took into timely account, that a few weeks after the occu- 
pation of Phocis, about the middle of August, the time ar- 

Chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 337 

rived for the festival of the Pythia, which since the Cris- 
rean War recurred every four years (vol. i. p. 284). On 
this occasion, then, the king for the first time appeared in 
full activity as a member of the Hellenic Amphictyony ; 
upon him was conferred the honorary office of conducting 
the festival ; and, as was customary at important epochs 
of the national sanctuaries, so that which now occurred 
was likewise celebrated by the introduction of a new com- 
petitive game in addition to those traditionally in use, viz. 
a wrestling and boxing-match between boys. But for 
Philip everything now depended upon obtaining, while he 
was still present with his forces, a universal recognition for 
his ordinances with regard to the festival and with regard 
to the Amphictyonic League, lest cavils might be raised 
against them as illegal. In particular he was interested in 
securing the assent of Athens, because relations of peculiar 
intimacy existed between her and Delphi, and because 
Athens was an authority in matters of religious law. 

The Athenians had little inclination for such a recogni- 
tion. They saw in his innovations nothing but acts of force, 
unwarranted interference, and violation of law. They were, 
moreover, offended by the transference to Philip of the 
Promanteia, i. e. the right of being the first to address 
questions to the Oracle ; in other words, the right of pre- 
cedence in the presence of the Delphic god, which had 
been granted to them since the times of Pericles : accord- 
ingly, they had on this occasion sent no official festive em- 
bassy to the Pythian festival. 

It was desirable for Philip that this ob- ~ . .. 

1 Delphic 

stinacy should be immediately broken. With embassy of 
the lively assent of the other Amphietyons, 
among whom ill-will against Athens predominated, a 
Macedono-Thessalian embassy was thersfore deputed, to 
bid the Athenians account for their reception of the fugi- 
tive Phocians, and, secondly, acknowledge the Delphic 
Amphictyony as at present constituted. It was a question 

338 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

of decisive importance for Athens, and for Greece, and one 
to which it was necessary to give a short and precise an- 

The citizens were agitated in a high degree. JEschmes 
could not even obtain a hearing. All the more eagerly 
were the orators of the opposite party listened to, who 
loudly declared, that a decided protest was the only 
answer to this offensive demand reconcilable with the dig- 
nity of Athens. There was much danger of imprudent 
steps being taken. For such a protest would have had 
no other consequence than this, that the army of the Am- 
phictyons, united and ready for battle as it was, would 
have continued the Sacred War against Athens, who stood 
utterly isolated, and had not even her slight war-forces 
collected on one spot. 

Demosthe- Demosthenes, who so often experienced the 
nes de Pace, pain of observing that his fellow-citizens were 
in the most pacific of moods when the moment had arrived 
for war, and demanded war when peace alone could bring 
salvation, was now, however repugnant it might be to 
him, obliged to advocate the maintenance of the peace 
concluded with Philip. He was one of the few who clear- 
ly judged the situation as it was, the solitary orator who, 
free from all party considerations, kept steadily in view 
nothing but the welfare of the city. 

1 The peace which you have concluded/ he said, * is 
neither fair to look upon nor worthy of you ; but, what- 
ever may be its character, this is certain : that it would 
have been better never to conclude it than to put an end 
to it now ; for in it we have sacrificed much of that 
which, so long as we possessed it, was of essential advan- 
tage to us for the successful conduct of a war. The 
second point in this, ye men of Athens, that we must take 
care not to force those states which now call themselves 
the Amphictyons, to engage in a joint war against us. 
For, should we again fall out with Philip on a subject of 

chap, in.] Athens and King Philip. 339 

no interest to the Thessalians, the Argives, the Thebans, I 
do not believe that any one of these states will take arms 
against us ; for so much sense even the most stolid among 
them possess, as to perceive, that in such quarrels all the 
burdens would fall upon them, while all the advantages 
would accrue to one who lies in ambush in the background. 
But at the present moment circumstances are as unfavor- 
able as they could be for us. For if some of the Pelo- 
ponnesians are hostile to us, because they believe that we 
are siding with Sparta against them ; — if the Thebans are 
more wroth than ever, because we have received among 
us the fugitive Boeotians ; — if the Thessalians hate us as 
friends of the Phocians, and Philip is angry at our having 
refused to acknowledge his Amphictyonic position : then 
it is to be feared that all of them, each on his own partic- 
ular grounds, will obey the impulse of their anger, will 
seize upon the decrees of the Amphictyons as a pretext, 
and will in their joint war against us be carried on by the 
current beyond that which is to the advantage of each 
individually, as also happened in the case of the Phocians.* 
" Are we then from sheer fear to do all that we are bid- 
den? And this you, Demosthenes, demand from us?" 
1 By no means ; we must consent to nothing which is 
unworthy of us, but at the same time we must seek to 
preserve to ourselves the glory of a prudent conduct of 
public affairs. And those, who will not listen to any 
recommendations of caution, I ask to consider what course 
our city has on former occasions followed. We have left 
Oropus in the hands of the Thebans, and Amphipolis in 
those of Philip ; we have allowed Cardia to be severed 
from the Chersonnesus ; we have given up to the Carian 
princes Chios, Cos, Rhodes ; and the Byzantians we have 
allowed to seize Attic vessels. Why have we submitted 
to all this? Assuredly only for this reason, that we hoped 
to secure greater advantages for our commonwealth, if we 
kept peace, than if we entered into war on account of 

340 History of Greece. £ Bo °* VI * 

those objects. If then you have abstained from quarrel- 
ling with a series of single foes on matters which involved 
your most important and proper interests, it would be un- 
pardonable folly, were you for the sake of something utterly 
insignificant, were you for the sake of the shadow of 
Delphi, now to enter upon a war against all/ 

It was thus that Demosthenes spoke in favor of the 
peace. The review of a series of instances of humble 
submissiveness was intended to shame the hotspurs, who 
clamorously insisted upon the glory of the city, and who 
opined that Athens ought not to be untrue to herself. If 
the war demanded by honor had been so often avoided 
even when the prospects were favorable, a decree of war 
at the present moment meant the downfall of the city, the 
Philip ardently desired triumph of her numerous and 

home 18 overwhelming foes. 

01 ... The envoys received a measured, but pa- 

(b. c. 346). c jfi c answer. Athens declared, as we may as- 
Autumn, sume, that she would raise no protest against 
the Amphictyonic organization, and would in future send 
deputies to the festivals. Hereby the insidiously expec- 
tant enemies were deprived of any pretext for war ; and 
in the autumn Philip returned home to Macedonia.* 

* The prisoners duly arrived according to promise (Dem. xix. 39) at the 
Panathenaea (vii. 38). The time of the Pythia is now established from 
inscriptions ; cf. Kirchhoff, MonaUberichte d. Preus$. Akad. 1864, p. 129. Am- 
phictyonic embassy at Athens : Dem. xix. 111. 




Thus, then, had by means of repeated embassies and 
treaties been terminated the state of war, which had ob- 
tained between king Philip and Athens since the capture 
of Amphipolis; but a real peace had not been hereby 
effected, Neither had Philip as yet gained, nor had 
Athens as yet lost, all. Upon the sham war which had 
dragged its weary course for ten years, there accordingly 
ensued seven years of a sham peace, during which the 
germs of the decisive struggle developed themselves. 

With the conclusion of peace an essential p osi tion of 
change had taken place in the situation of af- Se^orSur 
fairs. It was to have served to fetter the !i™ °«„-, 

the peace. 

freedom of action which the king had obtained 
by the fall of Olynthus ; but instead of this the king had 
employed it for placing a restraint upon the Athenians, 
until he should on the one hand have effected his purposes 
in Thrace, and on the other have made himself master of 
Thermopylae and Phocis. The king of Macedonia now no 
longer stood as a foreign power in a threatening attitude 
on the frontiers, but he had taken up a position in the 
centre of the Greek world. He was the presiding member 
of the League of the Greek states; he kept the passes 
occupied, the protection of which was the duty of the 
League ; he was the governor set over the national sanc- 
tuary for its protection. A Greek country of high im- 
portance on account of its central situation and its vigorous 
population, viz. Phocis, lay prostrate at his feet with its 

towns destroyed. The mightiest tribes of Greece, the 


342 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

Thessalians and the Boeotians, were gathered around him 
as their lord-in-war, while the Athenians were entirely 
isolated, humiliated, and by the imposition of a federal re- 
lation shackled in their freedom of action. The treasures 
of the Delphic god, which had been accumulated during 
the course of centuries, and which, if expended in the na- 
tional interest, would have made possible an extraordinary 
display of power, had been in a few years wasted, to the 
ruin of the nation. Where was there any longer left a 
force capable of resistance? 

Notwithstanding all this, Philip had not yet reached the 
goal. Delphi had long ceased to be the centre whence 
Greece might be ruled. Southern Hellas was still per- 
fectly independent ; the threads of the life of the Hellenic 
states were not yet united in the hand of the king; in those 
communities which lay outside his present sphere of power 
he had still to begin to knit such threads, in order that the 
authority which he claimed as head of the Amphictyons 
might become a reality. 

It was accordingly in the first instance not 

His further n-m •!• * 1 i in 

schemes. part ot rhilip s plan, to advance by force ; but 
he rather intended quietly to extend his in- 
fluence, by skilful treatment gradually to tame the Hel- 
lenes, and to accustom them to his guidance. For he was 
desirous, not of ruling as lord and master, as Xerxes had 
intended to rule, but of assuming the direction of confede- 
rate states, as was in accordance with native tradition, and 
as Sparta, Athens, and Thebes had repeatedly attempted 
to do, though, greatly to the damage of the nation, they 
had never succeeded in accomplishing their purpose in 
such a way as to control the whole of Greece, or enduringly 
to maintain their authority. Herein lay the power and 
importance of this exhausted people, and this was the 
blessing brought by its glorious history : that its land could 
not be looked upon like any other portion of the earth, 
which, so soon as sufficient strength for the purpose was at 

Chap, iv.j jjQ^f Struggles for Independence. 343 

hand, had simply to be conquered and subjected, — as 
Philip had done unhesitatingly with many districts, and 
with the colonial territories likewise. The Greek mother- 
country required to be treated with far more considera- 
tion ; and here it was necessary to show as much tenderness 
as possible towards existing legal relations, so far as was 
at all reconcilable with the Macedonian schemes of do- 
minion. This was no weakly whim on the part of the 
king, but a historical necessity. For the position occupied 
in the world by his royal dynasty was based upon its ap- 
propriation to itself of Hellenic culture; and its policy 
was no other than that of continually extending this cul- 
ture, and turning it to increasingly good account for the 
splendor and power of the growing empire. It was there- 
fore impossible for the king to be desirous of devastating 
the home of Hellenic culture, and of destroying the intel- 
lectual life still nourishing there; and impossible for him 
to intend to rule over Hellenes otherwise than after a 
Hellenic fashion. 

For the present, therefore, the king could do nothing 
more than attract to himself the states which still stood 
outside the combinations recently formed, establish more 
firmly his maritime supremacy, deprive of all power of 
doing harm those confederate districts in which resistance 
still showed itself; and prevent any combination among 
the states which still preserved their independence. If 
such a combination should form itself, the one point from 
which it could proceed was Athens. Her constitution, 
her history, her ways of thinking made Athens the focus 
of free Greek nationality ; here there still existed a feel- 
ing for honor and justice, which might with desperate 
determination confront the ultimate and inevitable de- 
mands of Philip. Of this the king was well aware;- and 
these points of view determined his proceedings in the nexrt 
ensuing year. 

Thus he in the first instance took decisive steps in Thes' 

344 Histoi-y of Greece. [Boo* vn. 

Phiii in sa ty> ^ or tne P ur P ose 0I> breaking all recalci, 
Thessafy. trance in this quarter. Frequently enough 
01. cviii. 4 (b. bad Demosthenes counselled his fellow-citi- 

C. 344). 

zens to secure a Thessalian alliance. In Thes- 
saly there were still large, unimpaired resources of popula- 
tion, and there still existed a desire, though of a kind not 
clearly conscious of its ends, to assert the strength of these re- 
sources, — in particular at Pherse, where since the days of 
lason men had accustomed themselves to believe in a new 
era for Thessaly. They had unhesitatingly followed the 
foreign lord-in-war, in order by means of him to satisfy 
their ancient bitter wrath against Phocis. After this had 
been accomplished, they thought it would be possible 
again to withdraw from the pressure of the supremacy of 
their foreign protector. In their delusion they failed to 
perceive, that they had been nothing but the tools of 
Philip's policy; and no sooner had the first symptoms of a 
desire for resistance shown themselves, than the king pro- 
ceeded with the utmost rigor, sent troops into the country, 
placed a garrison in the castle of Pherse, and established 
there a Board of Ten on the Lysandrian model, which 
was composed of partisans of his own, and which bowed 
the defiant spirit of the citizens under a military yoke. 
At the same time the whole of Thessaly was more firmly 
than ever united with the Macedonian hereditary domin- 

On the other side of the Isthmus, opportuni- 

His pro- ' rr 

gress in Peio- ties likewise offered themselves for extending: 

ponnesus. t ° 

the influence of Macedonia. For the Pelo- 
ponnesian states, from the first accustomed to abstain from 
carrying their interests beyond the peninsula, continued 
according to their wont to live on in absolute freedom 
from anxiety, and were by no means intent upon settling 
their internal party conflicts, or putting an end to the an« 

* AataSapxiai : Dem. vi. 22; xix. 260. Phene : vii. 32; ix. 12. 

Chap, iv.] j^ as i Struggles for Independence. 345 

cient border-feuds, in view of the menacing growth of the 
power in the North. The jealousy between Sparta and 
the states which had been withdrawn from her influence 
endured, and, in order to heighten the existing confusion, 
there now in addition arrived the Phocian mercenaries, 
who, after the capitulation of Phalsecus (p. 326), moved 
about from place to place. Where unoccupied mercena- 
ries made their appearance, they became the curse of the 
country ; glimmering sparks of hatred were kindled into 
a flame ; opportunity was offered to party-fury of deeds 
of blood ; and every ambitious scheme had a chance of 
execution. Thus in Peloponnesus too open civil conflicts en- 
sued, which in the end redounded to the sole advantage 
of the king, who was ever lying in wait, who left no 
movement unused, and to whom the same mercenaries, 
who had worked so admirably and prepared a way for 
him in Central Greece, now also opened the passage into 
the peninsula. So it befell in Elis. 

Elis was one of those petty states which Eli 
were at all times full of ambitious schemes, 
and ever anxious to carry on political action on a grand 
scale. Because they were in possession of Olympia, the 
Eleans fancied themselves superior to the other Pelopon- 
nesians ; and for this reason they also enjoyed special con- 
sideration at the hands of foreign Great Powers (vol. iv. p. 
486). But since their relations to Sparta had become 
hostile, the Eleans were unable to restore a tranquil con- 
dition of affairs in their own country ; they were torn 
asunder by parties ; and inasmuch as their power was one 
in itself utterly the reverse of independent, they were 
obliged to lean upon this, now upon that, other state. As 
allies of the Thebans they had promoted the restoration of 
Mantinea (vol. iv. p. 437) ; after the Arcadian War (vol. 
iv. p. 492) they had sided against Thebes ; and Sparta, to 
whom any aid against Megalopolis was welcome, had, by 
giving way with respect to Triphylia, contrived again to 


346 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

bring them over to her side (p. 259). During this period 
the aristocracy, which from the outset was very powerful 
in the land, had the commonwealth in its hands, while the 
popular party was in exile. It was the latter party which 
took advantage of the presence of the mercenaries, in 
order to effect by force its return home. A murderous 
conflict ensued, in which the city-party ultimately with 
Arcadian aid secured the victory. But its leaders, Euxi- 
theus, Cleotimus, and Aristsechmus, were not content with 
glutting their lust of vengeance after the most savage 
fashion, and with causing four thousand mercenaries to be 
put to death as sacrilegious despoilers of the temple ; but, 
in order to anticipate future revolutions, they now also 
entered into connexion with Philip, who was extremely 
rejoiced to establish a firm footing in the land of the 

Philip pro- 01y m pian Zeus, and readily accorded his pro- 
Eiis 0rof tection. Thus the Elean aristocracy became 
01 cix l (b c a body of partisans of Philip, and brought 
343 ); Elis uuder the influence of the king. Such 

was the sanguinary epilogue to the Phocian War (01. 
cix. 1 ; b. c. 343). 

of Messenia Philip succeeded with yet greater ease in 
Megalopolis, those states which, having been founded by 

Argos, 7 o J 

Thebes, were from the first obliged to depend 
upon foreign protection, and urgently needed it as against 
Sparta. For the Spartans, who at Pella had been not less 
than the Athenians deluded by false pretences, so long as 
king Archidamus was with his troops in Phocis still capa- 
ble of creating difficulties for the king, in their short- 
sighted policy continued to threaten their neighbors anew, 
and furnished Philip with the desired opportunity for en- 
tering upon the Theban course of policy. Thebes had, 
nine years ago, for the last time performed the duties of 
her office in the peninsula (p. 261) ; she now resigned it to 
her powerful ally, who took upon himself the protection 
of the communities, sent troops, and forwarded distinct 

chap, iv.] Last Struggles for Independence. 347 

orders to the Spartans to abstain from all encroachments. 
These successes, easily gained, but of extreme importance, 
followed immediately upon the Phocian War, and seemed 
to spring as it were as a matter of course from the posi- 
tion secured in Central Greece. The portal of the penin- 
sula, which Epaminondas had burst asunder, was now also 
open to the king ; his orders prevented the Spartan troop3 
from moving beyond the valley of the Eurotas; Eiis, 
Messenia, Megalopolis, and Argos likewise felt themselves 
dependent upon the new protector. 

On the northern side of the Isthmus the king of Meganu 
directed his attention to Megara, a commer- 
cial city at that time enjoying great wealth and prosperi- 
ty, which had been able rigorously to guard its independ- 
ence as against its near neighbor Thebes. Here, too, he 
brought over to his side the aristocratic party. In the 
same way he again stretched forth his hand towards Eu- 
boea, which was utterly defenceless, since Thermopylae had 
become Macedonian property, and since an end had been 
put to all resistance in Central Greece. Finally, he was 
already preparing the operations which, with Epirus as 
his basis, were to make him the master of the Ionian and 
Corinthian Seas. 

With Athens the peace was maintained, and Re i ation 
yet the object of all Philip's measures was to with Athens. 
surround that city more and more closely with a network 
of strong points of attack, and to cut off all its lines of 
foreign communication. In the Thracian Sea, too, the 
king made use of his vessels, so as under the pretext of ex- 
terminating piracy to hold certain islands, such as Halon- 
nesus, occupied ; and although he apparently took no 
notice at all of the Athenians, yet could their growing 
helplessness have in no way been more painfully brought 
home to them than when they saw the king extending his 
power by land and by water, in the north and in the 
south. Athens was more than ever the head-quarters of 

34b History of Gh*eece. [ BoCK VIL 

the adversaries of Philip, the single spot where men ex- 
isted who followed his steps with a vigilant glance, and 
who regarded the peace of Philocrates as nothing better i 
than a truce.* 

At the time of the conclusion of the peace the warning 
voice of Demosthenes had been unable to prevail ; the 
Athenians wished to be deceived, and therefore willingly- 
listened to such persons as iEschines and Eubulus. More- 
Pubiic over, their city had more reason than any 

Athens ^fter otner *° desire peace, as guaranteeing to the 
piSiocrat ° f - P oor tne unimpaired enjoyment of the festi- 
vals, while the wealthy and the middle-class- 

the party # ' J t 

of material which now had to bear its share of the public 

interests. A 

burdens (p. 119), were glad to have nothing 
further to hear at present of war-taxes and of the equip- 
ment of ships. Free traffic by sea was not only the inter- 
est of the ship owner and the wholesale merchant, but also 
of every inhabitant of Athens ; because in this city, which 
had to a great extent to depend upon foreign corn, the 
character of that traffic determined the prices of the neces- 
sary means of life. Moreover, Athens was the spot where 
there were still to be found the best artists, manufacturers, 
and handicraftsmen ; all articles of luxury were to be ob- 
tained here; and, accordingly, no city was more harmed 
by the war, or derived more advantage from the peace, 
than Athens. After a long blockade the Northern har- 
bors were once more opening, where, in consequence of the 
rapidly increasing Hellenization of Macedonia, and of the 
growing abundance of pecuniary resources, the demand 
for the productions of Greek artistic industry likewise per- 
ceptibly rose. The court of Philip once more gave its 
orders for such wares at Athens. In Greece, too, since the 
emptying of the Delphic treasury, a quantity of gold and 
silver had come into circulation, which had lain dormant 

* Elis : Diod. xvi. 16, seq. Arcadia, Ac. : Dem. xix. 261 ; xviii. 64. 

Chap, iv.] £ as £ Struggles for Independence. 349 

for centuries as an unproductive capital. This could not 
but in general cause prices to rise, and life to become 
dearer ; and the Athenians were all the more obliged to 
depend upon their gains by trade and manufactures, in 
that the native sources of profit were decreasing. The 
annihilation of their maritime supremacy was necessarily 
a heavy blow also for the material prosperity of the citi- 
zens ; and the silver-mines of Laurium began to grow less 
productive about the very time when the metallic trea- 
sures of Thrace opened with an abundance hitherto un- 
divined. For although the author of the essay on the 
Revenues (p. 182) still speaks in a very boastful vein, so 
as to affirm the inexhaustible character of the silver-mines, 
yet his artificial proposals for the advance of the Attic 
smelting system in themselves clearly enough betray the 
fact that the citizens no longer placed any genuine confi- 
dence in this kind of investment, and promised themselves 
little profit from the sinking of new shafts beyond the dis- 
trict fully turned to account by their ancestors, — a view 
which subsequent times thoroughly justified. Under these 
circumstances, freedom of traffic became more and more 
the main source of material prosperity. " How foolish, 
then," we read in the same essay, " is the judgment of 
those who think that Athens loses glory and authority by 
the peace ! In war, the city will only involve itself in 
humiliation and contempt ; but in quiet times who is not 
in need of Athens ? In such times the ship-owners and mer- 
chants, the corn-dealers, the wine, and oil-producers, the 
wool-growers, besides those who deal with intellectual capi- 
tal, the artists, the philosophers, the poets, and again, all 
who desire to delight ear and eye by artistic enjoyments ; 
finally, those who wish to sell or buy rapidly, — all of them 
have to depend upon Athens. In war, Athens is misera- 
ble and weak ; but in peace she is great and mighty — the 
acknowledged centre of the educated world. For this rea- 
son, then, her foreign policy, too, ought to be a policy of 

350 History of Greece, t BoOK VIL 

peace ; she ought not to seek to bring the neighboring 
states to her side by force and by offensive claims of do- 
minion, but by benefits conferred upon them ; she ought 
to obtain influence and secure allies by means of em- 
bassies, without pecuniary sacrifices or the troubles of 
war." This was precisely the congress-policy recom- 
mended by Eubulus and iEschines (p. 301) ; and when 
we read further in the same author : "If you, Athenians, 
after this fashion earnestly set to work throughout Hellas, 
that the sanctuary at Delphi may regain its former inde- 
pendence, I deem it by no means improbable that you 
will have all the Hellenes unanimously on your side as 
allies against those who now after its evacuation by the 
Phocians seek to make themselves masters of that sanctu- 
ary ; " — it is assuredly manifest, that the essay belongs to 
no other period than that of the Peace of Philocrates, and 
that it expresses the opinion of those Athenians who re- 
garded the power of the allied Macedonians, Thessalians, 
and Thebans as one which was illegal and insecure in it- 
self, and which required to be put an end to by peaceable 

About the same time the aged Isocrates 
Phfuppus. 8 composed his oration to Philip. He, too, in- 
veighs against the unblessed demagogues, as 
ever anew desirous of involving the city in war, in order 
to recover for it a position, which in reality was irre- 
coverably lost, and which had never been a real blessing, 
because it had invariably been based upon injustice, and 
had never admitted of being established except by blood 

* Xenophon (so-called) irepi npoaoStav, extols the mines, c. 27. The passage 
translated in the text is treated by Boeckh, P. Ec. of Ath. vol. ii. p. 393 [Eng. 
Tr.]; but his interpretation is intolerably artificial, and was only made in 
order to save the supposed authorship of Xenophon, which has meanwhile 
already been questioned in another quarter (Oncken, Isocr. u. A. p. 96). My 
view, developed in the text, I find confirmed by Hagen in Eos ii. 2, 149. This 
renders unnecessary the hypothesis of Cobet, Mnem. vii. 409. Cf. Philol 
txiii. 667. 

chap, iv.j j jas i Struggles for Independence. 351 

and iron at the expense of material prosperity. For this 
reason Isocrates had already uttered his imprecations 
against the war about Amphipolis, and had advanced the 
peace-negotiations, when they at last began, in every pos- 
sible way. But in this view the Macedonian power w r as, 
not a national calamity, which it might be hoped would 
soon pass away, but the long-desired commencement of a 
better future, of a new age of salvation. The Hellenic 
republics are mutually irreconcilable ; what is needed is 
a great man, a hero standing above the parties and unit- 
ing the states. Several times Providence has already 
shown such a man to our view; Archidamus, Iason, 
Dionysius, seemed to be the men summoned to the mission. 
At last he has actually appeared, — a man, whose historical 
mission is not open to doubt, a prince of the race of the 
Heraclidse, as Archidamus was. He is the new Agamem- 
non, who shall again lead the Hellenes into the field 
against their hereditary foe. In him confidence should be 
placed, and no hearing should be given to the orators who 
abuse him, and who thereby inflict the greatest damage 
upon their native land. The evil he has done to indi- 
vidual Hellenes is the consequence of the hostility unwisely 
fomented against him. It is the War which is cruel, not 
Philip. Thus to him Isocrates attaches the national 
hopes ; and for this reason now also addresses himself im- 
mediately to him, entreats him not to expose his person 
too much, and begs him not to allow his opponents to 
irritate him against Athens. Let him render the peace 
which has been concluded a lasting one, and on the basis 
of it recommence the long-interrupted National War, as 
to the successful issue of which there can be no doubt, in 
view of the weakness of the said Persian Empire as proved 
by Cyrus and Agesilaus. This was the ancient policy of 
Cimon : that of putting an end to the quarrels at home by 
means of a war with Persia (vol. ii. p. 411), — an idea 
which, as a promising subject of eloquence, had already 

352 History of Greece. [ Bo °* vu 

frequently been treated by other rhetors, in particular by 
Gorgias and Lysias, in public festive orations, but to which 
Isocrates first again restored a political significance. 

Finally, there existed a third party, which 
friends? s was zealous for the peace neither on patriotic 
grounds, nor from consideration for the general 
material prosperity, but on account of its personal relations 
to Philip's court. We may assume with certainty, that 
since the time when the attitude of the Athenian civic 
community had necessarily become an object of anxious 
attention to Philip, i. e. since the dispute about Amphipo- 
lis (p. 56), he had his agents at Athens, who were at work 
in his interest, in order to restrain the citizens from vigo- 
rous resolutions, to confirm them in their careless con- 
fidence in the royal promises and pretences, and to place 
Philip under obligations to themselves by means of menial 
services on his behalf. They fomented and took advantage 
of all the moods of public feeling advantageous to the 
purposes of Philip, the warlike (p. 257) as well as the 
peaceable; and the nearer the power of the king ap- 
proached, the more audaciously they revealed their senti- 
ments. Did not Philocrates boast before the whole people 
of the money which he had received, and openly display 
the prosperity which he owed to the favor of the king ? 
The others proceeded with greater caution. But JEschines 
too had received landed property in Macedonia ; he too 
now openly avowed himself on the side of Philip, and 
anticipated all kinds of benefits at the hands of the same 
man, whom he had recently attacked as the worst foe of 
his native city. These men and their fellow-partisans, 
Pythocles, Hegemon, Demades, now bore themselves as if 
all the rest had proved to have been the victims of a delu- 
sion, and as if they alone were the true statesmen and 
the politicians of influence at the present time. 

Thus we find after the conclusion of the peace three 
political parties at Athens, which we may call those of 

Chap, iv.] £as£ Struggles for Independence. 353 

Eubulus, Isocrates, and Philocrates, — three par- The three 
ties, which notwithstanding all the difference p |^®; 
in their standpoints were agreed in viewing the 
recently-concluded peace in the light of a blessing for 
Athens, and in representing all those who endangered its 
endurance as her enemies. In his "Philip" Isocrates in- 
veighs against those "who rage on the orators' tribune," 
those " who are envious of the powerful king, who inces- 
santly cast suspicion upon him, create confusion among 
the cities, find in the common peace a snare for liberty, 
and talk as if the power of the king were growing, not on 
behalf of Hellas, but against it, as if after regulating the 
affairs of Phocis he had no other end in view but the sub- 
jection of all Greece, — together with other follies, which 
they advance with as much certainty as if they had most 
accurately ascertained the truth of everything. It was 
thus that an Attic patriot, the venerated head of a wide 
circle, would represent the policy of Demosthenes, whom 
the bought partisans not less abused as one of those unquiet 
minds, which made it so difficult for the magnanimous 
king to carry out his benevolent intentions towards 

And yet neither was Demosthenes so de- 
serted, nor his position so unsupported, as might weakVoints. 
be expected. His activity had not been in 
vain ; his personal authority had risen. While to the 
aged Isocrates, who was old enough to have witnessed the 
full distress of the Peloponnesian War, the history of the 
Attic free commonwealth seemed like an orbit which had 
attained to its conclusion and could not be begun afresh, a 
younger generation had grown up, in whose breasts the 
words of Demosthenes had struck fire. The circumstances 
of the times were likewise in his favor; for they at all 
events served to cause no doubt to remain as to the situa- 

* Isocrates (xii. 76) describes in Agamemnon the person of Philip, and 
Inveighs (v. 73; 129) against Demosthenes. 

854 History of Greece. [BookYii. 

tion of affairs, and to destroy false conceptions. How 
could the delusion be now any further indulged, that the 
king might be stayed by embassies and peaceable com- 
pacts, as the followers of Eubulus wished! And with 
reference to the hopes of an Isocrates, the royal answer to 
this address had been given in the destruction of the Pho- 
cian cities, which ensued immediately upon the transmis- 
sion of his last oration ; the terrible events in the Chalci- 
dian peninsula had repeated themselves in the very heart 
of Greece. Could any sober mind still continue to give 
itself up to the delusion, that Philip really desired to be 
nothing more than a leader of the Hellenes in national 
deeds of arms ? And the other partisans of Philip, who 
behaved with so lordly an arrogance, as if they had 
already won their game, could not but by their treacher- 
ous sentiments forfeit all respect in any circle where Hel- 
lenic civic virtue was still held of any account, For even 
the less guilty among them had revealed themselves before 
the people as self-seeking, characterless turncoats, as un- 
trustworthy go-betweens who had repeatedly deceived their 
fellow-citizens by means of delusive fictions. How could 
it be intended to concede to them an influence upon public 
affairs ? 

Growing -^ s a o a ^ ns * a ^ the three peace-parties De- 

authority mosthenes accordinglv could not fail to gain 

of Demos- & J n 

thenes. m authority; and thus it came to pass, that 

immediately after the heaviest defeat which had been suf- 
fered by his policy, his personal individuality stood forth 
more powerfully than ever from among the midst of the 
citizens. Not only among the younger generation, but 
among the older citizens too he became trusted. For it 
beiog known, how on the Macedonian side no higher im- 
portance was attached to any voice than to his, the inde- 
pendence of his character, inaccessible to all temptations, 
and the immovable fixity of his personal convictions 
could not fail to secure him a constantly increasing respect 

Chap, iv.] j^^ Struggles for Independence. 355 

He alone had remained true to himself; he alone was in- 
cessantly at work on behalf of the city, had established 
connexions with the traders in Thrace, Macedonia, and 
Thessaly, was always readiest with full information ; and, 
although he had for a time believed in the possibility of 
an honest peace, had now himself attained to a clearer 
view of the condition of affairs. And if notwithstanding 
this he had on the occasion of the last embassy anew 
counselled peace (p. 338), yet this speech for peace was in 
reality only a summons to war, but to a war prepared with 
prudence, a war in which the Athenians should not be 
confronted by the momentarily existing armed league, and 
which would not turn upon the Amphictyonic innovations, 
which assuredly must collapse so soon as Philip's power 
should have been broken, but in which it might be possible 
to fight under more favorable circumstances on behalf of 
the essential and indispensable possessions of Athens. 

It is the preparation for this decisive struggle 
which Demosthenes pursues with unabating f the°city! 8 
force. Everything therefore depends upon 
strengthening the conviction of its necessity, upon estab- 
lishing connexions, and upon increasing the means of 
offence and defence. The resources of the city were still 
by no means small. It was poor by reason of its bad 
financial system, but the people were comparatively well- 
to-do; and Demosthenes could with a brave heart exclaim 
to his fellow-citizens : " Look, ye men of Athens, upon 
your city ! In it there exists a wealth, I may indeed say, 
like unto that of all other cities taken together." Nor was 
there as yet any lack of public spirit. Men are mentioned, 
such as Nausicles and Diotimus, who in the trierarchic 
services distinguished themselves by their self-sacrificing 
efforts. Moreover, immediately after the conclusion of 
the peace, the Athenians had set to work to give complete- 
ness to the harbors of war, to build new ship-sheds, and to 
create an arsenal, which under the direction of the archi- 

356 History of Greece. [Book vil 

tect Philon became an object of patriotic pride on the part 
of the Athenians; to this purpose an annual sum of ten 
talents (£2,437) was devoted from the year 01. cviii. 2 
(b. c. 347), and the wealthy resident aliens under the pro- 
tection of the State likewise in part contributed with 
great ardor. The superintendence-in-chief was confided to 
„ ,. About the same time earnest attention had 

tutional a l go been devoted to the improvement of home 

reforms. # r 

affairs, as is already attested by the essay "on 
the Revenues" The Athenians were not, however, satisfied 
with mere proposals but set actually to work, therein 
partly following the same standpoints, which are indicated 
in the above-named essay. Thus provision was made for 
an improvement of the judicial system, and a law was 
passed, according to which law-suits, the protraction of 
which was specially damaging to the progress of traffic, in 
particular suits having reference to commerce and naviga- 
tion, had to be settled within a month. Meanwhile, not 
only were the interests of trade kept in view, but it was 
also sought to remove the more deep-lying abuses. Thus 
most rigorous measures were taken against all those who 
were suspected of having engaged in attempts at bribing 
the citizens in the popular assembly and in the courts of 
law. A certain Demophilus distinguished himself in this 
matter by his patriotic ardor ; and the same statesman in 
01. cviii. 3 (b. c. 346) proposed a general examination of 
the list of citizens. This was beyond doubt a measure 
intended to purge the city of strangers, indifferent to its 
welfare and untrustworthy, and in general to re-elevate 
the spirit of the civic community ; it was a measure of an 

* Multifarious connexions of Demosthenes with the Greeks traveling or 
resident in Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly : Dem. vui. 14 ; and Rehdantz 
ad toe. — The resources of Athens : Dem. xiv. 25; Boeckh, P. Ec. of Ath. vol. ii. 
p. 248 [Eng. Tr.].— Zeal of the metceci : ib. p. 230 ; G. Curtius in Philol xxiv. 
268.— Naueicles and Diotimus: Sch&fer, ii. 309. 

chap, iv.] 2/as£ Struggles for Independence. 357 

aristocratic tendency, like the corresponding law of Aristo- 
phon of old (vol. iv. p. 71.) 

With these measures is also connected an innovation 
with regard to the popular assembly. Here the evil of 
clamorous lawlessness had continuously increased. The 
presidency over the citizens had been transferred from the 
Prytanes (vol. iii. p. 543) to the Proedri, a commission of 
nine men, chosen by lot out of the civic tribes not repre- 
sented in the presiding prytany. Now, a new way was 
adopted. For every popular assembly one of the ten 
tribes of the civic body was designated, which assumed the 
responsibility of preserving order and decency; to this 
tribe seats were given in the vicinity of the orators' tri- 
bune, so that it might protect the orator against any unfair 
treatment ; it was in fact a commission of persons appointed 
out of the midst of the citizens for the preservation of 
order. Hereby it was designed to reanimate the sense 
of honor in the community, and to counteract the efforts 
of those who observed with inner satisfaction the growing 
decay of the popular assembly, because they regarded this 
as a confirmation of their view, that a democracy like the 
Attic was utterly incapable of an independent and effec- 
tive policy. It is not improbable, that about the same 
time the Areopagus too was again allowed a greater influ- 
ence upon public life, and that powers were again con- 
ferred upon it, particularly for proceeding with the utmost 
rigor against public treason. We therefore recognize 
after the humiliation brought upon the Athenians by the 
Peace of Philocrates and by the ruin of Phocis an honora- 
ble striving to improve the public state of things, and to 
remedy the abuses of the democracy, — such as had also 
shown itself after the Sicilian calamity (vol. iii. p. 437), 
and after the rule of the Thirty. In other words, there 
still existed an efficient stock of citizens possessed of a 
healthy spirit and of a lively feeling for the welfare of the 
city, and refusing to despair of its future. It was only 

358 History of Greece. C BooK VIL 

indispensable to unite and guide those who were animated 
by patriotic sentiments.* 

Demos- Demosthenes was from the first no party-' 

the n oid an a d - man (P* 274). His was an uncommonly inde- 
ties - pendent nature; he was wont to pursue his 

own paths, and confided in the power of truth, as one from 
which the civic community would in the end be unable to 
escape. But at the same time it could not fail to happen, 
that his views in many respects agreed with the stand- 
points of the older parties among the citizens. Thus he 
shared with the Boeotian party (p. 87) a love for the 
constitution, a vigorous spirit of enterprise, and a determi- 
nation not to allow any start to Sparta. On the other 
hand, he approached to Callistratus' policy of the mainte- 
nance of a balance of power (p. 99), and shared his 
aversion from Bceotia, — an aversion, which after the ne- 
gotiations of the Thebans with Persia (vol. iv. p. 482 seq.) 
and during the Phocian War had become continuously 
more intense and general at Athens. In the speech for 
Megalopolis he considers it the most important point of 
view for Attic policy, to allow neither Sparta nor Thebes 
to become powerful ; and in the speech against Aristocrates 
he is able to regard the discord prevailing among the 
Hellenes as the good fortune of Athens.f Gradually the 
aspect of things changed. In proportion as the times be- 
came increasingly serious, Athens became more decidedly, 
as she had been in the Persian Wars, the head-quarters of 
all efforts for liberty; all narrow-hearted considerations 
with regard to the other states fell more and more into the 

* Expedition of procedure in commercial suits, recommended by "Xen." 
«. «. iii. 3 ; introduced before the transactions concerning Halonnesus 
(" Dem." vii. 12). — Aia»//^io-t? on the motion of Demophilus : iEschin. i. 77 ; 
ScMfer, ii. 289. — npdcfipoi, cf. ante Note to vol. iv. 67; Vischer, Epigr. Beitr. mt» 
Gr. 63. — <bv\r\ x-poedpevovcra : JSschin. i. 33; Ferd. Schultz, Demosthenes und d>e 
Btdefreiheil, 21. — Areopagus : Meier u. Schomann Att. Prozms, 344. As the text 
shows, several extraordinary commissions occur in this period, which are 
entrusted to the Areopagus. 

f Policy of a balance of power : Dem. xvi. 4; xxiii. 102. 

Chap, iv.] £as£ Struggles for Independence. 359 

background ; the national idea attained to more and more 
powerful prominence, and by it was formed a new party. 
This party gathered round Demosthenes. 

Men took up their position by his side, who, The 

stimulated by his speeches and action, or 55*?" 

moved by an impulse in themselves, pursued 
the same aims ; men in whom the sentiments of a better 
age revived once more, orators and statesmen of a truly 
Republican character, whose glance was vigilant, like that 
of Demosthenes, wherever the honor of the city was at 
issue, near at hand and afar off. Among them was 
Hegesippus of Sunium, formerly an adhe- He . 
rent of Leodaraas (p. 87), a fiery patriot, who 
already in the year 357 had ardently advocated the preser- 
vation of Cardia, when that important city was sacrificed 
(p. 140); in the same sense he had urged upon the Athe- 
nians an energetic alliance with the Phocians, so long as 
they still possessed power of resistance, and had most de- 
cisively withstood the Peace of Philocrates. Of yet higher 
mark were Lycurgus and Hyperides. Lycur- L 
gus, the son of Lycophron, was slightly senior 
to Demosthenes, and belonged to the ancient priestly 
family of the Eteobutadae. He was an Attic nobleman in 
the best sense of the word. Of a lofty spirit and loyal to 
the traditions of his home, he as it were towered into the 
present out of a better past. But he stood towards his 
times in no attitude of unsympathetic and hostile contra- 
diction ; he was thoroughly moderate, and therefore ready 
to consent to concessions and open to conciliation, although 
he made rigorous demands upon others as well as upon 
himself. At the same time, he was an enemy of all under- 
hand intrigues, truthful, simple in manners and pious, a 
patriot animated by the keenest sense of honor and, if only 
for this reason, decidedly anti-Macedonian, although other- 
wise he was not a member of the popular party, but rather 
had aristocratic leanings. His was an idealizing nature. 

360 History of Greece. [BookVu 

With a certain enthusiastic bent he gave himself up to the 
impression left upon him by the ancient poets ; he had a 
receptive sense for plastic art ; he was an admirer of Plato, 
but refused to allow this to restrain him from an active 
participation in public life. On the contrary, he trained 
himself with the utmost conscientiousness as an orator, 
and took advantage of the influence which he gained in 
this capacity never to weary in throwing light upon all 
the defects in the State, in chastising treason and immo- 
rality, in maintaining the honorable traditions of the past, 
and in insisting, as in the houses of the citizens, so also in 
the affairs of the commonwealth, upon discipline and order. 

Hyperides Hyperides, too, the son of Glaucippus, was 
of a family of repute, and an eager champion 
of national independence ; but in other respects he was the 
antitype of Lycurgus. For his was a sensual nature, 
devoid of any moral anchorage, prone to indulgence in all 
pleasures ; though at the same time he contrived like 
Alcibiades to keep his intellectual vigor unimpaired. He 
was a man of original power, to a far higher degree than 
Lycurgus a born orator, rapid and skilful in the combina- 
tion of ideas, pointed in expression, fresh and natural and 

Pol euetes °^ rea dy ^t. These men were joined by others, 
caiiisthenes,' sucn as Polyeuctes of Sphettus ; Callisthenes, 

Anstonicus, J r ' 

Nausicies, w ] 10 after the destruction of the Phocian towns 


Timarchus. called upon the Athenians to place city and 
country in a condition of defence; Aristonicus, 
the Anagyrasian ; Nausicies, who as general had guarded 
Thermopylae (p. 79) the patriotic Diotimus ; and lastly 
Timarchus, Arizelus' son, an Athenian of uncommon ac- 
tivity, who was on many occasions entrusted with pub- 
lic missions, and in his policy stood entirely on the side 
of Demosthenes, as is proved by the law proposed by him 
01. cviii. 2, b. c. 347-6, in which he moved that the 
penalty of death should be incurred by all those who sup- 
plied the king with ships' furniture or arms. 

Chap, iv.] £os< Struggles for Independence. 361 

Thus Demosthenes, who for a series of years had been 
left in so solitary a position, now saw himself surrounded 
by a considerable group of sympathetic associates. The 
serious significance of the times had exercised its effect. 
Their demands were so clear and so inevitable, that men 
of the most various tendencies, aristocrats and democrats, 
philosophers and men of the world, idealizing and simply 
practical natures, without any previous understanding 
united in common points of view. It is true that at the 
same time — and indeed it cannot be otherwise in party-life 
— some elements united which originally were not homo- 
geneous, impure characters attached themselves to the 
pure Demosthenes ; yet after all it amounted to a great 
progress, that in the place of the stolid indifference, such 
as had formerly prevailed, views standing in bold contrast 
to one another had now formed themselves at Athens. 
The three fractions of the Peace-party were now con- 
fronted by a Patriot-party, which regarded Demosthenes 
as its leading champion.* 

But the more that the national party in p ar t v . C on- 
Athens drew together, the more inevitable be- * est8 in * he 

p ' law-courts. 

came the conflict between it and its adversa- 
ries. In particular it could not be endured, that the 
partisans of the king should now as heretofore present 
themselves as honest citizens before the civic body. Right 
and wrong must become clearly distinguished, so that the 
consciences of men might become more keen. This pur- 
pose had to be served by the law-courts, which among the 
Athenians were so closely connected with public life, and 
from which it was customary to expect the ultimate deci- 
sion even in political differences. Those proceedings, 
which had not been settled in the popular assembly, had 

* Hegesippus on behalf of Cardia: Dem. vii. 43.— Hyperides, son 
T\o.vKinnov tou pijTopo? ; but the distinguished character of his origin is 
shown by the hereditary tomb before the Horsemen's Gate : Vit. X. Orat. 
849. — Callisthenes: Dem. xix. 86. Cf. as to the Attic statesmen of the na- 
tional party, Schafer, ii. 298—312. 


362 History of Greece. [Bd<*vil 

to be resumed by means of public law-suits ; for judicial 
sentences were required to establish the fact, that the 
civic community had been most vilely deceived by its 
plenipotentiaries, in order that hereby the citizens might 
be forced once for all to dissolve the connexion between 
themselves and such guides. The suits concerning the 
embassy were therefore not due to a petty appetite for 
vengeance or to personal scheming ; neither were they 
useless squabbles about matters settled and irremediable ; 
on the contrary, they were struggles necessary in order to 
make clear the stand-point of the parties, and together 
with the authors of the peace to bring the whole matter 
of the peace itself in its true aspect before the eyes of the 

Demos- Demosthenes took the first step, by calling 

thenes v. .^schines to account. The customary form 

iEschines. J 

was that of a question being promulgated to 
all the citizens by the Board of Account within thirty 
days after the completion of an official task : whether any 
one had any information to bring forward as to neglect of 
official duties. Demosthenes presented an act of accusa- 
tion, and declared himself ready, together with Timarchus, 
who had placed his name together with that of Demos- 
thenes on the presentment, to prove that ^Eschines had 
performed his office of ambassador in a manner contra- 
vening duty and conscience. 
„ , Demosthenes had every reason for reckon- 

Condemna- J 

tionofTimar- i n or n success; but he had associated himself 

chus. & ' 

with a man, who had nothing in common with 
him except the immediate party-object, and whose fellow- 
ship became very disadvantageous to the whole case. 

Timarchus was a man of loose habits of life, 

01. cvin. 3 

(b. c. 345). wno h a d publicly offended against propriety ; 
and however little importance really attached to these 
faults of character in connexion with the matter at issue, 
yet iEschines contrived with extreme cunning to take 

chap, iv.] j^^ Struggles for Independence. 363 

advantage of this circumstance. He busily accumulated 
whatever objectionable incidents were to be discovered in 
the wild youth of Timarchus, and with a hypocritical zeal 
on behalf of virtue attacked him so effectively, that he was 
declared to have forfeited his honor as a citizen. The 
consequence was, that the entire accusation became in- 
valid, and that ^schines not only personally rose in au- 
thority with many citizens, but that at the same time an un- 
favorable light fell upon Demosthenes and his case, on ac- 
count of his association with such a reprobate. The party- 
manceuvre had succeeded to perfection. The Philippic 
faction was again full of confidence ; and the king doubt- 
less remembered to encourage his partisans by all kinds 
of new promises. They once more dared publicly to de- 
clare themselves in his favor ; iEschines himself already 
in his speech against Timarchus points anew to the benevo- 
lent intentions of Philip ; and seizes the occasion for in- 
veighing against Hegesippus, and against Demosthenes as 
a man dangerous to the city and of pernicious influence 
upon its youth. The entire speech was a party-speech ; 
and here iEschines was in his own most proper sphere, 
acting the moralist, with his pathos acquired on the stage, 
and under this mask continuing successfully to ward off 
the assault of the national party. 

But a decision could not be brought about by this suc- 
cess ; it was nothing more than a truce. Demosthenes 
sustained the indictment even after the condemnation of 
Timarchus ; and although he abstained from immediately 
resuming it, he only did this because he was awaiting a 
more favorable moment for the further prosecution of the 
suit. In consequence of the composition of the Attic juries 
the entire success of such disputes-at-law depended upon 
the mood of the civic community ; and Demosthenes could 
safely calculate upon many a thing speedily happening 
which would remove the guilt of iEschines beyond all 
question. For it was already suspicious enough that 

364 History of Greece. t BoOK vn - 

iEschines Had raised a protest, when Demosthenes after 
the termination of the second embassy submitted himself 
to the Board of Account, in order to render an account of 
his proceedings ; iEschines maintained that there was no 
special account required in the case of this second em- 
bassy, which was nothing but a continuation of the former 
and rested on the same instructions and powers. This 
view was, as was to be expected, rejected by the authori- 
ties, who caused Demosthenes, and probably also the other 
envoys, to render an account, while the indictment re- 
mained suspended over iEschines. 

, The next years were not favorable to the 

The case of J 

Antiphon. repute of JEschines. In particular it wore an 
? L cy[i h^ ey il aspect for him, that he took up the cas8 
of a certain Antiphon, whom Demosthenes 
had caused to be arrested, because he was very strongly 
suspected of having entered into a treasonable engagement 
with the Macedonians, and having promised in return for 
gold from Philip to set fire to the ship-sheds of the Pirseeus. 
^Eschines declared the procedure of Demosthenes, who 
had here doubtless intervened in some official capacity, to 
be an unconstitutional encroachment, a violation of civic 
liberty and of the lawful sanctity of a man's house ; he 
contrived to gain over the popular assembly to his side 
and to bring about the liberation of the guilty man, 
although the name of the latter was expunged from the 
lists of the citizens. But at this point the Areopagus in- 
terfered, which we on this occasion see for the first time 
coming forward as armed with special powers ; by its or- 
ders Antiphon was arrested anew, brought before a jury, 
and, his guilt having been proved, put to death. 
~ - A fresh blow, suffered by the Macedonian 

Londemna- J 

tion of Phiio- party, proceeded from Hyperides. It was 
_ . „ , about this time that he subjected to an indict- 

01. cix. 1 (b. , » 

c. 343). ment Philocrates, the most audacious, arro- 

gant, and reckless of all the Macedonians in the Attic camp. 

Chaf. iv.] jjQgt Struggles for Indeperidenee. 365 

The affair was not treated according to the ordinary 
course of law, but in the form of an Eisangelia, or Indict- 
ment of Information, was brought immediately before the 
civic assembly, in order to stir up the whole community 
against a popular orator, who counselled it against the in- 
terests of the city, and who stood in the pay of the for- 
eigner. Proof was given of the damage which the decep- 
tive embassy-reports of Philocrates had inflicted upon the 
city ; and as the judgment concerning his personal char- 
acter was established beforehand, he was in spite of the 
assistance of jEschines unable to ward off the blow dealt 
against him. He was forced to acknowledge himself van- 
quished, before the sentence had been passed ; while in 
exile, he was found guilty of the heaviest crimes, and con- 
demned to death.* 

Although even after this event iEschines bore himself 
as if he had had no concern with the sentenced Philo- 
crates, yet already during this case Demosthenes had 
taken advantage of every opportunity for proving the con- 
trary, and for making clear to the citizens the absolutely 
equal degree of culpability in iEschines. And the extent 
to which his authority had suffered by the fall of Philo- 
crates and by his association with the traitor Antiphon, 
very soon became manifest on another occasion, when the 
matter in hand was to select a trustworthy man among the 
Attic orators, who was to be honored with a public com- 
mission of a most peculiar kind. 

In the Cyclades, and even in Delos, the Th j) elian 
island most closely connected with Athens, a of ^ ix j / B 
party had likewise formed itself under Mace- c - 34: ^- 

* Rendering of account: Dem. xix. 211; iEschines said: y irpeo-peia inl 
nenpaytt.ei'oi.s eyiyvero (ii. 123). — Antiphon: Dem. xviii. 132; Plutarch, Dem. 14 
(<r(f>6f>pa apicrTOKpariKov no\tT€vp.a). Criminal attempts by traitors upon the 
arsenal mentioned also on other occasions: Ar. A charn. 887. That Philip 
should have hired a fellow for this purpose is incredible; it is possible that 
the latter thought to earn a reward ex post facto. Boeckh (in Abhandl. dot 
Berlin. AJcad., 1834, 12) connects the deed with the 5iai/»j<£icriv. — Philocrates: 
Hyperides pro Euxenipp. c. 39. 

366 History of Greece. t Bo °* vm 

doman influences, which raised its head against the 
claims to supremacy maintained by the Athenians ; in- 
deed, their right to the administration of the Delian 
sanctuary was called into question. Undoubtedly these 
movements were connected with the efforts of the Ma- 
cedonian party, to obtain during the continuance of 
peace more and more ground in the regions surrounding 
Athens, and gradually to undermine the remnant of Attic 
power, which still existed beyond the boundaries of Attica 
itself. And it must have been most especially in conso- 
nance with the designs of Philip, to be here too admitted 
into the presidency over a national sanctuary, as he had 
succeeded in being admitted in the case of Delphi, and as 
he undoubtedly also intended with regard to Olympia (p. 
346). The true meaning of these movements is already 
manifest from the circumstance, that the proceedings of 
the Delians were directed by a Macedonian partisan, 
Euthycrates, the same who had betrayed Olynthus, and 
that they proposed that the legal dispute should be settled 
at Delphi ; for was not this an excellent opportunity for 
giving a political significance to the new Federal Council 
there, and for elevating the " Shadow of Delphi " into a 
power in Greece ? Athens was not in a situation allowing 
her to reject the proposal of the Delians; and it was now of 
the highest importance to find the right man to represent 
the cause of Athens before the Federal Tribunal of arbi- 
tration. The civic assembly chose iEschines, who seemed 
to be the born spokesman in all Amphictyonic affairs. 
Now, this choice could not but appear in the highest de- 
gree dangerous to ail patriots. How could the most 
sacred interests of Athens be entrusted, as against Euthy- 
crates, to a man who was himself likewise an adherent of 
the policy of Philip and an instrument of it, in particular 
before a tribunal itself standing under Macedonian influ- 
ence ? The national party, therefore, set all its strength 
in motion, in order to reverse the resolution of the assem- 

Chap, iv.] 2>os£ Struggles for Independence. 367 

bly, and was able to carry its proposal that the decision 
concerning this question of election should be left to the 
Areopagus. This authority annulled the first election, 
and appointed as agent for the Athenian case Hyperides, 
who had quite recently, by the suit against Philocrates, 
given proof of his patriotism as well as of his energy. He 
showed himself fully worthy of the confidence reposed in 
him ; and since Philip considered it unadvisable to settle 
this matter by force, the Athenians, by means of the 
1 Delian ' speech made by Hyperides at Delphi, obtained a 
judicial decision which solemnly recognized their claims 

After this new defeat had been inflicted upon ^Eschines, 
Demosthenes thought that the right moment had arrived 
for himself to resume the law-suit — the carrying through 
of which was a matter of conscience to him. He had un- 
changeably maintained his position, and left no opportu- 
nity unused for openly designating his adversary as a 
traitor and enemy of his native city. The time was come 
for the civic community to adopt his judgment as its own. 

One would suppose that this might have Resum 
been accomplished without difficulty. For if tionofthein- 

* J dictment de 

Philocrates was a traitor, then ^Eschines could f ( . lM le ^ ar 

7 tione. 

not be innocent, although he had now re- 
nounced his former associate. In the present case, how- 
ever, success was far less assured. For ^Eschines was a 
man of cunning and caution, who never exposed himself 
like the clumsy Philocrates ; he was a model of genteel 
propriety, a personage whose whole bearing made it im- 
possible to suspect anything dishonorable in him. He still 
possessed a very powerful following, because he was the 
most talented exponent of the views of the party of Eubu- 
lus ; and as an orator and politician he was still a favorite 
of the people. Demosthenes, therefore, instead of turning 

* Delian suit : Dem. xviii. 134 ; Boeckh in Abhandl der Berlin. Akad. 1834 
11 teq. 

3G8 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

against him with an indictment of information before the 
civic assembly, as Hyperides had done in the case of 
Philocrates, summoned him before the Board of Account, 
and even here brought forward no definite motion for 
punishment, but simply undertook to prove iEschines' ad- 
ministration of his office of envoy to have been dishonest, 
while the settlement of the penalty was after this to be left 
to the judicial court, which the Board of Account was to 

Although Demosthenes had adopted the regular course 
of judicial procedure, yet the whole case was by its nature 
not adapted for a rigorous lawyer-like treatment. For 
what was in question was not the transgression of this or 
that law, but the unpatriotic spirit in which the office en- 
trusted to jEschines by the confidence of the citizens had 
been administered, the change in his political position, 
which was only to be explained by external influences, 
and his dishonest bearing towards the citizens. Here, 
facts of public notoriety were at hand, rendering superflu- 
ous any demonstration rigorously based upon evidence. 
The entire civic community could be appealed to in wit- 
ness of how iEschines had formerly borne himself as a 
fiery patriot, and how a change had come over him in 
consequence of his sojourn at Pella ; how he had since 
acted in the interests of Philip, and had deceived the 
citizens by fictitious pretences. Demosthenes is indeed 
obliged to concede that his adversary may possibly have 
been deluded himself, and have in good faith communi- 
cated to his fellow-citizens the royal promises. But sup- 
posing this to have been the case, assuredly after being 
undeceived iEschines should have averted himself with 
indignation from the party of the king. Instead of which 
he had not allowed himself to be in the least degree dis- 
turbed in his amicable relations towards Philip, and had 
even in the most joyous mood joined in the royal celebra- 
tions of the victory over the Phocians, in whose ruin he 

Cha.p. IV.] jj^i Struggles for Independence. 369 

had borne a hand. The logical conclusion was therefore 
this : that he had intentionally deceived his fellow-citizens 
in the most important affairs of State, and had know- 
ingly done his utmost to bring the peace to pass after a 
fashion, than which none could have been more advanta- 
geous for Philip, and none more humiliating and perni 
cious for Athens. 

But although nothing could have been clearer than the 
main point upon which for Demosthenes everything de- 
pended, yet in the case of such a man as ^Eschines it is 
intelligible enough that it should have been extremely 
difficult to establish the measure of guilt, to distinguish 
accurately between weakness and bad intentions, and to 
prove treasonable sentiments from particular facts. In 
attacking JEschines, Demosthenes contended against all 
traitors, whose number was daily growing in Greece ; his 
wrathful zeal carried him away with it, and the exuberance 
of his charges redounded to the advantage of his adver- 
sary. For when iEschines was represented by Demos- 
thenes as the man who had betrayed Thermopylse and had 
introduced the foreign king into the heart of Greece, when 
to him were ascribed the ruin of Phocis, the overthrow 
of Cersobleptes, — the points of such accusations could be 
easily broken on particular heads ; JEschines could prove 
that the capital of the Thracian chieftain had fallen 
already before the embassy had started on its journey, and 
that the Tyrants of Phocis had been the causes of their 
own ruin. He could deny the secret conversations with 
king Philip with which he was charged, as resting on in- 
sufficient evidence ; he could in particular point out, how 
unjust it was to make him responsible before all other men 
for everything, and to treat him as if he, and he alone, 
were accountable for Philip and for the peace. And most 
especially was the position of iEschmes favorable in this 
respect, that the personal attack upon him was at the same 
time an attack upon the peace itself, and could not there- 


370 History of Greece. i Bo ™ VI * 

fore but cause apprehension in all peace-loving citizens 
For a condemnation of iEschines would have amounted to 
a new rift between Philip and Athens, to an indirect decla- 
ration on the part of the civic community, that it desired 
to redeem its honor, which the peace had pledged away. 

iEschines was quite the man to turn to the fullest 
account this favorable conjuncture of existing circum- 
stances. Like a skilful wrestler he slips from the grasp 
of his overwhelmingly powerful adversary, and instead of 
entering upon a serious justification of himself against the 
gist of the accusation, he takes advantage of every par- 
ticular weakness, mocks at the overflowing measure of re- 
sponsibility cast upon his poor head, and represents the 
entire case as one of political differences, which a law-court 
is an altogether unfit place to decide. As against this 
savage agitator, he is, he declares, the victim of the party- 
tendency anxious to preserve to the Athenians the peace, 
which after all has not yet failed to prove a blessing to 
their city in reference to material prosperity, not less than to 
their civic constitution. He made use of the good opinion 
which prevailed concerning him personally among the 
Athenians, in order to designate such crimes as those im- 
puted to him as utterly irreconcilable with his character. 
He exerted all the art of eloquence, all the charm of his 
voice which moved the hearts of men. At the same time 
he was favored by the circumstance, that it was he who 
spoke last, and that his opponent had no opportunity of 
effacing again the impression of the ^schinean eloquence ; 
lastly, personages so highly respected as Eubulus and 
Phocion came forward in his behalf; so that the mighty 
Acquittal of contest between the two greatest orators of 
^Esehmes: Athens in the fourth year after its commence- 
Sc.'Sil). ment ultimately closed with iEschines being 
acquitted on the indictment for violation of his 
duty, and being declared free from all obligation to rendei 
an account 

chap. I v.j £ as i Struggles for Independence. 371 

But a victory it was not, — rather the reverse. For only 
thirty votes acquitted the accused ; and those who were 
aware of the situation of affairs knew very well that this 
majority was not founded on a conviction of the innocence 
of .^Eschines; but that it had been brought together by 
external influences, by currents of feeling, considerations 
and views, which were quite remote from the real question 
of law. Although, therefore, the result achieved was not 
that which had been desired, yet Demosthenes had no 
cause to repent the labor which he had bestowed upon this 
contest; for with the better part of the citizens his au- 
thority had after all only increased, and they had attained 
to a clearer distinction between Right and Wrong.* 

During these contests within the city, for- „ . 

° * * Foreign 

eign affairs too had again become a subject of affairs .- 

° ° J Peloponne- 

discussion ; and just as among the citizens De- su s. 
mosthenes incessantly pursued the party of Philip, so 
he had outside Attica followed the king himself in all his 
undertakings, tracing out every one of his designs, and op- 
posing them with all the resources at his command. 

The first occasion was offered by the affairs of Pelopon- 
nesus. Here a task of special difficulty awaited the 
policy of Athens. Sparta was the most vigorous and in- 
dependent among the states of the peninsula; but no 
overtures could be made to her, lest her adversaries 
should be rendered wroth, and driven over completely to 
the Macedonian side. And the attention of Demosthenes 
had above all to be directed towards preventing any 

* Upea-ptiat tiQvvai, Dem. xix. 103, before the Logistoe (in contradistinction 
to the ticrayyekia napaireafieias, iEschin. ii. 139): Sch'afer, ii. 358 — 390. Discus- 
sion of the same points without express reference to a previous law-suit 
(hence the doubts with reference to the latter already ap. Platarch, Dem. 15, 
and in our days in O. Haupt, Leben des Dem., who in opposition to the testi- 
mony of Idomeneus considers both orations party-pamphlets) thirteen 
years afterwards in the speeches of Demosthenes and iEschines for and 
against Ctesiphon. Concerning the contradictions between the earlier and 
later speeches, see L. Spengel, bvm. Vertheidig. des Kteeiph., 1866. 

372 History of Greece. [BookVU 

Greek State from furnishing an opportunity to the king 
of extending the domain of his supremacy under a legal 
pretext. It was therefore of the utmost importance to 
open the eyes of the Peloponnesian communities to the 
true character of the Macedonian policy, and there as at 
Athens to excite against Philip that mistrust, which was 
the fundamental condition of a firm, national attitude. 

Demoathe- ^ or *^ s purpose, by the advice of Demos- 
nes in Peio- thenes envoys proceeded to the peninsula, 

ponnesus. . . 

... . , after Philip had already commenced his politi- 

01. cvm. 4 (b. r . . 

c. 344). ca ] action there, had promised aid, had sent 

mercenaries and had issued ordinances as a supreme 
authority (p. 345). Demosthenes himself was the leader 
of the embassy. His speeches were spread outside Athens 
too as fly-sheets ; and thus he appeared before the citizens 
at Messene as well as at Argos as a friend of the people, 
well known and admired on account of his love of liberty, 
in order to warn them against the king, whose attention 
was now directed towards Peloponnesus, and who was in- 
troducing himself among them as their friend and bene- 
factor, and as the guardian of their independence. But 
let them look around them and convince themselves, from 
the example of other states, what were the real fruits of 
the favors of a Philip. He bade them think of Olynthus. 
" Consider," he said, " ye men of Messene, how full of con- 
fidence were the Olynthians, and with what indignation 
they listened to any one who blamed the king, when he 
made them a present of Anthemus and Potidsea. Was it 
well possible for them in those days to expect such a doom 
as that which they afterwards suffered ? Would they not 
have laughed in the face of any one who should have pro- 
phesied it to them ? And yet they have deceived them- 
selves so bitterly, and, after for a short time enjoying the 
territory of their neighbors, they have for ever lost their 
own, have been shamefully driven out, and not only been 
conquered, but also betrayed and bartered away by 

chap, iv.] £ as j Struggles for Independence. 373 

their own fellow-citizens ! From this ye may learn, that 
to free states no advantage ever results from intimate in- 
tercourse with Tyrants. And was the lot of the Thessa- 
\ians perchance a better one ? When Philip expelled 
iheir Tyrants, when he bestowed upon them Nicsea and 
Magnesia, do ye suppose that they then expected the in- 
Iroduction of the Ten, by whom they are now governed, 
ind that they could believe that the prince, who restored to 
mem their seat and vote in the Amphictyonic League, 
Would appropriate to himself their revenues aud tolls ? 
Assuredly not ; and yet every one knows that this has 
actually come to pass. See, then, what Philip is, with his 
gifts and his promises ! God grant, that ye too may not 
speedily make acquaintance with Philip and his decep- 
tions ! Many inventions have been made by men, in order 
to protect their cities, such as ramparts and walls and 
fosses and other artificial works. Intelligent men possess 
a natural resource of defence, which is useful and salutary 
to all, but most especially to free communities against 
Tyrants. This resource is that of mistrust. This I be- 
seech you to preserve to yourselves ; this will save you ! 
For what is it above all to which your efforts are di- 
rected ? Liberty, ye reply. So be it. Do ye not see, 
how already the title of Philip is in conflict with this ? 
For whosoever is a King or Tyrant, he is an enemy of lib- 
erty and of civic constitutions. Be then well on your 
guard, lest, while endeavoring to escape from a war, ye 
saddle yourselves with a despotic master." 

The mighty force of Demosthenes had its 
effect. His words excited applause and ad- jog of the 

■*■ -*■ Pelopon- 

miration ; the more high-minded among the nesians. 
citizens of Messene and Argos were illuminated by a just 
understanding of the situation, and set aglow with a Hel- 
lenic love of liberty. But the sentiments of the multitude 
it was impossible to change. The appearance of Demos- 
thenes was only like the performance of a brilliant visitor 

374 History of Greece. [Book vu 

on the stage. No sooner had it passed away, than the 
hearts of his hearers grew cold ; and with their former 
indifference they again pursued the narrow-hearted inter- 
ests of their selfish domestic policy, which was afraid of 
nothing but Sparta. Nowhere was the self-seeking ten- 
dency which besets the policy of petty states more potent 
than in the peninsula; nowhere were men's eyes more 
determinedly shut against the broad aspect of affairs 
important to the world at large. They fancied themselves 
thoroughly secure behind the passes of the Isthmus, and 
deemed it sheer folly that it should be attempted to 
frighten the mountain-towns of Peloponnesus with the 
burning of Olynthus. It was too convenient for them to 
find the protection formerly furnished by Thebes at once 
supplied by a prince mighty in war, whose orders in truth 
the states of secondary rank far more willingly obeyed 
than those of a Hellenic commonwealth, which had itself 
only recently stepped forth from the number of the secon- 
dary states. 

Notwithstanding this, the proceedings of Demosthenes 
had frightened the partisans of Macedonia ; their chief 
leaders, Neon and Thrasylochus at Messene, Myrtis, Tele- 
damus and Muaseas at Argos, would not listen to any 
proposals for the termination of the discords at home ; 
they redoubled their exertions ; after the admonitions of 
Demosthenes they only all the more persistently excited 
their fellow-citizens against Sparta, and at the same time 
against all supposed friends of Sparta, whom they declared 
to be also the foes of Peloponnesian liberty ; and they 
cast suspicion upon Athens herself, as having arrived at a 
secret understanding with Sparta. From Macedonia this 
movement was encouraged, in order that difficulties might 
be created for the Athenians, and damage inflicted upon 

Peiopon- *^ e democratic party ; and thus an embassy 

embass WaS Sent t0 Athens on tne P art °^ tne cities, to 

at Athens, demand explanations as to the relations be- 

Chap, iv.] j^^i Struggles for Independence. 375 

tween Sparta and Athens. Macedonian envoys arrived at 
Athens together with the Peloponnesian, in order to sup- 
port the cause of the latter, and at the same time to 
proffer complaints as to the uninterrupted insults heaped 
upon the king on the Attic orators' tribune.* 

Such was the result of the efforts of Demosthenes. In- 
stead of the Peloponnesians having been severed from 
Philip, they were more closely united than ever, and con- 
fronted the Athenians as one party. But this failed to 
break his courage ; it merely offered him an opportunity 
for indicating with increased firmness and clearness the 
standpoint of himself and his friends ; as he did in the 
popular assembly, in which the reply to be made to the 
foreign envoys was debated. 

" In order to settle what we have to do," — „,, a 

9 The Second 

such was the gist of this speech — " we must Philippic 
know what Philip intends. If he is the friend 01 - cix - 1 

r (b. c. 344). 

of the Hellenes, as he pretends to be, those 
are in the right who follow him ; but if he is the reverse, 
we are in the right who contend against him with all the 
resources at our command. Now, the answer to this ques- 
tion, which is decisive as to our conduct, lies in the facts 
within the experience of all of us. Philip has gone for- 
ward, step by step, in order to make the Hellenes his sub- 
jects ; his measures show that he shrinks from no act of 
force. He is no king desirous of justice ; he seeks domin- 
ion and naught else. He makes himself master of one 
after the other of the bulwarks and inlets of Hellas ; and 
now also advances in the peninsula according to a definite 
plan. Therefore, in spite of all treaties of peace concluded 
by him, Philip is, and remains, the enemy of all Hellenes, 
and our enemy in particular. For the real goal which he 
keeps in view is Athens. Athens, he well knows, he can- 

* Of his speech at Messene, Demosthenes furnishes a report, vi. 20. The 
party-leaders : Dem. xviii. 295. Envoys in Athens from Philip also : Liba- 
nius, Introd to Dem. 6. 

376 Histonj of Greece. [BookVU 

not catch by the bait of false pretences, as he has caught 
Thebes and the Peloponnesian cities. It is a sign of 
honorable recognition, paid by him to the civic communi- 
ty of Athens, that he should not even venture upon the 
attempt to make you his allies by temptations unworthy 
of you, and thus to divert you from your Hellenic mis- 
sion ! " After the orator had thus under the eyes of the 
foreign envoys impressively shown to his fellow-citizens, as 
well as to the Greeks who were present, what sentiments 
all true Hellenes ought to entertain towards Philip, he 
brought forward the draft of the reply which ought to be 
made. Doubtless satisfactory declarations were made to 
Messene and the other cities as to the fact that Athens 
had no intention of subjecting them once more to the yoke 
of Sparta ; while, on the other hand, a firm resolve was 
expressed to defend Sparta against any attack ; for this, 
it was declared, was the patriotic task which Athens 
would never shrink from fulfilling: in every quarter to 
protect existing rights and to oppose foreign attempts at 

It was long since such an assembly of the citizens had 
been held at Athens. The city of Aristides seemed to 
have come to life again. The Peloponnesians could not 
refrain from acknowledging the grandeur of the bearing 
of a civic community under such leaders ; and in so far 
Demosthenes actually gained his immediate object, that 
the dangerous hostilities in the peninsula were appeased, 
and that no opportunity was given to Philip for interven- 
tion. Now, since about the same time the Macedonian at- 
tempt upon Megara (p. 347) likewise failed, and this city 
joined Athens, who would seem to have furnished effec- 
tive neighborly succor, Philip deemed that he ought no 
longer to remain an inactive spectator of the gradual pro- 
cess by which the defiant spirit of independence was ac- 
quiring more and more strength. It amounted to an in- 
voluntary recognition paid by him to the successes ob- 

chap, i v.] £«s£ Struggles for Independence, 377 

tained by Lis great adversary, that he should have re- 
solved to send an embassy to Athens, in order to justify 
his policy, and to enter a solemn protest against the suspi- 
cions cast upon it. It was simultaneously a confession of 
his belief that the men of his party at Athens were incapa- 
ble of performing this task; they had incurred too great 
a loss of authority, to be able to stem the growing feeling 
of ill-will against him. He therefore considered a direct 
message on his part called for, and selected as the bringer 
of it a Greek orator, who had received his education at 
Athens, and who seemed to be an adequate adversary of 
Demosthenes and his associates. This was Python, a 
native of Byzantium. In order to make this p fcho t 
mission more impressive, Philip surrounded Athens. 
this envoy with a stately suite. His allies £ 1,ci |ii 
were instructed to take part in the embassy. 
He wished hereby not only to display his power in its full 
splendor, but also to make the other communities wit- 
nesses of his ability to humiliate the champions of liberty 
on the Attic tribune. 

In fact he already bore himself as a monarch, who 
learns with displeasure the movements of discontent and 
contradiction in his states, and addresses his dependants in 
ungracious terms, because they give ear to men who make 
it their task to attack all the measures of the king. He 
renews the assurance of his benevolent intentions. But 
at the same time, he declares, a continuance of mistrust 
would really have the result of converting the benefactor 
into an enemy. Instead of incessantly vituperating the 
peace once concluded, the Athenians ought rather once 
more to review and examine the treaties. For this pur- 
pose he offered his co-operation, and declared himself ready 
to consent to alterations which seemed desirable in the 
interests of the city. 

The skilful and brilliant speech of Python had its effect; 
an apparent readiness for concessions was the best way for 

378 History of Greece. [Bookvil 

depriving the incessant attacks upon the peace of their 
force ; and the Philippic orators at Athens, with whom 
Python had from the first established an understanding, 
felt that a point had been gained in their favor, since they 
could now appeal to the royal message, as simply confirm- 
ing what they had invariably asserted. But their adver- 
saries refused to be allowed themselves to be silenced. 
Demosthenes demonstrated after so vigorous a fashion the 
false game played by Philip, that the confederates present 
were themselves obliged publicly to attest the truthfulness 
of his argument, and to acknowledge the mistrust of the 
Athenians to be well founded. Hegesippus on the other 
hand entered into the subject of the proffered revision of 
the treaties, in order to test the extent to which the king's 
intentions were serious on this head. The Peace of Philo- 
crates had been concluded on the basis of the status quo ; 
each was to retain " what he had." This provision, in 
itself unfavorable after the conquests made by the king, 
had become yet more so in consequence of the treacherous 
delay of the actual conclusion of the peace. Hegesippus 
therefore proposed an alteration of the expression in the 
treaty, to the effect that each should retain "his own;" 
and as the envoys made no protest, it was thought possible 
that the king might accede to this basis, and at all events 
in certain points allow, not the mere status quo, but the 
right of possession to be decisive. In this the proposers 
specially had in view the island of Halonnesus (p. 347). 
Hegesippus proved how a real peace could only be brought 
about, if the one side acknowledged the rights of the other, 
and if the provisions of the peace were made secure against 
arbitrary encroachments. Secondly, if the peace was to 
endure, all the Hellenes ought to be allowed to accede to 
it, and the independence of all neutral states ought to be 
solemnly guaranteed. In this sense Hegesippus moved a 
revision of the treaties, which the king himself had sug- 
gested as feasible ; on this basis he asked that negotiations 

Chap. IV.] £ as £ Struggles for Independence. 379 

with Philip might proceed, in order that it might become 
clear, whether he was the peace-loving prince which he 
was represented to be by Python. 

The motion was passed, and an embassy H e g esippus 
deputed to Pella under the leadership of the in . Macedo- 
proposer of the motion. Philip received it 01. cix. 1 
with undisguised vexation. The very persons (B * c * * 
of the envoys revealed to him the change which had taken 
place in public opinion at Athens. He accordingly 
treated them at Pella as his adversaries, offered them no 
hospitality, and even punished the poet Xenoclides, who 
had received them into his house, by banishing him from 
the realm. Their proposals he refused to condescend to 
discuss. He regarded it as criminal insolence, that it 
should be dared to call into question the entire basis of the 
treaties, that important seaports should be demanded back, 
that it should be desired against his clearly-expressed will 
to admit other states to participation in the treaties, and 
to bring about as against himself a combination of states, 
the sole purpose of which was to hinder him in his under- 
takings. For the present, however, he contented himself 
with sending home the envoys with an abrupt rejection 
of their demands ; and, without paying any further atten- 
tion to Athens, where Desmosthenes was fighting out his 
quarrel with iEschines, Philip calmly continued to pursue 
the execution of his schemes, the object of which was to 
assume positions of increasing strength and fixity in the 
circuit of the Hellenic states. Now, from this point of view 
no country possessed greater importance for ph „. , 

him than Eubcea. Here he might take Athens troops in 

& Eubcea. 

on her most vulnerable side ; here he found 01 cix 1 
the best-situated points of attack ; here he com- (B> c- 343) * 
manded the route of supplies to Athens, and inserted him- 
self with his power between the city and the Cyclades, 
where, as the case of Delos shows, his party was already 
extremely active. In Euboea he had no lack of the de« 

380 History of Greece. [BookVU 

sired opportunities (p. 275 seq.) ; for in all the island-towns 
the civic body was divided, and the friends of Macedonia 
were in conflict with the patriots. Ambitious party- 
leaders were on the watch for the support of the king, in 
order by means of it to subject to themselves the commu- 
nities ; and, while the credulous among the Athenians still 
held fast to the hope, which Philocrates and his friends 
had fostered, that the day was not distant when the 
benevolent Philip would hand over the whole island to 
them, they now had to see dispositions made rendering two 
of its chief cities strong points of support for the Macedo- 
nian arms. From Eretria the national party was expelled 
by Philippic mercenaries; and this city as well as Oreus, 
the territory of which at that time included a quarter of 
the whole island, and which by its situation commanded 
the most important maritime routes (vol. ii. p. 451), were 
by Parmenio delivered up into the hands of Tyrants, who 
held sway there as royal vassals. Gersestus and Chalcis 
still maintained their independence; and the latter city 
now acquired a prominent importance. Here there was 
most political activity ; here the plan was devised of bring- 
ing about a combination among the Eubcean towns; and 
Callias, one of the most highly-considered among the 
leaders of the citizens, sought to obtain support for this 
scheme at the Macedonian court. But to the designs of 
Philip every movement of independent policy among the 
Greeks and every combination among Hellenic commu- 
nities were repugnant; and since Callias had no inclination 
to submit unconditionally to the royal orders, while at 
Thebes too he failed to find any support for his plans, ic 
turned to Athens, and caused his fellow-citizens to furnish 
him with powers for proffering a defensive alliance to the 
latter city. The matter came under discussion, probably 
soon after the termination of the suit concerning the 
embassy (p. 368). JSschines was the representative of the 
Eubcean governments friendly to Macedonia. He warned 

Chap, iv.j £as£ Struggles for Independence, 381 

the Athenians against accepting such proposals, which 
would bring on the war with Philip; and in order also to 
put forward a seemingly patriotic reason for rejecting the 
offer, the orators of his party declared it not to be in con- 
sonance with the dignity of Athens that she should asso- 
ciate herself with Chalcis, a city formerly subject to her, 
on conditions of equality. But Demosthenes .„. 

* J Alliance 

refuted these arguments, and brought about itjjj^and 
the conclusion of a defensive and offensive chalcis. 
alliance with Chalcis. This was the first determined act 
of the civic community, which was recovering the vigor 
of its ancient spirit of liberty ; and its consequence was, 
that the control of the Euripus-channel, which the king 
thought already to have in his hands, was successfully 
taken out of his grasp.* 

At the same time, ever indefatigable, he 
was at work in the seas on the other side of Nonary 

changes in 

Greece. Here he had already several years Epirus. 
previously (p. 65) established intimate con- 01 a?.A x - 2 < B - 
nexions with the royal house of the Molos- 
sians, — connexions which, as will be remembered to have 
been the case in all other places, at first wore a very 
friendly and peaceable aspect, until it seemed good to 
him to reveal his real intentions. Arybbas had been 
highly delighted to see the mighty neighbor-prince a 
suitor for the hand of his niece, and thought himself here- 
by made safe in his own dominion. But together with 
Olympias her brother Alexander had also come to the 
Macedonian court. The latter had now grown up to man- 
hood, and had become a useful instrument for converting 
the country of Epirus into a Philippic vassal-state. The 
king hereupon at the head of an army conducted his 
brother-in-law into his father's kingdom, and availed him- 

* Python: jEschin. ii. 125; Schafer, ii. 352. Hegesippus (eKaWpov* i\ eiv T * 
iavToiv instead of a exovaiv), author of the (30-called Seventh PhiHppic) Oration 
vf pi • AAowijo-ou. Xenoclides : Dem. xix. 331.— Oallias . ^schin. iii. 89. 

382 History of Greece. [BookVIl 

self of this opportunity to subjugate the Gre^k colonies on 
the coast ; he went on as far as the gulf of Ambracia, and 
established connexions with the iEtolians, the most vigor- 
ous of the tribes of Central Greece, whom he brought over 
to his side by promising them in a special treaty the re- 
covery of Naupactus, which was at this time in the hands 
of the Achseans. Naupactus was the ancient place of 
transit to Peloponnesus, and moreover one of the most im- 
portant posts of the Attic naval power ; and of course the 
king had the port in view only for his own purposes. 

The eyes of the Athenians followed all the movements 
of the king. It was clear, that after the failure of his at- 
tempt upon Megara he was anxious to open to himself a 
new way of access to the peninsula. They accordingly 
without delay sent envoys into the regions now threatened, 
in order to direct the attention of the Corinthians and 
Achaeans, of the Acarnanians, Leucadians, and Ambra- 
ciotes to the danger, to summon them to be vigilant, and 
to promise them aid. In order to give impressiveness to 
their words, they about the same time sent auxiliary 
troops to the Acarnanians, their ancient allies (vol. iii. p. 
150), and without hesitation openly acknowledged as 
their friend, and gave refuge to, the expelled king of the 
Epirotes, who had fled to them. Finally, while Philip 
was in Epirus, they also sought to agitate Thessaly, and 
the Attic envoy Aristodemus was able successfully to es- 
tablish connexions leading to important results with the 
towns in that country. 

Thessaly Philip rapidly returned home across Mount 

amonete- Pindus, and let the Thessalians experience the 
trarchs. heaviness of his hand. It was time, he 

?3$) X ' 2 (B ' tnou g n t, for them at last to be thoroughly 
cured of their craving for change and freed 
from the delusion, that the Phocian War had caused them 
to enter into a new era of national movement. The crafty 
king made use of the division into districts, which had 

chap, iv.j j^^i Struggles for Independence, 383 

been established under the sway of the Aleuadae for the 
purpose of a distribution of military burdens (vol. ii. p. 
273), in order, while apparently following ancient nation- 
al ordinances, to divide the country into four parts, to 
place the several parts of territory, torn from one another, 
under tetrarchs entirely dependent upon himself, and 
thus to dispose absolutely over all Thessaly and its re- 
sources. In no other way could the unquiet spirit of the 
people have been more despotically bent. There was no 
longer any Thessaly in existence ; and the numerous sepa- 
rate Hellenic town-communities were no longer anything 
but villages devoid of rights and belonging to Macedonian 
provinces. The Aleuadae, to whom at the present time all 
national interests were as foreign as at the period of the 
Persian Wars, consented to fill the posts of tetrarchs con- 
ferred upon them.* 

It was probably during his stay in Thessaly that Philip 
again entered into communications with Athens. He was 
perhaps conscious of the fact, that on the occasion of the 
last embassy he had broken them off too harshly. But 
his real reason lay in his wish to bind the hands of the 
Athenians by means of new treaties ; for to his painful 
astonishment he became aware of the change in their 
bearing, and saw them coming forward against him with 
great determination in Peloponnesus, in Acarnania, nay 
even in the domain of his own alliance, in Thessaly. The 
war-resources of Athens were by sea still superior to his 
own, and well capable of hindering him in the execution 
of his wider schemes. But it was always a dangerous sign 
when Philip sought to approach the Athenians ; for every 

♦Epirus: Dem. i. 13; Harpocr. b. v. 'ApviSa? ('Apv'j3j3a? in inscriptions; 
Apv>|3a? ap. Diod.; Plutarch; Justin, vii. 6). — Ambracia and Naupactus • He- 
gesippus, § 32 ; Dem. ix. 27.— The embassy of Aristodemus to Thessaly is a 
fact which has only recently become known to us, from the -.Eschin 
iii. 83 (jrpe<rj3€v<ra»'Tos instead of eVio-TpaTeuaavTo?, ed. F. Schultz, p. 181). See 
Schultz in Neue Jahrb.filr Phil. 1866, p. 311. Wreaths bestowed upon the en* 
voys: iEschin. u. a. — Thessaly divided into four parts : Dem. ix. 26. 

384 History of Greece. [BookVII 

attempt of the kind was wont to be the predecessor of 
undertakings, in the execution of which he had to expect 
a justifiable resistance on the part of Athens. 

v . This time he made his advances by means 

King <* 

n> h the Ath* 6 ' °^ a ^ e ^ er » which he had very skilfully drawn 
nians. U p j n sucn terms, that it seemed readily to 

P 1, c %i enter upon the wishes of the Athenians, indeed 

(B. c. 342). r > ' 

to offer even more than was desired. Halonne- 
sus, he wrote, should not be the cause of any discord be- 
tween them ; he would make a present to the Athenians 
of the island, which he had taken out of the hands of the 
pirates. In future Macedonia and Athens should in com- 
mon guard the sea and suppress buccaneering. At the 
same time he offered a commercial treaty, which was to 
unite the two countries more closely than before, and re- 
peated his willingness to engage in a revision of the points 
objected to in the treaties, with only this reservation, 
that he must declare it never to have been his intention to 
abandon the basis of the actual status quo of possessions at 
the time of the conclusion of the peace. But, though he 
had formerly declined the admission of the hitherto neu- 
tral states into the treaty, he was now no longer opposed 
to their acceding ex post facto, and thereby acquiring a 
guarantee for their independence. On the other hand, as 
to the cities which were said to have been occupied by 
him after the conclusion of the treaty, as well as to the 
questions of territorial possession in the Chersonnesus, he 
proposed that a tribunal of arbitration should decide. 

These were the main points in this most important 
message, in which he had brought together everything 
capable of creating an impression upon the Athenians, 
apparent concessions and courteous offers, earnest protests 
against hostile tendencies and warnings against unbending 
obstinacy, promises, menaces; — in short, the letter was 
such a mixture of kindness and severity, that he might 

Chap, iv.] ^^ Struggles for Independence. 385 

thereby hope to terrify some, and gain over or confirm in 
their attitude the others. 

His envoys did what was in their power to „ ee . f 
comment upon the letter according to the Hegesippus 

1 ° concerning 

meaning of its author ; his partisans helped Haionnesus. 
them to accommodate the proposals as well as possible to 
the ears of the Athenians, and urgently recommended 
their acceptance. It was therefore no easy task for the 
patriots to counteract the impression made by this mes- 
sage, and to induce the citizens to give an answer worthy 
of the city. This task fell above all to the lot of Hegesip- 
pus, to whose embassy the reply proper had now been 
made ; and he was quite the man to make clear in a 
straightforward way, intelligible to all and impressive, 
the true stand-point from which it behooved them to judge 
the offers of Philip. In the first instance he claimed for 
all Athenians perfect liberty of speech, and protested 
against Philip's taking upon himself to signify his ap- 
proval or disapproval of speeches made before the civic 
assembly. Then he passed to the subject of Haionnesus. 
The island, he said, belongs to the Athenians, whose rights 
of property are not cancelled through a temporary occu- 
pation by pirates. What is ours, we cannot accept as a 
gift ; nor can we ever permit the king to dispose of 
Hellenic soil according to his choice, and in so doing even 
to play the part of a magnanimous donor, and to bestow 
benefits upon us, — benefits which it is humiliating for us 
to accept. And as to the tribunal of arbitration, the 
power of Athens is at an end, if we consent to carry on 
law-suits concerning our possessions, concerning our 
islands, with the man of Pella ; and it is equally little in 
consonance with the honor of Athens for us to divide with 
him the watch over the sea. His only desire is hereby 
to acquire the right of putting in with his ships of war at 
whatsoever points he chooses. The commercial treaty 
offered is likewise merely a trap. In itself by no means 

386 History of Greece. [BookVil 

indispensable, its sole purpose is to make the court of 
Philip the highest tribunal of appeal in national affairs, 
while it was formerly customary that all treaties con- 
cluded with Athens received their final ratification at the 
hands of the civic body. 

With reference to the revision of the treaties offered, 
Hegesippus said, Philip had by a previous embassy 
declared in the hearing of everybody his readiness to enter 
upon proposals for alterations. His own (Hegesippus') 
proposal, whioh the citizens had accepted, was indeed in 
conflict with the compact of Philocrates, but on the other 
hand alone in consonance with justice and with the true 
interests of Athens. That Philip would have nothing to 
do with it, simply proved that he was altogether not in 
earnest as to the proffered revision. 

The same was the case with regard to the admission of 
the other Hellenes, who had hitherto had no part in the 
treaties. This Athens had required as being equitable, 
and Philip himself at present conceded the equity of the 
demand. He was accordingly desirous, that the indepen- 
dence of the Greek states should be guaranteed by the 
enlargement of the treaties ; but at the same time were 
taking place the occupation of Pherse, the application of 
force to Epirus, the campaign against Ambracia, the 
subjugation of the colonies on the Ionian Sea. How was 
it possible in view of such facts to trust the words of the 
king, and to credit him with respect for Hellenic commu- 
nal liberty ? The same was likewise his course of proceed- 
in sr in the affairs of the Chersonnesus, where he was 
continuing to refuse to give up Attic property to the 
Athenians, and anxious to bring a fact clear as day, such 
as the boundary-settlement with regard to Cardia, before 
a tribunal of arbitration. 

Demosthenes supported the speech of Hegesippus ; and 
specially pointed out the fact that a tribunal of arbitration 
which treated disputed questions with justice and indepen- 

Chap, iv.] 2/as£ Struggles for Independence. 387 

dence, was absolutely not to be discovered. In spite of 
all the counter-efforts of the Macedonian par- phm , 
ty, the civic assemblv declared in favor of proposals 

J 7 J rejected. 

Hegesippus, and the proposals of Philip were Q . . 
rejected as unacceptable. This rejection very (B.c.342;. 
considerably increased the previous uneasiness of rela- 
tions ; the peace outwardly continued, but in fact it had 
been terminated ; the citizens had repeatedly given ex- 
pression to their objections to the existing treaties, while 
they had declined the revision which accorded with the 
wishes of the king. Hereupon it was inevitable that soon- 
er or later the sham peace should come to an end ; and 
war broke out, not, however, in Hellas itself, but in the 

The Thracian peninsula was, notwithstand- The 
inp* its remoteness, connected with Athens in Thracian 

* Cherson- 

the very closest intimacy of relations ; for it ne sus. 
was one of the most ancient and permanent traditions of 
Attic policy to look upon this peninsula, because it com- 
manded the northern maritime routes, in the light of a 
transmarine part of Attica. On this head the civic com- 
munity was more provident, vigilant, and resolute than in 
all the other fields of foreign policy. The Chersonnesus 
was regarded as an inalienable public domain, where the 
State had the right of disposing over the soil ; and even 
during the period in which all the other relations of 
Athens beyond the sea had grown slack, the practice was 
continued of sending out colonies to the Chersonnesus, 
after the precedent of Pericles (vol. ii. p. 534), in order to 
provide for Athenians not possessed of property, and to 
secure the dominion of Athens there. 

Shortly before the Social War, the territorial relations 

* The oration irepi ' A\owrj<rov, or more precisely (according to Dionysius), 
' jrpb? Toi»5 $(Ain-7rov 7rpe'(r/3eis ' or npbs rrjv imaTo^v xaX tou? npeafieis tows irapd 
*iAi7nrov. Demosthenes too declines to accept Halonnesus, el hitwriv aAAa 
ftrj anoSiSwn. Verbal quibbling, according to iEschin. iii. 83. 

338 History of Greece, [BookViX 

in the Chersonnesus had been advantageously organized 
by the successes of Chares (p. 113 ?) ; six years later Ses- 
tus had been taken (p. 234) ; and the entire peninsula was 
Attic land from the southernmost point up to Cardia. In 
the upper country it was sought to maintain Attic influ- 
ence by means of connexions with the native princes, — 
a policy which Demosthenes had recommended, as in 
clear accordance with the interests of Athens, in his speech 
against Aristocrates. 

In proportion as hereupon Philip established himself 
more firmly in the upper country, made Cersobleptes his 
vassal, entered into an alliance with Cardia, and revealed 
his intention of extending his dominion in the direction of 
the Propontis and the Pontus, it became the more import- 
ant to be vigilant, and to strengthen the positions in this 
endangered outwork, which was not of less significance 
to Philip, than it was to Athens. Accordingly, before the 
year was out in which the letter of Philip had occasioned 
the discussion at Athens concerning a revision of the 
treaties, a number of citizen-colonists were despatched to 
the Chersonnesus, in order to strengthen the colony 
there. In consideration of the difficult state of affairs, a 
™ ... man of talent as a general and of acknow- 

Diopithes ° 

ontheHei- ledged bravery of heart, Diopithes, was 
chosen as leader of this band of citizens. He 

01. cix. 2(b. . 

c 342). was a man resolved not to allow the interests 

of his native city to be prejudiced in his hands, and one who 
was bold enough to proceed on his own responsibility, in 
case the authorities at home should leave him in the lurch. 
This came to pass soon enough. Diopithes, meeting 
with resistance, contrived to obtain moneys by privateer- 
ing operations, for the purpose of hiring troops, and then 
advanced against Cardia, which entertained hostile senti- 
ments and received support from Philip. Indeed, in the 
year 341 he even invaded Macedonian territory, pillaged 
the country, took fortified places, and sold the prisoners. 

Chap, iv.j j^^i Struggles for Independence. 389 

This daring conduct caused extreme astonishment. It 
was the first time since the peace that the proceedings 
of the Athenians had passed the limits of bold speeches, 
of answers declining proposals, of embassies stimulating 
others to movement, and of military demonstrations. 
Philip immediately raised a complaint and demanded 
satisfaction, while he already stood with his troops in 
Upper Thrace and drew to him reinforcements from 
Macedonia and Thessaly. 

In the summer the affair came to be discussed in the 
civic assembly. The parties were directly opposed to one 
another. The adherents of Philip took full advantage of 
the opportunity for attacking their adversaries, who, they 
said, were with criminal frivolity involving the State in the 
most perilous quarrels, who could not even hold their hands, 
when Philip was so far distant from the Attic frontiers. 
They demanded the recall of Diopithes, and the infliction 
of punishment upon him for his self-willed proceedings, 
whereby he had by land and by sea broken the peace. 

The facts were not to be denied ; it only g eeeh 
depended upon the light in which they were Demosthe- 

r r ° » nes concern- 

Viewed. And now Demosthenes appeared be- in s the chep 

1 *■ sonnesus. 

fore the civic assembly, in order to put the _. 

Ji r . 01. cix. 3 (b. 

question before it from another point of view. o. 34i). 
The guilt or innocence of Diopithes he declared to be 
a secondary question ; the real point at issue was the con- 
dition of affairs, not a mere question of persons. It was 
very well for the opposite party to say that the present 
state of things was insupportable ; that either open war 
should be declared to the king, or peace honestly kept. 
" This decision," says Demosthenes, " is not in our power 
at all. Philip maintained that he was keeping the peace, 
when he was marching his troops into Oreus, occupying 
Cardia. and pulling down the walls of Pherae. If Philip 
takes Attic property and destroys Greek cities, that is no 
tasus belli ; but if we once in a way proceed to action, and 

390 History of Greece. [BookVil 

anywhere hold our own, complaints are made about a vio- 
lation of legal obligations. Are those who judge after 
this fashion Athenians ? Such tenderness of conscience is 
nothing but treason. We must at all times be armed for 
warding off his blows, since when he comes he always 
comes unexpectedly. And now, when our troops happen 
to be on the spot, we are of our own free impulse to grati- 
fy the king by leaving the Hellespont uncovered, and 
this at the time of the Etesian winds, which will soon pre- 
vent us from sailing thither, while he is assembling his 
troops there ! And the general, who once in a way dis- 
plays determination, — this general we are to punish, while 
in fact no one else is at fault but the citizens them- 
selves, that objections can be raised against the conduct 
of Diopithes; for it is only the want of home support 
which has forced him to seek for means of maintenance 
elsewhere ! Ourselves we ought to accuse, not him. We 
ought to be ashamed of sending round envoys to all the 
states, in order to call upon them to be vigilant against 
Philip, while we do nothing ourselves for our preservation. 
For it is our preservation which is in question ; this we 
ought clearly to perceive. We must make up our minds 
to the fact that Philip hates us, our city, the ground on 
which it stands, all its inhabitants, even those who now 
boast of his friendship, but first and foremost our constitu- 
tion. And for this he has good reason ; for he is very 
well aware how, even should he have brought everything 
else into his power, he yet can call nothing his own in 
safety, so long as here among us popular government pre- 
vails, inasmuch as, should any disaster happen to him, 
such as may in many ways befall a man, all those whom 
he now holds together by force will come to us and take 
refuge here ; for you Athenians are by your character 
and your constitution not adapted for making conquests 
and founding a dominion, but on the other hand you are 
indeed adapted for placing yourselves in the path of the 

Chap, iv.j j^j Struggles for Independence, 391 

grasping ambition of others, for taking from them their 
spoils, and for helping all men to secure liberty." The 
still continuing strong aversion of the Athenians from ex- 
pense and exertion Demosthenes combats by calling 
upon them to consider what awaits them, unless they do 
what is requisite. " For," he says, " supposing you to 
have one of the gods as a security for Philip's leaving 
you untouched, in case you hold your hands and abandon 
everything : it is indeed, by Zeus and all the gods, shame- 
ful for you and your city to sacrifice in indolent stolidity 
the whole number of the other Hellenes ; and I for my 
part would rather be a dead man than give such advice. 
But if another says it and convinces you, — be it so; ab- 
stain from defending yourselves ; give up everything ! 
But of course the fact is, that no man believes in any such 
thing. On the contrary, we all know : the more we allow 
him to take, the further he advances, and the more power- 
ful he becomes, to our cost and to our damage. Therefore 
we ought assuredly to arrive at a decision as to the point 
up to which we are willing to fall back, and at which, ye 
Athenians, we are ready to begin to do our duty." ' Well 
then, when the moment of necessity arrives/ " But that 
which free men call necessity has already long ago and 
abundantly come upon us ; since for such men there is 
nothing more intolerable than the shame aroused by what 
they are forced to see done every day. But that which 
slaves call necessity — chastisement and outrage — may the 
gods never let us undergo ! " 

Thus Demosthenes expounds to his fellow-citizens the 
serious nature of the situation ; he calls upon them to keep 
the troops together, to pay property-tax, to unite the Hel- 
lenic states for the pursuit of a common policy, and to 
inflict punishment upon those statesmen who serve the foe 
of the fatherland. 

The mighty speech produced its effect. The Macedo- 
nian partisans suffered a fresh defeat, and Diopithes was 

392 History of Greece. jbookVII. 

not recalled. But the success was notwithstanding an 
insufficient one. In the one particular case the Athenians 
had acted in a rational and manly way; but their general 
proceedings still left much to be desired ; the imminent 
danger was still not present to their minds under a suffi- 
ciently close and bodily aspect ; they were still unwilliDg 
to renounce the wonted sweetness of peace, and still per- 
suaded themselves that Demosthenes after all took an 
unwarrantably dark view of the state of things. He 

The Third therefore a few weeks after his last speech ap- 
phihppic. peared once more before the civic assembly, 

oi.cix 3 j n or( j er to explain to it after a still more 

(B. C. Ml). -T 

impressive fashion, how in reality the peace no 
longer existed, as Philip and his friends mendaciously 
pretended : how since the forcible reduction of Phocis war 
had incessantly been made upon Athens ; and how the 
present issue was, not the Hellespont and Byzantium, but 
the city of the Athenians themselves, and Hellas. During 
the last fourteen years, says Demosthenes, Philip has been 
incessantly intent, wherever Hellenes dwell, upon carry- 
ing through with an unrestricted use of violence the 
schemes of his lust of dominion. " More than thirty 
Hellenic towns he has destroyed in Thrace, so that over 
the soil which they covered men may pass without being 
aware of them ; at Delphi he has deprived us of our 
rights, and lets one of his servants exercise the presidency 
there. Thermopylae is occupied by his troops ; the exist- 
ence of Phocis as a country is annihilated ; Thessaly is 
torn asunder and in bondage ; in Eubcea he has established 
despots : Megara he has threatened, and Ambracia and 
Leucas. Elis and the other Peloponnesian cities he has 
already in his hands ; Naupactus he promises to the 
^Etolians ; Echinus, the Boeotian frontier-town, he has 
taken without ceremony from the Thebans ; and as he is 
on the one side stretching out his hands towards the Ionian 
Sea, so on the other he is extending his grasp towards the 

chap, iv.j j^^ Struggles for Independence. 393 

Hellespont, holds Cardia occupied, marches upon Byzan- 
tium, — and of such an advance on all sides are the 
Hellenes remaining tranquil spectators, as if a natural 
force were in question, — a hail-cloud, on the approach of 
which every man contents himself with praying that it 
may spare his fields? The same Hellenes, who were 
formerly so sensitive and jealous, if a Hellenic city assert- 
ed its superior power, now allow the most shameful wrongs 
to be inflicted upon them by a vile Macedonian ! 

" Wherefore were the Hellenes formerly terrible to the 
barbarians, while now the reverse is the case ? Not their 
want of resources is in fault, but the lack of that spirit 
which of old victoriously defended the liberty of Hellas 
against the overwhelming might of the Persians. In those 
days every one was accounted devoid of honor who entered 
into relations with the barbarians, and he who had been 
gained over by gold was an object of universal contempt. 
This sense of honor has vanished ; men play with treason, 
and no longer possess the force of hating what is evil. 
Are not even traitors, known to the whole town, called 
upon to address the civic assembly, although the examples 
of Olynthus and other cities show what are the conse- 
quences, if the citizens listen to the traitors and allow 
themselves to be caught in the network of lies? If the 
Olynthians were now still able to take counsel, they would 
have many a thing to say, which might have preserved 
them from ruin, had they understood it and taken it to 
heart at the right season. In the same way the citizens 
of Oreus, the Phocians and the other victims of Philippic 
ambition. All this is now too late. But as long as a 
vessel — whether great or small — can be kept above the 
water, so long the mariner, the steersman, and all the 
rest, must zealously labor, lest no man intentionally or 
unintentionally cause it to heel over. Therefore, ye men 
of Athens, so long as we are still unimpaired, in posses- 
sion of the greatest city, of numerous resources and of the 


394 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

fulness of our repute, it behooves us to do our part. We 
must place ourselves in a state of defence, resolved, even 
though all the remaining Hellenes without exception 
consented to enter into bondage, to fight for liberty, so far 
as in ourselves lies. This we must openly attest, pro- 
claiming our resolutions by embassies into Peloponnesus^ 
to Rhodes, to Chios and to Susa ; for the Persian king too 
cannot be indifferent to the Macedonian's succeeding in 
overthrowing everything. But above all our own resolu- 
tion must stand fast ; for it is folly to take thought of 
others, while sacrificing what belongs to oneself; and in 
the first place it is indispensable for us to do our own 
duty, and then to unite, and address exhortations to, the 
remaining Hellenes. Thus it befits such a city as yours 
is. But if you Athenians intend to wait, till peradventure 
the Chalcidians shall save Hellas or the Megareans, while 
you in a craven spirit withdraw from the task, you think 
wrongly. All these are satisfied, so long as they are 
themselves preserved ; but you it behooves to bring this to 
pass. Nay, for you your ancestors acquired this office of 
honor, and even amidst great perils succeeded in preserv- 
ing it as your inheritance ! Thus this speech supplements 
what was wanting in the former, and draws the attention 
of the Athenians from the particular affair to the general 
situation, from the Chersonnesus to Hellas, from the Attic 
policy to the Hellenic, which Demosthenes brings home to 
the Athenians and commends to them as their own.* 

The mightiest of all the popular orations of Demosthenes 
was also attended by the greatest success ; it finally de- 
termined the sentiments of the citizens, who had gradually 

The effects more an( ^ more come over to his side. The 
of the party of Eubulus could no longer hold its own 

speeches. . . 

against him ; it retired, and thus the conduct 

* Diopithes: Dem. ix. 15. The oration 7repl tQ>v eV Xepa-ovvrja-ia and the Third 
Philippic (which is preserved both in its original edition and in one enlarged, 
by supplements of an ancient date) are the last and at the same time the 
greatest Orations of State by Demosthenes possessed by us. 

chap, ivj j^j Struggles for Independence. 395 

of public affairs virtually came into the hands of Demos- 
thenes. A favorable influence was exercised by the con- 
dition of affairs in Thrace. The undertakings of the king 
there inspired the Athenians with more apprehension than 
the occupation of Phocis and Thermopylae. They re- 
membered the times of Lysander, and saw ruin approach- 
ing for the second time from the Hellespont through a 
cutting-off of the supplies of corn. Moreover, at this time 
a better spirit was arising outside as well as inside Athens, 
— a recognition of the danger menacing all Hellas, and a 
determined courage for the contest on behalf of liberty. 
Doubtless the speeches of Demosthenes, which were wide- 
ly spread about Hellas, co-operated in producing this 
effect; a movement of patriotic enthusiasm had been 
quietly preparing itself; and accordingly the embassies, 
which had been sent out on the motion of Demosthenes, 
this time remained no empty and fruitless formalities; 
they in real truth constituted the commencement of a 
combination among Hellenic states for purposes of offence 
and defence against Philip's lust of dominion. 

On this occasion also Demosthenes personal- D emos . 
ly participated with the utmost zeal in the j^ enes iu 
execution of his proposals. In the summer of 01. cix. 4 
341 he repaired to the theatre of war, where (B ' °' 
the first decisive events were to be looked for, — to the 
Hellespont, in order there to do his best towards keeping 
the Athenians at their posts, and to Byzantium ; for the 
latter was at present the most important point in the 
regions of the northern seas, the commanding spot for the 
traffic between the Pontus and the Archipelago, as well as 
for the passage from Europe to Asia. 

The Persian Wars had first made Byzan- Byzant i Um 
tium a European city (vol. ii. p. 369), and at 
the same time an important member of the Hellenic 
federal power, which was at that time forming as against 
the East. Of all Greek colonies, however, Byzantium was 

396 Histoid of Greece. [ BoOK *'H 

invariably the least inclined to take its place as a member 
of a greater body. Freed from all danger since the Per- 
sian Empire had become enfeebled, the city gave itself up \ 
to its particular commercial interests ; nor was any other 
Greek city equally privileged by nature as a maritime 
town. For Byzantium was not only the natural centre 
of the navigation of the Pontus, but also of the industry 
of the fisheries; and while the other cities took part in 
this lucrative pursuit amidst a variety of difficulties and 
dangers, the current of the sea drove the dense shoals 
of the tunny-fish, precisely at the time when they had 
attained to their most perfect condition, into the harbor 
of Byzantium, so that the most abundant of natural bless- 
ings was thus without trouble poured into the lap of its 
citizens The city being, moreover, distinguished by its 
strong situation on a peninsula, by its healthy climate and 
its fertile neighborhood, it is not wonderful that a very 
defiant spirit of self-confidence developed itself at Byzan- 
tium, and that even individual Hellenes, who established 
a firm footing here, such as Pausanias (vol. ii. p. 370) and 
Clearchus (vol. iv. p. 184), when in this city, deemed 
themselves invincible. Already during the Samian War, 
Byzantium had sought to break loose from her connexion 
with Athens (vol. ii. p. 520). In the Peloponnesian War, 
Alcibiades restored the Attic supremacy on the Hellespont 
(vol. iii. p. 506). Hereupon ensued successively the efforts 
of the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans (vol. iv. p. 
499) ; but none of these cities was strong enough to give 
the proper force to its claims. This tended to heighten 
the arrogance of the Byzantines, until at last the Social 
War gave them the desired opportunity of being reckoned 
among independent maritime states. At the present mo- 
ment Byzantium had ships in numbers, perhaps equalling 
those belonging to Athens ; it possessed a considerable ter- 
ritory ; it had a series of subject seaports on the Pontus 
and on the Propontis, and had established a connexion 

chap, iv.] j^ Struggles far Independence. 397 

with Perinthus, one of the strongest maritime Perint h Ug . 
fortresses of the ancient world, a city which 
kept an army of 30,000 men. For this reason the crafty 
Philip had made advances of so amiable a nature to the 
Byzantines ; he had contrived to intertwine their interest 
with his own, and had concluded an alliance with them 
for combating in common the Thracian princes. 

It had now become the task of Demosthenes A n iance 
to heal the evil rift, which had been made here between . 
by the Social War; to bring back to the side Byzantium, 
of Athens the defiant, arrogant, and unfriendly p 1 - ci £ * 

( B. (J. u'xl }. 

maritime city; to convince its citizens of the 
danger by which they too were threatened, and to proffer 
the aid of the Athenians. Circumstances were in his favor, 
since such a condition of discord, as according to the 
anticipations of Demosthenes had been inevitable, had 
actually already come to prevail between Philip and By- 
zantium. The Byzantines had refused the aid which 
Philip had demanded from them. They had become 
aware of the fact, that his proximity was becoming more 
dangerous to them than that of the Thracian princes, upon 
whom he wished to make war in their company. At this 
season Demosthenes arrived. It was the right moment for 
overcoming, in view of the common danger, the unbending 
pride of the Byzantines and their mistrust of Athens ; the 
two most important maritime cities joined hands, and the 
Athenians sent troops to the Hellespont, to Tenedus, to 
Proconnesus, in order publicly to prove, to their friends 
and foes alike, their determination to uphold their power 
in the Northern Seas.* 

Envoys were simultaneously sent to Khodes Embagsies 
and to Chios, where Hyperides was probably c°hk>s°and 
the spokesman of the Athenians ; while Ephi- Persia, 
altes went to Susa, in order to point out to the govern* 

* Byzantium : Dem. xviii. 244. 

398 History of Greece. [Boo*vil 

ment there the dangers arising for the security of the 
Persian empire out of the advance of the Macedonians 
into the Northern routes of the sea, and accordingly to 
propose the conclusion of a treaty of subsidies with Athens 
and her allies. At the court of the Great King it was 
thought impossible to enter upon these proposals; indeed, 
they were abruptly rejected in remembrance of the hostile 
bearing of Athens on former occasions (p. 249). The 
dangerous nature of Philip's advances was, however, not 
mistaken at Susa ; a vigilant eye was kept upon the Helles- 
pont ; and it seemed to be a convenient expedient, secretly 
to support the Attic defence of the Chersonnesus, in order 
thus to secure an obstruction against the advance of the 
Macedonians. The leaders of the war-party at Athens are 
also said to have received gifts of money; and it is in 
itself not improbable, that at this time the same policy was 
pursued at Susa, as in the days of the outbreak of the 
Corinthian War (vol. iv. p. 236), negotiations being carried 
on, not with the Greek states, but with individual party- 
leaders, and means being placed at the disposal of the 
latter, which they were to employ according as they 
thought fit.* 

Demos- During the labors of these embassies very 

Camas and important steps had been taken in Greece it- 
self. Demosthenes had throughout kept 
Euboea in view ; for in proportion as the actual outbreak 
of the war became removed beyond doubt, this island rose 
in importance, as well to Philip for the purpose of an 
attack upon Athens, as to the Athenians for that of the 
defence of Attica and the prosecution of a successful war. 
In this respect the greatest importance attached to the 
combination of Demosthenes with Callias, the son of 
Mnesarchus (p. 376), who was in the first instance intent 

* Hyperides' Adyoi 'Po8ia>eds and Xieued?: Sauppe, Orat. AH. ii. 300, 340. Ephi« 
altes: Vit. X. Orat. 847; iEsehin. iii. 238; [Dem.] xii. 6. Royal present ok' 
money sent to Diopithes TeOveutn : Aristot. Ehet. ii. 8. 

chap, iv.j jj^i Struggles for Independence. 399 

upon liberating his own island and uniting it under the 
leadership of his native city of Chalcis, but who in this 
endeavor was naturally obliged to seek for a support in 
the neighbor-states, and therefore went hand in hand with 
the patriot-party at Athens. Callias is the first statesman 
outside of Attica who attached himself to Demosthenes, 
and Chalcis the first neighbor-city who offered its alliance, 
and which was not merely anxious to receive aid, like 
Rhodes, Megalopolis and others, but also most zealously 
went forward itself. As at the time of the Persian Wars 
Athens and Sparta placed themselves in the van, in order 
to gather the patriot-party, so now the same step was 
taken by Athens and Chalcis ; they were the two cities, 
which first concluded the League, and then sought for the 
accession of others. Hereby the good cause assumed a 
Hellenic character, and awakened a greater amount of 
confidence. Demosthenes contrived to turn to the best 
account the advantage of existing circumstances ; he never 
forgot to direct attention to the main point, and prevented 
the wrecking of the great result upon secondary matters, 
in particular upon such as had reference to the interna- 
tional relations of the formerly dependent confederates. 
Demosthenes and Callias travelled together into Pelo- 
ponnesus and into the Western districts. The The Nation , 
Acarnanians, probably irritated by Philip's al League, 
treaties with the ^Etolians, promised their ac- pi. cix. e 
cession ; together with them the Leucadians ; „ . 

° March. 

then the Corinthians and Achseans; lastly, 
Megara. A regular scale of contributions for the forma- 
tion of a common land and naval power was agreed upon. 
The Eubceans bound themselves to pay forty talents, the 
Peloponnesians and Megareans sixty. 

Callias made a report to the civic community at Athens 
on the results of his embassy ; Demosthenes corroborated 
the successful laying of the foundations of a national asso- 
ciation against Philip ; and for the next month was fixed 

400 History of Greece, [BookVIL 

the definitive conclusion of the treaties, and the first meeting 
of the new Federal Council under the presidency of 
Athens. It was a good sign, that during the progress of 
these preparations the struggle against the Macedonian 
influence had been successfully commenced ; for the more 
limited Armed League between Athens, Megara, and 
Chalcis had already come into effect. Callias and his 
brother Taurosthenes had in company with Cephisophon, 
the commander of the Attic auxiliary force, marched out 
against Oreus, which naturally seemed to them the point 
of the greatest importance, especially because it was from 
this position that the tenure of the northern Sporades, 
Sciathus and others, was threatened. Already by 01. cix. 
3, b. c. 341, the Tyrant Philistides had been slain, and the 
city secured. 

With redoubled courage the further proposals of De- 
mosthenes were now entered upon. The deputies met at 
Athens in the commencement of the spring of the year 
340, in order to settle the treaties. Different views 
obtained as to whether a fixed scale of contributions 
should be adopted, or the war-expenses, which, as Hege- 
sippus insisted, were of their nature not determinable 
beforehand, be ex post facto divided. As to the main 
point a good understanding was arrived at, and a League 
was established, in which, under the presidency of Athens, 
Eubcea, Megara, Achaia, Corinth, Leucas, Acarnania, 
Ambracia, and Corcyra took part. 

Liberation Athens at the instigation of Demosthenes 
of Euboea. did more than it was her precise duty to con- 
(b!'c C1 34oJ tribute. He urged matters forward with irre- 

Spring. sistible energy, in order that above all things 
the League might be open to action as soon as 
possible. Moneys and vessels were made over to the 
Eubcean communities ; and Demosthenes had afterwards 
to hear himself blamed, for having in his Hellenic zeal 
impaired the particular interests of his native city. But 

chap, iv.] /^ Struggles for Independence. 401 

he well knew what he was doing. The advances in 
money and ships made by Athens essentially contributed 
to give the death-blow to the rotten peace, which he de- 
sired to see destroyed. From Eubcea landings were made 
on the Pagassean Gulf; Thessalian towns were occupied ; 
Macedonian vessels seized. In the Northern islands also 
bloody conflicts already occurred. Halonnesus had fallen 
into the hands of the Peparethians, who had made its 
Macedonian garrison prisoners. Philip in return caused 
Peparethus to be devastated, while the Athenians took up 
the cause of the island and gave instructions to their ships 
to make reprisals upon Macedonian property. The Athe- 
nians had been as it were transformed ; they now set to 
work with absolute unscrupulousness within the city as 
well as outside. In Athens a certain Anaxinus of Oreus, 
who pretended to be making purchases on behalf of queen 
Olympias, was arrested as a spy and executed. Abroad, 
an attack upon Euboea was expected ; it was indispensable 
to overthrow the other Tyrants too as speedily as possible, 
who promoted the schemes of the Macedonians, in particu- 
lar Clitarchus of Eretria, who had with Phocian mercena- 
ries ousted Plutarchus (p. 276). At Athens the most 
praiseworthy ardor was displayed. Forty vessels were 
equipped by voluntary contributions ; under the proved 
leadership of Phocion, Eretria was taken and Clitarchus 
slain ; and herewith all Euboea was once more free. A 
multitude of unexpected successes rapidly succeeded one 
another in this period. Taken singly, they were not of a 
nature to cause anxiety to Philip, but together they could 
not fail to attest to him a very remarkable revulsion in 
public opinion. The most daring policy on the part of 
Demosthenes was now welcome to the civic body ; the 
opposite party, upon which a fresh blow had been inflicted 
by judicial proof being given of an understanding between 
./Eschines and Anaxinus, was powerless; while Demos- 
thenes was publicly recognized as the statesman at tha 

402 History of Greece. £ BooK vlL 

helm of affairs, and was on the motion of Aristonicus for 

the first time honored by a golden wreath at the Dionysia. 

Indeed, the national ill-will against Philip was becoming 

so intense, that at Olympia too the mention of his name 

was heard with loud expressions of disfavor.* 

The circumstances were highly favorable for the success 

of the Demosthenic policy ; for Philip was at a distance, 

™ ... , and involved in a war which he could not 


w hraC fi-om immediately break off, so as to hasten into 
01. cix. 2 Hellas and burst asunder the League now in 

(a c 342) 

process of formation, before it attained to its 
full strength. Philip had from the first pursued a double 
method of conducting war, the one against the Hellenes 
and the other against the barbarians. In the case of the 
former he invariably sought to obtain a recognition peace- 
able in form ; with the latter he only had in view, the ac- 
quisition of territory, an advantageous extension of his em- 
pire, pillage, and the increase of his military forces. Thus, 
after having apparently succeeded in tranquillizing the 
Greek states, Philip had already for more than two years 
been engaged in a war, the objects of which were the 
conquest of an entire complex of territories and the gradu- 
al conversion of it into a province. Macedonia was no 
longer to be the boundary-land of European civilization. 
The vast kmd of the Thracians on either side of Mount 
Hsemus, hitherto only opened at its rims, a land full of 
mighty rivers, full of forests and mines, of pastures and 

* Upon the history of the (Third) Enboean War new light is thrown by the 
Scholia to ^sehin. % 85 and 103, of which 1 have made use in the text. Li- 
beration of Oreus in the month of Scirophorion, 01. cix. 3, by Cephisophon, 
who at that time had taken up a position near Sciathus (Boeckh, Seeurkunden, 
480; Bohneke, Forschungen, 736 ) ; of Eretria, 01. cix. 4 (spring of 340), on which 
occasion Clitarehus was slain. In this campaign Hyperides took part as 
trierarch on one of the two triremes presented by him : ViL X Oral. 850 
(ctj-iSoo-imos rp. 'AvSpet'a, Boeckh, 442, 498). Cf. Schikfer, ii. 480 and F. Schultz 
in Neue Jahrb. fur Philol. 1866, p. 314. Anaxinus the spy: ./Eschin. iii. 223; 
Pern, xviii. 137. — Aristonicus, son of Nicophanes: J 83; Vit. X Oral. 848.— 
Olympia* Plutarch, Mor. 457. 

Chap, iv.j ^^ Struggles for Independence. 403 

tracts for tillage, was, with its peoples, to be made to do 
him service, and at the same time to act as a bridge both 
for the acquisition of the shores of the Pontus and for the 
conquest of the continent beyond. To this task he was 
entirely devoted during a series of years, while he left his 
son to conduct the business of government at Pella. In 
Thrace too Philip acted in accordance with the stand- 
points of Hellenic culture, in contending against barba- 
rians who had, at all times within the memory of man, in- 
cessantly endangered the Greek coast-towns. Hereby he 
deemed that he acquired a claim upon a protecting 
supremacy over the neighboring Greeks ; here, too, he de- 
clined no opportunity offering itself to him of forming 
peaceable bonds of connexion, and preferred alliances to 
any other means of extending the boundaries of his empire. 
But in other respects his system of carrying on war here 
was utterlv different from that adopted by him in the 
regions of Greece itself, — in particular after he had over- 
thrown the principalities in the lower parts of the country, 
and was hereupon fighting against the mountain tribes, 
which confronted him with an unbroken love of liberty. 
To the changes in the fortune of war and to the difficulty 
of a permanent subjugation were now added the troubles 
arising from the rough climate and the trackless country. 
The soldiers were obliged to take up their quarters in 
wretched pits in the earth ; and the heaviest of losses had 
incessantly to be made good by the despatch of more and 
more fresh troops from Macedonia and Thessaly. 

But it was not only as a general that Philip was here 
occupied ; he was also for years engaged upon the explo- 
ration of the country, the study of its resources, the estab- 
lishment of order in it, and the securing of such acquisi- 
tions as had been made. Roads were constructed and 
towns founded, in order to make safe the routes by land 
and water, as well as to turn the mines to full account 
Thus there arose in the land, which had formed the nu* 

404 History of Greece. [Book vu 

cleus of the ancient Thracian empire, a series of Macedo- 
nian colonies, Philippopolis on the Hebrus, and Calybe 
and Bine on its tributary rivers, — places in which under 
the superintendence of armed forces convicts were settled, 
in order to make the soil arable and the district habitable. 
Since the spring of the year 342 Philip was engaged upon 
these tasks, which claimed his personal attention, so that 
he could only take thought incidentally of any quarrels 
at a greater distance. 

The main object had been achieved ; the rude country 
of the interior had been subjected b\ enormous exertions 
and sacrifices ; the dynastic power of Macedonia had 
been almost trebled ; the two empires of the North, which 
had developed themselves menacingly above Hellas, the 
basins of the western and those of the eastern rivers (p. 
15), had at last been blended into a single whole. But 
there was yet wanting the consummation of the great 
work, to wit the union with the newly-conquered mainland 
of the Greek coast-places, which were in this quarter to 
serve him after the same fashion as Amphipolis, Potidaea, 
&c, had in the case of his earlier acquisitions. Until he 
was possessed of these towns, he was not master over the 
routes of the sea ; without them his entire war of conquest 
remained an utterly incomplete and defective under- 
taking ; they shut him up in the interior. He had sought 
to gain his end by treaties ; but in vain. Very inoppor- 
tunely he saw arising not only in the peninsula on the 
Hellespont, but also in the Greek towns on the Bosporus 
and on the Propontis, a spirit of vigorous recalcitrance; 
and, instead of peaceably accomplishing his purposes, he 
was forced here at the Northern Straits to begin a war, in 
which successively the Persians, the Athenians and their 
confederates became engaged. At this point the contest 
between Europe and Asia unexpectedly came to an out- 
break ; and at this point the peace with Athens was, after 
an endurance of seven years, at last openly broken. 

Chap. IV.] Last Struggles for Independence, 405 

The question turned on Perinthus and Byzantium. 
Both cities refused to become the allies of Philip ; his 
final campaigns in Thrace had therefore to be directed 
against these cities, for the purpose of incorporating them, 
even against their will, into the new territory of the Mace- 
dono-Thracian empire. 

Perinthus was first assaulted. Siege-towers 

o Siege of 

120 feet in height were erected, in order to Perinthus. 
hurl missiles from above upon the walls ; and 01 - cx - 1 (»• 
at the same time subterraneous passages were 
mined, so that the city might also be entered underground. 
Hereupon the fleet was brought to the spot, in order to 
cut off* the supplies which might have arrived by sea. 
For Philip everything depended upon carrying the siege 
to a speedy issue ; constantly changing his troops, he ad- 
vanced towards the walls, and notwithstanding the valor 
of the citizens, the strength of their fortifications, the se- 
curity of the peninsular situation, and the support ac- 
corded by Byzantium, a protracted resistance was impos- 
sible. At this moment there arrived unexpected succor 
from the opposite shore, a support offered to the Greek 
struggles for liberty by Persia. 

The Persians were not by nature so stolid, as to remain 
apathetic spectators, while king Philip was making him- 
self master of the strong positions on the shore opposite to 
their own ; their attention had moreover been directed to 
the danger by Ephialtes (p. 395) ; and they had doubtless 
taken advantage of the warning. Attic influence is to be 
all the more readily assumed, inasmuch as an Athenian, 
Apollodorus, conducted across the auxiliary force, which 
had been collected by Arsites, the satrap of Lesser Phry- 
gia, in conjunction with the neighboring governors. 
Already this participation in the movement by several 
satraps allows us to conclude, that the orders for it had 
proceeded from the Great King himself. But undoubted- 
ly it was principally due to the skilfulness of the Attic 

406 History of Greece. f BooK vlL 

leader that the succor arrived at the right moment, and 
that the introduction through the lines of the blockading 
army of troops, money, provender and necessaries of war, 
was successfully accomplished. From Byzantium too 
fresh aid arrived ; and thus it came to pass, that the king, 
who had already broken through the circle of walls round 
Perinthus, was met by so vigorous a resistance out of the 
houses and from behind stone-walls which had been 
thrown up, that he was forced to turn back in the streets 
of the city, and, after enormous sacrifices and exertions 
which had occupied several months, was obliged to depart 
with his main force. 

Sie of He rapidly turned upon Byzantium, whose 

Byzantium. resources he supposed to be exhausted by the 

nl - c *- l ( D - participation of its citizens in the struggle at 

Perinthus. But he found the city better pre- 

Autumn. J x 

pared than he had expected, best of all 
through the fact that the civic community, which gener- 
ally was notorious for disorder and want of discipline, 
had now given itself up to a man who in full measure de- 
served and possessed its confidence. This was Leon, a 
pupil of Plato. As commander-in-chief he stood, like 
Pericles at Athens, at the head of the entire State, which 
recognized the necessity of the guidance of a single hand. 
It was in consequence of the efforts of Leon that the sister- 
city had been supported with the exertion of all the 
strength of Byzantium ; by his advice the Byzantines had, 
when Philip approached against them, withdrawn within 
their walls, and not afforded the king the desired oppor- 
tunity of an open battle. Leon trusted in the position of 
the city and in its mighty defensive works. Situate on a 
peninsula, washed on the south and east side by the Bos- 
porus and the Propontis, on the north side by the arm of 
the sea called from ancient times the Golden Horn, the 
city was only on the third and narrowest side connected 
with the Thracian mainland. Walls of extraordinary 

Chap, iv.] jr,^ Struggles for Independence. 407 

strength surrounded the entire peninsula, double ranges 
of walls securing the land-side. But even the strongest 
walls were incapable of preserving the city ; and now the 
hour arrived for Byzantium, as had been the case with 
the other cities of the North which had fallen away from 
Athens, when upon Athens it too had to place its last 
hope. Leon, the pupil of the Academy, doubtless essen- 
tially contributed to bring about the establishment of a 
connexion with Athens ; and in this too Byzantium was 
specially fortunate, that what had been neglected in the 
case of Amphipolis and Olynthus, or had been done too 
late, was here effected at the right moment and in a suffi- 
cient way. In the interval a totally different time had 
begun, and a warlike spirit prevailed which, having been 
called forth by Demosthenes, pervaded the whole of 

When Philip advanced upon Byzantium, he was 
already at war with Athens. He had unscrupulously 
passed through Attic territory, in order to cover his fleet, 
when it was sailing up through the Hellespont for the 
siege of the cities, and had caused ships of the Athenians 
and of their confederates to be seized. Athens called him 
to account for these proceedings. She received an answer 
from the camp before Perinthus, in which the king repre- 
sented himself as the injured party and the Athenians as 
those who were provoking the conflict, and cast upon them 
the guilt of having broken the peace. It was a mere dis- 
pute of words ; for in point of fact, as nobody could doubt, 
the peace had been broken on both sides and was untena- 
ble ; so that the only point of importance was the actual 
moment of the open rupture. It was in the interest of 

* Philip had been ten months in Thrace when Demosthenes made the 
speech concerning the Chersonnesus, the date of which is the year 341, towards 
the season of the Etesian winds (July): Dem. viii. 2. — Calybe ' nov7jpdjroAts :' 
Suidas, s. v. SovAwv ttoAcs. — Perinthus : Philochorus, Fragm. 135 ; Diod. xvi. 74. 
Apollodorus : Pausan. i. 29, 10. The orders of the Great King are mentioned 
by Diodorus. — Leon . Plutarch, Plwc. 14 ; Suidas. 

408 History of Greece. t BoOK vu. 

Philip to delay this moment ; he therefore once more at- 
tempted to terrify his adversaries, and in his manifesto 
made certain final demands, the rejection of which he 
would feel bound to regard as a declaration of war. 

Open war ^ ne Athenians replied to this ultimatum by 

PhSpand pulling down the pillars of peace, and more 
Athens. decisively than ever committing themselves to 

the guidance of Demosthenes. That the fortified positions 
on the sea-routes of the Pontus, that Byzantium, the chief 
market of the Northern trade, must not be allowed to fall 
into the hands of the king, was a point of view clear to 
every Athenian ; and therefore amidst universal assent the 
general Chares, who was in command of a squadron off 
Sciathus, was at once ordered to sail to the Bosporus. 
The new confederates too, who on account of their trade 
took an active interest in the preservation of Byzantium, 
— Rhodes, Cos and Chios — sent ships. Thus the besieged 
city was successfully freed on the side of the sea, and the 
enemy's fleet was forced to retire into the Pontus. 

All the more energetically Philip exerted his whole 
strength for the purpose of taking the city. An endless 
succession of subterraneous passages and of new machines, 
constructed by the inventive genius of Polyidus, menaced 
the walls round the city ; a bridge thrown across the Gol- 
den Horn warded off the fleets, the approach of which was 
obstructed by the sinking of great masses of stone; on one 
occasion, the Macedonians, favored by a rainy night, had 
already advanced within the circle of the walls, but the citi- 
zens awoke at the right moment, and under the light of an 
Aurora Borealis, in which they recognized the succor of He- 
cate, drove the enemy back into his underground passages. 
During the progress of these struggles fresh aid arrived 
from Athens, sent at the instigation of Demosthenes. The 
circumstances of the case made it necessary ; for although 
Chares had done his duty and driven the hostile fleet back 
into the Pontus, although in his excellently chosen posi- 

Chap, iv.] _£as£ Struggles for Independence. 409 

tion over against the Golden Horn he likewise commanded 
the sound, yet he was not the right kind of a man for 
making the league between Athens and Byzantium in full 
measure and reality. The remembrance of the days of the 
Social War caused him to be still regarded with great 
mistrust. Accordingly, in the spring of the year 339, 
Cephisophon and Phocion set sail with a second squad- 
ron. Phocion had been recommended in preference to 
all others by Demosthenes ; and what would never 
have been conceded to a commander of mercenaries 
like Chares, viz. admission into the city, was with perfect 
confidence allowed to a Phocion. In fraternal concord 
Athenians and Byzantines henceforth defended the threat- 
ened city, as a piece of common Hellenic soil ; gi of 
and the result was, that king Philip had with f a S tium 
a heavy heart to raise this siege also. 

It is true that he did not at once abandon the ground. 
He marched to and fro along the coast, so long as his fleet 
remained cut off in the Pontus ; he contrived by means of 
crafty manoeuvres and a variety of deceptive proceedings 
to make it possible for his ships in some incomprehensible 
way to sail safe home through the Hellespont ; he still 
continued to carry on negotiations with the Greek island- 
states, and through them even with Byzantium. phT . 
Then, however, he suddenly took his departure, Sc y thi *- 
and marched with all his forces away from the $!"ci 339). 
sea up into the land of the Scythians, where 
he for a time again vanished from the eyes of the Greeks. 
It was most assuredly no purposeless lust of conquest 
which drove Philip into the conquest with Ateas, the aged 
Scythian prince, whose bands in the low country of the 
Danube fought against the Macedonian phalanx ; but 
there were at issue the securing of the newly-acquired 
Thracian lands, the rounding-off of the territory of the 
empire in the North, and the exploration of the districts 
of the Pontus and of their resources. For this reason too 

410 History of Greece. t BooK VI * 

Philip tad designated it as his most important aim, that 
he wished to erect a statue to Heracles on the banks of the 
Danube; a pretext indicating his intention to bring the 
great water-route into his hands for purposes of trade. 
And again he doubtless in this too had in view the double 
purpose of his policy, according to which he desired not 
only to subject the barbarians of the interior, but also in 
this way to unite the Greek coast-towns with his empire. 
For as the Elean colonies (p. 380) properly belonged to 
Epirus, and Perinthus and Byzantium to Thrace, so the 
Greek towns on the western shores of the Pontus, Apollonia, 
Istrus, Odessus, which derived their wealth from the dis- 
tricts of the Danube, formed part of the Scythian land. 
Thus the campaign on the Danube connects itself with the 
conflicts on the Bosporus, and bears testimony to the 
mighty schemes which Philip cherished in his mind.* 

Demosthenes had brought it to pass, that 
sources of after a long* period of shameful inactivity 

Athens and . 

of Philip. Athens once more vigorously and effectively 
influenced the course of events. She had again 
gathered confederates around her; in Peloponnesus, in 
Acarnania, in Thessaly, on the Hellespont, she had reso- 
lutely confronted the king ; she had liberated Eubcea ; in 

* Philip's ultimatum: Pern, xviii. 43; Philochorus, «.«. ap. Dion, ad Amm. i. 
c. 11, where the following is stated, according to the supplementation by 
Herweden : €rre»Ta 5iefeA0wv, baa toi? 'Adijvatoi; 6 4>i'Ai7r*ros Bia ttjs 
effitrroAr)?, ravra jraAiy Kara Ae'fiv eniTiOnaiv' 6 Se Sr]^o<; oxovaas tt)s eniaToXrj? kol 
Ar)p.oa9evovs irapaKa\iaavTO<; avrous irpbs rbv iro\ep.ov tta* \]/ri<]>i<rp.a ypai^avTO?, 
€\eipor6vr](T€ r^v fxlv ctttjAtjv Ka0(\elv rr\v nepl tt}? 7rpo? ^lAirr-roy tip^i^s xai <n/ja» 
(ia\ias VTaQelaav, vav? Sk nkrjpovv teat raAA* evepyeiv t& tov jroAe'/Ltov. The letter of 
Philip appended to the Philippic Orations, deemed genuine by Grote, Bflhneke 
and Rehdantz, must probably, as well as the counter-speech having reference 
to it, be considered spurious, as is the opinion of Schafer, ill. 2 210. — Chares 
victorious at ©epjuTj/mepia : Dionys. Byz. Anal. Bosp. (iii. 14, Hudson). — HoAv'eiSos 
6®eTTaAds: Athenasus de Mack, in Mathem. veter. ed. Thevenot, 3. — Aurora Bo. 
lealis: Steph. Byz. s. v. Boo-nopo?. — Phocion('auctus adjutusque a Demosthene 
.... cum adversus Charem eum subornaret,' Nepos, Phoc. c. 2) ; Plutarch, 
Phoc. 14. — War with Ateas : Justin, ix. 2. His habitation in the low-countrj 
of the Danube : Schlfer, ii. 487. 

Chap, iv.] Last Struggles for Independence, 411 

the waters of the Pontus she had frustrated the underta* 
kings which Philip had carried on with the utmost exertion 
of all his military resources, and had kept open the route 
for the supply of corn, which he was anxious to bring into 
his power. The king had been obliged to abandon his 
positions before Perinthus and Byzantium ; and how 
proud a feeling must have filled the Attic patriots, when 
the two powerful maritime cities offered decrees of honor 
and wreaths of gold in testimony of their gratitude for 
their preservation to the civic community of Athens ! * 

The old Athens had revived once more. But it would 
not suffice to remain content with isolated successes. The 
rupture of the peace was now decided ; and it was indis- 
pensable to prepare the city for the now inevitable strug- 
gle on behalf of its independence. What resources ex- 
isted for the purpose? True, the enemy of the city now 
no longer appeared as* the irresistible lord-of-war, in 
whom failure was impossible ; but although certain of his 
undertakings were frustrated, yet his power was as a 
whole one of which it was impossible to stay the irrepres- 
sible progress. He was incessantly appropriating new re- 
sources of war, forcing more and more peoples to furnish 
their contingents, imposing tributes, levying war-taxes, 
forcibly amassing spoils, possessing himself of mines and 
lucrative tolls, and disposing absolutely over an abun- 
dance of resources, the continuous increase of which it was 
quite impossible to reckon up at Athens. On the other 
hand, Athens herself had no kind of augmentation of her 
resources in prospect ; without subsidies, without tributes, 
she had to rely entirely on herself, and her whole power 
of performance depended upon the good-will of her citizens 
and of the small number of her allies. At Athens nothing 
could be done besides turning the existing means to 
the best possible account by a suitable economy, removing 

* Decrees of honor to Athens : Plutarch, Mor. 350. 

412 History of Greece. [BookVU 

hurtful abuses, and raisiug the military strength of the 
community; it was indispensable to create in the civic 
body, demoralized as it had been by the peace-policy of 
Eubulus, such a bearing, that it should be capable of pass- 
ing through the severe test which awaited it. 

Reforms in -^ tne or dinary processes of legislation it 
*e Attic was impossible to carr} r out reforms of public 
system. life so urgent and so thorough ; for this pur-. 

pose was needed the directing influence of an eminent man. 
It was therefore most fortunate for the success of these en- 
deavors, that a statesman was at hand, who had secured 
the confidence of the citizens ; that the large majority of 
them felt the necessity of arming him with special powers 
at this critical moment ; and, lastly, that it was perceived 
with correct judgment at what point it was necessary to 
begin the reforms. 

condition ^ was ^y her ships that Athens had been 

affairs 10 MTil saved from being overwhelmed by the Persian 
calamity ; in becoming a naval state she had 
found her historical mission; nor had she ever been 
greater, than when the statesmen of all parties contempora- 
neously and successively emulated one another in striving 
to develop the city as a maritime power, and to render it 
invincible by means of ships and harbors and harbor- 
walls. Since the abuse of her naval power had brought 
ruin upon Athens, the self-confidence of the State had been 
most deeply shaken; the mistrust entertained by the 
aristocrats against the navy had spread further into other 
circles ; and in proportion as the vigor of the civic com- 
munity relaxed, the aversion became more general from 
the self-sacrificing efforts demanded for the maintenance 
of the fleet, although the customary construction of vessels 
went on, and the average number of 300 triremes con- 
tinued to be kept in an effective condition. And yet 
Athens could not abandon the traditions of her past. 
Every new forward movement originated in a successful 

chap, iv.j ^ostf Struggles for Independence. 413 

maritime enterprise ; and since the first victorious expedi- 
tion to Euboea (p. 113) the patriotism of the Athenians 
had repeatedly attested itself in a most brilliant way in a 
voluntary readiness for efforts directed to the equipment 
of ships of war. It was not, however, permissible to let 
the welfare of the city depend upon such ebullitions of 
patriotic sentiments, and it was a favorable sign of the 
power still possessed by the ancient traditions of Attic 
history, that now, when it had been resolved to prepare 
the city for an arduous war, a reform of the naval system 
was recognized to be the primary condition, and that to 
this end Demosthenes was commissioned to examine the 
actual state of the naval forces, and to propose such pro- 
visions as might bring about as beneficial as possible an 
improvement in it. 

Demosthenes had at all times regarded navy and har- 
bors as the main capital of the Attic power. He had 
always insisted upon the fact, that any movement for the 
better on the part of Athens must take its start from this 
point; already fourteen years previously he had, in his 
first speech on public affairs (p. 253), most sharply ani- 
madverted upon the abuses which had come to prevail, 
and had offered a clear testimony of the earnestness with 
which he interested himself in an amelioration of the ex- 
isting condition of things. Meanwhile, the abuses had 
struck their roots more and more deeply ; the condition of 
affairs had become more and more intolerable; and, even 
apart from all considerations of higher policy, the middle- 
class of Attic citizens could not but urge an alteration of 
the institutions now in force. For the entire system of the 
symmories (p. 119) had degenerated in this way, that 
advantage was taken of it by the rich in order to over- 
reach, and press upon, the less wealthy. The presidents 
of the taxing-associations arbitrarily distributed the ex- 
penses among the members of the unions bound to furnish 
a ship each, without considering the amount of property 

414 History of Greece. [BookVU 

possessed by each individual ; the poorer members had to 
spend their whole property, while the rich were quit for a 
very small expenditure, particularly if in the end they 
made over the entire management to speculators, who pro- 
vided the trierarchy for a fixed sum. The essential char- 
acter of the Attic trierarchy had been utterly destroyed; 
men had altogether ceased to speak of trierarchs, and 
only talked of "joint contributors." The whole business 
had become a doubtful financial transaction, which the 
capitalists turned to account in their own favor, — a system 
which seriously damaged the interests of the State, because 
it injuriously affected the central body of the civic com- 
munity, excited ill-will in it, provoked disorder of all 
kinds, incessantly occasioned the bringing forward of com- 
plaints and grievances, and on every occasion delayed the 
equipment of the fleet. But the worst evil was this : that 
the existing resources of the city were never actually made 
use of, inasmuch as it was precisely the most considerable 
capitals which escaped being devoted to public use. For 
while the real purpose which the symmories were intended 
to serve was, that those properties which, taken singly, 
Were too small to provide for a trierarchy, should by com- 
bination be made capable of undertaking such a service, 
the principle of association was abused to such a degree, 
that even the wealthiest men in the city as a rule only 
contributed as members of unions, as if there had no longer 
been left any citizens at all in Athens capable of under- 
taking a trierarchy by themselves alone. And yet per- 
sons were living at Athens who, as e. g. Diphilus, owned a 
property of 160 talents (£39,000) and more. 

Naval la These abuses Demosthenes, as commissioner 

of Demos- f fa e c [ v [ c body for the naval affairs of the 

thenes. J 

city, combated by means of a thorough -going 
34 0). law of reform. Its particular provisions are 

unfortunately unknown to us ; but so much is certain, that 
he established the census of property as the standard of the 

chap, i v.j £as£ Struggles for Independence. Alb 

contributions towards the fleet ; whereby he lightened the 
burdens weighing upon the poorer citizens, who had 
hitherto paid their quota together with the rich after the 
manner of poll-tax, while at the same time he drew higher 
payments from the rich. He therefore at the same time 
secured a just distribution of the burdens of war, and a 
material increase in the taxing-power at the disposal of 
the State. 

This law was a mortal assault upon the privileges of 
the rich, who stood at the head of the hitherto existing 
taxing-unions, and who formed a party-association closely 
united by the common interests of selfishness. They set 
to work all the means offered to them by their social posi- 
tion, in order by attempts at bribery, by menaces, by in- 
dictments, to frustrate his designs, and caused him the 
most vexatious difficulties in his patriotic endeavors. De- 
mosthenes, immovable on the main point, on particular 
heads did his utmost towards avoiding everything likely 
to endanger the concord among the citizens : he sought to 
give consideration to all well-founded objections, and 
made several changes in his naval law, until at last he 
managed to pass it through the Council and to bring it 
before the civic assembly, where it was debated in several 
stormy meetings, and finally passed. The principle of 
association was now for the first time combined in a pro- 
per way with the ancient trierarchy. In the unions the 
lesser capitals were included, in order that by correctly 
estimated quota of taxation the sum might be collected 
which was requisite for the equipment of a ship-of-war (50- 
60 minse = £200-240 circ.). The larger capitalists on 
the other hand, whose property was so considerable that 
they could undertake a whole ship each, had henceforth 
again to come forward as independent trierarchs. Ac- 
cording to a statement, which is, however, not to be de- 
pended upon, their number included those whose property 
was entered in the register as ten talents (£2,440 circ.\ 

41G History of Greece. [BooeVU 

Those whose property amounted to twice this sum had to 
furnish two ships each ; the highest liturgy on the part of 
a single individual rose, it is said, to the equipment of 
three triremes and a service-boat, 
its results ^ ne resu lts of this new organization made 
the abuses which had formerly prevailed more 
manifest than ever (p. 252). It actually occurred, that 
Attic citizens, who had hitherto only borne the sixteenth 
part of the equipment of a vessel, were now bound them- 
selves alone to provide for two ships of war. But in gene- 
ral not only was a considerable increase realized in the 
war-contributions, and in the offensive and defensive 
strength of the State, but these changes redounded to the 
advantage of the entire life of the commonwealth, as in- 
variably happens when, instead of partiality and arbitrary 
discretion, order and justice come to prevail. This could 
not fail to exercise a salutary influence upon the spirit of 
the civic body. Henceforth, every man had to render ser- 
vice to the State in his own place and according to his 
power ; an end had been put to the complaints as to the 
unjust imposition of burdens ; the anti-popular selfishness 
of the rich had been disarmed, and a multitude of vexa- 
tious quarrels, which had hitherto been a regular accom- 
paniment of all naval levies, ceased as of course. " After 
the introduction of the new law," said Demosthenes, " no 
trierarch any longer appealed to the compassion of the 
people as being unduly burdened; no man now fled to the 
altar of Artemis in Munychia (the asylum of citizens in 
trouble with reference to naval affairs) ; no man was 
placed in chains ; not a single trireme was lost to the 
State or left lying in the docks, because those who ought 
to have made it ready to put to sea lacked the requisite 

* Wealth of Diphilus: Vit. X Oral. 354; Boeekh, P. Ec. of Ath., vei. i. p. 50 
[Engl. Tr.]. — Demosthenes eTricrraTTj? toO volvtikovi iEschin. iii. 222; <;f. Dem., 
XVii. 102: baStv to, voutlkov Karakvofiewv ko.1 tous nkovaiovs dieAets airo u.i>epu>* 

t'HAP. I v.j l^ Struggles for Independence. All 

But the transformation of the trierarchical 


system was not enough. If war was to be car- reform. 
ried on seriously, it was necessary to procure ^VS^) 
pecuniary means. War-taxes were an in- 
sufficient expedient; still less could Demosthenes take 
refuge in unworthy financial measures, such as had 
formerly been applied (vol. iv. p. 297), or in bad financial 
laws, against which he had himself contended. Fortu- 
nately, however, in this particular too the situation was 
such, that there was no lack of means, and that the only 
point was to make the right use of them ; in other words, 
an end had to be put once for all to the rotten manage- 
ment of the finances, which Demosthenes had repeatedly 
designated as the cancerous disease besetting the common- 
wealth. As a financier, Eubulus had ruled the Attic 
State since the fall of Aristophon (p. 143). First he had 
himself filled the highest financial office ; then he had 
caused men who were entirely dependent upon him, such 
as Aphobetus, the brother of JEschines, to be his succes- 
sors, while for himself he arranged the office of super- 
intendent of the festival-moneys in such a way, that by 
virtue of it he exercised a control over all the other funds, 
had the whole property of the State in his hands, and even 
in the midst of war rendered every diminution of the 
popular entertainments penal as treason against the rights 
of the people. 

Meanwhile the power of Eubulus had been severely 
shaken. He had been unable to prevent that Demos- 
thenes was called to the head of naval affairs ; nor could 
he hinder his proceeding from the naval law to a reform 

dvaAco/aaTwv yiyfOjoievov?, tovs Si fieVpia i\ fxiicpd. /ce»cnj/u.eVov? ajroAAvoyTas, k. t. A. 
The documents inserted ap. Dem. xviii. 106 remain untrustworthy (Boeckh 
considers them authentic, vol. ii. p. 357). According to these the obligation 
for the equipment of a trireme begins with an ova-Ca anb raXavrmv Beta (i. e. a 
capital of CO talents), and the rise in a personal liturgy advances ews Tpiw» 
rrAotwv »cai vnr)p€Tiicov. Sch&fer, ii. 490, rejects the documents; their contents 
however seem to rest on a sound tradition. — Effects of the naval law. Dem. 
Xviii. 107. 


418 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

of the financial system, which constituted the necessary 
supplement to that law. It was necessary at once to 
restrict all expenses : the magnificent construction of the 
arsenal was stopped, and the moneys assigned to that pur- 
pose (p. 352) became applicable to the requirements of the 
war. But the main point was, that Demosthenes now 
took the steps which he had long designated as the neces- 
sary condition of real progress on the part of Athens. He 
moved the abolition of the law of Eubulus with reference 
to the festival-moneys (p. 280) ; and after this solemn 
restriction had been removed, he introduced a law to the 
effect that for the present the whole surplus of the annual 
receipts should, instead of being distributed, be accumu- 
lated as a war-fund. An independent war- treasure was 
once more formed, and a war-treasurer appointed for its 

These were the great results achieved by 
the reforms. Demosthenes in home politics. They were vic- 
tories of the most arduous description, gained 
by inflexible strength of character, and by firm persistency 
in a struggle which was carried on by the power of speech 
only, and which, instead of humiliating those who allowed 
themselves to be vanquished, only made them freer, 
stronger, and better. For although many only unwillingly 
bent before the intellectual superiority of Demosthenes, 
yet the great majority of the citizens were morally enno- 
bled by him, and elevated to the stand-point of a warm 
love of country and a patriotic enthusiasm, which he had 
so long held alone and without companions, being all the 
time exposed to vehement attacks. He introduced no 
innovations foreign to the life of the State, but merely 
restored the old condition of things ; he overthrew the un- 
constitutional oligarchy of the rich, and removed the 
abuses of the degenerate democracy, which only served to 
flatter the indolent love of pleasure in the multitude. He 
combated the selfishness of the rich as well as of the poor, 

chap, i v.j jj^ Struggles for Independence. 419 

and knew how to revive the idea of the State after so vigo- 
rous a fashion, that the poor voluntarily renounced the 
festival-moneys to which they had become accustomed, 
simply in order to see the State rise again in its ancient 
dignity. What Demosthenes achieved was an outer and 
inner new-birth of Athens ; and after a long period of utter 
want of purpose and of moral effeteness, all the thoughts, 
all the powers, all the resources of the people were once 
more devoted to one purpose — to the noblest purpose which 
it is possible for a commonwealth to pursue, viz. the pre- 
servation of its independence and liberty. 

These great reforms of Demosthenes were t, .. 

o Demosthe- 

rapidly carried into execution ; their date is nes and L y- 

r J curgus. 

fixed by the war on the Bosporus. At the 
time when Demosthenes carried his motion for the support 
of Byzantium he first felt that he had the civic communi- 
ty at command. In the following year the financial law 
was passed. Assuredly Demosthenes did not bring about 
these reforms unassisted. He was the champion in the 
van, and to his force is due the glory of the victory ; but 
he doubtless acted in connexion with those who shared his 
views, and above all with Lycurgus. Lycurgus possessed 
eminent administrative talents. He was better ac- 
quainted than any other man with the resources of the 
State, and was in a special degree fitted for providing for 
the increase of the revenues by useful institutions in the 
public economy. These qualities could not remain un- 
known to Demosthenes; and we may therefore assume 
that in his administrative reforms he made use of the 
counsel of his friend, who had for years gone hand in hand 
with him, and who is indeed said to have already accom- 
panied him in his journeys in Peloponnesus (p. 317). No 
sooner had the party of Eubulus been overthrown, than 
new men were needed ; and although it was not till 01. 
ex. 3 (b. c. 338), that Lycurgus assumed the office of 
chief superintendent of the finances, an influential activity 

420 History of Greece. [BookVil 

on his part doubtless begins already about the time when 
the reform-laws of Demosthenes were passed. In the same 
year in which Lycurgus entered upon his official duties, 
his brother-in-law Callias, the son of Habron, of the deme 
of Bate, likewise took office as the manager of the newly- 
established war-fund. These were the fresh forces which 
advanced the work of the new-birth of Athens. It was a 
new generation of statesmen, genuine Athenians, filled 
with love towards the city and the common Hellenic coun- 
try, united to one another by a lofty endeavor ; and when 
we compare these men with Eubulus and the upstarts 
whom his favor thrust into the highest offices of State, we 
perceive the difference between the old times and the new, 
the decisive turning-point which Attic history had 

The enemies at home lay vanquished ; Eubulus and his 
associates were powerless ; the friends of Macedonia had 
still less influence, and had no intention of offering open 
resistance. Demosthenes was therefore no longer the 
leader of the opposition against a party-government of 
overwhelming strength, but the director of the State ; and 
it now behooved him to show that he was not only able to 
reveal the evils of the commonwealth and to remedy them 
by well-considered legislative proposals, but was also in 
tempestuous times capable of guiding the helm, which the 
confidence of his fellow-citizens had placed in his hands. 
The rupture of the peace, which he had always demanded, 
had taken place ; the war, which he had conjured up, had 
broken out ; it now became the duty of the war-party to 
show that the struggle, which had been accepted at its in- 
stigation, was not a hopeless one. 

* Eubulus superintendent of the finances 01. cvi. 3— cvii. 3; Aphobetus 
01. cvii. 3— cviii. 3 (during the Olynthian War); Schafer, i. 375 seq— Cessation 
jrfthe magnificent construction of Philon, 01. ex. 2: Philoehorus, Fragm. 135 
(r«t Se xprffxara tyr\$iaavTQ navr elvai. orpaTiwriKa AT}/u.O(r0eeor? ypai/zavTO?). Cf. G. 
Curtius in Philol. xxiv. 266. — Callias Tafias rtov oTpaTiumxij' : Vit. X Orat. 842. 
—Demosthenes and Lycurgus : Philol. xxiv. 264. 

(hap. iv.] j^ Struggles for Independence. 421 

Herewith commenced Demosthenes' hardest „. 

Ine pros- 
task. For what hopes could be indulged ^J softhe 

upon a calm examination of the situation? 
Plow could the little commonwealth of citizens, whose 
strength had been relaxed by a long habituation to peace, 
be successfully enabled to defy the military prince of 
Macedonia and his veteran armies ? It was one thing to 
frustrate the designs of the king in individual underta- 
kings, difficult in themselves, such as the siege of Byzan- 
tium ; — another, to enter upon a war against him, which, 
once begun, must end in a complete humiliation of the 
king or in the hopeless overthrow of Athens. Where 
were the commanders, who could be opposed to Philip and 
his generals, accustomed to victory ? Where was to be 
found a pledge of success amidst so many dangers abroad 
and at home ? The Philippic party continued to work in 
secret, and to lie in wait for a turn in affairs favorable to 
it ; and how was it possible to rely upon the spirit of the 
citizens, concerning which it had to be assumed, that after 
having been raised by the successes on the Bosporus, it 
would with equal rapidity change into the contrary, while 
Philip on the other hand had often enough shown, how he 
could contrive to make good defeats suffered by him, and 
how, being in consequence of his inexhaustible resources 
undisturbed by all the changes and chances of war, he 
steadily pursued his aims ? Their navy made it requisite 
for the Athenians to let their war be one of offence ; but 
how could the Macedonian empire be effectively attacked, 
which had from year to year been increased and more 
and more advantageously rounded off? 

Doubtless Demosthenes and his friends seriously 
weighed all these difficulties ; and if they notwithstanding 
courageously entered into the war, it is only possible to 
comprehend and appreciate their mood from the stand- 
point of Hellenic patriotism assumed by them. They 
looked upon Philip as a barbarian, and upon his empire 

422 History of Greece. [BookVil 

as a barbarian empire. The further that his conquests ex- 
tended, the more manifest that his design became of uniting 
the whole complex of territory from the river Danube 
to Cape Taenarum, and of blending Scythians, Illyrians, 
Thracians, Macedonians, and Hellenes into a single em- 
pire : — the less did such an empire appear to possess the 
requisite guarantees of endurance in the eyes of the 
Greeks, who regarded capability of being clearly surveyed 
and inner homogeneousness as the sole secure basis of a 
State. The absence of measure from the schemes of 
Philip was considered his weak point ; it was thought in- 
evitable, that such an arrogance must come to a fall ; the 
strength of the enemy was under-estimated, because it was 
compared with that of the Persian empire, which had like- 
wise sunk into decay by reason of its inorganic immensity. 
The conviction was still held fast, that in a struggle with 
barbarians Hellenes must necessarily be victorious ; it was 
believed, that the event would again be decided by sea ; 
confidence was placed in the superiority of the Attic fleet ; 
and when even such men as Phocion, who in general ob- 
stinately opposed the policy of Demosthenes, after the out- 
break of the war had no hesitation as to doing their duty 
as patriots, Demosthenes and his friends might well hold, 
that during the progress of the war the entire civic com- 
munity would unite more and more firmly, and derive 
strength from union. 

The position in which the Athenians stood towards the 
mainland power of the Macedonians resembled that which 
they had of old held towards the Lacedaemonians ; only in 
the present case it was far less favorable, and the present 
adversary was far more difficult to reach. The blockade 
of the coasts was very keenly felt by the Macedonians ; 
but nothing could be decided by it. The landings effected 
in the territory on the coast were beaten back ; no bases 
of operations were discovered, where it was possible to 
establish a firm footing, and the great advantage secured 

Chap, iv.] jr;^ Struggles for Independence. 423 

by Philip through the wholesale destruction of the Hel- 
lenic coast-towns now became apparent. All attempts to 
induce the coast-populations to rise against Philip failed ; 
so that, before the king himself arrived at the theatre of 
the war, his adversaries were already discouraged. 

On the other hand, however, Philip himself p . , 
was at a loss as to the way of conducting the difficulties. 
war. He could not remain a tranquil spectator of the 
recalcitrance of the Athenians, and of the formation of a 
Hellenic League ; this would have amounted to a confes- 
sion of weakness, and would have been doubly dangerous 
after the failure of his undertakings on the Bosporus. It 
behooved him to redeem the honor of his arms, and to re- 
store his authority in the Greek world. If, then, he were 
to advance at once upon Athens, he was obliged to confess 
to himself, that a siege of the strongly-fortified city was in 
itself a very doubtful enterprise, and that in this event 
the Athenians might reckon upon support from many 
sides and of a vigorous character. But a Hellenic nation- 
al war Philip was still desirous of avoiding ; he wished to 
adhere to the stand-point, that it was not the people 
against which he was making war, but a perverse and de- 
luded party, which opposed the true interests of the city 
as much as it opposed himself. Nor could he in the case 
of such a war put trust in his allies. He was not certain 
of the Thessalians, and still less of the Thebans, his former 
relations with whom, once of so confidential a nature, had 
been long ago disturbed. At Thebes the parties were as 
bitterly opposed to one another as at Athens. Timolas, a 
despicable debauchee, was at the head of the friends of 
Philip, who were prepared for any humiliation. On the 
other side a national party had arisen, and had already 
gained in authority by the fact, that a great part of the 
civic body had been rendered indignant by Philip's self- 
willed proceedings in Phocis, by the connexions which he 
had established with the ancient confederates of Thebes in 

424 History of Greece. [BookVH 

Peloponnesus, and by his occupation of the fortified 
places at Thermopylse. Under these circum- 
intrigues. stances it was necessarily of the utmost im- 
portance to Philip to avoid the kindling of a national 
war ; it was therefore indispensable to discover an opportu- 
nity enabling him to enter Greece with an armed host, 
without appearing to take the field against the Greeks, in 
order that thus the responsibility of the actual attack 
might be cast upon his enemies, and that they might be 
induced openly to meet him in the field. For this pur- 
pose it became necessary once more to make use of the 
position which Philip had already assumed in Greece ; in 
it must be found the pretext for entering in a manner 
apparently justified. For if it was possible for him to 
come as the protector of Delphi, he would at the same time 
secure this advantage, that his enemies would be once more 
obliged to come forward as enemies of the Delphic god, 
while he appeared himself to represent a national cause. 
In other words, a second ' Sacred War ' was requisite. 

The War which had first introduced Philip into Greece 
had been the consequence of events which had developed 
themselves of their own accord and gradually. The new 
War, on the other hand, it was necessary to bring about 
artificially, the preparatory steps being taken by the 
Greeks themselves for Philip's purposes. For this end 
there was no lack of appropriate agents. For the rising 
authority of the national party at Athens and other places 
had indeed driven the friends of Macedonia into the back- 
ground in public life, but had at the same time only 
rendered them more bitter, sore, and unconscientious. 
They were in secret all the more anxious to serve the 
king, and for the second time to open to him the inlets 
into Greece. The necessary agreements between the 
Macedonian court and its adherents were probably ar- 
rived at in Delphi. Here were the head-quarters of the 
Macedonian intrigues : at Delphi Athens was betrayed. 

chap, iv.j Last Strugyles for Independence. 425 

The Athenians themselves were entirely oc- Th , 
cupied with the imminent war; thev observed turn of the 

x 7 J Pylagorse. 

more vigilantly than ever the personal move- 01 cx l 
ments of the king ; but to the Delphic affairs (B - °- 339 ^- 
no one paid attention, and no one took heed of 
the newly-created Amphictyonic assembly, which was 
despised on principle. Herein a great mistake was com- 
mitted by the party at the head of affairs ; for its adversa- 
ries turned this carelessness to the best account, and, on 
the next recurrence of the season when the officers of the 
city to be sent to Delphi were appointed, carried the 
assignment of all the posts to men of their own color, — a 
success which was made possible by the fact, that the par- 
ticipation in the elections held for the purpose was un- 
commonly small. Besides Diognetus, the Hieromnemon 
(i. e. voting assessor of the Amphictyonic Council) chosen 
by lot, jEschines, Midias, and Thrasycles were by a 
majority of votes elected as Pylagoroz or representatives of 
the community, who were able to exercise an important 
influence as consultative members. It was an easily gained 
party-victory, which annoyed the patriots not a little. But 
there was no objection to be offered to the elections ; and 
the patriots consoled themselves, because they did not 
anticipate the results which were to evolve themselves out 
of the event. As for iEschines, he had only waited for 
the day of this election in order to come forward once 
more into the arena out of the retirement in which he had 
remained for several years, and to assume the leading part 
in the game of intrigues, for which he was most perfectly 

At the western base of Mount Parnassus ^ ., 


dwelt the little population of the Ozolian * nd £ e 

r * Amphisseans. 

Locrians ; and their chief place, Amphissa, 

lay close at the foot of the chain of mountains which con- 

* Timolas : Theopomp. ap. Athen. 436.— Election of the officers for Del 
phi : .ffischin. iii. 195 ; Dem. xviii. 149. 

426 History of Greece. [Bookvii. 

nects Mount Parnassus with the JEtolian highlands ; below 
Amphissa spreads a fertile low-lying plain, which opens to 
the south-east towards the Crissean Gulf. The Amphisseans 
had in the most recent times of war been the most deter- 
mined adversaries of the Phocians ; next to Boeotia they 
had suffered most largely at their hands, and the over- 
throw of the Phocians accordingly gave great satisfaction 
to their lust of vengeance. Perhaps they on this occasion 
gained a few advantages, which rendered them insolent, 
and stimulated them to desire to play a part on their own 
account. This mood was taken advantage of at Thebes, 
where a feeling of wrath against Athens prevailed. For, 
before the purification of the Delphic temple had yet been 
completed, the Athenians had hastened to set up anew on 
sacred ground certain dedicatory shields, — the monuments 
of the battle of Plataeae, with the inscription recalling the 
victory achieved over the Persians and Thebans conjointly. 
The Thebans were anxious to have this insult animad- 
verted upon, not only as an act of personal unfairness, but 
also as a violation of Hellenic usage ; and, making a 
variety of promises, they put forward the Amphisseans, in 
order to have the matter brought before the Amphictyons. 
No sooner, therefore, had the deputies arrived for the 
spring meeting, than it became known, that in the first 
sitting a motion of the Amphisseans, directed against 
Athens, would be among the orders of the day. As 
Diognetus announced himself sick, iEschines took his 
powers upon him, and now conducted the cause of Athens 
entirely by himself. 

A tempestuous sitting ensued. The spokesman of the 
Amphisseans inveighed against Athens and against the 
criminal impatience with which she had revived the 
memory of the ancient struggles between brethren in 
Hellas; he proposed a penalty of fifty talents (£12,180 
circ), and went so far in his ardor, that at the close he 
broke out into the words . " Nay, ye Hellenes, were ye 

Cha>.. iv.] jj as i Struggles for Independence. A21 

wise, not even the name of the Athenians would be allowed 
to be mentioned on these festive days ; ye would have to 
send them forth from the sanctuary as accursed." 

It was now the turn of iEschines. He contrived with 
brilliant eloquence to repeal the accusation, so that it was 
not even entertained ; and, instead of this, to turn the 
point of the ban which was to have been launched against 
Athens, by charging the Amphisseans with a far worse 
violation of the Sacred Law. The lower por- The r _ 
tion of their plain touched without any natural gJ. I 5 1 ^ out 
boundary the domain of ancient Cirrha, upon 
which a curse had been laid in the First Sacred War, so 
that it was withdrawn from all cultivation. During the 
troubles of the immediate past the Locrians had appro- 
priated pieces of this territory ; they had built brick-kilns 
on the soil of the Cirrhaeans, erected a new enclosure for 
the harbor, and levied tolls upon the ships entering it. To 
these facts iEschines adverted with the thunders of his 
eloquence. From the rocky terraces, where the Amphic- 
tyons held their diet under the open sky, he pointed with 
his finger to the smoking brick-kilns on the sea-shore, and 
demanded a joint march-out, which was only on account 
of the advanced hour of the day postponed to the next 
morning. When this arrived, the entire population of 
Delphi capable of bearing arms accordingly sallied forth 
under the command of the Amphictyons, in order to pull 
down the buildings, which were only a few hours ofF, and 
to fill up the harbor. It was an improvised Sacred 
War, — a surprise executed in the midst of peace without 
the observance of any of the legal formalities. After its 
accomplishment, the tumultuous expedition came to blows 
with the Amphisseans, who lay in wait for it on its return 
home ; and after considerable losses it sought refuge in a 
wild flight to Delphi. Here was a new crime, in conse- 
quence of which an extraordinary meeting of the Amphic- 
tyons was immediately summoned to Thermopylae, where 

428 History of Greece. [Book vil 

the deputies of the confederate states were to appear, 
armed with powers, to discuss the new casus belli. -5£schines 
for his part, who had contended with so splendid a result 
for the honor of his native city and for the rights of the 
god, returned home in triumph, made his report to the 
civic assembly, and requested the necessary instructions 
for the coming federal meeting. 

At Athens, too, everything seemed at first to proceed as 
jEschines desired. He contrived to kindle among his 
fellow-citizens also the artificial enthusiasm which he had 
excited at Delphi. He unscrupulously appealed in his 
favor to the memories of Solon and of his Sacred War ; he 
dared to represent Demosthenes as a traitor, who had in 
his capacity of Pylagoras been purchased for 2,000 
drachms by the Amphisseans, in order to throw a veil of 
silence over their misdeeds. Indeed, such was the con- 
tagious force of fanatical excitement, that the Athenians 
quite forgot the serious position in which their own city 
was placed, and thought of nothing but the brick-kilns 
near Cirrha and the impious act of the Amphisseans. 

It was only by means of the greatest exertions that 
Demosthenes succeeded, first in the Council and then in 
the popular assembly, in asserting the voice of reason, and 
in making clear to the Athenians the danger into which 
they would precipitate themselves, if they entered into the 
projects of iEschines, the sole object of which he declared 
to be to bring the Macedonians into the land. It was 
resolved to send no deputy to the meeting at Thermopylae; 
and although it was impossible entirely to frustrate it, and 
to put an end to the criminally kindled quarrels, and to 
cross the intrigues of iEschines, yet his defeat was marked 
enough, and in particular it was a triumph for Demos- 
thenes, that the attempt to seize this opportunity for pro- 
voking hostility between Athens and Thebes ended in the 
contrary result to that which had been intended. For 
Thebes too kept away from Thermopylae, and for the first 

Chap, iv.] j^^t Struggles for Independence, 429 

time entered into a course of policy which, in accordance 
with the desire long cherished by Demosthenes, made 
possible an approximation between the two cities.* 

The diet summoned to Thermopylae accordingly re- 
mained a pure party-assembly, to which only those states 
sent deputies which stood entirely under the influence of 
Macedonia. As yet Philip was not at hand. During 
three quarters of a year after the siege of Byzantium he 
still continued withdrawn from the eyes of the Greeks, 
fighting in the distant land of the Danube against Scy- 
thians and Triballi. There was accordingly still needed 
an interlude, before the catastrophe, which was intended, 
could come to pass. Cottyphus the Pharsalian, who occu- 
pied the presidency among the Amphictyons, was there- 
fore empowered by the assembly to conduct the Sacred 
War. The threatened Amphisseans promised satisfaction, 
but gave none. When the summer had passed in these 
transactions, and king Philip, having returned from the 
North, and having been healed from his wounds, was 
ready for intervention, a report was made to the Delphic 
autumn meeting concerning the obstinate recalcitrance of 
the Amphisseans ; there was now, it was declared, no 
choice left to the Amphictyonic states but either them- 
selves to collect money, hire troops, and im- ph . 1} 
pose penalties upon all the states guilty of 55J°J3£ d 
delay, or to appoint Philip federal com- ^j™ s ene - 
mander. The latter alternative was resolved 01. ex. 2 
upon, as had long been secretly settled, al- ^ c ' 339) * 
though iEschines subsequently blamed the 
Athenians for having, misled by Demosthenes, spurned 
the opportunity offered by the gods for a pious and 
honorable war.f 

* JEschines at Delphia: Dem. xviii. 149; iEschin. iii. 117. — Demosthenes 
against iEschines at Athens: iEschin. iii. 125; Dem. xviii. 143 (iro\efiop ei? 
Ttjc 'Attiktji' ei<rdyet.s, Ai<T\ivT}, jroAe/^ov ifAfiucTVOvucov). 

t Meeting at Thermopylae and appointment of Cottyphus (*iAt7T7row . . . 
iv 2,*v0a<.<; (xttoi'tos): iEschin. iii. 128; Dem. xviii. 151. — The nomination of 

430 History of Greece. l Bo °* vu 

H .. Thus negligence, self-delusion, and treason 

new AmpMc- had within a short time accomplished what 

tyonic War * 

was brought had been the object of Philip s schemes. The 


fault of negligence falls to the charge of the 
Athenians, who at the time of the Delphic elections 
were not upon their guard, although they had four years 
previously so emphatically taken care that the interests? 
of Athens at Delphi should not fall into the hands of an 
iEschines (p. 366). The civic community was imperfect- 
ly adapted for taking a clear view of the situation of 
things beyond their immediate ken; and Demosthenes 
himself, whose task it was to turn his vigilant glance in 
all directions, is hardly to be acquitted of having been 
insufficiently informed of what was taking place at 
Delphi, and of having altogether under-estimated the 
dangers which threatened from that quarter. The situa- 
tion of affairs failed to become clear to him, until 
iEschines returned, and until Demosthenes cast at him 
the wrathful words : " Thou bringest war to Attica, an 
Amphictyonic war ! " The self-deluded were the Amphis- 
seans, who in aimless excitement allowed themselves to be 
tempted to kindle a new quarrel, the consequences of which 
were to burst over their own heads. Finally, treason was 
at work in every quarter, and this in accordance with a 
well-devised plan, based upon a joint agreement between 
the partisans of Philip, and doubtless in its main points 
already fixed, when iEschines was carrying the election 
of himself and of his associates at Athens. As in a well- 
studied drama we see all those concerned play their parts, 

Philip to the rjytfiovia tJj? evae/3eia$ (JSschin. 129) is said to have been advo- 
cated by iEschines himself among others, according to Grote, vol. xi. p. 
666. But assuredly Demosthenes would not have passed by this circum- 
stance. Moreover, j3Eschines not without intention represents the second 
(autumn-) meeting as a quite separate event, in which he took no part what- 
ever. It should also be remembered that new Pylagorse were elected for 
every Pylsea ; and how could it have been possible that JSschines si oultf 
have been re-elected ? 

chap, iv.j £as£ Struggles for Independence, 431 

each scene accurately fit on to its predecessor, and the 
catastrophe accomplish itself step by step, which corres- 
ponded to the intentions of the man who, concealed from 
the eyes of the public, managed the whole performance. 
The only subject on which doubt may remain is the ex- 
teut to which circumstances took their course of their own 
accord, and the point at which the intrigue began. 

The king wished to be summoned into Greece for a new 
process of execution. The first point therefore on which 
it was necessary to arrive at an understanding was the ob- 
taining of a culprit, the discovery of a community, upon 
which war could be made on account of an act of impiety 
committed against the Temple. For this purpose the Am- 
phisseans were selected, the only community against which 
exception could be taken on this head. But inasmuch as 
they had done no wrong, beyond what had for years been 
calmly allowed to take its course and been tolerated, the 
whole intention would have been too palpably revealed, 
had the opportunity been forced precipitately, and had 
the prescriptive acts of trespass been suddenly made a 
casus belli. It was therefore necessary that the Amphis- 
seans should themselves by an insolent proceeding furnish 
the occasion for calling them to account ; and to this they 
were excited by Thebes. It would therefore seem, that 
the whole intrigue had its beginning at Thebes, and that 
Theban statesmen, such as Timolas and his associates, 
guilefully abused the short-sightedness of the Amphisseans, 
took advantage of their hatred against Athens, and by all 
kinds of futile promises induced them publicly to attest 
their holy zeal for the honor of the god by means of a 
protest against Athens. But among the Amphisseans too 
there must have been men, whose conduct was the result 
of a secret understanding ; for the insolent vehemence and 
the defiant bearing of the Locrian envoy fitted so admira- 
bly into the plot of the drama, that in this also it is hard- 
ly possible to perceive a mere accidental connexion. 

432 History of Greece. [Book vu 

Moreover there existed in Locris a party of the " Godly," 
which sided with Cottyphus. 

The course of events becomes clearer from the moment 
when jEschines enters upon the stage, in order to assume 
the leading part. He is to all appearance completely 
taken by surprise ; nothing more than a vague rumor an- 
nounces an attack about to be made upon Athens ; and 
not until he has listened to the complaint of the Amphis- 
seans does the notion suddenly occur to his mind of the 
answer with which he will confound the audacious ac- 
cusers ; — and yet everything has been long ago prepared, 
in order by the withdrawal of his fellow-countrymen to 
play the whole game into his hands ; and yet he has all 
the documents in immediate readiness in order to prove 
the impious proceedings of the Amphisseans. The pla- 
cing of the shields in the temple was manifestly a matter 
of absolute indifference, which is altogether dropped, after 
it has, as an incident previously arranged, exercised its 
effect. The Amphisseans fell into the trap ; and under 
the presidency of Cottyphus, a person entirely dependent 
upon Philip, all subsequent steps are hurried on with a 
ruthless speed and violence, the sole purpose of which is 
to goad the unhappy Amphisseans into the commission of 
a new wrong, and to frustrate anything which might per- 
chance make possible an amicable settlement of the quar- 
rel. And the hypocritical nature of ^Eschines could find 
no greater satisfaction than in his having an opportunity 
of appearing as a fiery patriot on behalf of his native city, 
while he was in truth busily engaged in conjuring up the 
worst of calamities over its head. For, from the moment 
when he occasioned the process of execution against Am- 
phissa, he could not remain in doubt as to the fact that he 
was opening a way into Greece for Philip, and that his 
native city, between which and Philip a state of war pre- 
vailed, must thereby be involved in the most imminent 
peril. The only question as to which doubts may be en- 

Cuap. IV.] jjogi Struggles for Independence. 433 

tertained, is whether he acted thus from a desire of ven- 
geance upon his opponents, to whom he had succumbed 
at Athens, or from paid officiousness, of which motive De- 
mosthenes accuses him ; and even were it desired to give 
the mildest interpretation to his course of action, viz. that 
he considered the approach of a Macedonian army the 
best means for overthrowing the war-party at Athens, yet 
it would still have to be designated as base treason, that 
for such a purpose he made use of the national enemy. 
But in truth it was not political but personal motives, 
which made iEschines a traitor. By nature devoid of 
character and of independence, he invariably attached 
himself to such men as seemed to be likely to furnish him 
an opportunity of letting his talent shine and playing a 
prominent part, an end to which in spite of all his natural 
gifts he was unable to attain by a straight path and by his 
own strength. Vanity was the impulse at the bottom of 
his actions. Since the embassy to Pel la he had been daz- 
zled by the greatness of Philip, and unscrupulously sup- 
ported the designs of the king, in order thus to satisfy his 
own restless ambition and to gain personal advantages. 
Being more and more driven into the background by the 
personal superiority of Demosthenes, he sought for a new 
opportunity for asserting himself, and therefore unhesita- 
tingly entered into the intrigue which, whether its first 
threads were spun at Thebes or at Delphi or at Athens, 
was in any case a treasonable combination among all the 
partisans of Philip, designed to bring a Macedonian army 
into the country, and to place in the hands of the king 
the decision of the destinies of Greece.* 

* The eu<7e/3eis in Amphissa, whose recall is demanded hj r Cottyphus: 
.ffischin. iii. 129. It may he regarded as highly probable, that the Si evaep- 
tiau (/)€uyoi'T€5 are the same men as those who had with the Philippic party 
brought about the entire catastrophe, and had immediately afterwards been 
expelled as traitors. — The defence offered on behalf of TEschines and the 
attempted refutation of the suspicion cast upon him by Demosthenes in 
Spengel, Demosth. Vertheid. des Klcsiphon, have failed to convince me. 


434 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

Advance of After all the events had been accomplished, 
Philip. which Philip had awaited in prudent retire- 

(b°c'339) 2 ment, he no longer delayed. Of the strong 
November. positions at Thermopylae, Nicaea, and Echinus 
(p. 287), he had already made himself master. When the 
winter began, he took possession of all the inlets into 
Interior Greece ; and whoever observed the warlike stir in 
the frontier-cantons, the activity of the king and his 
generals, the extreme circumspection with which the cam- 
paign was commenced, and the large masses of troops 
which were gradually assembling, could hardly fail to be 
struck by the thought, that something of a different kind 
was intended from the chastisement of the obscure Locrian 
town, which was named as the goal of the military expe- 
dition. Soon even those at a greater distance were to be 
made to see clearly in the matter. 

From Thermopylae several routes lead into Interior 
Greece. Of these the one passes out of the recess of the 
mountains near Heraclea, the ancient Trachis (vol. iii. p. 
143), over to the Dorian tetrapolis; and thence by a 
second pass between Mounts Parnassus and Corax in the 
direction of Amphissa, which lay immediately at the outlet 
of the pass. This is the route which, leading from north 
to south, traverses the Isthmus between the Malian and 
the Crisaean Gulf by the shortest line. If Philip took this 
route, it was unnecessary for him to pass through the Pass 
of Thermopylae, or at all to touch Central Greece. But 
he actually sent only part of his army in advance by this 
route, conducting the main body from Thermopylae to the 
south-east, across the hills extending from Phthiotis in the 
direction of the Euboean Sea, — the offshoots of Mount 
Callidromus and of the Cnemis-range, where the passes lead 
towards Phocis and Boeotia. The most important of these 
passes ended at Elatea ; and before sure tidings had yet 
been received with regard to the movements of the army, 
the king suddenly stood in the valley of the Cephisus, 

chap, iv.] £a$£ Struggles for Independence. 435 

where after the devastation of Phocis he was met by no 
resistance. Elatea, the most considerable city on the south 
side of the frontier mountains, the citadel and 
key of the principal pass and of the whole of f Elatea. lon 
Central Greece, was rapidly surrounded by 
entrenchments ; below the city Philip pitched a fortified 
camp. In this position he controlled the plain of the 
Cephisus, which attains to its greatest breadth between 
Elatea and Tithora, a place lying opposite at the base of 
Mount Parnassus. His rear being covered in case of a 
retreat, and his communications with Thessaly and Mace- 
donia secured, he at the same time had at his disposal the 
resources of the fertile valley, the best pastures for his 
horses, and the amplest room for any movements of troops. 
For on one side he had a convenient line of communica- 
tion up the valley of the Cephisus, with the district of 
Doris (vol. ii. p. 437), and with the passes leading thence 
by way of Cytinium to Amphissa ; while on the other, i. e. 
down-stream, he was so close to the frontier of Boeotia, 
that he kept Thebes perpetually in check, without vio- 
lating its territory. By his occupation of Elatea Philip had 
flung aside the mask ; he had taken up a position, than 
which no better could have been found for making war 
upon Western as well as upon Eastern Greece. It was 
now manifest, that he had no intention of confining him- 
self to an expedition of execution against Amphissa. 

The Athenians had indeed already received 
an early warning from Demosthenes, so soon Athens . at 
as the treasonable scheme of a new Sacred 
War became known. They had however, notwithstanding 
this, not allowed themselves to be disturbed in their care- 
lessness, and even seem to have opined that the Amphissean 
quarrel would in the first instance keep the tempest of 
war at a distance from themselves. Out of this delusion 
they were now all the more unexpectedly torn forth. Of 
a sudden it seemed to them, as if the enemy's army was 

436 History of Greece. [Book va 

before the gates of Athens ; and all the misery of the war, 
which they had cheerfully decreed when the enemy was 
fighting in distant Thrace, now stood immediately before 
their eyes. 

It was evening, Demosthenes relates, when the message 
reached the Prytanes, that Elatea had been taken. They 
at once rose from their common meal ; some of them drove 
the buyers and sellers from the market-place, and lit a 
great fire, in order to give a signal to the rural population. 
The others sent to the generals, and caused the trumpeters 
to sound an alarm. The whole city was in motion. On 
the next morning, as soon as day broke, the Prytanes 
summoned the Council to the Town Hall ; the citizens 
streamed to the Pnyx ; and, before the Council had yet 
arrived at a resolution, the popular assembly was waiting 
in anxious expectation. And when hereupon the Prytanes 
had made public the situation of affairs, aud had also pro- 
duced the messenger, so that he might personally repeat 
his tidings, the question was asked: Who demands to 
speak ? Inasmuch as there was no motion of the Council 
before the assembly, the decision depended entirely upon 
the latter. And yet no man came forward ; and although 
the herald several times repeated his summons, although 
all the Ten Generals and all the popular orators were 
present, and although the interests of the fatherland im- 
posed upon every patriot the duty of offering counsel and 
aid, yet all remained dumb, deeply agitated, and morally 
unhinged by the overwhelming events which had taken 
place. All eyes turned to Demosthenes ; and the universal 
helplessness having been attested with sufficient clearness 
by the long and painful silence, the impression was all the 
greater which was created when he at last came forward, — 
and not with vacillatory and uncertain proposals, but with 
a resolute and clearly-arranged exposition of that which 
was demanded by the honor and safety of the city. In- 
deed, he contrived with happy presence of mind to take 

chap, iv.] £ as £ Straggles for Independence. 437 

advantage of the panic of the moment, in order to bring 
to pass what was of supreme importance, viz. the combina- 
tion with Thebes. 

Demosthenes had by no means remained Atheng 
free from the universal ill-will prevailing and Thebes. 
among his fellow-citizens against Thebes. He had deemed 
the ancient friends of the Persians to be likewise the na- 
tural adherents of the new national enemy ; he had not 
believed them capable of appreciating the national 
cause ; and yet he was from the first a man of too much 
magnanimity of mind and Hellenic feeling to surrender 
himself to a blind hatred. He had the preservation of the 
Hellenic nation too much at heart, for it to have been 
possible that he should have desired the weakening or 
annihilation of any one member of it. But the cautious- 
ness with which he was obliged to advance this sentiment 
too, is already evident from the fact, that in his oration on 
the Peace (p. 338) he had expressly to beg his fellow-citi- 
zens not to interrupt him by expressions of dissatisfaction, 
although he was giving utterance to nothing more than 
the expectation, that for the Thebans also a time would 
arrive when they would be unwilling to march by the side 
of Philip against Athens. 

The following years confirmed his words. After the 
peace there ensued a change of mood at Thebes ; the 
germs of a national party formed themselves, w T hich were 
not unobserved by the vigilant eye of Demosthenes. A 
change therefore took place in his views also (p. 338) ; 
and the opposition between him and iEschines contributed 
to encourage this alteration of sentiments. Demosthenes 
perceived the baseness of his opponent to lie principally in 
this : that he was so busily at work to foster the hostility 
between the neighbors, to goad on the citizens against 
Thebes, to make the rift more and more deep and incura- 
ble, and, so far as in him lay, to drive the Thebans more 
and more over to the side of the enemy. Demosthenes 

438 History of Greece. [BookVU. 

became correspondingly decided in his view ; his judgment 
grew more considerate ; his liberal recognition of the 
worth of the neighbor-state more ready, In his speech for 
the Chersonnesus he admonishes the Thebans to be on their 
guard, and not to trust Philip's favors, although at that 
time the mood of the Athenians was still so hostile, that he 
could call upon them to seek auxiliaries everywhere, even 
in Persia, but could not venture to mention the Thebans. 

After the fall of Elatea a change ensued. It was now 
impossible to look out for aid from a distance ; the next- 
door neighbors were now the sole auxiliaries possible ; and 
now of a sudden the preservation of Athens seemed to de- 
pend entirely upon a combination with Thebes. He ac- 
cordingly now demands the immediate opening of negotia- 
tions for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive 
alliance with Thebes ; at the same time the equipment of 
the entire civic forces, and a march-out to the Boeotian 
frontier. But in order to execute these measures with the 
necessary energy, a supreme magisterial authority invested 
with extraordinary powers was required. Demosthenes 
therefore proposed for the period of the endurance of the 
danger of war the establishment of a government-commit- 
tee of ten men, who together with the generals were to 
provide for the commonweal according to their best judg- 
ment. He was himself called to the head of this board of 
security. Men sharing his sentiments were placed at his 
side ; he was now the Regent of Athens, and on his 
shoulders rested the welfare of the citv.* 

* Occupation of Elatea in the last months of 339 b. c: Westermann ad 
Dem. xviii. 152. The impression created by this event at Athens had also 
been described by Hyperides ; cf. Rhet. Gr. i. 1G7. The ensuing events are 
according to Kochly (Freiheitskrieg der Hellenen gegen Phil, in N. Schweizer Museum, 
ii.), in opposition to Plutarch, Dem. 18, to be arranged in the following order: 
—339-8 b. c: Elatea taken — winter-quarters occupied — negotiations between 
Athens and Thebes — winter-fights. Spring : march to Amphissa — intrigues 
et Athens — fresh negotiations — approach of Antipater's army — return of 
Fhilip to Phocis— irruption into Boeotia — battle of Chaeronea.— Demosthenes 
on Thebes: v. 14; viii. 63. 

chap, iv.] jr^ Struggles Jot Independence. 439 

The first step was to make a journey to Thebes. Here 
he found the deputies of the Boeotian towns assembled, 
and also met an embassy from Philip, led by Negotiation8 
the crafty Python (p. 376), a man pre-emi- at Thebes. 
nently adapted for exciting all the elements of hostility 
against Athens which existed among the Thebans, and, 
on the other hand, for commending to them as impres- 
sively as possible the Macedonian alliance. For to Philip 
nothing could be less welcome than a combination 
between the two cities, which still possessed the civic 
bodies best able to fight ; their reconciliation on the basis 
of a national movement would amount to a moral defeat 
of his Amphictyonic policy, and at the same time to a 
material obstacle in the way of his strategical plans. The 
king therefore proceeded with the utmost caution. He 
abstained from taking advantage of the proximity of his 
army, so as to make rigorous and extensive demands ; he 
conducted himself, not as king of Macedonia, but as a 
member of the Hellenic League of states ; and his envoy 
was accompanied by deputies of the Greek cantons. He 
not even demanded active federal aid, but merely neu- 
trality during his war with Athens, and permission to 
march through Boeotian territory. In the case of a favora- 
ble issue he held out the prospect of an acquisition of 
spoils and territory ; in the contrary event all the horrors 
of war were described as imminent, and as specially 
certain to visit Bceotia. 

What had Demosthenes to throw into the opposite 
scale? He had no means at command either for terri- 
fying or for tempting ; he could open the prospect of no 
advantages ; he only came in order to demand sacrifices 
and to bring with him troubles of war. Besides which, 
he was an entire stranger to the citizens of Thebes, and as 
an Athenian had to contend against a general mistrust, 
Athens stood quite deserted in confronting the king. How 
easy therefore was it to interpret his intentions as if ha 

440 Histoinj of Greece. [Bookvii 

were endeavoring, in order to save his city, which had 
provoked the war, to drag Thebes also into the danger, — ■ 
into a danger of war, moreover, to which Thebes was in 
the first instance and in a prominent degree exposed. 
For upon Athens itself it was impossible to make war 
successfully without a fleet. 

Demos- ^ D( ^ y e * Demosthenes was victorious on the 

Th C ebes at decisive day in the Boeotian assembly. And 
01. ex. 2 yet he was able to proclaim the common duty 

B ' c ' ' of waging the struggle on behalf of the honor 
and liberty of the fatherland, and at the same 
time on behalf of the independence of each State, with so 
mighty a power of eloquence, that he carried away with 
him the hearts of the Boeotian men, that all timid con- 
siderations, all scruples, all feelings of ill-will vanished, 
and one flame of patriotic enthusiasm, kindled by Demos- 
thenes, seized Thebes as well as Athens. This was the 
greatest and noblest victory of Demosthenes ; it was most 
emphatically his own, his personal deed. It was not 
merely a moral gain, but also a political event which 
weighed heavily in the balance. For the measures taken 
by Philip at the very last hour best showed how deeply 
he was interested in preventing this union. Upon nothing 
had he calculated with so much certainty, as upon the in- 
superable hostility between the two neighbor-states. If 
these joined hands against him, then there was still a 
chance of the other states uniting ; then a national rising 
was still possible, which might ruin Philip's position in 
Greece and call all his successes into question. There 
manifestly still survived among the Thebans something 
of the spirit which Epaminondas and his friends had 
aroused ; an openness towards great ideas, a capacity for 
giving themselves up to moral greatness, for allowing 
themselves to be influenced by true eloquence, and for 
feeliug and thinking as Hellenes. The hard ore had been 
melted ; and that which it had been invariably in vain 

Chap, iv.] £as£ Struggles for Independence. 441 

sought to effect in former times, by force of arms (vol. ii. 
p. 440), and afterwards, by Epaminondas as well as hy 
the Boeotian party at Athens, by means of a political 
agreement, was now rapidly and successfully consum- 
mated ; and the two neighbor-lauds, either of which was 
so manifestly destined to supplement the other, and was so 
indispensable for its security, closely united in the last 
hour. The overtures of Philip's envoys were l ea ue be 
rejected, and all the proposals of Demosthenes and^rifebes 13 
accepted. Athens guaranteed to the Thebans 
the unimpaired local supremacy over Bceotia ; the ex- 
penses of the war were to be proportionately divided ; at 
the same time the restoration of the Phocian towns was 
resolved upon, and an agreement was arrived at as to the 
joint conduct of the war by water and by land. It was 
the noblest and most just league ever concluded between 
two Hellenic states ; for it was based upon the determina- 
tion to overcome all petty jealousies in the interest of the 
endangered fatherland. Thebes declared itself ready to 
re-establish the Phocians. The wall which severed Attica 
from Bceotia had fallen, and on either side of Mount 
Cithseron, from Cape Sunium to Parnassus, one endeavor, 
one will, held sway, — and this will was that of Demos- 
thenes, who was associated in concord with the most 
generous minds among the people.* 

There now once more stood opposed to one The t 
another, as in the Persian Wars, two groups ljj ea ^ of 
of states, the one siding with the foreign power, 
the other resolved to wage the struggle for liberty. The 
object, therefore, was jointly to defend this Hellas in a 
more restricted sense, and to take advantage for this pur- 
pose of the bulwarks provided by nature. Below Elatea 

* Demosthenes at Thebes : Theopomp. ap. Plutarch. Bern. 18 : tj tou piji-opo? 
Svvatxis eKpini^ovaa rbv Ovfxov avriov KaX SiaKaiovaa rr)v <^i\oriiJ.iav eneaKOTiqae 
tois aAAoi? anaaiv, ware <poj3ov icai Aoyta/xbi' Kal X^P 11 ' «K/3aAeti> aurovs evBovaiuii* 
Ta? dirb tov Adyou jrpb? to Ka\6v. — Treaty with Thebes : iEschin. iii. 142. 


442 History of Greece. [Bookvu 

the valley of the river Cephisus becomes narrower. From 
Parnassus a hill (Parori) springs forward in advance to- 
wards the river, and from the opposite range, Mount Cne- 
mis, another, by which lay the town of Parapotamii. 
This pass was occupied by the allies ; here was now the 
Thermopylae of free Greece. Simultaneously it was sought 
to gain other bases of operation against Philip. A combi- 
nation was established with the Amphisseans ; for it was 
of the highest importance to prevent Philip from succeed 
ing in rapidly ridding himself of these enemies by force or 
by means of an amicable settlement. Accordingly, 10,000 
mercenaries on foot and 1,000 mounted, who had 
been hired by the Athenians, were designated for the pro- 
tection of Locris, and marched to Amphissa under the 
command of Chares and of the Theban Proxenus. In 
other words, the allies renounced all participation in the 
shameful abuse to which the national religion had been 
put in the interest of Philip, and were courageous enough 
before the eyes of all the Hellenes to attach more import- 
ance to the preservation of the fatherland than to the ex- 
communicatory curses of the traitorous Amphictyons. For 
the same reason steps were at once taken to repair, so far 
as it was possible, the wrong which had been committed, 
and restore Phocis, which had been sacrificed to the in- 
trigues of Delphi. On the summons of the allied cities, the 
fugitive inhabitants returned to their homes, and the scat- 
tered Phocians assembled in their desolated habitations. 
With the skilfnlness peculiar to the Hellenes they rapidly 
re-settled amidst the ruins of their towns under the pro- 
tection of the Locrian troops, and helped to render safe 
the mountain-passes of Parnassus. They at once became 
efficient allies, as they glowed with eagerness to take ven- 
geance upon Philip, and were resolved with the courage 
of despair to defend the home they had regained. Final- 
ly, the allies sent messages around Greece, in order to ob- 
tained armed auxiliaries : and the states which Demosthe- 

chap, iv.] L^t Struggles for Independence. 443 

nes had secured, viz. Megara, Corinth, Eubcea, Achaia, 
Leucas, and Corcyra, proved ready to furnish their con- 
tingents and to pay contributions to the war-fund, while 
the jealous Peloponnesians at all events remained neutral, 
and could not be induced to support Philip, who claimed 
their contingents on the pretext of the Sacred War.* 
Thus, then, an end had likewise been sue- a . . . . „ 

' ' Skirmishes 

cessfully put to the hostilities between Thebes in phocis - 
and Phocis, between Phocis and Amphissa, 01 g°*- 2 (B * 
between Amphissa and Athens. Round TTr . ± 

... Winter. 

Mount Parnassus gathered a considerable mili- 
tary force ; and at the same time the Thebans and the 
Athenians had taken the field in fraternal concord against 
Philip on the Boeotian frontier, watching every movement 
on his part. Nor was this all. Bloody skirmishes ensued 
between single divisions in the low-lying plain of the 
Cephisus. Two of these conflicts were known under the 
names of the ' River-battle ' and the * Winter-battle ; ' in 
both fortune was on the sides of the allies, in both the 
Athenians in particular — as Demosthenes states with 
pride showed themselves not only unexceptionable, but 
worthy of high admiration by the excellence of their 
equipment, their good discipline, and their ardor. They 
were once more acknowledged and celebrated as the cham- 
pions of the Hellenes. Certain bodies of troops which 
were specially successful in these conflicts, as e. g. that of 
the Cecropian tribe with its captain Bularchus, vowed 
dedicatory gifts to the Athene on the citadel ; in the city 
the successes achieved were solemnized by sacrifices and 
processions : the minds of all men were in an elevated, 
grateful, and hopeful mood. They had full confidence in 
the guidance of Demosthenes, and gave a public expres- 
sion to this trustfulness, when at the spring-festival of the 
Great Dionysia he was, on the motion of his cousin Demo- 

* Phocis: Paus. x. 3,3; 33,8. Allies: iEschin. iii. 95; Plutarch. Dem. 17. 
The neutrals («ri tjj -ri}s iSta? n-Aeope^a; ikniSi), Dem. xviii. 04; Paus. viii. 6, & 

444 History of Greece. t BooK VIL 

meles, who had formerly been among his enemies, re- 
warded with a wreath of gold.* 

Demosthe- It is true that even now opposition to him aud ph °- raised its head. It was sought to deprive him 

cion. ° r 

of the love of his fellow-citizens. Invectives 
were uttered against the friendly attitude towards Bceotia, 
which had so long been regarded as an aberration unpar- 
donable in the case of any decent Athenian ; and among 
prominent personages, Phocion in particular, at a season 
when a good understanding between him and Demosthenes 
was of greater importance than ever, confronted him with 
unconcealed bitterness. Doubtless no opposition was felt 
more painfully by Demosthenes than this ; for Phocion 
was, next to himself, the character of the highest mark, 
and his was the manliest individuality at Athens ; he was 
a man who, like Demosthenes, owed everything to himself, 
who was equally unbiassed in his judgment, and of an im- 
movable independence of spirit. He could never become 
a party-follower. In him the two tendencies of the society 
of the times met. In the Academy he had imbibed a 
stern contempt for all existing ways ; but his nature was 
too practical and too much in need of self-exertion, for it 
to be possible for him to withdraw from the world like a 
true follower of Plato. He required a calling ; he served 
the commonwealth, but served it merely from a sense of 
duty for conscience' sake, without taking any personal in- 
terest in it, without devoting any love to it, or feeling any 
warm impulse towards it. Probably there has rarely ex- 
isted a successful general who has been less animated by 
ambition, and who has taken less pleasure in his successes, 
than Phocion. Every danger of war raised his authority ; 
and yet it was peace alone which he desired. He looked 
upon any enthusiastic movement on the part of the people 

* *H enl tou irordnov KaX »j x et M e P»'*? ^XV- Dem. xviii. 216. — Bularehus: 
Monatsberichte der Berliner Alcademie, 1863, 6.— Bestowal of the wreath : Vit. X 
Orat. 816. 

cnAP. iv.j jjdgi Struggles for Independence. 445 

as a dangerous delusion, and regarded the orators who en- 
couraged it, and who exhorted the citizens to make efforts! 
as the most dangerous counsellors of the community. Per- 
sonally, he had no desire to be an orator ; but the train- 
ing in dialectics which he had acquired, the energy of his 
character, the sober coldness and the decisiveness of his 
views, which last is connected with the one-sidedness of his 
stand-point, gave to his words a cutting force as well in 
occasional sayings as in public counter-speeches, and made 
him the most dangerous of all the opponents of Demosthe- 
nes. He resembled a rock, upon which all the waves of 
the current of the times broke ; and the higher they rose, 
the more rigid was his resistance. 

In other quarters, too, attempts were made Intri ueg 
to prevent the outbreak of the war. Alarming of * he P e » c ©- 

r ° party. 

signs were announced ; calamitous accidents 
which had occurred on the occasion of the last Eleusinia, 
it was contrived to turn to account as warning omens. 
The opposition-party combined, as in the days of Pericles, 
with a superstitious tendency fostered by the priests, who 
saw in the alliance with the Phocians and Amphisseans, 
still under the ban of the Delphic god, an abomination 
which averted the favor of the gods from the Athenian 
state. Oracles were bruited about in order to spread 
terror and pusillanimity; and in the end it was actually 
demanded, that before the decisive step was taken the 
Pythia should be asked what Athens ought to do, although 
it was well known that Delphi was at present even less 
than at the time of the Persian Wars entitled to a vote, 
and that the Pythia was, as Demosthenes expressed it, 
Philippic at heart. 

But all these efforts at resistance were impotent against 
the current of the times. The citizens were in a confident 
mood. Demosthenes stood firm and secure at the head of 
the national affairs ; he took vigorous measures against all 
who intended to cripple or disturb the patriotic move* 

446 History of Greece, lbookvii 

ment ; and probably we may also see a connexion between 
his struggle against the priestly party and his proceedings 
against the priestess Theoris, whose execution on account 
of her intrigues was brought about by him. At Thebes 
as well as at Athens he directed the government; and 
with joyous courage all patriots looked forward to thd 
summer campaign, which was to decide everything.* 

It was otherwise in the camp of the enemy. Philip 
found himself utterly at fault in his calculations. Before 
his eyes the towns which he had destroyed were being re- 
built ; the passes on his right and on his left were occupied 
by considerable numbers of troops, advantageously dis- 
posed and efficiently commanded. The first skirmishes 
had not ended in his favor. The struggle, to which he 
saw himself forced, was one in itself entirely unexpected 
by, and unwelcome to, him ; and, moreover, he was any- 
thing but assured of ultimate success. 

Phiii 's During the winter months he had kept the 

march to main body of his troops in the rear of the 

Amphissa. J t 1 

01 ex 2 passes ; when the spring arrived, it was ne- 

(b. c. 338). cessary for him to abandon this anxious posi- 
pring * tion, and to advance either along the base of 
Mount Parnassus or in Bceotia. He preferred first to 
repair to the western theatre of the war, because here he 
hoped for an easier success. A division of his troops still 
lay at Cytinium, where the pass leads across from the 
region of the sources of the Cephisus to Amphissa. But 
here again Philip refrained from venturing at once to 
penetrate with his troops into the perilous gorges of the 
hills ; he preferred to make use of one of his stratagems, 
in which the advantage was always, more than in any- 
thing else, on his side as against the Greeks. He arranged 

* Expressions of opposition to Demosthenes: .SSschin. ii. 106: 7rp6? tois 
aAAoi? KdKots Kal /Soiura^ei. Cf. W. Schmitz, Ueber den Bootismus des Demosthenm 
in Zeitschrift filr Gymn., 1865, 1.— Phocion : Plutarch. Phoc. 9 and 16.— Prodi- 
gies : iEschin. iii. 130; Plutarch. Phoc. 20. — Theoris : Philoehorus op. Harpoer. 
Boeckh, uber Philochoro; 23 ; Plutarch. Item. 14. 

l'hap. iv.j jjj^ Struggles for Independence. 447 

an apparent movement of retreat, drew off his troops out of 
the passes of Doris ; and by means of general orders, which 
he intentionally allowed to fall into the enemies' hands, 
spread the news that a revolt had broken out among the 
Thracian peoples, which required his presence, and for the 
nonce made impossible the continuation of the Hellenic 
War. Upon bands of mercenaries, which were negligently 
commanded and only to be retained at arduous posts by 
the impression of imminent danger and by the immediate 
presence of the foe, such stratagems exercised a specially 
strong effect. The troops dispersed ; the passes were left 
open; and, before any movement of the kind had been 
expected, the king had suddenly returned by forced 
marches, and had penetrated through the passes. The 
army of mercenaries, taken by surprise, was completely 
defeated at Amphissa, and the town itself was subjected to 
the same judgment as Phocis had formerly undergone. 
Naupactus too, which was garrisoned by Achseans, was 
taken by storm, and handed over to the iEtolians. 

Through this success, which had been obtained for the 
king by the carelessness of the commanders of the 
mercenaries, perhaps also by treason among them, an es- 
sential part of Demosthenes' plan of operations had been 
frustrated. Philip was now able to throw his whole 
strength into the eastern theatre of the war ; he had open 
access from the south side of Mount Parnassus ; and could 
cross from Naupactus into Peloponnesus, so as to force the 
auxiliary troops of Athens to return home.* 

It was probably about the same time that Fregh 
the king entered into fresh negotiations. He negotiations. 
could calculate upon the inability of the cities pi. ex. 2 
to sustain for any length of time so excessive 
an exertion of their resources ; he was aware 
of the large amount of opposition which still existed 

* Amphissa: Polysen. iv. 2, 8; iEschin. iii. 146 seq. — Naupactus: Theopomp 
up. Suidas, «. v. 4>povprjcreis ee N«v7raKTy. 


448 History of Greece. [BookVil 

against the war-policy; the annihilation of Amphissa 
could not have failed to create a most terrible impression. 
Boeotia, which had from the first not followed from any 
original impulse of its own, was now the object which ho 
had next in view. The capital was still animated by the 
spirit of Demosthenes ; but Thebes was not Boeotia, and 
the deputies of the country-towns, whose territory already 
had to suffer as the scene of war, were otherwise inclined. 
Vacillation accordingly ensued in consequence of the new 
offers brought from Macedonian head-quarters ; and not 
only at Thebes, but also at Athens, the peace-party again 
ventured to come forward more boldly ; from the fact that 
the most proved general of the city, as to whose patriotism 
it was permitted to no man to express a doubt, it derived 
a significance disproportionate to its real strength. It was 
a strange contrast, that the unwarlike orator should urge 
on the citizens to the conflict, while the soldier never 
ceased from warnings and advice in a contrary sense. 
The two men even came into angry personal contact; 
Demosthenes, wroth at the unbending resistance of his 
adversary, is said menacingly to have called out to him, 
" The Athenians will make an end of thee, if they become 
heated with anger ;" to which Phocion replied, " And thee, 
if they recover their senses." These and similar exchanges 
of sallies handed down from these times give a notion of 
the extreme bitterness prevailing between the opposite 

„ To Demosthenes no idea could be more in- 

Energv of 

Demosiheues. tolerable, than that in the last hour all the 
results of years of sacrifices and efforts should be lost. 
This intensified his energy, and impelled the fiery man to 
act with continuously increasing decision, in order to terri- 
fy the traitors, to encourage the hesitating, and to 
strengthen the uncertain. He has been charged with 
having carried on a system of terrorism irreconcilable 
with the spirit of a republican administration. As in the 

chap, iv.j jr a6 .£ struggles for Independence. 449 

days when Pericles was at the helm, it was complained 
that the constitution had been virtually abolished, and 
that Attic affairs were conducted by Demosthenes ac- 
cording to an understanding with the leaders of Bceotia. 
It was declared that he tolerated no contradiction, treated 
the generals with masterful arrogance, persecuted with 
savage wrath, like Cleophon of old (vol. iii. p. 535), every 
expression of views tending towards peace ; and that it 
was likewise only by despotically intimidating the Bceo- 
tarchs that he had induced them, whom the recent offers 
of the king had shaken, to abstain from renouncing their 
connexion with him. The bearings of Demosthenes at 
Athens is, however, justified by the fact, that opposition 
was not openly offered to him by a considerable part of 
the citizens, but only proceeded from individuals or small 
knots of men, who sought to hinder his labors by secret 
intrigues. The feelings of the civic community found ex- 
pression in the bestowal of another wreath of honor upon 
the orator, which was proposed by Hyperides, and carried 
with brilliant success against the protest of Diondas, per- 
haps at the festival of the Great Panathensea (summer of 
338 b. a). After the rejection of the last proposals of 
peace the battle was inevitable ; and both sides could not 
but desire a speedy decision. As to the scene of the con- 
flict, it was necessarily of the utmost importance to the 
Hellenes that they should maintain their strong position 
in the narrow part of the valley of the Cephisus, and there 
await the attack ; while Philip, who during the recent 
negotiations had caused the reinforcements to join him, 
which Antipater led to him out of his kingdom, required 
a battle-field where he could unfold his cavalry and prove 
his superiority in tactics.* 

He accordingly quitted his winter-quarters; withdrew 

* Terrorism (Suvaoreia), of Demosthenes : iEschin. iii. 146 seq. bwaarevtov 
qvk aSocws ovSe ■nap' df iai>, axTrrep ano^aiveraL ®eonofxiros : Plutarch. Dem. 18.— • 

Second bestowal of a wreath of honor : Schifer, ii. 529. 

450 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

Advance of ^ rom ^ e P aSS » Sen * i ^ S van g uar ^ m t° the 
the Macedo- mountainous country which surrounds the 

man main » 

force. valley of Lake Copais in the north ; devastated 

the Boeotian hamlets, and threatened the entire eastern 
district. The allies had staked their success in the strug- 
gle upon the holding of the pass, and were thus by the 
movement of the enemy suddenly placed in a position of 
the most anxious doubt. For it was possible, that the 
whole army of the enemy might march off in an easterly 
direction, nor was it known where he ought to be awaited. 
It was therefore necessary to follow his movements, if in 
accordance with the desire of the Boeotians their land was 
to be protected. The allies accordingly separated; and 
only a feeble garrison was left in guard of the pass. 

Disposition ^ sooner na0 ^ Philip gained this advan- 
of the two tage, than he rapidly drew back his troops 

armies. & ' tr J r 

into their former position, easily overthrew the 
body of men left behind in the pass, pushed his troops 
through it in pursuit, and hereupon unexpectedly stood 
with his whole army in the Boeotian valley of the Cephis- 
us, the broad plain of which he had from the first re- 
cognized to be the battle-field best suited to himself. 
The Hellenes gathered to the south of the Cephisus, 
where the town of Chseronea served them as a support 
in the rear, and the river as a line of defence. Here, un- 
hindered by the enemy, they drew up their contingents at 
the base of the heights which rise to the rear of Chaeronea, 
on either side of the rivulet of the Haemon, which flowing 
from the rocky theatre of the town empties itself into the 
Cephisus. Nearest to the town stood the Athenians, who 
formed the left wing ; the Thebans occupied the place of 
honor on the right wing, where they touched the river ; in 
the centre stood the Phocians, the Achseans, the Corinth- 
ians, and the remnants of the mercenary army, which had 
made their way hither from Locris. The Boeotians were 
commanded by Theagenes, a proved general out of the 

Chap, iv.] Jjost Struggles for Independence, 451 

school of Epaminondas, the Athenians by the brave Stra- 
tocles, with Chares and Lysicles under him. 

Against this disposition the king advanced. His army 
is stated to have numbered 30,000 infantry, Ba ttie of 
and 2,000 cavalry, the latter estimate being Ch»ronea. 
beyond doubt too low. Altogether it is proba- £Lcx. 3 (b. 
ble that the two armies were about equal in h of Meta _ 
numbers ; they were also equal in warlike ar- gitnion^istof 
dor. But the great superiority on the part of 
the enemy's army consisted in the nature of its leadership ; it 
was directed by one will, of which the most practised com- 
manders were the instruments. On the enemy's side a 
plan of battle, which had been thoroughly thought out, 
was followed. The Hellenes were solely intent upon 
bravely holding their own against the enemy's advance ; 
each division fought on its own account ; and the mind of 
a general was wanting, capable of uniting the loose mem- 
bers into a single whole, and of proving a match for a foe. 

At first the battle had not an unfavorable beginning. 
The left wing courageously advanced ; Philip drew back 
into the plain, and already Stratocles called out to his 
men : " Let us drive the enemy back as far as Macedo- 
nia ! " On the other side the Thebans stood immovable, 
although they were charged with the utmost vehemence 
by Alexander, the king's son, aged eighteen years, who 
was on this day to gain his spurs. The discipline of Epa- 
minondas proved itself above all in the Sacred Band. 
During several hours of the morning the Boeotians held 
their ground, till at last the brave warriors sank, one after 
the other, under the lances of the Macedonian horsemen. 
Over their bodies Alexander charged into the flank of the 
centre, which was composed of the contingents of the allies 
and was only capable of offering a far less enduring re- 
sistance, especially as it had no supports upon which to 
lean, either on the right or on the left. No sooner had 
the battle arrived at this point, than Philip too again ad- 

452 Histoi-y of Greece, [bookvij. 

vanced against the Athenians, who in the ardor of the 
pursuit had gone much too far forward into the open, and 
had broken off the cohesion between the several parts of 
the army. They were obliged to stay their advance, and 
were then driven back ; with the overwhelming numbers 
of the cavalry swarming around them on every side, they 
sought amidst great losses to regain their original position, 
but here too they found no means of defence. They per- 
ceived that the army was broken up, that the whole 
strength of the enemy was combined against themselves, 
and that their only chance of preservation lay in flight. 
One thousand men had fallen ; two thousand were taken 
prisoners ; while the loss of the Thebans must have been 
far greater. Philip, who intended not only to fight his 
way through and to gain a battle, but by one single blow 
to annihilate all power of resistance on the part of 
Greek troops, had completely gained his end. No 
thought was taken of re-assembling the troops, or of offer- 
ing a second battle. There no longer existed any com- 
mon command, or any cohesion. The contingents dis- 
persed to their homes ; and the Hellenic League, barely 
concluded, had been completely dissolved after a single 
defeat. Attica and Boeotia lay unprotected; the two 
neighbor-cities were incapable of aiding one another, and 
both had to be equally prepared for all the terrors of war, 
with which they were threatened by the wrath of the vic- 

* The day of the battle (7th of Metagitnion according to Plutarch, CamiU. 
19) corresponds either to the 1st of September or to the 2d of October, ac- 
cording as 01. ex. 2 is taken as a leap-year or not. Boeckh (Mtndcyklen, 29) 
assumes the cancelling of the intercalary month not to have fallen till 01. 
cxii. 2; and places in 01. cxii. 3 the introduction of a new (the Metonic) ca- 
lendar. But this assumption is, as Boeckh himself allows, very doubtful. 
E. Muller (Pauly, Beatencyclopiidie, i. p. 1054) considers it probable, that a re- 
form of the calendar took place at Athens between 01. lxxxix. 3 and xcix. 3. 
Possibly the year of Euelides was in this respect also an epoch-year. Cer- 
tain it is, that in the Octaeteris also extraordinary cancellings were not un- 
frequently instituted, in order to make the beginnings of the years coincide 
with the course of the sun ; and this i3 the reason why it is so difficult t« 

Chap, iv.j j^^i Struggles for Independence. 453 

And yet the lot of the one of the two cities Treatment 
was very different from that of the other. The of Thebes. 
heroic valor of the Thebans was a last sacrifice, offered by 
them to the glory of their past ; it was able, indeed, to ob- 
tain the acknowledgment of the conqueror, but not to de- 
termine his conduct. Philip saw in the rising of Thebes 
nothing but faithlessness and ingratitude, nothing but a 
base violation of sworn treaties and an open act of revolt, 
which here, as in Thessaly, he deemed it necessary to pun- 
ish with inflexible rigor. For the falling-away from his 
body of confederates, from the new Amphictyony founded 
by him, he was resolved to cause to be regarded as an act 
of treason against the Hellenic fatherland. He dealt with 
Thebes, as Sparta would have dealt with her, had Sparta 
been victorious at Leuctra. The State established by the 
great Thebans was broken up ; Thebes remained nothing 
more than a Boeotian country-town ; Orchomenus, Thcs- 
pise, Platsese were restored ; a Macedonian garrison en- 
tered the Cadmea; the leaders of the civic body were put to 
death, or banished, as traitors; their lands were confis- 
cated and given away ; a new system of government was 
introduced. The fall of the Sacred Band on the field of 
Chseronea was likewise the end of the city of Epaminondas 
and Pelopidas.* 

Athens, on the other hand, was regarded as situation 
an enemy, who even after her overthrow ought of Athens. 
to be treated with respect and gained over by magna- 
nimity. And indeed already the dictates of the simplest 

decide, whether fche more ancient traces of a more correct system of the 
year are based upon isolated rectifications or upon the introduction of a 
new Cycle. As to the case in question, the omission of an intercalary month 
before 01. cxii. 3 is probable. If we assume this to have taken place in OL 
ex. 2, the beginning of the year 01. ex. 3 falls on the 23d of June, and the 
battle of Chseronea on the 2d of August, as Schafer, ii. 529, also assumes. 
As to the battle : Diod. xvi. 84; Justin, ix. 3. Disposition of the Greek army 
Kochly, u. s. 58 ; Vischer, Erinnerungen aus Griech. 591. The death of Stratocles 
(Koehly, 1G6) is not handed down by tradition, but is probable. 
* Fate of Thebes: Pans. ix. 1, 8; 37, 3. 

454 History of Greece. tbookVII. 

prudence forbade driving Athens to extermination. The 
courage, and therefore implicitly the strength, of the 
Athenians, were by no means broken. Athens was ac- 
customed not to consider herself lost, although the enemy 
stood in the land, but to trust to her walls. A siege of 
the city was, under any circumstances, a very doubtful 
undertaking, one of a far more serious character than the 
two last sieges in which the king had failed. Should the 
Byzantines, the island-cities, and perchance Persia too, 
furnish the city with supplies, and send succor into the 
Pirseeus, there was no longer any prospect of success. To 
these considerations were added those of a higher general 
policy. It was not permissible to Philip to act like an- 
other Xerxes; the king who had made an Aristotle the 
tutor of his son could not refuse to recognize the soil of 
Attica as a consecrated one. Its devastation would have 
been a blot upon his reign ; while, on the other hand, an 
amicable recognition of his Hellenic position on the part 
of the Athenians was even now the highest advantage 
which he could have in view. 

Demades ^ was therefore, of great value to him to 

piviT' 68 establish relations which might promote his 
agent. plans ; and for this purpose the most excellent 

instrument offered itself to him in the person of Demades, 
who had fallen into his hands as a prisoner on the field 
of battle. Demades was a man of low birth, a true child 
of degenerate Athens, untroubled by a conscience, frivo- 
lous, eager for lucre, sensual, but full of mother-wit, 
prompt of speech, inexhaustible in happy thoughts and 
sudden retorts, and, although devoid of superior culture, 
yet a man of irresistible eloquence. He had already come 
forward as an opponent of Demosthenes, but without pur- 
suing any definite policy. His meeting with king Philip 
first brought him into a track thoroughly according with 
his desires and inclinations ; Philip made out of this per- 
sonage, who had begun as an oarsman, a great lord and a 

Chap, iv.] ^astf Struggles for Independence. 455 

statesman of influence. Through Demades, then, Philip 
now entered into relations with Athens, precisely as he 
had once done from his camp before Olynthus ; he sent 
him to Athens, in order to make known his benevolent 
intentions. He had every reason for pursuing this course.* 

The Athenians had vigorously overcome the . 

first impression of the tidings of terror, the °( the Athe * 

1 ° ' mans after 

first loud grief aroused by the defeat and by th * Battle of 

~ ... Cheeronea. 

the heavy losses; and, notwithstanding their 
painful anxiety on behalf of the prisoners, of the wounded 
and of the dead bodies of their brethren, which had been 
left lying on the battle-field, they without delay took all 
the measures required by the security of the State, without 
thinking of negotiations with the foe. As in the war of 
Archidamus, the rural population was admitted into the 
city ; the men between fifty and sixty years of age were 
summoned under arms ; the passes into the land were 
made safe. A general was sought for, and the more hot- 
headed part of the civic body carried the election of Cha- 
ridemus (pp. 139, 267). He was still accounted the most 
talented military commander, and he was credited with 
being the right man for critical times. However, the 
choice of so untrustworthy a personage, with whom Demos- 
thenes and his friends could not possibly act in company, 
seemed extremely dangerous to the more self-possessed 
citizens. An interference of the Areopagus was therefore 
brought about, to which it will be remembered that a 
decisive influence had been again conceded in the case of 
important transactions of State (pp. 357, 366). The elec- 
tion was declared invalid ; and a new election of General 
fell upon Phocion, with whom under existing circum- 
stances the party of Demosthenes too hoped to be able to 

♦Demades (At/juicov Ilaianev?, Boeckh, Seewesen, 234): Suidas. According 
to Diod. xvi. 87 and Justin, ix. 4, it is to him that is ascribed the change 
effected in the intentions of the king, when full of insolence after the vie* 
tory. Schiifer, iii. 4. 

456 History of Greece. [BookVil 

arrive at an understanding. For this party still continued 
to direct public affairs, and was by no means minded to 
allow the political conduct of the State to pass into the 
hands of Phocion. Hyperides therefore proposed, that the 
Council should be invested with extraordinary powers, in 
order that it might adopt the measures which it judged 
salutary ; the members of the Council were themselves to 
take arms and to march into the Pirseeus which was to be 
regarded as the nucleus of the fortifications of the city. 
Furthermore, all the inhabitants capable of fighting were 
to be summoned to take up arms ; the exiles were to 
return home; the civic franchise was to be bestowed upon 
all the resident aliens who bore a part in the defence of the 
city ; and even the slaves, in particular the slaves in the 
mines, were on these conditions to receive their freedom. 
It was thought that by these means not less than 150,000 
men could be collected, who might be employed in the 
service of the State. In order to obtain arms, even the 
dedicatory gifts in the temples were not spared. The 
proposals of Hyperides were passed. Demosthenes pro- 
vided for the repair of the walls and the regulation of the 
service on guard ; the most important financial duty, viz. 
the purchase of corn, was likewise entrusted to him by the 
citizens. Lycurgus labored with redoubled exertions for 
navy, arsenal, and the supply of arms. The well-to-do 
citizens, men of the most various political tendencies, 
Demosthenes, Charidemus, Diotimus, and others, emulated 
one another in attesting their zeal by voluntary gifts of 
money and arms ; and Lycurgus took advantage of the 
high confidence enjoyed by him among his fellow-citizens, 
in order to accumulate a capital amounting, it is said, to 
650 talents (nearly £160,000), which he placed at the 
disposal of the State. Finally envoys went forth, in order 
to represent the danger of the city as one common to all 
the Hellenes ; and Athens had every reason for expecting 
vigorous aid from those states, with which she had already 

Chai>. iv.j "Last Struggles for Independence, 457 

conjointly and successfully fought against Philip. In 
short, there was no confusion or despair in the city, but a 
regularly planned and energetic activity, a bold determi- 
nation to defend its independence by the exertion of all 
the resources in its possession. The mood prevailing 
among ths people resembled that of the days of the battles 
of Marathon and Salamis ; as in those times, so now again 
the Areopagus contributed to give firmness to the bearing 
of the citizens. Pusillanimity was punished as treason, 
and the penalty of death was decreed against those who 
withdrew themselves by flight from the danger of the 

It was in this condition that Demades found ~ . 


the city. Its mood could not have been less at Athens. 
favorable for the intentions of the king ; and for the 
moment the victor was almost in a position of greater 
difficulty than the vanquished ; for the latter were in the 
midst of the most resolute activity, while the former had 
yet to discover the means for disarming his adversaries 
without a conflict.* 

Demades entirely followed in the footsteps of the former 
orators of Philip, by above all assuring his fellow-citizens 
that the king was exceedingly wroth with Thebes, but had 
none but kindly intentions towards Athens. But Dema- 
des had this great advantage over his predecessors — that 
this statement was for the first time absolutely true. This 
he contrived, after the most vigorous fashion, to make 
understood ; and thus he easily succeeded in ruining the 
fairest results of the Demosthenic policy, in reviving the 
old sentiments of jealousy, and in extinguishing once more 
the spirit of national union which Philip recognized to be 
his most dangerous enemy. All petty and evil elements 

* Charidemus, Phocion : Plutarch, Phoc. 16. Hyperides : Lye. in Leocratem, 
26 seq. ; Vit. X Oral. Rid. Sauppe ad Fragm. Ilyperid. rrpbs 'ApiaToyziTova, 33 
(ivpta.8a<; ttAci'ov? f) SetcanevTe, npoirov fxev 5ovA.ou? tous €/< twi> tpyotv twv apyvpciuiv 
ical tous nard. rr]v aK\t]v \u>pa.v. Boeckh, Staatsh. d. Alhen., vol. i. p. 53 [2d Ed.]. 
Patriotic contribution.! : Dem. xviii. 114. 


458 History of Greece, [BookV;; 

came to the surface again ; with base faithlessness the 
allies were abandoned, in company with whom the citizens 
of Athens itself had recently bled for the freedom of Hel- 
las ; it was no longer remembered that any consideration 
was due to the Thebans ; and pleasure could once more 
be taken in any humiliation inflicted upon them. This 
self-abasement on the part of the Athenians was the first 
result of the negotiations. Hereupon Demades was en- 
abled to add in the king's name, that he was willing to 
liberate the prisoners, and ready to conclude a peace 
w T hich should guarantee to the Athenians their independ- 
ence. On the other hand, if this offer was not accepted, 
the prisoners would be sacrificed to the anger of the king ; 
even the dead bodies were still in his hands ; for it was an 
extremely crafty piece of policy on his part to have re- 
fused the first request that they might be delivered up, 
which had been proffered to him immediately after the 
battle. But the main point was, that the reason had been 
suddenly removed on account of which the Athenians had 
been willing to expose themselves to the heaviest sacrifices 
and troubles of the war. The warlike heroism of the 
Athenians was based on the presumption, that the king 
was drawing near with fire and sword, that he demanded 
unconditional submission. Instead of this, he appeared 
with the most tranquillizing promises, and without any 
humiliating demands. Hereby the whole situation of 
affairs was suddenly changed, and the mood of the great 
multitude of the citizens transformed. Even of the more 
reflecting citizens, who not without reason saw in the pro- 
posals of Hyperides a radical revolution in the political 
system, the majority were well satisfied that it was unneces- 
sary to resort to such desperate measures of defence ; and 
Phocion, the commander-in-chief, was able more effectively 
than ever to point out the insanity of a recalcitrance 
pushed to extremes. The Macedonian party was once 
more in full activity. Demosthenes, who alone mighf 

ctiAP. IV.] Jjqsi Struggles for Independence. 459 

have been capable of bringing about at least a cautious 
reserve, was still absent ; and inasmuch as in the first in* 
stance all that was required was to establish relations with 
the king, in order to settle the most imminent questions, 
and to obtain officially an assurance of the intentions of 
Philip, no opposition was offered in the whole civic body 
to Demades' motion for the despatch of an embassy. But 
of course it was not permissible to send any Athenian 
personages unacceptable to the king, as the fjjjf 887 to 
lives of the prisoners and the honor of the 
dead were in question ; and thus the public affairs of the 
city once more fell into the hands of the adversaries of 

iEschines had again come into the foreground. He 
and Phocion and Demades seemed to be the personages 
pre-eminently required for the task. When Philip saw 
these men enter his camp, he might feel convinced that 
he would easily achieve his ulterior purposes. He treated 
them at the banquet as the most amiable of hosts, and 
during the negotiations with the most charming magnani- 
mity. He was not content with the liberation of the prison- 
ers ; he actually equipped them for their return home. The 
dead bodies he still kept back, but only for the purpose 
of paying a new attention to the Athenians by causing the 
remains to be solemnly conducted home. After the de- 
parture of the envoys he sent the dead bodies to Athens, 
accompanied by the foremost men of the realm, in particu- 
lar by Antipater and by his own son, who were at the 
same time to bring to the Athenians the draft of the 

These treaties proposed friendship and alii- „.„. , 
ance Attica was not to be entered by the peace-pro- 

J posals. 

Macedonian army ; her ancient independence 
was to continue, and in particular no foreign vessel of 
war was to sail into the Pirseeus. Oropus, the disputed 
frontier-district (p. 105), was restored to the Athenians. 

460 History of Greece. £ Boos vu 

Part of the islands were left to them ; and they even con' 
tinued to be recognized as an independent maritime 
power, the protection of the sea being undertaken by 
them in conjunction with Philip. The most disgraceful 
of all the articles of the peace caused the greatest satisfac- 
tion ; for Athens could not humble herself more deeply 
than by accepting from the good grace of the enemy a 
part of the territory of her ally, and by rejoicing over the 
fact, that the latter alone had to suffer for the war. But 
to Philip Oropus served as a pledge, that it would be long 
before the two neighbors would again think of making 
common cause against him ; and the transfer of a piece 
of land wholly indifferent to himself obtained for him a 
readiness on the part of the Athenians to agree to that 
which was alone of importance to him, viz. to their en- 
trance into the League, the establishment of which was 
his most immediate task. Herein lay a renunciation on 
the part of Athens of any independent foreign policy, of 
any hegemony, and of any maritime dominion of her own. 
Finally, Oropus had to console the Athenians for the loss 
of their more distant possessions, which were an obstacle 
in Philip's path, i. e. of the Chersonnesus. Hereby the 
route of the corn-supplies fell into Philip's hands : and 
this fact alone placed the city in his power. 

Doubtless it was contrived to clothe the sacrifices, to 
which Athens had to consent, in the gentlest forms possi- 
ble, so as to render their bitterness less perceptible to the 
citizens ; and thus Demades could with thorough confi- 
dence propose the acceptance of the terms of peace. Ca- 
vils were not indeed wanting. Even Phocion came for- 
ward, because he took exception to the point as to the 
Conclusion league. He most justly demanded that at 
of the Peace. a j} events full explanations should be obtained 
°\^' 3 (B - as to its character, before the Athenians tied 

c. 338). ' 

their own hands in the matter. But he found 
no hearing, when in this instance he sought to guard the 

chap, iv.] jr^^ Struggles for Independence. 461 

interest of the city against Philip ; and the peace was con* 
eluded. Demosthenes would assuredly have raised a pro* 
test against those points which most deeply wounded the 
honor of the city ; in accordance with his convictions he 
would have specially been bound to declare himself op- 
posed to the acceptance of Oropus; and, although he 
would have been unable to prevent the conclusion of the 
peace, yet he would at least have demanded the utmost 
caution and firmness with reference to the League. But, 
when he returned home from the Archipelago, where he 
was still actively at work in the cause of the war (proba- 
bly he visited even allies at a greater distance, such as 
faithful Tenedos, the cities on the Hellespont, &c), 
everything had been settled at Athens ; and there was 
now, as after the Peace of Philocrates, nothing left for 
him but to see that Athens kept the peace to which she 
had sworn, while at the same time preserving as much as 
possible of her dignity, of her liberties, and of the patriot- 
ism which he had once more called forth in her citizens. 
Nor was there any lack of opportunities for this even now. 
For, however greatly the mood of the people had been 
changed by Demades, yet it refused to withdraw its confi- 
dence from the man in whom it had reposed it. The ad- 
verse party left no means untried, in order to discredit him 
and cast suspicion upon him ; they thought it would be easy 
for them to triumph over him, now that his policy had 
been so completely overthrown ; he was to be made respon- 
sible for the losses suffered, for the resources wasted, for the 
blood shed in vain ; he was charged with cowardly con- 
duct in the battle ; and in every way it was sought to 
render him contemptible. And yet they failed to accom- 
plish their purpose. The citizens would not be persuaded, 
that their former proceedings had been an aberration. 
Their heroism had been broken, but as to their judgment 
they remained true to their past, and honored themselves 
by holding fast to Demosthenes. Of this they offered the 

462 History of Greece. [Book vn 

best testimony, by according to Demosthenes the honor of 
holding the Funeral Oration at the sepulchral solemnity 
in honor of the fallen (November 338 b. a), They felt 
with perfect truth, that there was an indissoluble connex- 
ion between Demosthenes and the dead of Chseronea, and 
that these would be dishonored, were such orators allowed 
to speak at their tomb as failed to acknowledge the sacred 
cause on behalf of which these men had gone into death.* 
Phm in Philip had meanwhile made a progress 

Peiopon- through the whole of Greece, in order by his 

nesus. to . 

01. ex. 3 personal presence rapidly to organize the af- 

fairs of the states ; for he was impatiently 

Autumn. . . . . 

longing to attain to his goal, which no serious 
difficulties any longer remained to delay him in reaching. 
The Peloponnesus had long ceased to be a citadel of Hel- 
lenic independence. Its ancient system of states had been 
burst asunder by the battle of Leuctra : since which time 
it had been a scene of incessant ferment and feud ; now 
it was intended here too to accomplish, what the policy 
of Thebes had been unable to bring about, viz., a fixed 
order of affairs, and to unite and peaceably settle the en- 
tire peninsula as a member of the new association of 
states. Those states which had taken part in the most re- 
cent movement, in particular Corinth and Achaia, sub- 
mitted to the victor, and, as likewise Megara, concluded 

* Embassy to Philip : iEschin. iii. 227. Demades: Snidas. The participa- 
tion of Phocion in this embassy Trept c-wnjpia? T7js 7r6Aecos or vnep ai;(ju.aAi6TWf 
is not handed down, but probable. — Peace-embassy: Diod. xvi. 37. Terms of 
the Peace : Paus. i. 25, 3 ; 34, 1. Chersonuesus : F. Schultz, de Chers. Throe. 113. 
The Attic clerucM remained in possession of their lands; so likewise in Sa- 
mos, whither the ancient inhabitants did not return until after the Lamian 
War. Cf. W. Vischer, in Rhein. Mas. xxii. 320. — Scruples of Phocion: Plu- 
tarch, Phoc. 16: Arj/uaSou ■ypai/zai'TOS, o7ra>? rj 7r6Ai? ^terex 01 r '7? koivjj? eiprjvns /cat 
tou (rvveSpiov tois "EAArjcrtv, ovk eia npb toO yvtavai., riva $i\iniro$ avr<Z yeveaOai 
irapa ?wv ' EAA^vtuv afiwcrei. — Demosthenes at sea: Dem. xviii. 248; iEschin. 
iii. 159 (tov? *EAA>jva? apyvpokoywv). Cf. the crvvraf is e\fjr)<)>t(Tp.evT) in the decree 
at Tenedos (Bullett. deW Inst, 1866, p. 109).— Funeral Oration (Dem. xviii. 298) 
in the first winter-month, i.e. Msemacterion. Cf. Sauppe, in Gottinger Nachr^ 
1864, 201, 215. 

chap, iv.] j^^i Struggles for Independence. 463 

peace on the terms proposed to them. The other states 
had, it is true, also failed to respond to the wishes of the 
king; they had not furnished him with contingents; but 
it was not in his interest, at the present moment, to call 
the several communities to account: he accepted their 
neutrality as a fully valid sign of their devotion ; and 
since the spirit of recalcitrance had been now completely 
extinguished, since the ancient adversaries of Sparta all 
of their own accord offered him open homage and saluted 
him as their supreme protector, Philip too had no other 
intention than that of showing himself their gracious 
friend and benefactor. Quite peculiar relations existed 
between him and Argos. That city was the cradle of his 
royal line (p. 26), and in a sense the mother-city of Mace- 
donia ; and was accordingly to have its share in the 
splendor of the empire. Sparta had driven back the 
Temenidae ; she had deprived the Argives of the first place, 
which was due to the city of Agamemnon, and had over- 
thrown the ancient order of things established by the 
Heraclidse. As a prince of the race of Heracles, as the 
new Agamemnon, Philip now designed to restore its an- 
cient honors to the ancient primary city of the Hellenes. 
Here again, as at Athens, it was possible for him to create 
an exuberant satisfaction by means of gifts which cost him 
nothing ; and the Argives enthusiastically joined the mili- 
tary expedition, which was at last to avenge upon Sparta 
all the iniquities suffered by them in the course of centu- 
ries. The Arcadians and Messenians likewise joined the 
king ; as did Elis, which had only for a short time been 
reconciled to Sparta (p. 345). The united contingents of 
the Peloponnesians, of the Greek auxiliaries of Philip and 
of his own Macedonian veteran troops, together swelled 
to an armed host, which poured with irresistible force into 
the valley of the Eurotas. The day had arrived, when 
judgment was to be held over the ancient primary State 
of Greece. 

464 History of Greece. t BoOK VI *« 

Attit d of Since her brief enjoyment of the acme of 
Sparta. power under Agesilaus, Sparta had been con- 

tinuously retrograding ; so that even the resources of good 
which still survived brought no blessing to her. This 
shows itself in the case of the son of Agesilaus, the vigo< 
rous Archidamus, who since his first coming forward (vol. 
iv. p. 380), in spite of certain glorious deeds in the field 
(vol. iv. pp. 472, 505), had been able to effect nothing by 
his valor for his native city. He too had allowed himself 
to be deceived by Philip, and had after the attempt, end- 
ing in failure, to assert the influence of Sparta in the Pho- 
cian War, returned home in deep vexation of spirit. 
Even when the common country was at the height of 
danger, it had been impossible to induce Sparta to re- 
nounce her cold and narrow-hearted selfishness ; her own 
sins had utterly isolated her. While the Athenians de- 
clared in open assembly, that they would not sacrifice 
Sparta in the case of need (p. 375), and would not allow 
the pressure of the general hatred against Sparta to induce 
them to abandon their peaceable connexion with her, the 
Spartans were without any cordial feeling toward Athens, 
and never thought of supporting her national policy. In 
vain Perinthus too had applied to Sparta ; and when the 
Hellenic League had taken the field for the final decision, 
king Archidamus was risking his life, not on the field of 
Chseronea, but in a remote foreign land. As in the case 
of his father, so with him, the love of military enterprise, 
because it pursued no national aims, degenerated into a 
purposeless search after adventures. He went first to 
Crete, and then to Tarentum, where he was slain in a 
battle against the Messapians, about the time when the 
Hellenes were fighting against Philip. It thus fell to the 
lot of his son Agis to suffer in full measure the calamity 
which had befallen his home. 

Degenerate and ossified as Spartan life was, yet there 
still survived in it a remnant of the ancient greatness. 

chap, iv.] £ as £ Struggles for Independence, 465 

which proved itself most manifestly in times of trouble. 
The idea of the State had still more vitality in the 
shrunken nucleus of the Spartans, than in the remaining 
communities, decomposed as these were by the spirit of 
party ; and however untrustworthy the individual citizens 
of Sparta might prove abroad, yet the civic body had in 
it a fixed consciousness of inner cohesion, and a resolute 
assurance in action, whereby it put all other Hellenes to 
shame. On the present occasion also no traitor was to be 
found at Sparta ; no blandishments met with a hearing ; 
no negotiations were entered into ; the Spartans allowed 
the country to be devastated up to the sea-shore and, after 
a few attempts at warding off the enemy, gathered around 
the city-heights, which had been twice already defended 
with success (vol. iv. pp. 450, 505). At last it became 
necessary to entertain thoughts of peace ; but when the 
question was, whether they would renounce their claims 
to hegemony, and bind themselves to furnish their mili- 
tary contingent to a foreign king, the citizens steadfastly 
refused to conclude any such treaty, and were resolved 
rather to undergo any sufferings. They gained their end. 
An annihilation of the civic community could not lie in 
the intentions of Philip, since it was not demanded by his 
interests, to which a heroic martyrdom of the Spartans 
would only have been disadvantageous. He was there- 
fore, although much against his wish, obliged to content 
himself with putting an absolute end to any power of 
doing harm on the part of this State, whose domain had al- 
ready become so narrow, and whose power had sunk so 
low. An Hellenic tribunal of arbitration was Territorial 
summoned ; and Sparta was deprived of all p^f" g e ^. in 
the territory which she had obtained by con- nesus. 
quest, in favor of her neighbors. The Messenians laid 
claim to the declivities of Mount Taygetus up to the ridge 
of the lofty mountain-range. Argolis received back 
Thyreatis and the entire district of the ancient Cynurians, 


466 History of Greece. C Bo °* VI1 

after the Lacedseinonians had during two centuries held 
sway up to the confines of the Argive plains ; to the 
Arcadians was assigned the territory on the upper Euro- 
tas and on the streams forming its sources, to the Mega- 
lopolitans Belmina, to the Tegeatse Sciritis ; so that the 
Lacedaemonians were not even left in possession of their 
own river-valley and of their most important passes. 
Sparta was treated like a brigand-state, from which its 
plunder is taken in order to restore it to its legitimate 
owners. In mute defiance she allowed the members to be 
cut off, which in the course of centuries seemed to have so 
firmly grown together into a single body, that Epaminon- 
das had formerly been derided as a madman when he de- 
manded from the Spartans the liberation of the lands 
surrounding their city. 

Federal ^e cousumm ation of all these measures 

tT . ea }y, con " took place in the summoning of a General 

eluded ai * ° 

Corinth. Hellenic Diet to Corinth. Here the treaty 

(b* c X 338) was °ff ere d for acceptance, in which the king 
Close of the represented the aims of his dynastic policy in 
such a light, that they appeared to be the 
long-cherished desires of the Hellenic nation, and the 
pledges of national prosperity: on the one hand peace 
throughout the land and security of intercourse and traffic, 
on the other new splendor and glory as against foreign 
countries ; so that both the settled citizens in their pursuit 
of trade and industry, and the younger generation, eager 
for adventures and spoils, were to find their interests satis- 
fied by the new era. The renewed proclamation of the 
independence of all Hellenic communities served to calm 
the apprehensions of the petty states ; the secure establish- 
ment of order and peace against all demagogic innovations 
was in accord with the interests of the classes possessed of 
property. A permanent Federal Council was to guard 
the existing order of things against any attempts in any 
quarter to violate it; while the Amphictyonic Assembly 

ctiap. iv.] Ijast Struggles for Independence. 467 

was as a Federal Tribunal to punish any impious violation 
of Federal law. And a guarantee was given for the effec- 
tual execution of these institutions by the watch over it 
being kept by Philip, as the most powerful member of the 
new League. For Macedonia and the newly organized 
Greece were now united as a single whole, as a sworn 
Confederation ; and in this again the king appeared merely 
as the representative of national ideas, inasmuch as he 
resumed the task of the war of vengeance against Persia, 
which the weakness and disunion of the Hellenes had 
interrupted, and for this purpose alone claimed the con- 
tingents, as to which a fixed system of regulations waa 
settled with the deputies of the Greek states.* 

So immense were the events and the transformations of 
the relations determining the condition of all Greece, which 
crowded into the year 338. In order to appreciate their 
significance, it remains necessary in conclusion, after our 
summary narration of the facts, to review the efforts of 
Demosthenes and the situation of the Hellenes under the 
Macedonian supremacy. 

The greatness of Athens is essentially based upon the 
fact, that at the right time she had the right men, for 
making clear to the citizens their mission and pointing 
out to them the true aims before them. After Solon had 
in grand lines sketched out for the community Retrospect 
the entire moral and civil task of its existence, of the p^I*? 

' career of De- 
it was in the critical moments of its later his- mosthenes. 

tory led onward with a safe hand by Miltiades, by Themi- 

stocles, by Aristides and Cimon, and conducted by them 

to ever higher goals : to the highest ol all by Pericles, 

* Philip in Peloponnesus : Arrian. vii. 9, 5 ; Theopomp. Fragm. 66 seq. The 
Eleans : Paus. V. 4 (tt)? e<p6Sou &i\iTrn<p ttj? eirt AaxeSat/ixovtovs /werecrxov). — Archi* 
damus : Diod. xvi. 62 seq.— Restriction of the boundaries of Sparta: Paus. ii. 
20 (enl Tot? KaOea-TYiKoa-tv ef apx>?s opois). Autonomy: Strab. 365 — Synedrium: 
Diod. xvi. 89 (koivt) etpVjvTj) ; Justin, ix. 5 (lex pacis universse Greeciae .... 
concilium omnium velut unus senatus). 

468 History of Greece. [BookViv 

when in the period of peace he carried through the con* 
struction of the edifice of Athenian supremacy, and esta- 
blished the dominion, which had been gained by arms, 
upon intellectual culture and wise reflection. This w T ag 
the legitimate combination of Attic with Hellenic policy. 
The Athenians pursued only the former of these; they 
were too one-sidedly intent upon dominion, and after a 
desperate struggle lost even this. Hereupon ensued a 
period in which Athens lived an aimless life from day to 
day, a desolate time devoid of meaning and of movement. 
There occurred particular moments of a rise towards 
loftier ends ; but these were only transitory after-effects of 
earlier efforts, mere feeble reminiscences of the past. 
Thebes assumed the championship against the Spartan 
dominion, and Athens was incapable of elevating herself 
above the policy of a petty jealousy. After this she en- 
tirely abandoned herself, and sought in an indolent life of 
enjoyment a compensation for her lost greatness, until at 
last, a century after the appearance of Pericles, a force 
once more revealed itself, which was able to resume the 
efforts of the great statesmen and to restore the interrupted 
history of the city. 

In Demosthenes the gradual development of his activity 
as a statesman is to be perceived with incomparably 
greater clearness than in any of his predecessors. We see 
the youth in his struggle on behalf of his paternal house 
gain the strength of will, which fearlessly confronts any 
and every baseness ; we see him as an advocate acquire his 
knowledge of civil life and his mastery over speech. He 
perceives the vile abuses in the administration ; and they 
urge him to the struggle against a party of overwhelming 
power, a struggle of years, which steels his character, inas- 
much as amidst the greatest hostilities, and notwithstand- 
ing the want of success in his opposition, he never becomes 
untrue to himself. In the Olynthian question he gains a 
decisive influence ; but not until after the Peace of Philo* 

otiap. iv.j Last Straggles for Independence. 469 

crates is he successful in gathering men of the same views 
as his own around him, in unmasking the baseness of his 
adversaries, and in bringing the citizens over to his side. 
Henceforth bis own endeavors too become continuously 
loftier and purer ; he emancipates himself from one-sidedly 
Attic points of view ; his labors aim at a rising on the part 
of the nation under the leadership of Athens. His elo- 
quence has its effect in the islands and in Peloponnesus ; 
his fellow-citizens bow before his greatness ; they entrust 
to him the conduct of their home and foreign affairs. 
Whatever vital forces are still at work in Greece range 
themselves under his guidance. 

The entire policy of Demosthenes rests on The his _ 
historical foundations. His anxiety never was jettons*™ 11 " 
to shine by new ideas and schemes, but only to his policy, 
re-establish his native city on ancient bases; his convic- 
tion is this, that he who speaks and acts on behalf of the 
State must thoroughly enter into its moral and mental 
being, and possess himself of its character. Hence the 
unbroken continuity of his career from his first oration of 
State ; and it is for this reason again that it in so many 
respects recalls the public career of the earlier statesmen. 
Like Themistocles, he too foresaw an inevitable war on 
behalf of the independence of the fatherland, armed the 
city for this purpose, and gathered in Greece a patriot 
party resolved upon the struggle. His financial reform, in 
so far as it constituted the fundamental condition of a 
successful resistance, had the same significance as the law 
on the mines (vol. ii. p. 260). In the organization of the 
new League he, like Aristides, was intent upon treating 
the rights of others with the utmost possible consideration; 
for, according to his conviction also, justice is the true 
foundation of all political institutions. But greatest of all 
is the harmony between his activity and that Demos . 
of Pericles. Both these men, beginning as thenesand 

' to ° Pericles. 

orators of the Opposition, after a long struggle 

470 History of Greece. iboo*vu 

became leaders of the community and legislators, and this 
only by the force of a moral superiority, which gradually 
overcame all contradiction. Neither of them was per- 
sonally cast in a popular mould, nor was their influence 
obtained by them through a pleasing eloquence which 
flattered or dazzled the people ; but, strict towards them- 
selves and others, severe and serious, they confronted the 
citizens with unpalatable demands, unsparingly reproving 
their perversities and subduing their vanity. The one and 
the other were enemies of long speeches, and only spoke 
after careful preparation; it was the perfect command 
over their subject, the strength of their will, the inner 
truth of their meaning, which gave to their words the 
power of conviction. In both we find the same combina- 
tion of a force of genius, able to create in the great mass 
of the citizens enthusiasm for the loftiest tasks, with a 
sober rationality, invariably intent upon facts, and follow- 
ing practical points of view, such as could not but become 
evident to any one willing to look upon the matter impar- 
tially. Both had, the one as a nobleman, the other as a 
member of the upper burgher-class, an aristocratic ten- 
dency, but were notwithstanding loyal adherents of the 
democracy, and confided in the healthy judgment of the 
citizens ; both had the common people on their side, while 
the rich were their adversaries. With regard to foreign 
affairs, Demosthenes, like Pericles, desired that no war 
should be recklessly begun, yet that a necessary and just 
war should not be evaded in a cowardly spirit, but pro- 
vided for during the time of peace with the utmost circum- 
spection. They were both with an equally lively assurance 
pervaded by a conviction of the mission of Athens to hold 
the primacy in Greece ; and as Pericles acknowledged a 
right belonging to the stronger, which in the interest of 
the nation must hold together even the unwilling among 
the confederates, lest the laboriously achieved results 
should melt away again in the hand, — so Demosthenes 

Chap, i v. j Last Struggles for Independence. 471 

also held, that whosoever was striving for a good and just 
object, ought not to remain inactive in the face of hostile 
guile, or damage himself by timid scrupulousness. For 
such a scrupulousness among unscrupulous adversaries he 
considered to be not justice, but cowardice. Lastly, both 
attained to the highest goal of a republican statesman, in 
being enabled to take into their hands, as the men enjoy- 
ing the full confidence of the community, the direction of 
public affairs. Statesmen who lack personal greatness are 
only able to maintain such a position by associating them- 
selves with subordinate creatures who follow them from 
merely selfish motives of interest; it was thus that the 
party-rule of Aristophon (p. 112) arose, and the yet worse 
system of cliques under Eubulus. But Demosthenes, like 
Pericles, brought it to pass, that for a time his will alone 
determined the action of the State. Hereby the system 
of democratic equality was seemingly abolished, but not 
really so, because the powers conferred upon him were 
conferred vo^ntarily and constitutionally. We are rather 
justified in designating it as the greatest advantage pos- 
sessed by the democracy, that it provided the possibility 
of at any time summoning the most efficient citizen to the 
helm of the State ; and experience teaches, that Greek 
republics were never more vigorous and more covered 
with glory, than when their citizens with perfect conviction 
gave themselves up to one man, in whom they recognized 
the representative of their highest interests, as the The- 
bans did in Epaminondas, and the Tarentines in Archytas.* 
Such phases of affairs, in which the civic community 
temporarily renounces the exercise of its authority, cannot 
of their nature be enduring. And if Pericles conducted 
the personal system of government with better fortune and 

* Distinction between public and private law: Dem. xv. 28; cf. Jacobs, 
Staatsreden, 146. Archytas was, like Pericles and Epaminondas, head of the 
community by a prolongation of the strategy. Diog. Lairt. viii. 79. The best 
result of democracy is the apxh rov rrpwrov ardpos. 

472 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

with far greater results, the cause lies in the incomparably 
more favorable circumstances of his times. He had still 
an admirably armed city, a civic community sound at the 
core, efficient in war and patriotic ; while the civic com- 
munity of Demosthenes disliked arms and was feeble of 
heart. " The hero-maiden of Marathon had/' as the 
scoffer Demades said, " become an old gammer who com- 
fortably swallows her mess of barley-soup, and slinks 
about in slippers." Athens in those days wore the aspect 
of a colony like Tarentum, of an effeminate industrial and 
commercial city, where the citizens sought as much as 
possible to escape from the demands of the commonwealth, 
and let mercenaries fight on their behalf. Although far 
worse troubles of war were imminent than in the times of 
Pericles, the walls were allowed to fall into decay, and 
the navy to go to ruin, in order that the number of festi- 
vals and sacrificial banquets might be continually in- 
creased. The supreme authority enjoyed by money, and 
the selfish party-power of the capitalists, likewise perfectly 
remind us of the condition of things in mercantile cities 
beyond the seas. In this respect the task of Demosthenes 
was far more arduous, and his merit incomparably greater. 
Moreover he, the plain citizen, was more unpretentious 
than Pericles, freer from personal ambition, severer and 
purer in his choice of means. He employed no demagogic 
party expedients ; for it is unjustifiable to interpret in this 
sense the gifts and voluntary contributions by which he 
attested his patriotism ; and although on occasion he com- 
bined with unworthy personages, with such a man as 
Timarchus, yet he did it before the eyes of the public, and 
only for definite purposes. And, indeed, he also at- 
tempted to amend with a vigorous hand such institutions 
of the Periclean Athens as we must acknowledge to have 
been pernicious abuses ; and above all he sought to enno- 
ble the evil system of distributions of money, by desiring 
them to be regarded as a compensation paid for the ser- 

chap, iv.] jr^j Struggles for Independence, 473 

vices given to the State, and by requiring a counter 
service on the part of the receiver.* 

On the other hand, Demosthenes had neither so many- 
sided a natural endowment, nor, in consequence of the 
pettier character of the relations of life among which he 
had grown up, so happy a development as Pericles. He 
lacked the inborn dignity, the lofty calm, and the blended 
self-control and self-confidence of the " Olympian ; " but 
above all he lacked the military training and the talent 
of generalship, which, combined with the qualities of a 
statesman, made Pericles so great and so impossible to re- 
place. Notwithstanding his toughness and manly power 
of endurance, the natural temperament of Demosthenes 
was uncommonly excited and irritable, vehement and pas- 
sionate; and the more exclusively that he had in his 
efforts to rely upon the orators' tribune, the more too did 
its influence assert itself upon his character. He returns 
vituperation for vituperation ; he employs all and any 
means for rendering his opponents contemptible; he 
proved unable to preserve himself free from the spirit of 
rhetoric, and allows his acumen to tempt him even into 
quibbles. Demosthenes was without Pericles , knowledge 
of the world and of mankind ; he was an idealist, and in 
dangerous times over-estimated the effect of moral forces. 
And yet it was precisely in this that he showed himself a 
Hellene of the noblest kind. For it is precise- E ... 
ly this moral conception of civic duty which polities, 
gives to Greek politics their peculiar warmth, and to 
Greek statesmen their transcendent dignity. Every de- 
mand made by Demosthenes upon the community is of an 
ethical character ; every civic duty upon which he insists 
is a matter of conscience ; and the loftiest task of the 

* Demades, Fragm. 7. Demetriusirepl epixrivelas, § 282, according to Cobet'a 

emendation : iroktv ov rr]v cnl twc npoyovuiv •rijv Mapa9njv6p.a)(ov, aAA& ypai/9 
aavSdkia viroSeHenivriv <cai nTi<ravr)v po<pu<rav. Cf. Th. Gompertz, Demosthenes^ 
1804, 29 seq 

474 History of Greece. t BoOK vlL 

statesman he finds in being an example of civic virtue. 
Demosthenes passed without reproach through all tempta- 
tions, and allowed neither friend nor foe to drive him to 
any unworthy step. When the citizens demanded from 
him that he should prefer an indictment against an un- 
popular personage, he declared to them that they would 
find in him a counsellor, even when they had no wish for 
it, but an informer never, even if they desired it. Thus 
again the civic community was as a body to be careful of 
its reputation ; he stimulated the sense of honor in the 
citizens, and sought to awaken in them the conviction, 
that fair fame was better than money and lands. His en- 
tire view of democracy was to the effect that it could only 
be based upon pure patriotism and loftiness of sentiment. 
He demands gratitude towards the great men of the city 
and reverence for the laws handed down ; " w T hosoever 
recklessly introduces changes into them is worse than a 
murderer." As against the foreign enemy also, who does 
wrong, he credits the consciousness of honesty with a 
strength which gives victory to the arms of those who 
possess it ; while, on the other hand, it is a religious and 
moral scruple which prevents him from vigorously urging 
the alliance with the Phocians. All the most important 
questions are settled, not by considerations of statesmanship, 
but by the voice of conscience. The defence of indepen- 
dence is an absolute duty, a moral necessity, which must not 
be allowed to be determined by the consideration of success. 

Demos- ^ u ^ was no ^ ^ ne c ^ earness of the political 

thenesand judgment of Demosthenes disturbed by this 

Isocrates. Jo j 

way of regarding things ? Was not his treat- 
ment of the Macedonian question from the outset a one- 
sided policy of mere sentiment ; and was not Isocrates after 
all in the right, when he disapproved of the perverse re- 
sistance offered to Philip, and required of the Athenians 
that they should recognize in the enemy their friend and 
the benefactor of Greece ? 

Chap, iv.] £ as £ Struggles for Independence. 475 

Superficially regarded, the course of events seems to 
favor the view that Isocrates was in the right as a politi- 
cian ; and yet undoubtedly far too much honor would be 
done to him, were his bearing to be commended at the 
expense of Demosthenes, and were a deeper penetration 
into the significance of the times, or a prophetic insight 
into the course of history, to be ascribed to him. Isocrates 
was not swayed by a confidence in Philip and the Mace- 
donian State, based upon superior knowledge, but by 
a feeling of mistrust with reference to his city, by a 
spiritlesss renunciation of its own history, which he at all 
times failed justly to appreciate, by indifference towards the 
highest possessions of the city. Isocrates was altogether 
unacquainted with the real Philip ; he was only anxious 
for a man who should with a vigorous hand unite the 
Greeks and stay the evils of democracy; for this reason he 
transferred his hopes from the one to the other, and, sitting 
among his books, idealized to himself the Macedonian 
king, so that he corresponded to the image of a magnani- 
mous friend of the Greeks, which Isocrates had sketched 
out for himself in imagination. It was at bottom a craven 
optimism, which took pleasure in agreeable self-delusion, 
and which refused to perceive whatsoever contradicted its 
wishes and expectations. In the end, it is stated, Isocrates 
recognized his mistake ; and the eyes of the old man — he 
was ninety-eight years of age — are said to have been 
suddenly opened to the real intentions of the king by the 
battle of Chseronea, so that a few days after the battle he 
voluntarily ended his life by starvation. It is, however, 
unintelligible, why the final conflict should have made 
him cease to put trust in Philip. For the blood shed 
in it the king could not be held responsible ; and however 
deeply Isocrates must have lamented the struggle, which 
had been urged on by a policy disapproved of by himself, 
yet every obstacle had been now removed ; what he had 
so long desired could now be carried into execution ; and 

476 History of Greece. t BooK VIL 

he could himself by virtue of his high authority vigo- 
rously co-operate to that end. But Isocrates saw his native 
city not discouraged after the defeat, he saw it rather 
arming for a last struggle of despair, which, as must have 
seemed certain, could not fail to drive the king also to 
measures of ruthless hostility. Under the impression 
created by these armaments, and by the decrees of Hype- 
rides, it is very possible that Isocrates arrived at his reso- 
lution, in order to escape the conflict of positions in which 
he would necessarily have been inevitably involved in the 
event of a fight for the walls of his native city, — as an 
Attic patriot and as a friend of Philip.* 

Demos- Doubtless Demosthenes under-estimated the 

Km n -Phm P ower of Philip, and allowed himself to be 
deceived as to the vital powers of Macedonia 
by comparing it to other foreign empires (p. 419). But 
after the great variety of experiences which the empire 
had undergone up to Philip's reign, and after all the acts 
of violence which had united the most diverse populations 
into a variegated whole, it was very natural that no power 
of endurance should be attributed to such a government, 
and that it should not be regarded as a power to which 
an immutable destiny forced all neighbor-states to sur- 
render. The entire cohesion of the empire seemed to de- 
pend upon one man, who exposed himself personally with 
foolhardy daring ; of his successor a very slighting 
opinion was entertained. How, then, can we wonder that 
a good Athenian should have deemed the independence 
of his native city and Hellenic liberty to rest upon far 
surer foundations than the young barbarian empire, the 
result of a rapid succession of conquests ? And was it in 

* The statements as to the death of Isocrates (Dionysius; Isseus; Paus. i. 
18, 8 ; Lucian. Ma*p6/3ioi 23, and the Biographies) will not admit of being 
invalidated by the doubtful authority of the Third Epistle, as Blass would 
have it, Rhein. Mus. xx. 109 seq. But he is right in considering the usual 
conception of the motives of the suicide unintelligible. Perhaps the expl» 
nation suggested in the text may be more self-evident. 

chap, iv.j ^a^ Struggles for Independence. 477 

truth so foolish to hope for success ? Since it was treason 
alone which caused such cities as Olynthus to fall, it 
might well be hoped, that if the citizens of Athens re- 
mained united, the power of Philip would be wrecked 
upon her walls. There was reason to hope that during 
the conflict the generous spirit of the citizens would gain 
strength, and that the common danger would bring to 
pass a new League among the Hellenes ; that the Great 
King too would remain true to the course of policy which 
he had begun in the case of Perinthus, and would send 
money and ships. The disastrous results of the Social 
War might be made good again> and by her once more 
coming forward to fight in the front for the liberty of the 
fatherland, a new hegemony of Athens might be estab- 
lished. A happy beginning having been made, and the 
most inflexible opposition on the part of an ancient 
jealousy having been overcome, it would have been un- 
worthy pusillanimity to despair of one's own people. 

The petty states, which had always required some power 
to lean upon, might join Philip, without making any real 
sacrifice, since the ancient contrast between Hellenes and 
barbarians had long lost its keenness, as had the aversion 
of Greek republics from royal dominion. Accordingly, 
Polybius comes forward on behalf of his fellow-country- 
men, and defends the Peloponnesian statesmen whom 
Demosthenes regarded as guilty of treason against the 
nation. They acted, says Polybius, with intelligence and 
patriotism ; through the instrumentality of Philip they 
brought it to pass that they were avenged upon Sparta, 
that they obtained perfect safety and an enlarge- 
ment of their territory, without having in return to admit 
Macedonian garrisons, or to alter their constitutions. In 
other words, Polybius ascribes to them the right, and in a 
certain sense the duty, of preferring their separate inter- 
ests to aught else, while the object of the efforts of Demos- 
thenes was, that all the civic communities of Greece 

478 History of Greece. [BookVIL 

should feel themselves to be one united body, and should 
defend their liberty in common.* 

While the cantonal policy of the Peloponnesians finds 
an excuse in the impotence of the petty states, which had 
for centuries pursued no other interest beyond that of pre- 
serving to themselves their narrow separate existence, the 
case was quite different with Athens. It was the mission 
of Athens to prove herself the hearth of Hellenic feeling, 
and to give to the others an example of patriotism ; 
Athens would break with her past and deny her entira 
history, if she purchased peace by surrendering her inde- 
pendence to a foreign king. 

Or was Philip perchance a prince with whom an agree- 
ment was possible, in which the honor of the city was safe- 
guarded ? Isocrates believed in such a possibility. But 
how could the personal individuality of the king, which 
even the pupil of Isocrates, Theopompus, judged so con- 
temptuously, awaken confidence, so that a Greek states- 
man of patriotic sentiments might have lent himself to the 
thought of voluntarily placing the destinies of his native 
city in Philip's hands ? Demosthenes and his friends could 
not find in the camp of the king aught but a policy of 
mendacity and falsehood, dynastic ambition and measure- 
less lust of dominion. They could not but regard his 
Philhellenism as a mask ; for with him everything was 
means to his end. How could they hopefully anticipate a 
future for Greece from association with his empire ? No- 
where was any sense for the encouragement of the inter- 
ests of the people displayed by him ; the countries were to 
him nothing but sources of money aud districts for the 
levy of troops. Everywhere he favored the lowest ten- 
dencies ; permitted himself a vile abuse of Hellenic tradi- 
tions ; diligently fostered the most narrow-hearted selfish- 
ness in the individual states ; promoted discord among 

* Polyb. xvii. 14. As to his view, cf. Orelli in Index ltd.. Zurich 1834 (Led 
Potybianoe), p. 12. 

chap, iv.] j^^i Struggles for Independence 479 

neighbors ; and best liked to pursue his aims by bribery. 
The worst men in the nation were his friends, and whoso- 
ever entered his circle was as it were seized by an evil 
spirit. How, then, could the establishment of any closer 
connexions with the Macedonian empire be regarded in 
any other light than as the worst of calamities? Could 
the subordination to this king at the head of his hosts, 
with his lust of conquest, lead to any consequence but the 
promotion of the restless quest of adventure which had 
been the fatality of Hellas since the days of the younger 
Cyrus, — to anything but a demoralizing adulation of 
princes, and an infection by barbarian manners and cus- 
toms which would seize upon the entire life of the 

An amicable agreement with Philip, an acceptable mid- 
dle course, could not therefore appear possible. The 
choice lay between two alternatives, — liberty or slavery, 
the preservation or the downfall of the nation. The State 
was in the eyes of the Greeks not like unto a house, in 
which a nation finds a lodging, so that, when the old dwell- 
ing-place falls out of repair, it is possible to migrate to 
another. On the contrary, the State was the image of 
their intellectual being, the perfect expression of their 
moral consciousness, the visible form of personal individu- 
ality shaped from within and necessarily such as it was, 
into which the several communities had developed them- 
selves in the course of history ; and the more abundant 
this development, the more sensitive was the consciousness 
of the communities as against any change imposed upon 
them from without. The petty states might console them- 
selves with the prospect of municipal independence ; not 
so Athens. Moreover, even the outward conditions of ex- 
istence seemed to be in danger. For in this point Demos- 
thenes and his friends probably judged the king incorrect- 
ly, that they suspected him of entertaining designs against 
Athens similar to those which he had executed against 

480 History of Greece. [BookVU 

Olynthus and Phocis ; they could not believe otherwise 
than that he must hate Athens most, and they failed to 
see what political motives necessarily induced him to 
treat her considerately. The king had not spared men- 
aces ; and thus it is intelligible, how the Attic patriots 
pictured to themselves the fate of Athens as far more ter- 
rible than that which in reality awaited her, and were 
thereby stimulated to the utmost exertions in their la- 

Theiude- *^ ne s ^ ru gg^ e against Philip was, therefore, 
™ steriif on no P erverse fancy on the part of Demosthenes, 
Demos- no blind obstinacy, but a moral necessity. 

thenes. J ' ■» 

There existed no other standard of action, be- 
sides the law of honor and the sworn civic duty of defend- 
ing city and country to the last breath. Had Athens 
been victorious in her resistance, Demosthenes would 
beyond all doubt have been placed on a level with the 
greatest heroes of the nation; but the failure of the 
struggle has, both in ancient and in modern times, deprived 
him of the recognition which was his due. Polybius 
judges him according to the standpoint of his age ; he is 
unjust, because he considers the resistance offered by 
Demosthenes not less unreasonable than the rising of the 
Achseans against Rome ; because he failed to perceive the 
difference between the Greeks of his own times and the 
contemporaries of Demosthenes and Lycurgus, and equally 
so the difference between Philip's military sovereignty and 
the world-encompassing Power of Rome. Demosthenes 
himself, even after the fatal day of Chseronea, did not re- 
pent of his policy ; he looked back upon his labors with a 
good conscience, and could tell his fellow-citizens, that 
with a view to their fair fame, to their ancestors, and to 
the verdict of coming generations, they could not have 
acted otherwise, even though the issue of the struggle had 
been manifest to them beforehand ; to act according to 
the demands of duty was, he declared, the business of 

chap, iv.] £as£ Struggles for Independence. 481 

human beings, while success or failure lay in the hands 
of the gods.* 

With excellent reason Demosthenes takes exception to 
being held responsible for the result, and to his administra- 
tion of the State being judged accordingly. The regulta 
And yet, who can dare to assert that it was a jjj Athen? icy 
failure, and devoid of result? He achieved 
the highest success to which it is possible for a statesman 
to attain ; by his speeches, by his legislation, and by his 
personal example, he overcame the self-love, the craven 
indolence, and all the evil inclinations of his fellow-citi- 
zens ; instead of creating in them a transitory excitement, 
he animated anew the extinguished powers of the Athe- 
nians, revived their nobler consciousness, and restored 
them to themselves. The length of time for which this 
regeneration would endure it was not in his power to esti- 
mate ; and in the life of the Greek free states we are least 
of all justified in measuring the deserts of statesmen ac- 
cording to the period of time during which their efforts 
took effect. In any case, he preserved Athens from a 
downfall which would have given the lie to her history. 
For while filled with the deepest grief by the bloody de~ 
feat, he could yet say with just pride : " The city has re- 
mained unvanquished," — because so long as it followed 
him, it rejected all Philip's attempts at corruption. It 
was his example, from which even in the ensuing period 
the better kind of Athenians derived strength for uphold- 
ing the dignity of the city to the best of their ability. 
Such a gain would not have been too dearly bought even 
by the heaviest sacrifices. But neither was the outward 
fate of Athens aggravated by Demosthenes, any more than 
the opposite policy brought advantage to the other states. 
The Thessalians and the neighboring tribes, who, seduced 
by delusive promises, first introduced Philip into the a£ 

* Dem. xviii. 199. 


482 History of Greece. t Bo °* vu 

fairs of Greece, and who became his helpers in her subju- 
gation, were those who lost their independence first, and 
who lost it most completely. The other states de- 
clined to be used as supporters by Philip ; but they let 
him take his own course, and pay them for their neutrali- 
ty by a variety of small advantages. Such was the course 
pursued by Arcadians, Messenians, Argives, and Eleans. 
They too derived no blessing from their conduct ; they 
were made safe as against Sparta, but in return they were 
by the partisans of Philip reduced to a far more oppres- 
sive condition of dependence and to absolute impotence. 
Athens is the single State which caused real difficulties 
and dangers to the king. But the motives which had al- 
ready previously determined him to try every method of 
gaining over the Athenians by gentleness, were even more 
powerful after the battle of Chseronea than before it. 
Athens had in the eyes of the civilized world once more 
proved herself to be the foremost city of the Hellenes, the 
heart of Greece. Philip was in his own interest bound to 
be more than ever intent upon sparing her, and upon 
guarding himself against any abuse of his victory. For 
this reason Demosthenes was, eight years after the battle 
of Chseronea, able to ask his fellow-citizens, whether even 
the bitterest opponent of his policy could now persist in 
wishing that Athens might have stood on the side of the 
Thessalians or the Peloponnesians, who had without ex- 
ception fared worse than the Athenians ? * 

The Hei- Demosthenes was the representative of a 

le f n ph?u liey P ast a £ e * ^" e st ^ f° un( l sympathy and con- 
fidence ready to meet him, but no enduring 
determination ; he was still able to gather round him men 
who shared his sentiments ; but the number of the faithful 
was small even in Athens, and outside Athens it was pre* 

* Dem. xviii. 64. 

chap, iv.] j^j Struggles for Independence. 483 

cisely in the most populous districts of Greek inhabitants 
that his efforts met with least opposition. " If," he said, 
" according as I have here stood at my post, so in every 
Hellenic town there had been only a single person, or 
rather if Thessaly or if Arcadia had only possessed one 
man whose sentiments were the same as mine, — the Hel- 
lenes would have remained free and independent both 
inside and outside Thermopylae." 

That which gave the victory to Philip was therefore the 
fact, that the strength of the people had come to be re- 
laxed. No moral forces of resistance had survived ; and 
for this reason the immense advantages which Philip had 
had on his side could not but determine the result ; the 
standing army could not but gain the victory over the 
civic militias, the one consolidated empire-state over the 
loosely-knit confederacies, the monarchy over the republics. 
Notwithstanding this absolute superiority, we find the 
victor not dealing with the vanquished according to his 
own arbitrary choice; on the contrary, he follows their 
native traditions with the utmost precision, and, instead 
of with a rough hand slitting the threads of the develop- 
ment of the national history, he carefully takes them up 
again. The ideas which the Macedonian appropriates to 
himself are one and all Hellenic. 

Thus it was a usage of primitive antiquity among the 
Hellenes, that those tribes and states which sought to ac- 
quire a power of primacy, established a connexion with 
the national sanctuaries, took these under their protection, 
and, by offering voluntary homage to them, gained them 
over to their own interests. It was thus that Polycrates 
and Pisistratus acted towards Delos, and the Lacedaemo- 
nians towards Olympia. But the highest importance of 
all attached to Delphi. Upon their connexion with 
Delphi was founded the significance which the Dorians 
acquired for the history of Greece. Athens, Sparta, 
Thebes (vol. iv. p. 427) at different times sought to attach 

484 History of Greece. ibookVU. 

themselves to Delphi ; after them, Iason of Pherse (vol. iv. 
p. 470)o Into the same course of policy Philip entered, 
taking his seat at the " common hearth " of the Hellenes, 
and thus, as it were, becoming the master of the house in 
Hellas and acquiring a title to be the spokesman of the 
national interests. 

In his measures in Peloponnesus he recurred to the dis- 
tribution of territory, which was said to have taken place 
on the occasion of the immigration of the Heraclidse. The 
new Hellenic League against Persia was concluded on the 
Isthmus in remembrance of the League of Corinth in the 
times of Themistocles ; and the entire conception of the 
Persian War as a national duty was of course an idea of 
the Cimonic age. In his humiliation of Sparta, Philip 
carried out that for which Athens and Thebes had striven ; 
while he engaged in a Spartan line of policy, when he fol- 
lowed the precedent of Lysander in shaking at its base 
the power of resistance in the states by means of his par- 
tisans, and in placing the vanquished under Boards of Ten 
(p. 341) ; and again, when, in accordance with the exam- 
ple of the Peace of Antalcidas, he broke up Bceotia and 
proclaimed the autonomy of its country towns. In 
Thessaly he recurred to the institutions of the Aleuadse. 
Thus it is a sheer series of reminiscences from Greek 
history which reveals itself in the several measures of the 

But the entire position assumed by him towards the 
Greeks likewise follows their ancient traditions. For 
among all the forms under which Greek forces of popula- 
tion were united for common efforts, none had proved 
more effective than that of the Hegemony. The direction 
of a smaller or larger group of states in its foreign affairs, 
by a primary State called to the task by virtue of its su- 
perior power, was, since the Heroic age, accounted the 
institution most thoroughly in accordance with the spirit 
of the Greek nation, and alone capable of forming a§ 

Chap, iv.] £ as £ Struggles for Independence. 485 

against all foreign powers, without prejudice to home inde* 
pendence, an authority, which corresponded to the national 
ambition and to the desire for security of intercourse and 
traffic. It is true, that no permanent creation was ever 
successfully accomplished, but the striving after the hono- 
rary right of the Hegemony became the most potent im- 
pulse towards the development of strength ; it constitutes 
the most essential contents of Greek history; it conducted 
the Spartans, the Athenians, and the Thebans successively 
to the height of their fame. By confining, then, his royal 
government to the lands of his empire proper, while among 
the Hellenes he desired to be nothing more than the chosen 
general for the conduct of a national war, Philip in the 
main point likewise followed tradition, and merely as- 
sumed the vacant post of the hegemony whom the nation 
could not spare. 

Thus the foreign military sovereign clothed Rg inner 
his entire policy in forms which he borrowed untruthfui- 

* J ness. 

from the vanquished people. But they were 
in truth nothing more than forms. He applied them with 
great sagacity, in order to appease the Hellenes, in order 
to have their resources more promptly at his disposal, and 
in order himself to be regarded as a thorough Hellene. 
But the small respect which at bottom he entertained for 
that which was most sacred in the eyes of the Greeks was 
shown by his destruction of the Greek cities in Thraca 
and Phocis. If, therefore, already in the associations of 
states under Sparta and Athens there was many an ele« 
ment of untruth, inasmuch as the actual relations received 
specious names, which failed actually to correspond to that 
upon which they were bestowed, the inner untruth was in 
his case yet far greater. The common compacts were 
royal ordinances, the confederates were vassals, the na- 
tional war, for which the nation was summoned under 
arms, as if eager to rush to the satisfaction of its warliko 
cravings, was at the tim